



Strengthening the IAEA: the double track

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Challenges: central role within the non-proliferation regime

- Mandate

- Current IAEA safeguards obligations
 - NPT , regional treaties
 - Bilateral agreements
- Future verification roles
 - PMDA, Article VII. 3
 - Disarmament: discussion on legal basis and potential new verification missions for the IAEA

• Nuclear security

IAEA's unique expertise

- 54 years service
- 2338 professional and support staff from 105 countries
- Safeguards applied in 175 States

'The Agency's safeguards are a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime' 'The Conference emphasizes the important role of IAEA in fostering international cooperation in nuclear security'
(Final document, 2010 NPT Review conference)

Challenges: persistent difficulties

- Legal authority
 - Non universality of the additional protocol
 - No full use of existing legal authority: case of special inspections
 - Ambiguity of existing legal authority: non-compliance
- Proliferation of mechanisms within the regime, complementarities BUT:
 - non cooperation
 - undermining multilateralism
- Institutional aspects
 - Politicization : bipolarization of the Board of governors and the General Conference ; introduction of political items
 - Compartmentalization : need to know vs. need to share
 - Continuity of expertise at stake
- Lack of Resources
 - Budget: 304 million € → 'extraordinary bargain'
 - Problem of extrabudgetary contributions

Strengthening the IAEA

- Objectives:

- Preserving institutional legitimacy, authority and multilateralism
- Ensuring support for a strengthened verification process
- Optimization:
 - Effectiveness: measure of the extent to which the Agency is able to achieve its NP objective
 - Efficiency: measure of the productivity of the Agency, i.e., how well the available resources (staff, equipment, money) are used to fulfil the Agency's part in the implementation of its function

Double track approach

- **Internal level:** Agency's actions
 - internal process (Secretariat)
 - internal process (member States)
- **External level:** Agency's actions
 - external actors
- External actors
 - Agency

IAEA training exercise at the Reactor Hall of the Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant (Mochovce, Nuclear Power Plant, Levice, Slovakia, January 17-21, 2005). Dean Calma/IAEA.

Internal actions (1)

- Enhancing verification
 - Maximizing legal authority: universalization of the additional protocol with IAEA assistance
 - Targeting and tailoring verification
 - Need “to move further away from an approach that is narrow, prescriptive, criteria-driven, and focused at the facility level – to one that is more objectives-driven, customized, and focused at the State level. This makes sense because we need to be guided by objectives rather than procedures: concerned with outcomes rather than processes” *H. Nackaerts, IAEA DDG for Safeguards*
 - Information-driven safeguards; State-level concept
 - Differentiation without discrimination
- Enhancing deterrence
 - Full use of existing authority: special inspection
 - Clarifying existing authority: non-compliance and enforcement process

Internal actions (2)

- Improving institutional practices
 - Within the Secretariat
 - Clearness on the Agency's mission and processes
 - Better communication with States
 - Being clear on what is expected from States
 - Communication of verification results in a timely manner
 - Renewed evaluation process
 - collaborative analysis in safeguards evaluation
 - Secretariat's independence: to what extent do political organs influence the technical work of the Secretariat?
 - Within political organs/ Member States
 - Need for Member States to focus on what falls within the mandate of the Agency.
 - Need to promote a balanced functional approach: support for peaceful uses
 - Provide necessary resources
 - Provide necessary support: national and regional system of accounting for and control of nuclear material

External actions (1)

- Furthering cooperation and communication: external transparency towards:
 - Other verification organizations
 - Sharing best practices and relevant information
 - Avoiding duplication of activities
 - The industry
 - The public : NGOs, think tanks
 - Objectives of the Rules on the consultative status of non-governmental organizations within the IAEA
 - Access to information and meetings while securing confidentiality

External actions (2)

- Engaging other parties and programs within the non-proliferation regime: actions of external players
 - PSI, NSG, 123 agreements, WINS, UN Security Council, etc.
 - Coordinating and central role of the Agency
 - Support to the IAEA's authority
 - Incentives to universalize the additional protocol : condition for supply of E&R technologies, equipments
 - Generic UNSC resolutions in cases of non-compliance
 - Democratization and institutionalization of ad hoc and informal mechanisms? (ICNND recommendations)



Conclusion

- Strengthening the IAEA requires a collaborative approach from all actors involved : technical and political organs of the Agency (including member states), other mechanisms of cooperation within the regime, non-governmental organizations
- Strengthening the IAEA will benefit all actors and will ultimately strengthen the regime itself