

Paths and Limitations to Universalizing the Additional Protocol



Sarah Poe, MA 2011 Candidate, Monterey Institute of International Studies
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Brief Outline



- ❧ Background of the Additional Protocol (AP or INFCIRC/540)
- ❧ Comparison of the safeguards system
- ❧ Status report
- ❧ Roadblocks
- ❧ Considerations
- ❧ Paths and Limitations
- ❧ Conclusions

CSA, 93+2, and the AP



- ❧ The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and Article III
 - ❧ “...for the exclusive purpose of verification to the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons...”
- ❧ Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), INFCIRC/153, approved by the Board of Governors in 1971
- ❧ Lesson learned: Iraq. Efforts turned to strengthening capabilities, both technical and legal
- ❧ Model AP approved by IAEA Board in 1997 – voluntary

Compare and Contrast



CSA, INFCIRC/153

- ❧ Correctness
- ❧ Quantitative approach
- ❧ Declared facilities
- ❧ Special inspections


AP, INFCIRC/540

- ❧ Completeness
- ❧ Qualitative approach
- ❧ Mines to waste, entire nuclear fuel cycle
- ❧ Complimentary access

Status Report



- ❧ **135 of 151** IAEA member states have signed the AP
- ❧ **106** have ratified
- ❧ Significant Nuclear Activities:
 - ❧ **62** NNWS have significant nuclear activity
 - ❧ **55** of those have signed the AP
 - ❧ **47** with the AP in force



Roadblocks



- ❧ **Iran** – signed in 2003, but not ratified. Application on provisional basis in 2005, now suspended.
- ❧ **Algeria** – draft AP approved by Board in 2004, not yet signed
- ❧ **Argentina, Brazil, DPRK, Egypt, Syria and Venezuela** – not yet begun negotiations of the AP
- ❧ **Brazil, Egypt and Syria** – have explicitly refused implementation

‘What next’ Considerations



- ⌘ Perhaps a static situation?
 - ⌘ Time for an 11+2
- ⌘ Incentivize ratification of the AP
- ⌘ Need to convince states that the AP is a security interest
- ⌘ Address broader security concerns of NNWS
- ⌘ Commitment to disarmament by NWS

Paths



- ❧ Nonproliferation norm could become a nonproliferation obligation
- ❧ Condition of Supply
 - ❧ Nuclear Suppliers Group
 - ❧ GNEP
 - ❧ G8
- ❧ Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone



Mr. Abdulla Abdullatif Abdulla,
Undersecretary, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain and
IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano

Limitations



- ❧ Political polarization, NAM opposition
- ❧ Useful bargaining chip, voluntary
- ❧ Misunderstandings about obligations
- ❧ Difficulty implementing, complicated declaration process, requires further cooperation



Mr. Herman Nackaerts, IAEA Deputy
Director General, Safeguards

Conclusions



- ❧ The IAEA is unable to verify absence of diversion without an Additional Protocol
- ❧ Member states must incentivize others to ratify and assist with implementation
- ❧ The AP is an essential component of the non-proliferation regime
- ❧ Time to revitalize momentum to universalize the AP