

THE DUMA-SENATE LOGJAM REVISITED:

ACTIONS & REACTIONS IN RUSSIAN TREATY RATIFICATION DEBATES

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“THE DUMA-SENATE LOGJAM ON ARMS CONTROL: WHAT CAN BE DONE?”

- George Bunn and John B. Rhinelanders article from the Autumn 1997 issue of THE NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW argued:
 - Post-Cold War arms control and nonproliferation agenda (START II and III, CTBT, ABM Treaty) is in danger
 - It's difficult to obtain legislative consent for treaties because legislators in Washington and Moscow are:
 - Focused more on domestic problems than international relations
 - Suspicious of one another's intentions, have a nationalistic attitude toward arms control
 - Exercising independence from executive
 - U.S. and Russia should do arms control by other means (that don't require ratification)
- THE FOCUS OF THIS PRESENTATION:
 - Duma political dynamics and themes of debates during treaty passage



LDPR leader starts a fight in the Duma

ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN RUSSIA'S ARMS CONTROL POLICY MAKING

- Federal Assembly plays an important role in treaty ratification:

- Ratification requires a majority vote in State Duma, followed by a majority vote in Federation Council
- Foreign affairs committee chairmen shepherd treaties
- Legislature oversees executive nuclear policy making



Putin in the Duma

- The cohesion between the executive and legislative branches on arms control is a recent trend
- Legislative politics have centralized during Putin presidency:
 - United Russia holds the majority of Duma seats
 - Communists (KPRF) and Ultra-Nationalists (LDPR) are “in opposition”
 - There are questions about United Russia’s future, discussions about emergence of other parties



“United party of crooks & thieves” (kprf.ru)

STATE DUMA ELECTION RESULTS*

	Party/ Coalition	2007	2003	1999	1995	1993
	United Russia/ Unity + Fatherland All Russia	315	220	73+66	-	-
	Communist Party of RF (KPRF)	57	52	113	157	42
	LDPR	40	36	17	51	64
	Fair Russia/ Rodina	38	37	-	-	
	Yabloko	-	4	20	45	27
	Agrarian	-	2	-	20	37
	Union of Right Forces/ Russia's Choice	-	3	29	9	64
	Women of Russia	-	-	-	3	21

*Total seats (source: Wiki), does not show December 2011 election results

TREATY PASSAGE STATS

TREATY	TIMELINE*	VOTES**
START II	7+ yrs (Jan '93-Apr '00)	288 Yes 131 No 4A
CTBT	3 yrs, 9 mo (Sep '96-May '00)	298 Yes 74 No 3A
SORT	1 year (May '02-May '03)	294 Yes 134 No 22A
New START	9 mo (Apr '10-Jan '11)	350 Yes 96 No 1 A

*Treaty signing to treaty ratification

** Need 226 votes for treaty passage

CONTENTS OF LEGISLATIVE DEBATES

TREATY	THEMES	OTHER FACTORS
START II	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -ABM Treaty (& theater missile defense) -Modernization of nuclear & conventional forces -Concerns about funding, defense industry health -NATO operations in FRY, expansion to CEE -U.S. nonproliferation sanctions on Russian firms -U.S. strikes in Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Presidential & parliamentary elections -Western criticism of Russian actions in Chechnya
CTBT	-U.S.-Russian relationship	-India & Pakistan tests
SORT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Nuclear forces funding & concerns about cutting newer systems -U.S. upload potential, missile defense 	-Duma vs Federation Council on link to U.S. invasion of Iraq
New START	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Missile defense and prompt global strike -Modernization of Russian strategic nuclear forces 	-U.S. Senate ratification resolution

KEY POINTS OF RESOLUTIONS & DECLARATIONS

START II	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Government to report on nuclear forces (& treaty implementation) -START III by Dec '03, Rus. withdrawal linked to ABM Treaty, TNW in CEE -EOF conditioned on U.S. ratification of 1997 Demarcation Agreement
CTBT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -President to ensure funding of nuclear force development -Concern about U.S. failure to ratify (use "nuclear components" in "destabilizing anti-ballistic missile systems") -Call on other countries to ratify as soon as possible
SORT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Nuclear forces are primary "guarantor" of Russian security -President to report on nuclear force development, treaty implement. -Reaffirm role of legislature in funding nuclear force R&D, procurement -Withdrawal provisions (MD & NW of "other countries," not just U.S.) -Need additional arms control measures; call on U.S. to ratify the CTBT
New START	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -President to adopt nuclear posture program (& report to Duma) -Monitor offense-defense balance (& "other countries") -Discuss new strategic offensive systems in BCC before deployment -List of withdrawal provisions -Address PGS, space-based weapons, missile defense, and conventional imbalance (instead of starting with TNW)

CONCLUSION

- To summarize,
 - Treaty ratification has gotten less challenging (but...)
 - The Duma debates
 - Reflect challenges of U.S.-Russian & NATO-Russian security relationships
- Factors influencing future arms control:
 - Executive-legislative branch cohesion is probably temporary
 - Legislators are listening to and learning from their U.S. counterparts
 - Uncertainty of party politics developments
 - Solid anti-Western bloc with permanent constituencies and supporters
 - Absence of consensus on Russia's identity and foreign policy
 - Nuclear weapons policy is at the center



Legislators ponder national problems