

Next Steps in Arms Control: Restoring Consensus on U.S. Nuclear Policy

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
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Continuity and Consensus After New START

- ❑ **Competing Prague visions: eventual Road to Zero, but need deterrence for the indefinite future**
- ❑ **Road to Zero is a vision, but not an end in itself: strategic force reductions must be judged as a means to the end of national security.**
- ❑ **The New START debate was a catalyst to renew attention to the nuclear enterprise and helped pave the way forward for a shared, bipartisan understanding of a sustainable nuclear deterrent.**
- ❑ **A grand bargain: delivery vehicle & stockpile modernization in tandem with cuts.**
- ❑ **❑ But now, all this stands in jeopardy.**

No Shortage of Documentation

- 2001 NPR: New Triad, responsive infrastructure
- Taiwan ('06), Barksdale ('07)
- 2007 Defense Science Board Report ("Chiles Report")
- 2008 DoD Task Force ("Schlesinger Report")
- 2008 DoD/DoE: *National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century*
- 2008 Gates Carnegie speech
- 2009 Strategic Posture Commission Report
- 2010 NPR
- 2010 SSMP Report



The Grand Bargain

- Apr 2010: New START signed
- May 2010: SSMP report; 1251 Report
- Nov 2010: 1251 Report Update: “Given the extremely tight budget environment...these requests to the Congress demonstrate the priority the Administration places on...the deterrent”
- Dec 2010: Presidential commitments
 - \$7.1 B in FY10, \$7.6 B in FY12
 - \$189 billion for nuclear weapons activities and delivery vehicles over the next decade.
 - Avoid further BMD limits
- Dec 2010: Senate approves New START, with certain provisions in Resolution of Ratification


Next Steps

- **Tom Donilon, Mar 29, 2011**
 - DoD “will review our strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile...”
- **Rose Gottemoeller, Apr 2010**
 - New START “setting the stage for further arms reductions.”
- **Gary Samore, May 2011 *Arms Control Today***
 - Dyad vs. Triad; “some unilateral steps that the US could take”
 - De-alerting
- **Ellen Tauscher, Jul 1, 2011**
 - “As we undertake deeper reductions, we have a responsibility to hedge against geopolitical or technological surprise.”
- **Possible single ceiling for stockpiles, perhaps sublimits**
- ☐ **Should pursue transparency, disclosure**

Concerns about Deeper Reductions

- Nonproliferation: friends and allies may doubt extended deterrent commitments
- Nonproliferation: potential adversaries may be emboldened
- Credibility: Reduce robust and flexible options available to President
- Strategy: counter-force vs counter-population strategies, de-alerting
- □The next “concrete step” in arms control is to sustain the New START bargain and implement modernization. Deeper reductions can follow later.
- □But sequestration/budget imperil this way forward.

Delivery Platform Service Lives



The Post-New START Environment: House-passed FY12 NDAA

- **Links progress of New START implementation to progress in modernization**
- **New annual “1251” report**
- **Hedge force reductions tied to responsive infrastructure: progress on CMRR, UPF, LEPs**
- **Counterforce strategy, deterrence review**
- **Future reductions with Congressional approval (either by treaty or ordinary statutory authority)**
- **Non-strategics in Europe**
- **Report on delivery systems**
- **Senate NDAA**

Non-Deployed Hedge Force

- **Certain underlying facts remain unchanged:**
 - **Relationship between the potential for hedge reductions and a responsive infrastructure**
 - **Hedging against geopolitical and technical uncertainties.**
 - **1994, 2001, 2010 NPRs**
- **Perry: Prague speech “in a sense, the most recent formulation of the ‘lead but hedge’ policy”**
- **In the absence of a responsive infrastructure, changing hedging rationales to justify deeper cuts may upset domestic/allied consensus**

Looking for a Path Forward

- Stay the modernization course, make progress before additional cuts
- Caution on changing deterrence philosophy
- Focus on stability & capabilities, not numbers or Zero
- Avoid BMD/CPGS linkage
- Protect delivery system flexibility and resilience
- Avoid repeats of old “new” foodfights
 - RRW, RNEP, B-61, the 3 Rs (refurbish/reuse/replace)
- Less is more: smaller yields, smaller numbers
- CTBT easier with modernization than without
- Transparency
- □ Failure to fund modernization, especially if dyad or deeper reductions continue, would harm way forward

If You Want Reductions, Prepare for a Sustainable Deterrent

- **Creating a sustainable, robust, and credible nuclear deterrent is the best way to defuse opposition to reductions and restore consensus**
 - The road to zero is not the Autobahn.
 - For “indefinite future”
 - For both ourselves, and for our allies
 - Supports rather than undermines nonproliferation
 - Both stockpile & delivery systems
 - Flexible, resilient, second to none, tailored to holding at risk whatever potential adversaries may value
- **Neither easy nor inexpensive**
 - What price continuity, consensus, deterrence?