
Contextualizing and Engaging Russian Nuclear Policy

Alejandro M. Sueldo

**University of California,
Berkeley, School of Law**

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Doctrine & Prestige

- Nuclear weapons remain a key pillar of Russia's national security and global status.
- Fears any devaluation of its strategic forces.
 - New heavy missile.
- Importance distracts from other threats.



Arms Control

- War unrealistic -- interest lie elsewhere.
- Status, parity and transparency vis-à-vis U.S.
- Obsolescence and military-industrial complex.
- Maintain NPT leadership, support global zero, and prevent collapse of strategic arms talks.
- Pillar to engage on other issues: Afghanistan.
- Plan against worst scenario.




Military Reform

- Nukes compensate for conventional military that will remain inferior even after reform.
- Better military likely to *not* result in reduction in role of nuclear weapons.
- NSNF: greater role to deter regional conflicts.
- Developing precision conventional weapons.



Threat Perception

- Contradiction: institutionally, NATO main threat, familiar enemy, but war unlikely.



- Hedging bets on nuclear Iran.
 - Bipolar policy: appease West but maintain constructive ties.



- Why? Seeks to gain economically, 'check' the U.S., and recognizes that much like the West there is little it can do short of a military strike.

China: The Unspoken Threat

- Genuine concern: superior military, and demographic and economic expansion.
- But conflict with China highly unlikely.
- Fears: jump to parity and threaten W. Russia.
- Strategic arms talks not practical at this time.
- China drives much of the uncertainty as to future of Russia's nuclear weapons.




Tactical Nuclear Weapons

- No clear role in 2010 nat'l. security doctrine.
- Seen as hedge to possible Chinese attack.
- But NSNF location and type don't reflect this.
- NSNF provide artificial assurances.
- Cannot be used against China, the U.S. or NATO.
- No military or deterrent value.
- Political not military tool.



Missile Defense

- Test case for U.S./NATO-Russian relations.
- Russia recognizes BMD not a threat because (i) interceptors are too far, short and few; (ii) its arsenal can defeat it; (iii) tech. and econ. factors make national BMD difficult.
- Russian political posturing:
 - fears being sidelined on security.
 - nuclear reaction unrealistic.
 - domestic politics.



BMD: Prospects for Cooperation

- BMD systems incompatible – Rus' unreliable.
- Separate but coordinated BMD systems.
- Means to deal with PAA Phases III and IV.
- First reconcile purpose of cooperative BMD.
- Satisfy R need to be viewed as U.S. partner.
- Technical cooperation to surf ebbs and flows.
- Threat assessment; JDEC; joint exercises.
- Deploy Phase IV in light of Iran's capabilities.

Challenges and Opportunities



- Russia will never completely disarm.
- NSNF Treaty next: define; exchange; verify.
- Progress on CFE would facilitate talks.
- Still room for strategic reductions.
- Hindrance: domestic U.S. and Russian politics.
- Military reform to reduce nuclear dependence.
- Consult and more accommodating: ameliorate suspicion and inclination for penetrating nukes.

Thank You.
Questions and Comments?

