

Japan's Nuclear Hedging


Jithin S George
Research Associate
National Maritime Foundation
New Delhi
India

Japan's Nuclear Hedging

Scope:

- Background of Japan's nuclear hedging.
- Possible scenarios for Japan's nuclear hedging.
- Conclusion.

Japan's Paradoxical Nuclear Stance



Keep Japan
protected by the
U.S. nuclear shield



Oppose the
existence of
nuclear weapons



Japan's Nuclear Hedging: Background

- Separate study on atomic weapons program by Imperial Army and Navy.
- Censorship Policy carried by the U.S. occupation forces.
- March 1954 :*Fukuryu Maru* No. 5 incident and realisation of nuclear fallout.

Post 1952

Peace Constitution

Atomic Energy
Basic Law ,1955

Mutual Cooperation
and Security
between U.S.A and
Japan, 1960

- 1964 - China's first nuclear weapon test.

Japan's Nuclear Hedging: Background

Three Non
Nuclear
Principles
(*Hikaku San
Gensoku*), 1967

Non
Introduction

To promote the peaceful use
of nuclear power

Non
Possession

To work toward global nuclear
disarmament

Non
Manufacture

To rely on the extended U.S.
nuclear deterrent

To support the Three Non-
Nuclear Principles

Japan's Nuclear Hedging: Background

- 1968/1970 Internal Report - Secret, non-governmental study on Japan's nuclearisation.
- 1976- Ratification of NPT.

Post Cold War

- 1994 - Another secret study on Japan's nuclearisation.
- 1998 Nuclear shock - India and Pakistan nuclear tests.
Launch of a North Korean Taepo Dong missile over Japan.

Japan's Nuclear Hedging: Possible Scenarios

1. Change in the direction of U.S. foreign and security policy
2. Rising Chinese influence in the Japanese periphery
3. Aggressive North Korean nuclear stance
4. Russian advances in the North
5. Breakdown of the Global Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime
6. Domestic imperatives

Japan's Nuclear Hedging: Conclusion

- Japan's incentives associated with becoming a nuclear state might now outweigh the incentives associated with remaining a non-nuclear power
- Given the preponderance of U.S. conventional and nuclear military presence, Japanese policymakers are **unlikely** to push for an independent nuclear deterrent as long as they remain confident that this deterrent power is conferred on Japan
- Current coalition constraints and consistent opposition by the people can prove Japanese nuclear hedging an **imprudent action**.
- Japan's decision to go nuclear can be seen as an outcome of events which will take place outside Japan.