

**CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)**

**PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ISSUES (PONI) DEBATES THE ISSUES:
U.S. DECLARATORY POLICY**

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CLARK MURDOCK: I think we're ready to begin. My time up here will be blissfully short. I'm just calling the meeting to order. My name is Clark Murdock. I'm the director here of our Project on Nuclear Issues, PONI, and this is another of our continuing series of debates under the moniker of PONI Debates the Issues. And I would like to turn it over to our research assistant, Chris Jones.

CHRISTOPHER JONES: Thanks, Clark. I'm honored to be here today to introduce the two fine speakers we have for this event. So I'm the David on the stage with two Goliaths. We have, to my left, Keith Payne, who's the CEO and president of the National Institute for Public Policy and to my right, Scott Sagan is the co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.

As you all very well may know, they are the two of the intellectual giants, if you will, in this field, discussing all things nuclear but particularly U.S. declaratory policy and they had a series of articles last fall in *Survival* where Dr. Sagan laid out the case for no first use and then there was a back-and-forth with a number of contributors about the pros and cons of such an approach. And so we hope to build on that, particularly in the context of the recently released Nuclear Posture Review as well as everything that has happened since then.

So for the debate, what we're going to do is each side will just provide a series of opening remarks to the tune of about 15 minutes and then I'll ask a couple questions. And then we'll turn it over to you all so you can ask questions that you have and then provide closing statements from each side and call it a day. So without further ado, Dr. Sagan.

SCOTT SAGAN: Thank you very much. I've been asked to address the question, what should U.S. declaratory strategic deterrence policy be? I continue to believe, as I wrote in my 2009 *Survival* article, that the United States should move, after appropriate consultation with allies, towards a no-first-use declaratory policy by stating that the role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear weapons use by other nuclear weapons states against the United States, our allies and our armed forces, and to be able to respond with an appropriate range of nuclear retaliatory options if necessary in the event that deterrence fails.

I believe the slow and steady movement towards a no-first-use doctrine is in the U.S. interest because I believe U.S. declaratory policy should have three characteristics. It should, A, address the full range of nuclear threats to U.S. and global national security objectives, not just basic deterrence.

It should, B, be accurate and consistent, reflecting actual military doctrine rather than mere rhetoric. And, C, U.S. declaratory policy should reflect what U.S. leaders really want to do in the event that deterrence fails. So in my brief opening remarks, I'll examine these three points and provide the logic and evidence that leads me to the conclusion that the benefits of a no-first-use declaratory policy outweigh its costs.

So point one, deterrence is one but only one critical U.S. national security objective and prudent decisions about declaratory policy should therefore take into account not just its effects on deterrence, but also its effects on reassurance of allies, further proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states, the risk of nuclear terrorism, the impact of our declaratory policy on nuclear doctrines of other nuclear weapons states and the prospects for long-term nuclear disarmament.

In this sense, the CSIS question, what should U.S. declaratory strategic deterrence policy be, is too narrow and focused like previous nuclear posture reviews. It's too narrow in scope and therefore could lead to excessively narrow answers. Historically, there have been many actions and statements made by U.S. leaders in the name of deterrence.

Think of Richard Nixon's madman nuclear alert over Vietnam or George W. Bush's suggestions that all options are on the table include nuclear preventive strikes against Iran, actions that might have added just a smidgen of deterrence strength but could be highly counterproductive with respect to broader U.S. national security goals.

Opponents of this broader conception of what U.S. declaratory doctrine should say claim that there's no evidence that U.S. nuclear posture influences others or the perceptions that we are honoring our Article VI commitment help with nonproliferation goals. I think that view is wrong and let me just give the two most recent examples for the sake of brevity.

First, evidence – the first piece of evidence to support the view is Indonesia's recent decision to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. When Indonesia announced its decision, it said it had taken note of, quote, "the serious effort on the part of the current administration to promote disarmament."

We do feel, at this time, they said, that what is needed is positive encouragement rather than pressure of a different type that we've been trying to impart in the past. And we are cognizant of some positive aspects of the United States Nuclear Posture Review. For evidence that our doctrine influences others, what I've called the mimicry phenomenon, let me cite the case of India.

In January, 2003, the BJP government in New Delhi, influenced by the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review of the time, adopted a revised, more offensive nuclear doctrine, including the explicit threat of Indian nuclear first use in response to chemical or biological weapons used by others. India must consider withdrawing from its no-first-use commitment, one of their officials wrote at the time, as other nuclear weapons states have not accepted this policy.

Although it's too early to know the final result today, the Indian government appears to be contemplating reversing course. A group of very senior former officials have stated recently that it's time to review the objectionable parts of India's nuclear posture and the foreign minister has called for the universal declarations of no first use and negative security assurances.

So that's my point one, broaden the debate. Point two, U.S. strategic nuclear declaratory policy should be consistent with actual U.S. nuclear doctrine. That is, U.S. government officials should not misrepresent what its real nuclear policy is when making public statement about intents and plans. Now, that may seem like an obvious point to some, but history suggests that this principle is not always followed.

From Robert McNamara's mid-1960s declarations about assured destruction, which too often downplayed the heavy counterforce emphasis in U.S. posture at the time, to the Bush administration's February, 2002, statement, in which in the same speech, it said that it reaffirmed the 1995 negative security assurances and at the same time, stated, in the same speech, that if a weapon of mass destruction is used against the United States, we will not rule out any specific type of military response.

This was then followed by the leaking of the classified portion of the 2001 NPR, which reportedly placed Iran, Libya and Syria on the target list, creating a flurry of negative international press reports. Now, in an era in which leaks should be considered highly likely, if not inevitable and a time where we want, for national security reasons, more transparency by other nuclear weapons states, the U.S. government should err on the side of transparency.

With multiple audiences present, ambiguity may sometimes be necessary. But clear contradictions and calculated hypocrisy are rarely helpful. Here, I must give the current administration some credit for it judged that there was a small set of specific threats that could not currently be met by U.S. and allied conventional forces. And it said so clearly and also clearly committed itself to deal with the challenge with its allies.

The United States, and I quote from the NPR, "The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons and deterring non-nuclear attacks with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons."

Now, critics have constantly said, well, this is abandoning extended deterrence and will make it so that our allies feel abandoned. The evidence so far is to the contrary. Take the case of Japan. Foreign Minister Okada said in October, we cannot deny the fact that we're moving in the direction of no first use of nuclear weapons.

And the Japanese 2010 RevCon statements in New York two weeks ago said Japan appreciates and welcomes the Nuclear Posture Review by the United States. We call on all states possessing nuclear weapons to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategy and we call on nuclear weapons states to take, as soon as possible, such measures as providing stronger negative security assurances that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that comply with the NPT.

Point three, U.S. declaratory policy should reflect what the U.S. might really want to do if deterrence fails. Deterrence and declaratory policy should be made with an acute awareness that deterrence might fail and we should not succumb to the common wishful thinking bias that assumes perfect prospects for success.

This leads me to appreciate the wise advice that Brent Scowcroft once gave George H.W. Bush during the first Gulf war, saying that you should avoid spoken or unspoken threats to use them – that is, nuclear weapons – on the grounds that it is bad practice to threaten something that you have no intention to carry out. It is bad practice to threaten something that you have no intention to carry out.

When an official threatens actions that we have no intention of carrying out, it can, I should note, add a thin sliver of deterrence to mix, but at considerable cost. For if the action occurs anyway, the action occurs anyway – our declaratory policy has either cheapened the currency of deterrence or it risks creating a commitment trap leading a government to execute an option that it otherwise would deem ill advised.

Here, I think of Gen. Chilton's recent remarks about using nuclear weapons to deter and respond to cyber attacks as a case in point. Here, I should note, by way of a set of finer remarks, that the Nuclear Posture Review, in an effort to enhance nonproliferation and move slowly in the direction of a nuclear-free world, adds new negative security assurances and threatens only to use conventional options against any non-nuclear weapons state in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation obligations. And it promises that conventional responses will be devastating and that any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders would be held fully accountable.

Now, this has been an issue which Dr. Payne and I have had a vigorous disagreement. He has been critical of the whole goal of nuclear disarmament, despite the U.S. Article VI commitment and has written that the continuing threat posed by chemical and biological weapons is a fatal flaw in the logic of nuclear disarmament narratives, one that is all but ignored by its proponents; and has argued that if all enemies and potential enemies of the United States miraculously gave up its nuclear arsenal, the United States would still need to maintain a nuclear arsenal because of chemical and biological weapons in other states; and favorably quotes the commander of the strategic air force in France as saying that if we gave up nuclear weapons to deter chemical and biological use, that would give a green light, in quotes, "to chemical and biological used by others."

Well, I fail to see how the promise of devastating conventional responses and a promise that any individual responsible for an attack will be held fully accountable is giving a green light. Indeed, I think the argument that any individuals would be held responsible for an attack and devastating conventional responses would occur is a very credible threat, in large part, because it's the threat that we would be very interested in executing if need be.

And here, I would note, finally, one last piece of historical evidence. Dr. Payne and I have gone back and forth on the issue of the 1991 Gulf War because he has argued that this is the one case in which – that demonstrates the unique deterrent capability of nuclear weapons

because he argues that Saddam Hussein was deterred from using chemical weapons by our nuclear threat.

And I believe the preponderance of evidence now suggests that that's not the case. We know that George Bush's letter to Saddam threatened responses if – said the United States would not tolerate the use of chemical, biological weapons or the destruction of Kuwait's oil fields or terrorist activities, two out of three activities occurred, so it's hard to say that nuclear deterrence was unique in that one case.

More importantly, we have Saddam – we have James Baker's memoirs where he not only acknowledges that he purposefully left the impression that chemical or biological use can invite tactical weapons, but he directly warned that our objective, if Iraq used weapons of mass destruction won't be the liberation of Kuwait, but the elimination of the current Iraqi regime.

And lastly, we have Saddam's own statement under interrogation. How would Iraq have been described if it had used chemical weapons? He argues, we would have been called stupid. And he contrasted the case of 1991 to the case of the war with Iran when saying that Iran was threatening the sovereignty – that is, it was threatening Baghdad, the United States was doing exactly the opposite.

So I think you will discover today that reasonable people can certainly disagree about how to value and prioritize different nuclear-related objectives. And reasonable people can and do disagree about how to best pursue them and how to weigh the complicated and always ambiguous evidence that we use to try to support different positions.

But reasonable people should not ignore the full range of U.S. objectives when trying to describe what our deterrent and declaratory policy should be. We should not narrowly conflate deterrence with security. We should continue to search for evidence to support or weaken our arguments and we should engage in rigorous dialogues like this one to help propel the debate forward. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

CHRISTOPHER JONES: Thank you very much. Dr. Payne.

KEITH PAYNE: Thank you, Chris. It's a pleasure to be here today to talk about U.S. declaratory policy. It's a pleasure, in particular, to be in company with Scott Sagan and Clark Murdock. And I'm actually particularly glad to see that Scott reads my work so closely.

Declaratory policy is how the U.S. characterizes its nuclear policies to all audiences, external and internal, including, for the purpose of deterrence. Declaratory policy is not employment policy, that is, how nuclear weapons might actually be used in conflict, nor is it a force-sizing methodology.

Declaratory policy is the public face of U.S. deterrent threats. The Obama administration, in its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, got this declaratory policy right. The NPR maintains a basic continuity with the existing policy of calculated ambiguity and rejects a declaratory policy of no first use.

A no-first-use policy would have meant – would have meant – that the United States would commit publicly not to threaten nuclear escalation in response to non-nuclear attacks, including chemical and biological attacks. Now, the NPR did not do that. In contrast, with calculated ambiguity, the United States generally does not define precise conditions that could lead to U.S. nuclear escalation or the precise character of U.S. nuclear escalation.

Calculated ambiguity leaves open the possibility of U.S. nuclear escalation without being explicit about that possibility. Calculated ambiguity has been basic U.S. policy for decades and it provides several advantages that I think are particularly important.

One, it may provide greater deterrent effect than would otherwise be possible. Two, it helps to preserve U.S. freedom of action as opposed to binding the United States to very specific promises. And three, its flexibility is helpful in an alliance context where there are many competing demands, unanimity is important.

Now, that flexibility is also important in a highly dynamic international environment wherein rigid declarations could be too risky or could undercut deterrence when we desperately want deterrence to work.

In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the possibility for nuclear escalation is retained to help deter a wide spectrum of potential threats including, one, all threats from nuclear weapons including chemical and biological threats, all threats from states not in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

That caveat includes, or captures, North Korea and Iran and compliance, in this case, is to be determined by the United States, not the by the IAEA, which means that the U.S. defines who is and who is not subject to U.S. nuclear threats. And nuclear deterrence – the threat of nuclear escalation remains on the table against biological threats.

Secretary Clinton said, in elaboration of the NPR in public, if biological weapons are used, all bets are off. If you actually track what this series of comments and exclusions and caveats mean, it means that the 2010 NPR retains the threat of nuclear escalation, for deterrence purposes, for virtually all cases of plausible concern.

The NPR tracks, with the traditional approach of calculated ambiguity. It is not explicit about U.S. nuclear threats, but it does not take them off the table, in principle, for most any real threat of concern. Why is calculated ambiguity to be a preferred approach over a no-first-use policy? One reason is that calculated ambiguity seems to be the most effective, practicable approach to deterrence.

You might ask, as Scott does on occasion, why should we care now about deterrence? Isn't deterrence an outdated goal? The answer to that, in short, is not at all. The longer answer is that now and for the foreseeable future, deterrence remains a critical objective for the United States.

For one reason, or there are many reasons, but let me mention one, is that alternatives to deterrence for security are likely to be insufficient on a number of occasions to provide for security. Disarmament, for example, which is sometimes suggested as an alternative to deterrence, certainly is not going to provide the alternative for decades. My personal view is it will never provide that alternative. But you can hold that aside. It's at least not going to provide that alternative for decades.

Preemption: my personal view that strategies of preemption are risky and of questionable effectiveness; warfighting as opposed to deterrence: again, risky, expensive and comes with enormous political costs.

Damage limitation or consequence management – in other words, providing for defense and clean up after an attack has taken place: By and large we're not prepared for this. In the case of sophisticated attacks by weapons of mass destruction we're not prepared and it's very difficult and expensive. We essentially are ill-prepared to protect society against virtually any sort of sophisticated WMD attack.

So as you look for alternatives what you find is that deterrence becomes very important. It remains very important against emerging threats of the post-Cold War era. We need to make it as effective as it can be, as is practicable.

Let me recommend to your reading Martin Shubik's article; appeared in Comparative Strategy, October 1997. It's a bit dated but it's an amazing article. The title is "The Socioeconomics of Death" – sort of a scary title: "The Socioeconomics of Death." What Shubik does, a professor at Yale, he tracks over decades and actually over centuries the ability of small groups of individuals to inflict large numbers of casualties on unprotected civilians.

And what he shows is that there is a jump in the level of orders of magnitude since about the 1950s and '60s. And what he looks at particularly is the potential for biological threats. So what Shubik says is, in the past, small numbers of individuals could only inflict a limited number of casualties. In the future a small number of individuals might be able to inflict large numbers of casualties. And he looked at the potential for biological threats and was very, very concerned.

Our declaratory policy should help deter as many forms of potential attack as is practicable, including chemical and biological weapons and including conventional attacks.

Perhaps my desire to deter conventional attacks sounds old-fashioned. If so, recall that conventional attacks undeterred can lead to massive civilian casualties as can be seen from Caesar's annihilation of several German tribes in 55 B.C. up to the 1937 annihilation of 300,000 Chinese civilians in Nanking.

In 1914 and 1939 there was no nuclear deterrence to prevent this type of horrific destruction and so World War I saw roughly 40 million casualties. World War II saw 50 to 70 million casualties. Which part of the non-nuclear world do you want to go back to? Forty million casualties? Fifty to 70 million casualties that we saw from conventional conflict alone?

Undeterred chemical and biological attacks could now lead to levels of civilian annihilation greater than that experienced in World War I or World War II. U.N. reports, for example, have stated that if Saddam Hussein had used biological weapons in his missile attacks on Israel in 1991 he could have inflicted hundreds of thousands of deaths on unprotected – and even protected – Israeli civilians. Without ever having had to engage the Israeli military he could have inflicted hundreds of thousands of Israeli deaths without ever having to engage the Israeli military.

We should avoid a declaratory policy that makes the world safer for non-nuclear warfare. Hence my conclusion that we should leave nuclear escalation on the table for broad deterrence purposes – as calculated ambiguity does.

Calculated ambiguity is a declaratory policy that helps to facilitate the deterring belief among opponents that if they engage in severe provocations against the United States or its allies there would be the chance of U.S. nuclear escalation. Calculated ambiguity keeps this deterrent threat on the table.

This may be particularly important for the deterrence of chemical or biological attack because the U.S. has no comparable threats to deter such attacks. We've obviously given up chemical and biological weapons. And a conventional-only threat may be insufficient to deter.

Indeed, officials in the Clinton administration said that one of the reasons the United States could sign on for the chemical weapon convention was because we would retain the threat of nuclear escalation for deterrence purposes if chemical weapons happened to be used.

You know, the great strategist Bernard Brodie once said, "If we are not going to use nuclear weapons, at least we should be smart enough to shut up about it." Brodie was not advocating nuclear employment. He was advocating a declaratory policy that maintains the deterring threat of nuclear escalation. This means keeping the U.S. nuclear escalation threat on the table without necessarily being specific about it.

Calculated ambiguity does so; a no-first-use policy explicitly would not vis-à-vis chemical and biological threats.

Effective deterrence may prevent attacks that otherwise would occur. And, as such, it's a priceless commodity. It may be particularly crucial to prevent chemical and biological attacks because either could lead to catastrophic casualties among undefended civilians.

This isn't a game. This isn't semantics. We're talking about the difference between possibly hundreds of thousands – even millions – of casualties. And calculated ambiguity and declaratory policy along those lines can help prevent that, can help deter that.

Now, nobody knows in detail how much deterrent effect would be lost if the U.S. were to adopt a no-first-use policy and thereby take nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis conventional and chemical and biological threats. Scott says it might take a sliver off the table. Let me tell you that nobody knows how much deterrent effect it would take off the table. It might be a sliver in

some cases. It might be absolutely decisive in other cases because requirements for deterrence shift over time, place, on opponent and contingency.

So indeed taking nuclear deterrence threat of escalation off the table might have a modest effect in some cases for deterrence purposes. In other cases it might be taking off the table that which prevents a biological or chemical attack that could cause horrific civilian losses.

The value of the threat of nuclear escalation is almost certainly more or less depending on the opponent and the circumstances as I said. But we should want to avoid losing that priceless deterrent effect by declaring that the threat of nuclear escalation is off the table. No first use would do exactly that. Calculated ambiguity maintains that coupling.

Is there evidence that nuclear deterrence can help deter non-nuclear attacks? Yes. There is historical evidence from past crises although I always add to that point that historical evidence seems never to be definitive. We're still arguing about the causes of World War I.

But given that and adding that caveat upfront let me mention that, for example, during the '62 Cuban Missile Crisis and also the Yom Kippur War of '73 the fear of nuclear escalation appears to have helped constrain parties from engaging in greater non-nuclear provocations. In other words, it looks like nuclear deterrence was important in those cases.

The best open examination of the U.S. and Soviet historical record that I know of – open examination of the historical record that I know of – reaches exactly this conclusion. Lebow and Stein in “We all Lost the Cold War” say, quote, page 356, “The reality of nuclear deterrence had a restraining effect on both Kennedy and Khrushchev in 1962 and on Brezhnev in 1973. When superpower leaders believed that they were approaching the brink of war, fear of war pulled them back.”

Again, page 368: “The history of the Cold War suggests that nuclear deterrence should be used as a powerful but very dangerous medicine. As with any medicine, the key to successful deterrence is to administer correctly the proper dosage.” Yeah, Amen to that. That's the proper dosage, not taking it off the table.

I'll give you another example. In September of 1985 Moscow appears to have made explicit missile threats to Tehran to compel Iranian leaders to put pressure on Hezbollah to return kidnapped Soviet officials being held in Lebanon. According to the KGB account that you can now read in Russian in Moscow if you'd like to – according to the KGB account, this missile threat appears to have helped get the Soviet officials released almost immediately thereafter.

More recently, in 2009, a former Indian army chief general asked the question: Do nuclear weapons deter? The context was, do they deter non-nuclear attacks? So the Indian army general asks the question and then he answers it: Of course they do.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons deterred India from attacking that country after the Mumbai strikes. And he goes on – and it was due to Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons that India stopped short of a military retaliation following the attack on parliament in 2001. This is the

Indian army general saying Pakistan's nuclear weapons deterred an Indian response – a military response – on those occasions.

The 1991 Gulf war offers a variety of sources that suggest the deterrence value of implicit U.S. nuclear escalation threats. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in August of '95 said that Iraq was deterred from using its weapons of mass destruction because the Iraqi leadership had interpreted Washington's threats as grievous retaliation – and that that meant nuclear retaliation.

January 1996, the head of the Iraqi military, Gen. Wafiq Al-Samarrai, said some of the Scud missiles were loaded with chemical warheads, but they were not used. The warning was quite severe and quite effective. The allied troops were certain to use nuclear arms and the price will be too high and too dear.

In 1995, Iraqi Gen. Hussein Kamel, the Iraqi minister of military industry and Saddam Hussein's son-in-law – who later met his death at the hands of Saddam Hussein – said, "During the Gulf war, there was no decision to use chemical weapons for fear of retaliation. They realized that if chemical weapons were used, retaliation would be nuclear." Nuclear weapons deterred chemical attack, according to this evidence.

Note that nuclear deterrence appears to have worked in these cases even though the United States by its own declarations had no intention of using nuclear weapons at the time. The United States had no intention of using nuclear weapons at the time, but declaratory policy was good enough that the Iraqi leadership appears to have believed it and was deterred.

And according to most sources we were spared the possibility of hundreds of thousands of losses as a result. The threat of nuclear escalation was important. We're not talking academic semantics here; we're talking about real blood and death and avoiding it. And declaratory policy can help.

Now, look, these quotations that I just gave you don't close the case, as I have always acknowledged, Scott. And Scott is right: Saddam Hussein once contradicted these claims during his post-capture interrogations. I've seen those interrogations. I know what he said, of course.

However, during these same interrogations he said that he invaded Kuwait because the Kuwaiti leader had told a crude about Iraqi women – which almost certainly wasn't the reason why he invaded Kuwait. He also said that in those same post-capture interrogations that everything that he knew about the U.S. he learned from Hollywood movies. We have to hope at least that wasn't true as well.

Saddam Hussein lived in a world of deception. And Scott knows that to take one quote and present it as the paramount representation of historical truth against considerable other evidence isn't the way you do historiography. Again, the issue isn't settled here. Fifty years from now we may be arguing about what actually deterred the Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons in 1991. The story isn't settled but at least there is evidence that U.S. nuclear weapons were a part of what prevented that use.

The available historical evidence is sufficient to suggest that we would increase the risk of attack in some cases if we were to reject calculated ambiguity and instead adopt a declaratory policy such as no first use that would take the threat of nuclear escalation off the table vis-à-vis conventional, chemical and biological threats. That's why the congressional strategic posture commission specifically rejected a declaratory policy of no first use.

And I suspect it's why the Obama administration did the same thing. They got it right. The question is, do we want to run the potential risks of degrading deterrence by rejecting calculated ambiguity as declaratory policy in favor of no first use?

Scott's answer is yes. My conclusion is that we should be very wary of doing so because we need to be mindful of the priceless value that deterrence can provide and the deterrence benefits of calculated ambiguity – especially when the potential benefits of adopting a different policy such as no first use are so speculative.

In summary, my basic points regarding calculated ambiguity as a declaratory policy and deterrence are the following: One, deterrence remains a crucial U.S. goal. And we should make it as effective as is practicable. It will never be perfect. It will never function perfectly. Nothing does. Deterrence won't. I certainly recognize that.

Two, we should want to retain calculated ambiguity because, on occasion, the threat of nuclear escalation may be necessary to prevent attacks for which we are not prepared – particularly including biological attacks. Some historical suggests that nuclear threats can play an important role in deterring non-nuclear provocations.

Three, to deter by threat of nuclear escalation as a general principal, we should not declare that threat to be off the table. Doing so could lead to the failure of deterrence when it otherwise would function and when we would desperately want it to function.

Four, the great advantage of calculated ambiguity is just this: It keeps the declared threat of U.S. nuclear escalation on the table for the purposes of deterrence against a spectrum of potentially severe contingencies. And it does so without making broadly binding and explicit nuclear threats. As such, it offers what I believe is a prudent balance between seeking the benefits of nuclear deterrence while also seeking to minimize the risks. Other possible declaratory policies including no first use do not do that.

So let me conclude by saying, the bipartisan congressional posture commission got it right in endorsing calculated ambiguity and rejecting no first use. And I believe the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review similarly got it right by rejecting no first use and adopting a variation on calculated ambiguity. Thank you. (Applause.)

MR. JONES: Let's start with a couple – two, I guess, sets of questions; the first being nonproliferation, which the Nuclear Posture Review – has said is up there in the administration's priorities – that and nuclear terrorism.

And there's two factors to that: One is that we don't want our allies to go nuclear. And the other is that we want to prevent other countries such as Iran from going nuclear. For Dr. Payne I wanted to start with the latter category, which is the Iranians, what have you, of the world.

Dr. Sagan's remarks centered on the fact that deterrence and declaratory posture should be situated within the larger context of United States' interests and strategic objectives. And so, in a world in which calculated ambiguity is important for the benefits you provided, how does the United States go about trying to achieve the other benefits or other strategic goals it has in mind?

MR. PAYNE: And you're referring specifically to, for example, nonproliferation? Is that it?

MR. JONES: Yeah.

MR. PAYNE: There's nothing inconsistent with pursuing a declaratory policy of calculated ambiguity and nonproliferation. I mean, I'm not up here to tell you that we shouldn't pursue nonproliferation. I'm an ardent supporter of nonproliferation goals and many nonproliferation means. Let me give you an example.

Probably the single most successful example of counterproliferation was the Bush administration's success in getting Libya to back off its weapons of mass destruction program. There's a book out that explains point by point how this was done. And this happened within the context of a declaratory policy of calculated ambiguity.

There's nothing in calculated ambiguity that says we should not pursue nonproliferation. I don't believe that there is incompatibility or inconsistency in those two policies. They can run in parallel, as they did on that particular example.

MR. JONES: Let me turn to the other side of the equation for Dr. Sagan, which is our allies, who we also have an interest in not going nuclear. You said that the way we should – we should begin with consultation with the end goal in mind to pursue a no-first-use policy, but that seems, at a level, to be disingenuous in that we are showing up with the foregone conclusion that we have the idea of no first use in mind and are just trying to figure out how it is we can get them to agree when, in fact, extended deterrence seems to be much more their perceptions.

And one can parse out, to the degree there's always, one minister says X and one minister says Y and no one really knows what a capital thinks, per se. So how does the United States go about the extended deterrence challenge when pursuing no-first-use policy?

MR. SAGAN: Well, it's not disingenuous at all. That's what's called leadership. It's to say, we want to move in this direction, and we think it's – it's not disingenuous; it's what's leadership in saying, we want to move in this direction and we believe it is in all of our interests. Let's discuss whether you agree and why you don't agree. And if you do agree, let's do it; if you don't agree, let's try to discuss what are the conditions that could make this possible.

I have no doubt that with NATO and with Japan, there will be challenges moving in this direction. And that's why you always should say, we want to have serious consultations, dialogue and high-level meetings to analyze this. What I'm struck with is how – not opposed, but how open to these discussions most NATO allies are. The Germans, the Norwegians, the Belgians and the Canadians have all said they don't want to have tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and they're very much in favor of pushing in this direction.

The Japanese, as I cited, have already said they would like to move in this direction. I think what happens sometimes is that the United States goes and tells our allies, we believe that this particular weapons system – take the TLAM-N – is absolutely necessary for your security. And then we're surprised when an ally will come back and say, we need the TLAM-N for our national security.

But what's happened instead, as the foreign minister of Japan told Secretary Clinton, is that he doesn't feel any particular weapons system is necessary. He wants to know what the United States is willing to do, and is certainly open to the idea of no first use and is open to the idea of nuclear disarmament over the long term, and has directly acknowledged that. So I think we have an opportunity to move in the right direction and that leadership does not mean pushing your views. It means persuading people.

We moved from massive retaliation to flexible response, over time. We moved the German government from support of the multilateral force to support for the nonproliferation, over time. That's called leadership.

MR. JONES: Great. I want to turn the second set of questions to the conventional response, with regard to a chemical or biological attack, and what that could mean for U.S. declaratory policy. For Dr. Pagan – or Dr. Payne, sorry – (laughter).

MR. SAGAN: Combined, the two of us were “pagan.” I think that's pretty interesting. Or it could be “Sayne” – one of the two. (Laughter.)

MR. PAYNE: That would be an interesting response, wouldn't it? (Laughter.)

MR. JONES: Secretary Gates, when he was discussing the NPR, he said that, during the Bush administration in 2008, you said that we were able to deter Iraq in 1991 – that this seems to be somewhat of a flip-flop, albeit a pretty minor one, given what the NPR said. And he said, well, the reason I was able to change my view on what the NPR was able to do is, I have new things in my deterrence toolkit. I have an increased ability for missile defense, a prompt global strike program that was more advanced than it was at that time. Do you think that these types of capabilities, now or in the future, can be used to slowly reduce the role, you know, on the spectrum of calculated ambiguity and no first use, to move towards no first use, or is the overwhelming deterrent value of calculated ambiguity means that, that discussion is not worthwhile?

MR. PAYNE: Was that – that was for this side of the “Pagan” twin.

MR. JONES: For you.

MR. PAYNE: Okay. Being able to provide missile defense for allies, possibly having a prompt global strike that's non-nuclear – I think these are great tools. I believe they can contribute to deterrence, and they may be able to contribute to damage limitation in the event deterrence fails. So I've been a supporter of both of those for a long time. And I should add that the 2001 NPR said explicitly that we would like to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and that deploying these sort of advanced conventional capabilities could help us in that direction.

So you don't have to go back to a recent quote. That goes back to 2001. And it was part of the Bush administration's nuclear posture review. And the most recent nuclear posture review certainly picks up that theme, and I think it does a very good job of that. The question, though, is, conventional weapons – can they be necessary and sufficient for deterrence, not whether they're necessary.

I think conventional forces are very important for deterrence purposes, but the question is, are they sufficient? And this is a case where you have to be able to understand what opponents think to come to a conclusion on that. And the trouble is that it's almost impossible to know exactly what opponents think, particularly in the context of a crisis, when you want deterrence to work. That's why I go back and look at history to try to find out, what was it that opponents were thinking in those rare occasions of crisis, and war or not-war was an actual choice. What role did nuclear deterrence make?

It's a very difficult question to try and answer by history, because we're not talking about a science experiment that you can go back and replicate. This is a unique event in human existence, and it's not a scientific endeavor, per se. But it can be methodical and systematic, and it can be careful. And when you go back and look at these historical incidents, on most places where there is evidence that you can reflect, what you see is that it appears that nuclear deterrence had an important role in preventing these – some of these attacks, as I discussed in my presentation.

So in a sense, there's no answer to your question that says, yes, I know that nuclear escalation is an absolutely necessary threat to make deterrence work in every case in the future. I can't say, just as Scott can't say, with any reasonableness, that nuclear deterrence won't play a role, or that it will only be a sliver of a role. Basically, what we have to look at is, as history – I mean, as much as history tells us, is, nuclear deterrence may be extremely important. And in other cases, it may not be.

Now, with that as really what we can pull out of the historical record, the question really is, do you want to run the risk that, on the next crisis or the crisis after that, when hundreds of thousands of lives may be at stake, do you want to pull the threat of nuclear escalation off the table and hope that conventional deterrence does the job? My answer is, I'd rather have calculated ambiguity that keeps nuclear deterrence on the table.

Scott says he'd prefer to take nuclear deterrence off the table. I think my answer to that is much more careful; it's much more prudent; and it's much more respectful of the lives of Americans and American servicepeople, and allies. But obviously, there's room for debate here.

MR. JONES: Picking up on the prompt global strike theme, for Dr. Sagan, one of the primary reasons you cite against a no-first-use policy is that it creates a commitment trap where, after a chemical or biological attack, the pressure will be so high from the public for the United States to maintain its reputation, et cetera, et cetera, that a nuclear attack would have to be a response because we had left that option on the table.

I was wondering if I could push you a little, though, on why, exactly, a nuclear response would necessitate from the world-post-a-conflict scenario. Because it seems that by just leaving it on the table, that there are a number of options we could choose from and that we could say that this is a sufficient or an overwhelming – whatever adjective you want to use – response, including perhaps some of these new tools that the United States has to make sure that our leadership isn't attacked, or whathaveyou.

MR. SAGAN: The reason I get concerned about a commitment trap problem is because I think the U.S. government is poorly disciplined when it comes to making threats. And when you make calculated ambiguity statements, they escalate internally within the bureaucracy. So you have numerous statements made by senior generals – rather than saying that they might, or that there's a possibility that they could have escalation, they'll say, it is the United States' policy that we will do this.

We have cases where presidents have said that if X occurs, the gravest response will occur – think about Kennedy when he found out about the missiles in Cuba – and then felt that, boy, I wish I hadn't said that because now, I have to respond for the sake of broader credibility. I could have lived with that, potentially, had more negotiating room. Should options be taken off the table? Well, if it's dangerous medicine, I think it should be put in the medicine cabinet, and not be kept on the table. And I think that in some cases, the current NPR does exactly that – it takes it off the table with respect to negative security assurances to states that are noncompliant – that are in full compliance with the NPT.

I'm very glad that Keith Payne has corrected the impression that a reporter in the Washington Times gave, where they quoted him as saying that this gave the IAEA leverage over U.S. national security policy, which I thought was a very clever, but specious argument. I'm very glad that he's corrected that today.

We have taken it off the table with a small number of states – or actually, a large number of states, but states that were very concerned that we were threatening them in the name of deterrence, in the name of not knowing, over the long term, what threats might emerge, and doing it at the same time that we're trying to convince them that you have no interest and no need for nuclear weapons yourself over the long term. So with respect to commitment traps, I think we should state what we want to do and be committed to that, rather than be ambiguous, given that ambiguity often can escalate because of statements.

Let me just tell one story that one of – just as Keith cited Bernard Brodie, I'd like to cite Tom Schelling, who told a very interesting story about a war game in which he was participating in the early '90s, in which, at the War College, U.S. officers were asked to decide what to do, in Schelling's game, in which Saddam Hussein had used chemical weapons effectively against an airbase in Saudi Arabia.

And after consulting to a man, they said, we should go and take Baghdad, now – get rid of this guy. They said, well, why not use nuclear weapons? They said, well, the last thing we'd want to do in that condition is use nuclear weapons, given the long-term consequences of the United States being the first state, over this long period of time – the protection of the tradition of non-nuclear use is very much in our interests. We might need to threaten nuclear weapons in retaliation, but when we threaten them and hold open the option of using them in other circumstances, I think it's counterproductive.

MR. JONES: Thank you. So throwing it open for questions, right here in the front. And if you wouldn't mind waiting for the microphone, and also state your name and affiliation.

Q: Hi, I'm Jan Lodal. I don't know which affiliation – Atlantic Council, perhaps. I have a bit of a comment to make about both Scott and Keith, and then maybe they can respond together on this. First of all, let me say that neither of you talked much about existential deterrence, which I think is there no matter what we say. And Scott, you talked about trying to bring in line what we declare and what we actually tend to do. But that still leaves open what our inherent capabilities are, and it seems to me that's relevant to this discussion.

But then turning to Keith, Keith, a lot of your analysis is based on historical analysis from the Cold War era, and it seems to me that, that's really the nub of the problem here, is that the world has changed so dramatically, and that a whole lot of these historical examples are pretty irrelevant to a situation in which the biggest threat, many of us believe, is a terrorist getting their hands on a nuclear weapon or continued proliferation to the extreme.

And so the question is, how do we devise a strategy, over the next decades, that minimizes the chance a terrorist can get their hands on a weapon and maximizes the chance that we can stop proliferation, particularly given the lack of success of the two-tiered world that we hope to set up with the NPT? Because we have a lot more than just the five states either with nuclear weapons or the capability of getting them at this stage.

And then to Scott, I think that, as you know, Scott, I'm not really terribly in favor of no first use as our official policy because I think it sort of conflicts with your other criterion, which is that we be careful not to have declaratory policies that are inconsistent with reality. And it seems to me that in those cases where we keep nuclear weapons just to deter other nuclear weapons, there are in extremis circumstances in which an in extremis pre-emptive attack would almost certainly be ordered by the president.

And we don't have to go quite so far as saying, no first use, but we simply have to limit the purpose of nuclear weapons to deterrence of other states with nuclear weapons. But perhaps

I've missed something in the argument for going a step further in no first use. And perhaps you could comment on that?

MR. SAGAN: Well, to me, both under international law and logically, pre-emption, defined as an attack against someone in a condition in which an attack is imminent and unavoidable is self-defense. I would differentiate that between preventive war and preventive strikes and pre-emption. And I thought one of the clever, but counterproductive, moves that the Bush administration made was trying to conflate those two during the post-2001, September 11th campaign.

To talk about preemption, as if attacking a state that might be a threat in the long term, that's not pre-emption as well. So I think no first use, and in an extremis case, which would be hard to imagine, but legally and logically, I don't think that could ever be ruled out. And therefore, to me, I don't think there's a conflict there.

I think that there people who argue against no first use on the grounds that the Soviet Union had that policy and was basically lying about it, and therefore, we shouldn't have it. My view is the opposite; it's that we should have it and we shouldn't lie about it. We should be honest about it and be honest about some of the costs involved. There are costs, but I think they're outweighed by these broader benefits.

MR. PAYNE: Sure, good question. Let me just mention that, of the four cases that I discussed as cases offering some evidence for this discussion, three of them were post-Cold War. The Indian Army chief of staff referring to the attacks on parliament and Mumbai; the 1991 Gulf War, and the 1985 incident wherein the KGB, according to KGB announcements – or retired KGB announcements, I should say – engaged in missile threats against Tehran. All post-Cold War.

So you can go back and mine the Cold War period for a lot of additional evidence. I tried to focus on post-Cold War cases specifically because those sound more pertinent and may be more pertinent. With regard to nonproliferation, I think the question that you posed was, is nonproliferation an important goal and should we be moving towards supporting it?

Q: And terrorist cells.

MR. PAYNE: And terrorists – and the answer is absolutely. Where I miss the connection is that somehow no first use has to be the declaratory policy that gets us there. Calculated ambiguity I believe is a perfectly useful declaratory policy that maintains as much out of nuclear deterrence and escalation threat as we can mine out of it and also allows us to pursue nonproliferation and counterterrorism as effectively as we can pursue that.

But there's nothing in between that says these are somehow completely in contradiction. Just as I mentioned with regard to the Libyan counterproliferation success and some of the counterterrorism successes that we've had while we have maintained a calculated ambiguity – a policy of calculated ambiguity.

Q: Thanks. Matt Rojansky, Carnegie Endowment. So, I'd like to sort of probe each side of this argument against the scenario that troubles me most, which is a successful – let's say it's a biological terror attack on the United States.

For Dr. Payne, if, in response to such an attack, we don't invoke the nuclear response simply because we don't know where to target the nuclear weapon, and even if we're as clear as we can possibly be about that, what does it do to the future logic of calculated ambiguity? In other words, there is now a precedent that an attack has taken place of the nature that we're concerned about and we didn't use nuclear weapons, regardless of the reason.

And then for Dr. Sagan, assuming that we're going to use a conventional response, and even assuming that perhaps we know enough to target it, sort of the precedent that I've seen over the last decade indicates that it's probably not going to be devastating, that we probably can't devastate where the threat comes from simply because we haven't really ever been able to do that with terrorists. And if we had, then we wouldn't be seeing effective terrorist attacks.

And if that's the case – a similar question as what I asked Dr. Payne – does that undermine the credibility of the threat of devastating conventional response?

MR. PAYNE: Let me repeat the question just to make sure I got it right, is what if there is a devastating bio attack and the United States doesn't respond with a nuclear response? Doesn't that undermine deterrence in the future?

Not necessarily, is the answer, and particularly if calculated ambiguity has been your policy, because calculated ambiguity, as I said, doesn't say that there is an explicit, specific response – nuclear response to an explicit, specific strike. It simply leaves nuclear escalation threat on the table.

It doesn't say, if you do this then nuclear response will be absolutely certain. Even NATO doctrine doesn't do that. It leaves it on the table. So it provides again, I believe, that balance between trying to get deterrent effect out of declaratory policy without leading to the trap that you draw red lines and then don't follow up, in one sentence. Calculated ambiguity I think helps protect against the kind of degradation or deterrence that you've just described.

Now, that said, anytime you have a horrific biological attack and you don't respond in a very forceful way, you may have reduced your deterrence for the future. I don't know how you would sidestep that particular problem, but I think calculated ambiguity protects you, in a sense, as much as you can be protected.

MR. SAGAN: I think a lot of this has to do with attribution. If the United States knew, for example, that this material came from Syria or Iran and the government had deliberately given it, then I think a declaration of war would be appropriate and that military action would take place.

In the conditions that are more likely, which you're suggesting that it is al-Qaida, then we're already at war, in essence, with that organization. Could our actions be devastating?

Well, perhaps we would want to go into Pakistan and get sources there and have an even more aggressive campaign. We would hold the people at risk. I think the key question here is what do we do in terms of deterrence of state sponsors or would-be state sponsors?

And here I think we have to be very careful. On the one hand, we want people to know that if there is complicity and we have evidence for that, they will be held responsible. On the other hand, we should acknowledge that sometimes there's negligence or even states that are trying to control biological materials or nuclear materials may not do so successfully.

And so, if we're too aggressive in making threats that we will take out the capital of any state that we've discovered has had materials stolen from it, the net effect of that will actually be to, I think, decrease that government's centralized control over its materials because they're going to try to deter us and will not be helpful if there is any kind of loss of material or loss of a weapon.

So it's a tough scenario and one that I think holding the individuals responsible would be a better long-term solution.

Q: Thank you. David Cooper from National Defense University. I wonder – first for Dr. Payne.

I must say I don't really worry so much about the effect of declaratory policy on deterring our adversaries because I sort of take it as a given that they're not going to believe it anyway, particularly knowing the adversaries in question that we would be most likely to do this against, and also knowing and they knowing how reversible any declaratory policy would be. So I wonder if you could address that.

On the other side of the equation, for Professor Sagan, I am very worried about the effect of declaratory policy on assurance of our allies, and it strikes me, your example of allies who have said they are open to this. I wonder how credible that is.

If we are publicly flirting with the idea of withdrawing extended deterrence as something they can rely on – and, again, doing it in a fairly public way, and then if hypothetically we were to go to them having declared that the reason we're going to them is to tell them – to consult with them that we are contemplating changing our declaratory policy, having essentially signaled that we may be withdrawing this and then asking them, well, how essential is this to your security, isn't the default public answer always going to be, it's not at all essential to our security?

But what is the private answer and what is the impact you're already having by this public flirtation on allied assurance, and how do you get at the real allied feelings on this and the complexities of those? Thank you.

MR. PAYNE: The first part of the question – let me paraphrase it – it doesn't really matter what declaratory policy is for our enemies because they'll look at our capabilities and work from there.

First let me say that, you know, that may or may not be true, but probably the last thing we want to do is to reduce whatever inherent extended deterrence or deterrence capability is possible out of those capabilities because whatever deterrent effect might reside in those capabilities by their mere existence, we don't want to reduce that.

And it seems to me that taking the nuclear escalation threat off the table reduces that. Whatever it is, it reduces it. So, going back to Jan Lodal's position, isn't there a degree of existential deterrence that remains no matter what you say? I think that's probably true.

That said, we don't want what we say to reduce that, and it seems to me that taking the escalation threat off the table could function to reduce that deterrent effect, which is obviously my concern. In this sense, it doesn't really matter what we think about it; it matters what they think about it, and so we're speculating about what it is that they think about it.

MR. SAGAN: Let me respond. I misspoke if in any way I said that we should get rid of extended deterrence, and I don't think that the administration, in its Nuclear Posture Review, is in any way trying to get rid of nuclear extended deterrence.

Indeed, I believe that the term "nuclear umbrella" should be banished from the lexicon that we have when discussing grand strategy because it both gives a bad metaphor, some kind of defensive shield rather than saying we have a nuclear stick, but it doesn't differentiate between two very different forms of extended deterrence, one that says that we threaten to use nuclear weapons if our allies are attacked by any means, which I think is not wise, and a declaratory policy that says we will promise to use nuclear weapons if our allies are attacked with nuclear weapons, which I want to maintain and which a no first use policy maintains and actually, I think, makes more credible because it says that we would respond seriously to serious responses and we'll respond conventionally to conventional responses.

That said, you said, well, isn't this a question of people responding to us ahead of time, and I don't think historically that's right. The Japanese government came to power with campaign statements about wanting to move towards – more vigorously towards a nuclear-free world in saying – recognizing that there is a tension between their reliance on extended nuclear deterrence under a variety of scenarios and their goal to have a nuclear-free world, and they want to work with us, sharing responsibilities to limit the roles of nuclear weapons.

And they've said that publicly and I think it's actually – at least from my experience privately talking to them in Japan, it's what this government, as opposed to perhaps other governments, actually holds as their belief about what's in Japanese national interests, and similarly with the Germans.

The Germans' position on getting rid of their nuclear weapons – our nuclear weapons on their soil came in their campaign. It was a campaign promise. It was not something in response to the United States.

That said, I think the biggest question, the biggest concern is Turkey here, and I think we need to think through how to move towards a no first use doctrine, what we should do about the

weapons in Turkey, very carefully, after long consultations, and I don't think we should just go in there and say this is our view and not take into account their perceptions. So I think that to me is the greatest challenge that we have in NATO today.

MR. JONES: A quick follow up?

MR. PAYNE: Let me just add to the point that declaratory policy can be important, because I think there's another reason why it can be, and that is as you go back and look at actual case studies of how leaders have made decisions in situations of high stress – decisions for war or peace – what you find is that in a number of those cases, leaders have made a decision and then searched for any rationale as to why that's the right decision.

Humans do that in their decision-making. They make the decision and then they search for the rationale as to why that's the right decision. And leaders will – just as humans, it's kind of the way we're wired in some ways – will grasp at any opening that seems to make that decision look like the right one. It's a psychological process called bolstering and it's well known in psychology.

And so, in a sense, what I'd like to be able to shut down is any green light that says using a biological or a chemical weapon against the United States or its allies is a reasonable decision. And I think calculating ambiguity that leaves the nuclear threat on the table for that helps to shut down the possibility that a leader could grasp onto a no first use policy and say, see, this is the right decision – not because it would be a prudent thing for a foreign leader to do, but because leaders often make decisions, not based on the very prudent, methodical process that we would all like to see and believe takes place.

But if you look at the sweep of historical epics – and I have gone through 200 case studies going back to 200 B.C. looking at case studies – what you often see are leaders who make fairly rash decisions based on skimpy evidence. We would like to shut that down in this case.

MR. JONES: Clark?

Q: Clark Murdock from CSIS. First of all, I want to thank the panelists for a very sophisticated, very nuanced presentation on a complicated issue, and both professors clearly at the top of their games. And I say that to justify – not just to praise the panelists but to justify –

MR. SAGAN: To justify a tough question.

Q: That's right.

MR. SAGAN: That's what comes after those kinds of comments.

Q: That's right.

MR. PAYNE: We'll let "Pagan" answer that one.

MR. SAGAN: That's right; we'll let "Pagan" answer that one.

Q: Or Sapayne (ph) or something like that.

Returning to my academic years, which were over 30 years ago and ask a question that I might have asked as a professor but I don't think about that now that I'm a Washington hack, the issue I want to get at is that when I hear people talk about increased reliance on conventional munitions, whether it's Prompt Global Strike or advanced conventional munitions or increased reliance upon defenses and reduced reliance upon nuclear weapons and deterrence, you have to ask yourself what deterrence is about.

And we don't want just deterrence; we want either a credible deterrence, if you use the terms that this administration does or – I'm sorry, a credible deterrence of the last administration, or effective deterrence is what we say today. You want a good deterrence, one that works. And there is an assumption in – and you see it in this NPR and I think you see it somewhat in the contrasting positions of the two professors – that deterrence and the security provided through deterrence is in some sense a finite sum gain. There's only a set amount of it.

And if you increase missile defenses contribution to it, you somehow decrease the role that nuclear weapons play in that security. And the same with conventional munitions. It could be you're just going from a weak deterrent to a slightly stronger deterrent. It could be that the credibility is increased a little bit. There is no such thing as a finite security sum here. By definition it's an amorphous concept.

And so the notion that you can say, you know, we're going to reduce our reliance upon nuclear weapons and our strategy by increasing our reliance on defenses, that doesn't track. You're just maybe getting more security. Comment please.

MR. SAGAN: Well, Clark, it seems to me that credibility is in the eyes of the beholder and it is a –

Q: Which just reinforces the case I made even more.

MR. SAGAN: – which is an estimate that a potential aggressor has to make about what are the likely costs? And, to get back to Jan Lodal's point about existential, there still will be some residue that the United States might do something that it has said it won't do, and that would be one factor. It would be a less likely – it would be less credible. It will be less probable if we have said we're not going to do it then if we said we were going to do it. Defenses I think add to the credibility of conventional options in many, many cases.

Now, that said, I think your question again leads to, I think, excessive focus on deterrence as the only objective, and that is a main message that I want to get to this audience, which is that our declaratory policy should not simply try to tack on little bits of extra credible deterrence, whether it's through conventional capabilities or ambiguous nuclear threats, but should also take into it, well, how does that play around the world in other things?

Because if our long-term nuclear security is influenced by the prospects from the Nonproliferation Treaty, whether states will agree to the internationalization of the fuel cycle, indeed I believe that non-nuclear weapons states have an obligation under Article VI of the NPT to negotiate in good faith towards the internationalization of the fuel cycle because I don't see how we can get to nuclear disarmament unless there's some kind of control on nuclear fuel around the world.

We can't even get close to having that kind of agreement conceptually if it's considered by many states that the United States is holding open lots of nuclear options for the sake of deterrence because we think it adds a little bit to the credibility of our threats.

So I think that part of the problem we have here is that we're talking too much about deterrence and not talking enough about nonproliferation and the credibility of our actions in another sphere, which is more important, in my judgment, and one in which we need to do much more work.

MR. JONES: Keith?

MR. PAYNE: Clark, I'm glad you asked that question because I think it's really a profound question for this discussion. And I agree with your point and even layers below the point. And it's actually important to put out on the table here is that deterrence is not a finite-sum game. Deterrence is not a known recipe that you can understand, that you can say substitute Splenda for sugar and you'll get the same result.

We don't know deterrence well enough to know how to adjust the dial here or there and get the same result. Nobody does. It's not because we're ignorant; it's because that's not how deterrence can be known. It's a variable function dependent on time, place, circumstance, the particular opponents in mind, even the specific characteristics of the opponent.

Think about trying to deter a Hitler as opposed to trying to deter Chamberlain, for example. The individual personalities of the leaders involved can shape whether deterrents can work or whether it won't work and what might be taken for deterrence, or whether it's irrelevant.

So, Clark, I gather your point. I agree with the point. We don't know how much of what is necessary to deter. We might not even know it after the event. We certainly don't know it before the event, which is essentially a basic pillar of my position here, and that is because we don't know that, it's my goal to think how we minimize the risks of deterrence failure and why I think it's important to look at history and see what we can derive from history.

And, as I said, the lesson of history suggests that in some cases in the future, if the future reflects the past at all, the threat of nuclear escalation could be enormously important to prevent enormous numbers of casualties. I can't tell you that there is an exact recipe. I can tell you that we would be running that risk if we take the threat off the table.

Now, I don't mind Scott's metaphor of putting it in the medicine chest. Put it in the Medicine chest. What I don't want you to do is throw it out the window, which is, in a sense, what a no first use policy suggests we ought to do with the threat of nuclear escalation.

Q: Hi. Achilles Zaluar – (unintelligible) – Brazilian Embassy but asking on a personal capacity. Both speakers are obviously very knowledgeable and quite persuasive, but they don't seem to agree on much, which is appropriate, but they do agree on one thing, if I heard correctly. They both like the declaratory police policy in the Obama administration Nuclear Policy (sic) Review.

My question is, how is that possible, given they don't agree on much else? Do you have the same interpretation of the declaratory policy on the NPR, and what is it that you would change in it if you had the opportunity? Thank you.

MR. SAGAN: Well, we may have different interpretations, clearly. I think the NPR went closer to a no first use than I actually thought it would, and went about as far as it could given the concerns about wanting not to be too in front of the allies and to say that we're going to work towards that goal with our allies and going to consult with them and create new conditions, new ways of consultation, and given what the political traffic would bear at home.

There are other priorities. There are things that you want to push forward on the nuclear arms control front, and I think some people in the administration thought that pushing too far too rapidly might be harmful. But I am optimistic because I viewed this as a first step in the right direction even though it didn't go as far as I would have wanted it to.

MR. PAYNE: Actually, I don't think there is a different interpretation of the words. In fact, administration officials themselves have characterized the NPR with regard to declaratory policy as a slight variation on calculated ambiguity – a slight variation, and fully in consistency with the continuity of calculated ambiguity.

Now, the question I think is, how do you square that circle? Well, it's not really that hard because what you see is that the effort to take the threat of nuclear escalation off the table, as reflected in the words of the NPR, applies to a number of states but largely not to states of concern.

Now, we're going to take the threat of nuclear escalation off the table for lots of states, but because we're not worried about lots of states. If you look at the states that we're actually worried about, it doesn't take the threat of nuclear escalation off the table for any of them, with the possible exception of Syria, and I'm not even sure that it does that.

So, when you talk to folks in the administration about it, that's the answer. The threat of nuclear escalation is on the table for all of those states that we are concerned about, and we have not taken it off the table for those states. That's why there are all the caveats listed out in the Nuclear Posture Review with regard to the threat of nuclear escalation.

That's why Secretary of State Clinton, when asked about the threat of biological weapons, her answer was, if you use bio, all bets are off the table. And she didn't specify if that's from this state or that state. She said, if you use bioweapons, all bets are off the table.

MR. JONES: A quick follow up?

MR. SAGAN: I just wanted to note that the threat to Iran and the DPRK, that their negative security – that they are not covered under the negative security assurances I think could be twisted in a much more positive way, and Mort Halperin has made, I think, this argument, which is that this statement, for the first time, promises the Iranians and the North Koreans that if you got rid of your program and came back into compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, we promise that we're not going to use nuclear weapons against you.

We haven't promised that we're never going to go to war against you. We haven't promised that we're going to abandon our allies who may have opposition to you, but we, under this NPR, would not threaten to use nuclear weapons against those two states.

So even that caveat has a long-term, more positive spin to it that I think is valuable, and that is a different interpretation but I think it's consistent with the language.

MR. JONES: These two questions right here.

Q: Mike Gerson, Center for Naval Analyses. I have a question for Dr. Payne.

So, it seems like a key theme that sort of underpins most of your arguments about chem and bio is that conventional forces simply may not be scary or sufficiently devastating enough to deter a chemical or especially a large-scale biological attack. Therefore, the threat and the sort of unknown of nuclear weapons is a necessary component of that deterrent.

So, I mean, I've heard people argue, and maybe I'm wrong but I think I've heard you argue that, you know, what the United States does with its nuclear policy or posture is not going to have any effect on, you know, sort of what North Korea or Iran do with their nuclear forces. I mean – (unintelligible) – I think you have made that argument.

And it seems that if you accept the idea that among the many reasons why countries like North Korea and Iran may want nuclear weapons – domestic reasons, economic reasons and otherwise, one reason vis-à-vis the United States is because they're concerned about our conventional capabilities, so they see nuclear acquisition as a asymmetric response to U.S. conventional superiority, not unlike NATO used the threat of nuclear escalation under flexible response to deter what was perceived to be a conventionally superior adversary.

So if you accept – and maybe you don't, but if you accept the logic that the motivation vis-à-vis the United States is because they're concerned about our conventional capability, then why is the execution of that conventional capability not a sufficient deterrent? You know, if we're scary enough conventionally and they're worried enough to go down the path of

developing nuclear weapons, further, you know, isolating themselves as international pariahs, it seems like they're actually sufficiently scared of our conventional forces.

MR. PAYNE: I think I got that. Yeah, I mean, one of the points that I make is that conventional-only may not be an adequate deterrent against chem and bio, but it's not necessarily because the threat in principle isn't lethal enough. I mean, it might not be lethal enough but there are a whole series of reasons why it might not be an effective deterrent.

One, it might not be lethal enough because maybe what is that that state and leadership values the most can't be threatened predictably and reliably with conventional forces other than if the United States and its allies invade and occupy the country and go dig it out. That may be the only way conventional forces will be lethal enough to hold at risk what that leadership values the most.

So they may not be lethal enough in that sense, unless what you're saying is, you know, the threat is the United States invading, occupying and digging out the leadership. And what I would say to that is, you know, maybe that's an adequate threat but how credible is that? The United States has just had some experience with invading and occupying countries. It hasn't always been pleasant.

And so the question that states would have to ask themselves is, is the United States ready for that again, here, wherever the here is? Even if that's a lethal enough threat, the question is, how credible is it? Do you really think the United States has the stomach to invade and occupy another country as a part of its deterrent threat? Maybe you think that's a credible threat. Maybe you don't. The question is, what does the opponent think? And I would suggest that in some cases the opponent is not going to think that's a credible threat, maybe even less credible than a nuclear threat.

MR. SAGAN: So it's not just the lethality of the conventional threat; it's the credibility of the conventional threat versus other kinds of threats. There's a series of possible reasons that have to do with how opponents see the United States. And so, again, I'm not suggesting that we only have conventional threats; I'm suggesting that conventional threats should indeed be a part of our deterrent kickback. I'm simply suggesting we shouldn't take the nuclear escalation threat off the table because that may be – you know, that may be very important.

And, again, there are historical cases where we know that leaders thought they could survive conventional war with the United States. It appears that Saddam Hussein though, in '90 and '91, that he could survive conventional war with the United States, and in fact he did. If you look at some of the exchanges between Tariq Aziz and the U.S. side when the conventional threat was on the table, Tariq Aziz shows every confidence. In fact, he said, you're a very powerful country but we will survive and continue to rule Iraq.

They had just come out of a very horrific conventional war with Iran and they had survived that. So, you know, it's not implausible – in fact, I think we have some historical evidence that shows that some leaders will believe that they can survive a conventional attack,

whereas they may not necessarily have the same view with regard to nuclear attack. In those cases, the threat of nuclear escalation could be absolutely decisive for deterrence work.

MR. SAGAN: I wanted to just respond very briefly. I think this question about leadership targeting is an important one that's poorly analyzed and a lot more work needs to be done. For those analysts who are looking for great topics, I think thinking through questions about leadership targeting and how to do that in a way that does not create incentives for pre-delegation of authority in other states is an important one and a very tricky one.

The first thing that those of you who do if you have interest in this is to read Mike Gerson's forthcoming international security piece where he lays out the capabilities of the GBU-28, the BLU-118, the Massive Ordnance Penetrator and functional defeat tactics as an alternative, and then analyze whether those capabilities, if advertised properly, could be a more or less credible threat than nuclear threats against deeply hardened targets – a very important issue and one that I don't think will be resolved here but I encourage more people to work on.

MR. JONES: Right here in front.

Q: Thank you very much. (Unintelligible.) My quick question is, one, what do you think about the recent China and Pakistan nuclear deal? And maybe the Obama administration is literally numb, or is not taking any action required to intercepting. How much – (unintelligible) – do you see from the terrorists are getting hands on the nuclear weapons?

MR. SAGAN: I'll start on the second one. I think there have been two major actions over the last few years that have reduced the risks of terrorists getting their hands on nuclear weapons inadvertently, or, that is, through negligence or through mismanagement.

And the first is the Nuclear Security Summit, which I think was misunderstood in much of the press. Many people acted as if the major effect or the major consequence of the Nuclear Security Summit was the Ukraine and Canada and Mexico getting rid of some highly enriched uranium more quickly than they would have otherwise. I don't think that was the main effect.

I think the main effect and the most important effect was that it committed a set of leaders to meet again in two years, and that they have every incentive now in front of their peers to do something over the next two years so that they're not embarrassed when they show up in Seoul a few years ago and either have an incident or have no progress in locking up some of the materials. So I think that actually was a very clever, high-level, attention-getting phenomenon.

And the second is the creation of the World Institute for Nuclear Security, which recognized that the IAEA has only very limited capabilities to encourage states to have better physical security at nuclear materials facilities around the world. It has no statutes that permit it to give out standards, for example. It can only give voluntary suggestions and have voluntary improvement teams come in.

But the World Institute for Nuclear Security is a private organization set up to share best practices in a private setting, to not create standards but to create conversations among the states

and industrial leaders who have to control materials that could be used by terrorists for dirty bombs or for nuclear weapon creation, and say let's talk privately about what we have learned and what you might learn from our experience.

And there have been enough experiences and enough close calls that that kind of organization is very helpful. Bismarck once said that only a fool learns from his mistakes; a wise man learns from other people's mistakes, and having an institution that actually tries to encourage that kind of learning is very, very valuable.

MR. PAYNE: Yeah, I don't have much to add to that other than essentially reiterate Scott's point that the prospect of terrorists getting nuclear weapons obviously is very daunting, and it's one that I fear and I think anybody who looks into the subject shares that fear. There are only so many doors that can be closed to that and we should try and close every door that we can.

Scott mentioned physical security for the weapons materials. Obviously that's something that we should be about. Fortunately this is an avenue for international cooperation that I think we and the Russians actually agree on, and I think there is a good bit of opportunity for a U.S.-Russian agreement in this area, building on some of the cooperation that the United States and Russia has had in the recent past in these areas.

There's another piece of this that I think is important, and that is damage limitation efforts within the United States. Some of the recent studies – you may have seen these in various testimonies before Congress – with regard to U.S. preparedness in the event that efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism fail, how well is the United States prepared to deal with the consequence management of that in simple things – I mean, simple but very important things like the number of burn beds that are available in metropolitan areas.

In most cases, according to the unclassified studies that have been done of late, the number of burn beds available which would be for victims of even a small nuclear terrorist attack are woefully inadequate. In fact, in nowhere were they adequate.

And so it seems to me that, one, we need to try as hard as we can for the physical security of these weapons and the materials to shut down the chances for acquisition, but the other part of it is being more serious about being prepared for an eventuality that we probably can't know we will be able to prevent.

MR. JONES: Let's take two questions together and then – we've got one there. Is that a hand from Mark Jansson?

Q: Thank you. I'm Carl Lundgren from Jonah Speaks, and when I worry about nuclear war, I worry about the big one between two nuclear powers, whether it be U.S. and Russia, U.S. and China, China or Russia, what have you. And I heard someone up there – Mr. Pagan, I suppose – tell us that it would be perfectly legal to launch a nuclear war if you knew that the other side was going to launch first.

And of course, in real life I doubt that will actually happen. So the question is, if we believe or think that a nuclear war is imminent, should we launch one first or should we wait it out and hope for the best, because afterwards we're not going to be asking you if it was legal but whether it was wise, rational, just or what have you. So, could either of you wish to speak to that one?

(Cross talk.)

MR. JONES: The last question came at us via Twitter, and that has to do with how Dr. Sagan and Dr. Payne would view the idea that a change in U.S. declaratory policy would impact strategic interactions with Russia and China.

MR. PAYNE: Let me respond briefly to the first one. Just to be honest, I'm not sure what the exact question was but I took it sort of along the lines of that someone on the table said that preemption might be a good idea under certain circumstances and did we agree with that? Is that more or less the question?

MR. JONES: I think the question is, should we engage in a first strike with another nuclear power? Is that ever wise?

MR. PAYNE: Okay. As I said in my prepared remarks, I see preemption as a woefully inadequate solution to security problems because it's dangerous, particularly – I mean, here we're talking about nuclear preemption – because it's dangerous and very rarely do you have evidence beyond a shadow of a doubt that a country is about to attack you with nuclear weapons. I mean, even if it brings nuclear weapons out, it doesn't necessarily mean that they're going to attack you. It could be a display of power. There could be all kinds of reasons behind it other than that you're about to be on the receiving end of a nuclear strike.

So I think part of your question was, you know, if we were absolutely certain that we were about to get struck with a nuclear weapon, would it be reasonable to preempt? I would say that the first part of that, that we're absolutely certain – I mean, I suppose it's plausible in theory; I don't know if it's ever true – likely to be true in practice.

I would much prefer to see reliance – heavier reliance go on the ability to, for example, have active defenses that would protect against strikes so that we are less concerned with having to preempt than we otherwise might be.

In a sense, this goes back to an old discussion about missile defense, that in the instance of a potential missile threat, it's much better to have defenses that give you an alternative to preemption than to have to rely on preemption because of mistakes that could be made because you don't want to start a third world war when it otherwise wouldn't happen – all the reasons why preemption can be a risky option in the scenario that you're talking about. So my own preference is to emphasize alternatives to that option.

MR. SAGAN: I would just add there that I think an alternative is also to warn, saying that we have evidence that you appear to be prepared for a strike; please know that we have a full capability to respond appropriately, and try to deter even at the last minute.

That said, my point was that preemption is legal under self-defense doctrine and does not necessarily mean that under most conditions it would be prudent. And I would agree with Keith Payne's comments that it's woefully inadequate and often very dangerous.

On the second question regarding opportunities for the Russians, I think what the posture review has done is open up an opportunity for dialogue at the strategic and highest levels between the Chinese and the Americans and between the Russians and the Americans, telling the Chinese that we have come some ways towards a no first use doctrine. We want to understand exactly what your policy is with respect to this.

Are you willing, this week or in the future, to re-commit to the negative security assurances and tie them in to the NPT the way we have? Are you willing to be more transparent? We're trying to be more transparent.

That opens up the opportunities, and with the Russians to say, look, don't use our doctrine as an excuse to say that you would use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, which is their current policy as far as I can tell. Instead, let's have a dialogue about what makes sense for you, what makes sense for us, and what kinds of threats you're really concerned about.

So I think this is a very positive step and I hope those kinds of dialogues occur.

MR. JONES: Did you want to say anything on Russia?

MR. PAYNE: Yeah, I think that the question was, is there a chance the declaratory policy changes relations with Russia and China. My guess is that relations with Russia and China are built on so much more; the fabric of U.S.-Chinese relations, the fabric of U.S.-Russian relations and how each of those parties is viewing the relation of the other with the other has so many constituent parts to it that are so important.

I don't know that declaratory policy within some broad boundary of possible variation is going to have a profound effect on the basic nature of the relations among those three countries. I suppose that's possible but my strong feeling is that those relationships are built on so much more and that I think Russia and China both take a view of declaratory policy given their own declaratory policies, particularly on the Russian side, given the Soviet experience with no first use that it subsequently admitted was just nonsense may place less weight on the honesty that would be attached to a declaratory policy that we do.

And so, in that sense, I don't know the declaratory policy in and of itself is likely to shape the relations dramatically one way or the other.

MR. JONES: The last quick – (unintelligible) – here, we reserved a few minutes for each side to make a couple of closing remarks, if they have any, whether it's points stated earlier or things they wanted to address. So we'll start with Dr. Sagan.

MR. SAGAN: Yes, let me say in conclusion that I was very pleased to have this dialogue and debate here today with Keith Payne. I read Keith Payne and admire his work because he's one of the few analysts in this business who, even if you disagree with him, you know the evidence that he brings to bear and therefore can debate the assumptions and the evidence rather than mere assertions.

His work is filled with historical references, with analysis, and he has, on occasion, been willing to correct himself, as you saw today with respect to the comments made in the Washington Times, or maybe mis-comments made in the Washington Times. And I think that is all for the good.

I would note in conclusion, however, that there are three things that I wanted to point out as continuing differences. One is that Keith Payne has a tendency to put the burden of proof on anyone who wants to make changes, saying that this has worked in this and this and this case, and anyone who wants to change is threatening – holding at risk American lives, but in fact, given that, there's uncertainty about success even in what we've done in the past and uncertainty, as he acknowledges, about success in the future.

We're all taking risks and the burden of proof should not be placed solely on people who want to make changes. It should be – the burden of proof should be on all of us to assess where we are today, what future threats are, and what the best policies are. Change sometimes is necessary.

Second, I noted very often that the historical analogies went back pretty far. He's right that there were some recent post-Cold War ones, but also there are references to 1914, to deterrence of Hitler, to deterrence of Stalin.

Now, I've done research on past cases as well and certainly have no objection to doing that, but I would note that if I thought we were facing an Adolf Hitler or a Joseph Stalin in Russia today, or a Mao Zedong in China today, I wouldn't take some of the positions that I do. And if that reemerges in the future, then I think we need to rethink some of our policies. But we should not base our current doctrines and current thinking on past states.

And lastly and most importantly – I think Keith and I agree on this – is that we face a pretty dangerous new world out there with potential less centralized control over weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons in some states who might get them. And that creates both problems of deterrence and problems of nonproliferation, about why it's important to stress nonproliferation.

He and I may differ on how to weigh those balances and how much weight to place on the goals of nonproliferation versus the goals of deterrence, but I think we're debating the right

subject and in the right way and I'm really pleased to have this opportunity to have this discussion with him.

MR. PAYNE: Similarly, it's been a pleasure to have this conversation, debate with Scott here today. I'm not going to take the bit of time I have here to respond to the three points that Scott made. I'm going to do something else instead. We can do that some other time.

Although let me say that, no, I don't believe the burden of truth is only – the burden of proof, rather, or the burden of truth – is only on those who want change. The burden of proof can be in very different places at very different times. In fact, I have often been one seeking change as well as one on occasion who says we shouldn't change here. So that's not a qualifier that I would put on a burden of proof in any of the discussions that I have.

Let me take a minute, though, to talk about something that was raised in the discussion here, and that is the value of extended deterrence and the value of calculated ambiguity for that. It was raised as an important point I think by Mr. Coper, and let me just extrapolate a little bit on that because I believe that taking extended nuclear deterrence off the table for one or more allies could undermine their assurance and thereby undercut the U.S. goals that are served by assurance, which one of those goals is nonproliferation.

Whether we here in Washington believe that extended nuclear deterrence is necessary or that conventional extended deterrence is adequate is irrelevant. The question is what do the allies think of that question? What do the allies think about having extended deterrence, have the nuclear escalation threat implicitly available, or have the United States essentially say, no, extended deterrence will be conventional only? The key is what do the allies think about that?

And many allies have expressed the opinion that nuclear extended deterrence is quite important to them. Some allies, not all, have little confidence in deterrence that takes the nuclear component off the table. We saw that in the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission where we had allied representative after allied representative come to the commission and lay out their views on this subject. Not a one said, by the way, we think nuclear extended deterrence is now irrelevant.

Every ally that came in front of us said, we may have some different variations on the notion, we may have different views on where those nuclear weapons ought to be placed – a lot of variation, but every one of them said, nuclear extended deterrence is quite important to us. Why? By and large – this is my interpretation – is they don't aspire to go back to the nightmare world of conventional deterrence.

As I said, World War I and World War II are good examples of what the mountaintop looks like when you get to a non-nuclear world and you rely only on conventional deterrence. It wasn't a very pretty picture.

I think Prime Minister Thatcher caught this point really well in a single sentence. I quote her. She said, "There are monuments to the futility of conventional deterrence in every village in Europe." And if you travel Europe, you'll see those monuments to the futility of deterrence.

They're big stone slabs with lots of people's names on them. They're throughout every country in Europe and they commemorate everybody who died in World War I and World War II.

Prime Minister Churchill essentially made much the same point. He said, "Be careful above all things not to let go of the atomic weapon until you are sure and more than sure that other means of preserving peace are in your hands." Some, not all, allies do not yet believe that we have met Churchill's requirement. We don't have alternative means, non-nuclear means of fully preserving the peace against the spectrum of threats that they face.

That's why you'll hear comments such as the recent Lithuanian statement that said, "Nuclear deterrence alone cannot guarantee allied security from any threat. It is, however, a crucial part of the overall alliance defense posture." Calculated ambiguity has served this purpose very well in the past and probably is a key to our ability to assure allies in the future. And I'll quit on that point.

MR. JONES: Great. On that note, would everyone join me in thanking our two speakers? (Applause.)

Two very quick orders of business. We have clocks for our guests because we ended right on time. And also, for – (inaudible) – issues going forward, I believe there are handouts on your chair. We will be hosting our next debate June 10th that will actually feature – the college debate topic this year was actually U.S. nuclear weapons policy, and so we'll be bringing in the team that was the regular season winner and the team that won the national championship to debate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and will feature comments from Will Bookless, who I'm not sure he was here or still is here, as well as John Harvey, and to be confirmed but we think, Dr. Miller.

So we hope to see you all then. And, again, thank our panelists for what was a very excellent discussion. (Applause.)

(END)