

**CENTER FOR  
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)**

**TAKING STEPS TOWARD A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

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JOHN HAMRE: Okay, ladies and gentlemen. (Pause.) Okay, ladies and gentlemen. (Pause.) Okay, folks, while we're getting organized, let me just say thank you all for coming. We are delighted to have you with us. My name is John Hamre, I'm the president here at CSIS, and we are fortunate to be partnered with our very good friends at the Schieffer School of Journalism down at Texas Christian University.

We've been doing this series, now – we do about one a month – and it's turned out to be one of the most popular things that we do, and it's really because we're able to use Bob Schieffer and his remarkable capacity to draw people that want to be with him and talk about important issues. And we're very fortunate that way. Bob is very generous with his time, and of course, we want to put together some of the most timely and interesting topics for all of you.

And this is going to be a very interesting discussion tonight. Probably, we're on the front end of a big nuclear debate. We haven't had one, you know, in Washington for probably 15 years, and we're going to have a rip-roaring one here in the next couple of years, I think. And these are people that have probably done more to get this shaped and going than anybody. And I'll let Bob explain all of that.

I do want to give all of you a little advanced notice that we're going to – on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March, we have our next session and it's going to be Bob Schieffer interviewing David Gregory and George Stephanopoulos. Now, won't that be interesting: the three openers on Sunday morning. I think that's going to be a fascinating session.

Bob, welcome. Thank you so much for doing this. Let me turn it to you.

BOB SCHIEFFER: Thank you very much, Dr. Hamre. And thank you again on behalf of Texas Christian University and the journalism school there. We have three people from TCU here today. You can tell the TCU people because they're wearing the purple ties: David Willock, who's the chairman of the college of communications; Larry Lauer over there, who is the vice chancellor of TCU; and John Tisdale, who is a professor at the journalism school. So this is a great thing for TCU and we really appreciate it.

The best thing about having a distinguished panel is you don't have to spend a lot of time on introductions. So I'm going to be brief because all of you know who these people are. I would just say this about Sam Nunn. I've been a reporter in Washington for over 50 years. In all of that time, I always found Sam Nunn to be the single most effective legislator that I came in contact with.

GEORGE SHULTZ: I didn't think he was that old.

(Laughter.)

MR. SCHIEFFER: And that's the best part, is the way he's been able to hold his age.

SAM NUNN: Bob was here when I got here.

(Laughter.)

MR. SCHIEFFER: He's also a fine person, as is the person on this side of me, George Shultz, who I must say meets every definition of a fine public servant. Here is someone who held four Cabinet-level positions: director of the Office of Management and Budget, secretary of labor, secretary of the Treasury, secretary of state. In all of those positions, he gave his country good judgment, good sense and maintained a good sense of humor even when – and I was on this trip with him as secretary of state; you'll remember this, Mr. Secretary, we went into Bon (sp) and when all of the press got off of the plane, the members – (chuckles) – of the U.S. Embassy press office gave us each a press kit that said, "Official Visit of Secretary of State Charles Shultz." (Laughter.)

MR. SHULTZ: Don't I wish.

(Laughter.)

MR. SCHIEFFER: And I still have it, Mr. Secretary. (Laughter.) It's one of my favorite souvenirs.

Syd Drell is a senior fellow at Hoover Institution and advisor on nuclear matters to various administrations for 40 years. He is truly an authority on nuclear matters large and small. David Sanger said to me that Syd Drell probably is cleared for more classified information than any single person that he knows. And David knows a few, which brings me to Mr. Sanger over here, who is the chief Washington correspondent for the New York Times, an English-language newspaper – (laughter) – that is read here in Washington by the elites.

David did not go to TCU, but he went to Harvard, which for many of us at TCU was our backup school. David, I'm so proud that you could be with us today. (Laughter.)

The subject we're going to talk about today is the big one; it is a very big one and it is going to be at the front of this administration's agenda. It's on the front of the world's agenda. And that is, what do we do about nuclear weapons?

Well, back in 2000, Senator Nunn along with Secretary Shultz, Henry Kissinger and William Perry authored an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal in which they said we should begin taking steps to a nuclear-free world. And I just want to ask both of you – but we'll just start with you, Senator Nunn, since you are the chairman of CSIS – (laughter) – is that feasible? Is it possible? Is it just a fairy tale? Is it something to say, gosh, we wish we could do this but this is never going to happen?

How did four men who have dealt with this for so long come to the conclusion that, yes, it was something that we should at least be talking about?

MR. NUNN: Bob, the four of us – George and Henry and Bill Perry and myself – we all went through the Cold War. And we all supported deterrence and we all supported a strong national security including a strong nuclear posturing because we felt that nuclear weapons then were a deterrent to every type of war including conventional war.

But we're in a different set of circumstances now and the world hasn't adjusted. First of all, we've got terrorists who are willing to give us their own lives. There's nothing particularly new about that except the intensity of it and us being the target is new and unpleasant. But we've had terrorists for a long time. But what we haven't had is loose nuclear material in large quantities, large enough quantities to make a bomb the size of Hiroshima. And what we haven't also had is the knowhow, the technology which we thought was a monopoly of state for many, many years; it's not longer a monopoly of states.

People that get a supply, a decent supply, a small amount, but enough to make a nuclear weapons of highly enriched uranium can figure out if they get a couple of physicists working with them and people who know something about the technology – and that's not impossible; it's not a piece of cake. I don't want to make it sound real easy, but the knowhow is spread all over the world now. And so the combination of nuclear material spread around the world, knowhow and terrorists who would use it if they had an opportunity is a fundamentally different equation.

The other thing that's fundamentally different – and I call it the shaping of a perfect storm – is that the nuclear industry is making a renaissance. Now, I happen to support nuclear power based on safety and security and reliability. It has to be part of the answer – not the whole answer – but part of the answer on the carbon problem.

But the Nonproliferation Treaty provides that every country that wants to gain peaceful nuclear technology has the right to do so. The Iranians are claiming that as their right to make – to go into enrichment. The problem is, if you can enrich low-enriched uranium to burn legitimately in power plants, you can also enrich the same technology and take it right up the scale to high-enriched uranium. So those are all things that are happening now. And we are on the verge of a proliferation of enrichment.

So, the bottom line is, we are in a fundamentally different position than we were in during the Cold War. We have other countries that now have nuclear weapons. We have a number of them who may seek nuclear weapons. And deterrence as we visualized it during the Cold War, primarily between the Soviet Union and the United States, is no longer the only equation. It's part of it, but it's not the only equation.

So I came to the conclusion slowly but surely, and George Shultz and Syd Drell and Bill Perry and Henry Kissinger came from different directions, but to the same general conclusion, that we had to change directions and we had to get countries around the globe to work with us. We're in a race between cooperation and catastrophe here. Without cooperation, we're never going to get the steps that we need to take to protect our own citizens. And without the vision of a world that some point, ultimately, will not have nuclear weapons, we're not going to get the cooperation we need.

So the steps are absolutely essential for our national security. The cooperation is absolutely essential for the steps and the vision is absolutely essential for the basic cooperation we need. That's why we came to a fundamentally different conclusion than we had during the Cold War.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Are we headed to a world that it's more likely a nuclear weapon will be exploded than back during the Cold War?

MR. SHULTZ: The way we're going now with proliferation spreading it's more and more likely. Sam has a great image which I'll repeat – not as well as he does it – but he says, think of yourself on the side of a mountain. The top of the mountain is a world free of nuclear weapons. The air is nice and clear up there. We can't even see it from where we are.

The bottom of the mountain is a world where more and more countries have nuclear weapons, which means more and more fissile material is around, and you have plenty of non-deterrent people, as Sam said. So at the bottom of the mountain is a world where it's almost certain that nuclear weapons are going to wind up going off in some cities.

So we need to turn around and start going up the mountain. And we just have to do that. And we need to do it with determination to get to the mountain top. And – at least as I see it, the way we've tried to formulate – and the book that's passed out has important papers on the subject – is to say the vision of where we need to go causes you think about how you're going to get there. And then you start identifying the things you can do. And when you look at them, well, they're difficult but they're doable. It's not impossible; you can do them.

And then that gives confidence, if these are steps that you can take, that you can get there. So there is an interaction here. It's also the case, I think, that every step identified, when you take it, makes the world safer. So we really have to get onto this thing. I have been struck in working on this at the difference in which way our op-eds have been received with Reykjavik time. I sat there with Ronald Reagan in Hofdi house for two days with Mikhail Gorbachev and Edward Shevardnadze and we talked about eliminating nuclear weapons.

I get back to Washington and Margaret Thatcher comes right over. She summons me to the British ambassador's residence. You'll remember, she always carried a little handbag, a stiff handbag. (Laughter.) Well, there's a verb in the British language: "to be handbagged" – (laughter) – and I got handbagged. (Laughter.) I mean, I really got handbagged.

She said, George, how could you sit there and allow the president to talk about getting rid of nuclear weapons? I said, Margaret, he's the president. She said, yes, but you're supposed to be the one with his feet on the ground. But, Margaret, I agreed with him. Oh boy! (Laughter.) But her reaction was very much the way people around town reacted. They were all devotees of deterrence and they couldn't imagine a world other than that.

Ronald Reagan had a long conviction about this. He thought it was immoral. There's a book coming out, I don't know when, a couple of months or so, that's entitled "Reagan's Secret

War.” And it’s an amazing book because it traces through the long period of his convictions about this and the way he thought about it and worked at it and so on. It’s really an extraordinary book.

But, at any rate, after this op-ed was released, I might say we put this together first: Syd Drell and I got it going at the Hoover Institution. We didn’t have any money to have a conference and finally we got a little money out of the director and we got a little more and we got this conference off the ground. And after the op-ed was published, two foundations said, would you need any money? We’d like to give you some money for this. So we had enough money to do some more.

But the reaction was entirely different. I don’t mean that everybody reacted yes, yes, yes. But it was almost as though it was a wakeup call. People had gone to sleep on the subject and it’s getting out of control. So we have to get going on it.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Syd, I want to get you in a minute, but I want to go back to Senator Nunn because I remember you also were a little take aback by what was going on at Reykjavik. How did you come to have a different view of all of this?

MR. NUNN: Well, I didn’t have a handbag. I might have joined Margaret Thatcher at that stage – (laughter) – but what I always felt is that – I said in a speech on the floor after being debriefed by George. And, by the way, George, as usual, was the one who was always accurate about what actually had happened. There was a lot of confusion about what had happened at Reykjavik and there were a lot of stories floating around. And I think George, without any doubt, was the one who had it pegged.

But once I figured out what had happened, I made a talk and talked about the fact that the nuclear weapons were our way of preventing conventional war because conventional war, in my view, would have been heavily tilted towards the Soviet Union because they had a preponderance of tanks and artillery tubes and manpower and so forth, the Warsaw Pact in the Soviet Union.

And so I was concerned about getting the cart in front of the house because I felt we ought to concentrate on the conventional side, which would lead to the nuclear. But I went back and re-read that speech the other day and it did raise those questions, no doubt about it, Bob. And in that speech I said I do believe in the dream of a world without nuclear weapons. I think that ought to be a goal. I’m not trying to quote precisely, but we have to get the conventional balance right.

And you’ll notice that one of the steps in here – because the other countries now, some other countries, including Russia, feel that they are in the position now that we were in then, that they are at a disadvantage. So you have to work hard on regional balance and you have to work hard on the insecurity the countries feel about their own defenses. You have to work hard in regions like India and Pakistan, where Pakistan feels that nuclear weapons prevent India from dominating with a conventional weapon.

You have to work hard with Russia in dealing with them not only on missile defense, but you have to put things like NATO expansion on the table; you have to discuss those things with them, not give them a veto but discuss those things. You have to work hard on the Middle East situation, where Israel is not certainly going to give up their – whatever they may have. They don't make that clear, but they are not going to give things up without seeing some balance of peace in that region with a two-state solution and a lot more stability than they have now and a lot more assurance.

So all of those things have to be done. It's not just nuclear. The steps have to be worked one by one. We have to – as George said – we have to first stop going down the mountain and then try to find base camp. And once we get to base camp, together with others, then we head up the mountain. But it's going to take an awful lot of work. The whole equation has to be addressed, not simply the nuclear.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Syd Drell, what is the first thing we ought to do, if you were going to draw up a list of things?

SYD DRELL: Well, in my view, we have to restart a strategic dialogue with the Russians because between us we have more than 90 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world. And we've got to get our act together and get an agreement on what we're going to follow the START Treaty with, which is going to expire within a year; it has the only clarification procedures that are in effect now. If that goes out of business, we have no means of verifying limits. And we have to settle some other events like where and how we're going to work cooperatively, as we said, on an ABM system. So if when we get to lower levels, it might be effective against a rogue threat coming.

So I think getting that dialogue started is very important. Then the most difficult immediate challenge is the spread of nuclear energy because, according to the Nonproliferation Treaty, the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy is due to all signatories of the treaty. That means they will – like Iran right now – be developing enrichment capacity. And it's a simple fact that if you can enrich uranium to the low percentage needed to run a light-water reactor, you have more than what it – and to make enough uranium to power a reactor of reasonable scale, you have enough – you have a capacity to also make highly enriched uranium, enough to make a bomb.

So that's an immediate problem that hits the commercial world as well as the arms-control world.

MR. SCHIEFFER: You know, I said that – David Sanger said you had clearance to more classified information than anybody he knew of. As far as I know, David has no clearances for classified information – (laughter) – but he seems to know a lot of things.

MR. DRELL: It proved you don't need clearances to know something! (Laughter.)

MR. SCHIEFFER: I'm just going to give a little plug for David's book. This is a fascinating book, especially what he has to say about Iran and what's going on in Iran right now

and what the United States is trying to do about it. It's called "The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power."

MR. NUNN: Bob, could I say one thing? Chett Crocker is here in the audience and Chet wrote, with George's inspiration, a terrific paper on the diplomacy of what has to occur in the direction we're talking about.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Oh, that's great.

MR. NUNN: It's absolutely terrific and it shows you the complexity of the parts that I was talking about and how different things have to be addressed. So any of you in the audience who are interested in the diplomatic side of this and the challenges in that regard would do well to read Chet's papers.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Good. Maybe we'll get him to answer a question here in a minute. Let me ask David. You did a lot of work and a lot of it's in this book about what's going on in Iran right now, and they're – what are they trying to do? Are they trying to build a nuclear weapon?

DAVID SANGER: Well, I guess I – where I came out at the end of the work on the book is they are certainly trying to get the capability to build a weapon, and that may be all they need. Because as Syd just said, if you can show that you can do the enrichment, that's the hardest part of this entire operation. There was some intelligence which came out in the National Intelligence Estimate in 2007 that suggested they suspended their work on the design of the weapon, but almost everybody who interviewed on that, even those who believed the intelligence in the NIE – and there was some vigorous debate on that – said look, once they have the enriched uranium, they can do the high enrichment in a matter of months, they can do the weapons design in a matter of months, and in the world – nuclear age that we're in, a sort of second nuclear age, you don't need to have the arsenal to have the kind of power that comes with that.

And so that gets to just what Senator Nunn raised, which is if we spread nuclear power around, you could have a number of countries that have that capability without having a weapon. Now, some of them have it now, and we don't worry about it. Japan has had this capability for years on end, and you don't see people complaining about that. But in Iran's case and certainly in the case of North Korea, which did drop out of the treaty, you've got a case where if they don't actually build the weapon, they certainly can export the technology. And you know, probably the scariest event we've seen in recent times was the construction of that reactor in Syria with North Korean help, which the Israelis dismantled for them overnight one night in September of 2007. But that showed you that you could go on for years proliferating the technology and helping a country move along without detection.

MR. SHULTZ: I'd like to –

MR. SCHIEFFER: Yes, go ahead.



MR. SHULTZ: – build on what David said about Japan’s capability. Look at the diplomacy that people are taking on with respect to North Korea. You have to go to China. What do you go to China with? I should think you say to them – I don’t know what they’re doing – but I should think you say to them look, if North Korea has a nuclear weapon on the end of a ballistic missile, they’ve already flown ballistic missiles over Japan. What do you think Japan’s going to do? They’re just going to sit there?

The most – the worst nightmare in China must be a nuclear-armed Japan. So, it shows on the one hand the dangers of breakout if these things start alarming people and on the other hand, the kinds of things as a diplomatic process that you try to use to persuade people to do something important about these matters.

MR. SANGER: That was exactly the argument that President Bush used with the Chinese when he was trying to get them to lean on North Korea. The other trick they used was they discussed North Korea’s – with the Chinese – they discussed North Korea’s extraordinary safety standards and then showed them a little map of if there’s a meltdown in Pyongyang where that plume of radioactive material goes, and it was right over Chinese territory. That got the Chinese a lot more interested in it.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Let me just ask you about the diplomacy here because it seems to me all of this fits in with what role NATO is going to play, NATO expansion. Somebody here has talked about we have to have the cooperation of Russia. What do we want Russia to do? What do we – what is the most important thing we can do to have them see this our way or see it – the two of us see it in the same way?

MR. SHULTZ: Seems to me from the standpoint of diplomacy, we don’t want to get ourselves in the position where there’s an American initiative and we go around trying to sign people up to it. That’s not the right way to proceed, and Chet brings that out very nicely. We somehow want to have this emerge as a global initiative, and everybody has a stake in it. And we’re willing to give leadership, and we’re willing to go around and so on, but it should be something that people see very much in their advantage, and that’s beginning to happen. The – we finished a second conference and we sat around Sam and Henry and Bill and I and others and said, you know we should have a conference in some other country and talk to people in some other countries.

And out of the blue came an invitation from the Norwegians. And they said, if you’ll bring your act to Oslo, we’d like to have a conference. So we went, had 29 countries there, all the countries with nuclear weapons. And it was a – great response, a wonderful conference. One of the interesting things was – this is weapons-oriented people that came – the nuclear fuel cycle was not much on the agenda, but it kept coming up and coming up and coming up. This is on the minds of anybody who thinks about nuclear weapons. So, let’s get going on diplomacy to get control of the nuclear fuel cycle.

MR. NUNN: I would say that that’s enormously important – the fuel cycle, working with Russia on that is actually got to be at one of the top priorities, and they have made a very good proposal on that. The Russians have a facility at Angarsk and they’re basically saying, we’re

going to control the technology, but any country that wants to buy into it as an equity partner into this enrichment facility, they would be able to get material, they would be able to make a profit if there's a profit. They're able to do so. I mean, they made that proposal to the Iranians; the Iranians said no. As I read it, they didn't say hell no, and if we basically get any solution with the Iranians, then I think it's going to have to be along some line like that.

The other feature of the – trying to stop the proliferation of enrichment facilities is to adopt the general premise that we aim in the long run to have everybody who enriches under international inspection. That includes us. We've got to be willing to do things if we want others to do things. We cannot basically tell people to stop smoking while we're chain smoking ourselves. That's – Director ElBaradei has said that over and over and I think it's a good analogy. So enriching material has got to be internationally controlled. And I think the – to the extent we can prevent new countries from getting enrichment, I think it's a great help on that.

Our organization, with Warren Buffett's support, has proposed a fuel bank. He put up \$50 million and basically it made available to the IAEA – they would set all the rules. Internationally, that fuel bank, if matched two to one, will come into operation if the IAEA decides to do it. It would be a backup supply facility so that if the market forces were inadequate, countries would be assured they'd have a fuel supply. We've got to take away the excuse of countries to develop their own enrichment facility; otherwise it's going to be hard to control this nightmare.

Another point with Russia is if we could have a breakthrough, and this is tough – it's hard, it would slow it down, but in my view we have time and should take time to view this strategically. We have an opportunity to work with Russia on ballistic missile defense. If we could begin working with Russia on ballistic missile defense, it would have an enormous effect psychologically, because they would no longer view the deployments in Poland and Czech Republic as a threat to them.

It would open up the door also to work on something else that I think is enormously important, and that is getting nuclear weapons off hair trigger alert. We still have thousands on prompt launch just like we did in the Cold War, they still have thousands; it facilitates all sorts of accidents, miscalculations. We've been very good during the Cold War, and they were good in terms of preventing accidents in those calculations, but we were also very lucky. And they were very lucky. We had all sorts of incidents during the Cold War, and you take a continuing prompt launch policy by the United States and Russia and you add to it India and Pakistan, you add to it other countries in the world that have nuclear weapons. And you add to it Iran and North Korea, and you've got yourself a real nightmare there. So working with Russia on ballistic missile defense is enormously important.

The third thing is you can't surround Russia by taking everyone into NATO except Russia and expect them to react any way other than hostile. Now, I have favored taking in new democracies into the European community and so forth, but when you look at Georgia on the map and you look at Ukraine on the map and you say, are we going to be able to work with Russia on nuclear weapons and work with them to help us on the Iranian problem and work with

them on other problems if we basically take those countries into NATO right now against their protest? Russia has to at some point be a part of the Euro-Atlantic security arrangement – not necessarily in NATO, but they’ve got to be included. We cannot expect them to cooperate if we continue down the line that the last two administrations have moved in, frankly.

MR. DRELL: There was another very important idea that came up at the Oslo meeting that George referred to with the fuel cycle. There are a lot of skeptics who say that the goal zero is unattainable, it’s so difficult, not real. Those 29 nations there, one point was foremost in their mind: if you want us to cooperate with you on controlling proliferation and making progress, you have to accept the point that we’re not going to do that in a two-tier world. You have to accept the vision that all nations are headed towards this goal. And that’s why it’s so important – that even though it seems like a very difficult challenge, we stay with this vision and work to – as Sam said, without division – we’re not going to get the steps. And countries made that explicit – we’re headed towards zero, no two-tier world.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Want to ask a question?

MR. SANGER: Yeah. In the course of talking to the Bush administration about your proposal, the answer I got back was first they argued that President Bush had brought down a number of nuclear weapons through the Moscow Treaty somewhat significantly in 2002. Of course, there was very little done by the administration after that time, and the question I kept asking as I was doing interviews for the book was why not? What kept you from doing this?

And the answer I got back was that they couldn’t imagine, even in a negotiation with the Russians getting down to a level below 1,200 or 1,300 U.S. weapons because to go lower to that – say to a Chinese 300 or 400 – you would end up setting a target so low that other countries would feel an incentive to come out and match the United States. Not only would you make China an equivalent power, but the Iranians would say well, we could get to three or four hundred. The Pakistanis, who were already at a hundred or more, would be able to get to three or four hundred. So I was just wondering how you would answer the critique that came from the Bush administration – though they – I don’t think at any point did they stand up and publicly criticize your proposal.

MR. SHULTZ: Well, I can tell you what I would say. I would say, first of all, do you have any idea what one nuclear weapon will do, let alone 2,000? One of the kind that Sid can describe to you now – they’re much more powerful than the ones in Japan. They would incinerate Washington, D.C., or New York City. These are weapons with awesome power. And if one of them went off in a major city somewhere, it would – basically it would shut the world down, it would be so horrific. So, when you talk about each side having 2,000 weapons aimed at each other, it’s an inconceivable amount.

But then it seems to me that dramatizes the importance of having a goal that goes to zero. This is where we want to go. We don’t want to go down to 200 and stop or something. We want to go to zero. And this is the way you can do it, by taking these kinds of steps and by being willing to work at it. Let me tell a little story, just for fun on this business of collaborating with

the Russians on missile defense. At the end of the Reykjavik meeting, we'd also talked about getting rid of ballistic missiles as well as – we were big-time radicals there.

(Laughter.)

MR. SHULTZ: And meeting in – the Soviet position had always been to try to get the Strategic Defense Initiative eliminated. So, Gorbachev says to Reagan at the end, he says, Mr. President, if we get rid of ballistic missiles, why do you need a defense against them? And Reagan said, because people know how to make them, and they'll always be some rogue nation that may get them. And you and I will both be happy that we have an ability to defend ourselves and whatever we get up, we'll share it with you. We'll work with you. And Gorbachev said, Mr. President, you won't even share milk technology with us.

(Laughter.)

MR. SHULTZ: Well, that was the atmosphere of the Cold War days. That was true enough. But I think it's different now, and it's got to be different if we're going to get anywhere.

MR. SCHIEFFER: We'll go to some questions in the audience – we'll make a round.

MR. NUNN: Just one comment on David's question. You've got to get the other countries involved in the negotiations to begin with. U.S. and Russia are going to have to move out first. No country like China, France, Great Britain, or other countries are going to reduce their weapons when we're at thousands and we're at, you know, hundreds. But you have to anticipate that, they have to brought into it – it has to be a joint venture, not just U.S. and Russia.

And they have to agree, at the very least, they're not going to increase while we're decreasing. So you've got to calibrate all of that into it, and at some point – we, of all countries, have the strongest conventional forces in the world – so we basically if you look at – talk to our military, we have basically less need for targeting with nuclear weapons than a lot of other countries. But we have to take all of this into account as we're talking about it. But China, for instance – I haven't been briefed lately on it – the guy who's got all the classified briefings could probably tell us, but it used to be that China did not really upload their missiles. They were not in a prompt launch position. Now, if United States and Russia continue the way we are, then inevitably China's going to move in that position. And when China gets into prompt launch position, it's not going to be very stabilizing.

So when people say, I can't visualize how you ever get to the top of the mountain, ask them this question: Can you visualize how we can have 10, 15 countries with nuclear weapons, terrorists running around, nuclear materials loose, no how proliferating and not have nuclear explosions? I can't. Because it's going to happen, and when it happens, the world's going to change. And it's not going to change for the better. So yes, it's a very tough job, but we've got to tackle it, and we've got to head in that direction.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Syd, how likely is it that a terrorist could get his hands – his or her hands – on a nuclear weapon and where would be the most likely place they would get it?

MR. DRELL: Well, first of all, there's still enough material – enriched uranium for uranium bombs or plutonium – not under tight control around the world to make hundreds if not thousands of bombs. The Harvard people keep track of this, and the Nunn-Lugar legislation and then the Global Threat Reduction Initiative worldwide is being pushed ahead. But as many others have said, that ought to have a very high priority, to get control on that material. Once a organization has uranium, enriched uranium, they can make a bomb just like we did to drop on Hiroshima. That was a uranium, gun-type bomb. None of this fancy implosion business; simple gun-type bomb – inefficient, but you can see what it did to Hiroshima. We dropped it; it had never been tested. That's the most immediate danger. It would take a little bit more to get a plutonium bomb that you have to implode, but the uranium one enrichment, that's the one lurking to –

MR. SHULTZ: The Nagasaki bomb was a plutonium bomb.

MR. DRELL: And that had been tested.

MR. SHULTZ: So that's a long time ago.

MR. DRELL: But that had been tested in Alamogordo before we dropped it. That's available. Uranium's easier.

MR. SCHIEFFER: What about bombs that are already made? Are – How is the security in Russia, for example? Nuclear-wise.

MR. DRELL: Well, since I'm still recovering from air-launch cruise missiles flying from Minot Air Base down to Louisiana in this country, I don't really know what to say. I thought we had done better than that. It's discipline and commitment. The military in Russia we think is in good control, but it's never good enough.

MR. NUNN: The strategic nuclear weapons – the ones that could basically fly across the oceans and hit us are certainly better controlled than any others. The tactical nuclear weapons – the battlefield, short-range nuclear weapons which the Russians still have – we worry a lot about those. You remember one of the Russian generals who later died in a helicopter basically said that a number of those were missing. And of course the Russians denied that. But the battlefield nuclear weapons are part of the missing agenda – we really – that needs to be upfront with Russia. We need to figure out how to get rid of all of those battlefield nuclear weapons. They are a terrorist dream. You could put them in the back of an SUV if they stole them. So those are not as secure in my view as the strategic weapons. The third part is the nuclear materials, and they have much less secured than others. And it's not just Russia, it's countries all over. Russia's in much better shape than they were 10 years ago with nuclear materials, much better shape.

MR. SCHIEFFER: What about Pakistan?

MR. NUNN: Well, I think that I'd put that right at the top of the list of dangers. Not only because of the nuclear materials and nuclear know-how, but because of possible instability in the country, and that's the ultimate danger.

MR. SHULTZ: One of the points here is Sam starts putting things at the top of the list – everything is at the top of the list.

(Laughter.)

MR. SHULTZ: There are lots of things to do, and really, the point is, that if this gets going – and there seems to be a momentum building – if this gets going, it's a daunting diplomatic challenge. It's a huge amount of work to be done. So Secretary Clinton I'm sure will be asking Congress for appropriations to expand, to be able to field a better and better team. And it's also quite obvious that people who are quote diplomats unquote are not going to be effective unless they're accompanied by scientists. You've got to have people who understand this from the inside out with you if you're going to negotiate effectively. So that's another skill that's going to have to get going. I think we have a big diplomatic task ahead of us.

MR. SCHIEFFER: We have a very distinguished audience today. I'd like to – Congresswoman Jane Harman is here right on the front row, Max Kampelman. Would any of you like to ask a question – and Chet Crocker is here, we've already mentioned him. And if not one of you, then we'd like to take some other questions from the audience if you have some at this point. And there's the mike right here. Jane? You wouldn't be a member of Congress if you didn't have a question, here. (Chuckles.)

REPRESENTATIVE JANE HARMAN (D-CA): I wouldn't be a member of Congress if I didn't speak, right. No, I think this is absolutely fascinating, and a huge reminder of the recent history that many in Congress don't even know anything about. I just wanted to add to the stew dirty bombs, which are much easier to put together. I mean, the whole idea that you could take some material out of a radiology machine at a hospital and blow it up on a window with two sticks of dynamite, and the half-life of some of that stuff could be 30 years, and you would contaminate two square kilometers of Manhattan, or something like that. I think that's extremely likely.

Obviously, it is not as horrific as the stories you're telling about what modern weapons can do, but I just wanted to ask how easy that is and what strategies we could use against some of that, because I think, if you ask the question, Bob, of what could really happen – what's likely to happen or what's possible to happen – I think the dirty bomb scenario is much, much easier than any of the rest of this.

MR. NUNN: I would agree with that. I think that is most likely. In fact, I think we're very fortunate it hasn't happened so far. And it's going to – unless the public is better prepared for it than they are now, it's going to frighten an awful lot of people. And if I were in the nuclear power business, I'd be very worried about the psychological repercussions from a dirty bomb going off because of the feeling, around the world, that all nuclear materials are unsafe. I think it's a real danger.

So the only answer to it that I have is that every country has to secure their radiological material. I think we need to do a better job in our country; we can't just point at other people. There's a U.N. resolution that has passed charging every country with that responsibility. One of the things we could do with Russia, I've felt, is to have U.S. and Russian scientists and military people working together, offer themselves to other countries that might need our expertise to secure their materials, because we've worked together for the last 15, 16 years. So it's very important.

We stood up an organization – or our foundation did – it's not the only answer to the problem, and I don't want to pretend it is, but it could help – called the World Institute of Nuclear Security, a private organization that we funded that's now in Vienna. We have a director; we're about to get an international board. Its job will be to invite every entity that has nuclear material, whether it's a hospital or whatever the facility – agricultural use, food purification – to join and begin working on best practices and peer reviews, all over the world. We do that on the safety side – the nuclear power industry did it after Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, but doing it on the security side is equally important.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Syd, did you want to add to that?

MR. DRELL: I'll just add a sentence: The greatest damage done by a dirty bomb is the high explosive – it's not casualties, it's psychological and economic damage – but it's very likely.

MR. SCHIEFFER: All right.

Q: Yes, may I add to that there's also denial of space – you block off – Goldfinger was also a question of blocking off the U.S. gold stocks in Fort Knox – in Kentucky. But my question is quite different: Senator Nunn, you talked about missing tactical weapons. One thing about missing tactical weapons is their shelf life; would you comment on that? And before I finish, I might add two more things. One is, should Russia be a part of NATO? Then we could have Russian lines of communication to Afghanistan – they're well-developed; they were supporting 110,000 troops there for many years. And lastly, that nuclear disarmament, being from India, has always been a highlight of the government of India before it even became independent.

MR. SCHIEFFER: All right. Let's try to get through that first one, there.

MR. NUNN: Well, on the latter question, I think it was a mistake, years ago, to exclude, in effect, implicitly and explicitly, in some cases, Russia from being a part of some type of security alliance – it may not be NATO – it may be a broader umbrella than NATO is a part of. So I think Russia ought to be part of an Atlantic-Euro security alliance, and if it's not – and I say alliance; that may be too specific a term – if it's not, it's going to be very hard to deal with Russia on these major issues.

I think one of the things that we seem to have difficulty with in this country is distinguishing between the vital and the vivid; things that are vivid get a lot of attention and things that are vital sometimes get almost no attention. And it's vital that we have a relationship with Russia; I must say, it's vital for them, too. It's not a one-way street, and we're not going to give them veto on things. We're not going to say, we need you so you can do what you want. They need us, also, and they need to be part of the Western world.

Interesting economic speech that Putin just made in Davos. The headlines were the criticism of the U.S., as they would be, but he had a lot of interesting things to say about the world economic situation – very interesting speech. So, yes, I think we need to work with Russia and we need to broaden the concept. I don't think Russia would want to be a part of NATO; I don't think there's any chance they will be an early part of NATO, but they should be part of a discussion about European security. I think that's absolutely essential.

On tactical nuclear weapons and so forth, you know, we have what we call permissive action links where weapons that are basically in our inventory and that main part – you have to have a code, and if you try a code two or three times and it doesn't work, they basically self-destruct in the sense that they cannot be operated. It would be to the advantage of the world if every country that had nuclear weapons had PAL devices. Now, I think – I'm sure we have worked with other countries on that, and in some cases, our friends.

I'm sure we've had some discussions with countries like India and Pakistan. The level of trust is probably not sufficient for U.S. technology to be used in all those cases, but it's certainly in our interests. Now, the Nonproliferation Treaty, interpreted by some as blocking that cooperation. I don't think that's the right interpretation, but if it is, we need to take another look at it, because even if a country is not part of the Nonproliferation Treaty – they've got nuclear weapons; we want them to have some type of device, whether it's their technology or whether it's with our systems.

MR. SCHIEFFER: All right. Let's try to, if we can make the questions a little shorter, that would be great. So we can get to more.

Q: Sure, Steven Young with the Union of Concerned Scientists. The Obama administration is required to do a nuclear posture review by the end of this year. I think this is going to be a very important, obviously, look at nuclear – look at these questions. Would you agree that – there have been two of these earlier, by Clinton, then by Bush, that were not very dramatic in the changes they recommended.

Would you recommend that they make more changes in this posture – more dramatic – along what you're talking about, particularly a question of should they – should Obama say, going in, that the posture of – should have this as his preface – the only role for nuclear weapons is as a deterrent – that's it; full stop – and make that the basis of the policy going forward for the posture review?

MR. SHULTZ: President Obama has innovated with something – he has a Web site at the White House. And posted on it, under the heading of foreign policy, is a statement that says



– I can't quote it exactly – but something like, Obama and Biden will seek to have a world free of nuclear weapons. This is our job, or something like that, and we'll have to take these kinds of steps very consistently, the sort of steps that are outlined here. And it seems to me if they – since they are in that posture – not if, they're there; they've put it out publicly – that that's the posture we're in.

And then a lot flows from that. And a lot flows from that with other countries; a lot flows from that in terms of what you can expect the United States to try to do. So I think it's a good posture to go into the nonproliferation review. And I think, also, if we can get into this position, we'll be better off on the nonproliferation issue. The way we are now, we're sort of against other people getting nuclear weapons and we're sitting there with lots of them. So we're trying to prevent things; we're just in a negative position.

Probably, a lot of people here are going to watch the Super Bowl on Sunday, and any football coach will tell you that the best defense is a good offense. So if we can get in the position that President Obama seems to be getting us into, we'll be on the offense – there's something we're for. And then lots more things are possible once you're in that position, and if you have action going on the nuclear fuel cycle, for example, that's really there and doing something, you can go to Iran, as a diplomatic matter, and say okay, so this is for peaceful purposes, put it into this international pool with everybody else and have it supervised and manned, in many respects, by people from the international community so that everybody knows what's going on. So I think an awful lot of positive things flow from getting yourself in the position of saying, my goal is a world free of nuclear weapons and I'm going to work for it.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Let's go here.

Q: Thanks, Brian Bender with the Boston Globe. Syd mentioned the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, Nunn-Lugar; can you just give a couple of specifics of what you think the U.S. government – the Obama administration – needs to do immediately to achieve what is set out to be a goal of securing that nuclear material that currently exists – or nuclear weapons material – in four years? It's taken them about 15 years to secure about half of it, if my estimates are right; how do you do it in four years? Is it possible? What do you need to do immediately, two or three things?

MR. NUNN: I think it can be done in four years and I think you have to – I think you – one thing I would suggest they do is take a look at what the Bush administration has done. And they've done a lot; there's been a lot done. Every administration, basically, has the tendency to say nothing was done until we arrived, but there've been a lot of things that have been done. And on the Nunn-Lugar program, the administration – they were lukewarm to it to begin with, but then they really got behind it.

And then they developed the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which Syd alluded to a minute ago – that's working with Russia. We put a lot of money up in our Department of Energy to bring back highly enriched uranium that was furnished to countries all over the world by the United States and by the Soviet Union. There's a whole list of countries that we're trying to

bring that material back from, with the cooperation of Russia, that would go back to Russia and be blended down.

We have a whole list of countries that we're trying to bring that material back from. But the baseline of the GTR program and the Nunn-Lugar program is not nearly broad enough. On the baseline, we're making a whole lot of progress, but there's a world beyond that baseline that's not included in the original goals and that needs to be viewed. So a partnership with Russia, here, but a partnership with a lot of other countries is absolutely essential.

It's not money alone, but it's also a lot of hard work, and a lot of work with countries that have nuclear materials and don't want to give them up. The direction that George is talking about – the vision and the steps – if the United States were to – and there are things that have to be done – it has to be done carefully, there have to be hearings, there's some legitimate concerns but they can be addressed – but if we were to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it would make an enormous difference, psychologically, in the world, and it would make cooperation, not automatic, but it would make it a lot more likely to happen in all of these areas.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Let me – we'll have one more question from the audience and then I want to just go around and let everybody say something they'd like to say in closing. Yes?

Q: My name is Jennifer Neper (ph). I'm with the Strategic Posture Commission, and I'm here on behalf of Dr. Freddy Iklé (sp), who had a question he wanted me to ask. Do you think the top of the mountain would require a fundamental change in the world order to prevent serious violations of this abolition of nuclear weapons? Would a world government be necessary? Would a United Nations with a nuclear-armed praetorian guard? What would the end state have to look like to prevent these violations?

MR. SHULTZ: You certainly would want to have assurance that you have a method of detecting any cheating and you had a clear, sure-to-happen way of dealing with that cheating. And I don't think that necessarily means a world government or something, but it means you have a nuclear regime that people agree to that's going to see to it that we continue to have a world free of nuclear weapons. And that's one of the kind of tasks that you have to address yourself to and figure out how you're going to do that and get people to collaborate.

You can think of things immediately, but that's one of the great diplomatic tasks – just to say again, you could not accomplish that – if I were charged with negotiating that, I couldn't do it if I didn't have Syd and people like that who understand the technicalities of this and the scientific aspects of it much better than I ever will.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, we are getting close to the end. I want to give each of you a chance – sometimes I'm happy to say we're getting close to the end; today I'm really sorry – (laughter) – because it's been a fascinating discussion, but Syd, what's the most important thing – what's the most important thought you'd like to leave this group with today?

MR. DRELL: I sort of cop out at this point. I'm a physicist and I rely on Einstein when he said, "Politics is much harder than science." It's true – the verification needs – I mean, if we

get down to small numbers, we have to verify that there's no hidden material, or no hidden and disassembled warhead that we don't know about. The accuracy requirement is greater. The level of trust we're going to have to create among countries – all countries – that they're going to allow a degree of transparency as to what's going on in their countries is beyond anything. These are very difficult problems. And they go together.

I can't give you a verification scheme that's going to work without enormous trust. But people have to realize what a dangerous treadmill we're on, now, going down, as Sam has said. And a world with many nuclear nations doesn't want a Cuban Missile Crisis, for example. And you look at the close calls in the Cold War, where there was just one adversary. It was a bipolar world that was simple and clear. There's much more complex, much more dangerous technologies out there. And so we just have to understand, we have to work at this problem; we have to succeed, because the alternative is unacceptable. But it's a formidable diplomatic job, and when I listen to Chet Crocker and people like this talk, I realize how easy physics is. (Laughter.)

MR. SCHIEFFER: David?

MR. DRELL: I mean it!

MR. SANGER: What strikes me, Bob, about the problem as we've been describing it today, is that we've got two issues that are operating on two very different clocks. The long-term issue that Secretary Shultz, Senator Nunn, Professor Drell raised today of how you get down to zero and what stages you go to. And obviously, that is a multi-year, generational effort. And then, with the states that we are most concerned about now – with Iran, with North Korea – a different kind of problem with Pakistan and India – and with states that we're fearful could get a weapon, if Iran, for example, made progress, where we're working on a much shorter clock, where President Obama is going to have to make decisions probably within a year or two on Iran, if he is going to stop them from getting that capability.

We may be too late already, on North Korea, after their nuclear test. And so to add to the political complexity that Syd laid out here, is you've got to somehow convince the American people how you have one set of policies for the short-term clock and another for the longer term. And I think you've made the argument here today, which may well be right, that they're reinforcing – that if we're coming down, you can convince other countries to as well. But we may get into a situation where we're in at least a diplomatic and perhaps something worse with some of these countries that are seeking a new capability. And I'm not sure that the new administration, yet, has sort of gotten their minds around how you handle that short-term and longer-term problem.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Secretary Shultz?

MR. SHULTZ: I think we have to work at this with a sense of urgency. And no doubt, it will take a long time, but I don't think we should keep saying that. I think we should say, this is an important problem and we see things that we have to do, so let's get going and do them. And if we do that, I think maybe we'd be surprised at how much could get accomplished. And if

people around the world saw that somehow, the leaders of the world are able to take on a difficult subject and really begin to do something about it that's going to make everybody safer, they may say gee, the world looks pretty good after all, and maybe we can do some other things, and get some encouragement out of that.

I might just do one little plug here: As we talked – our little group – about what can we do – we're not government; we're just guys out there trying to be helpful – we thought, well, one thing we can do is look at these steps and try to get the most professional, scientifically trained people we can find to address themselves to each of these steps. And then convene very knowledgeable people, distribute these papers ahead of time and discuss them intensely. And then, have them revise their papers in the light of the discussion. And the book – the big fat book that you have is the result of that, and the thinner one, by Chet Crocker, is the same process with respect to the diplomatic side.

So we've tried to give the president and his advisors, if they decide they really want to get going, something to look at to get started with. These are the things – steps you need to take; these are considerations about them by people who are really knowledgeable; and here are some people who are willing to work with you to help do this and move this ball along. So if anybody here has a chance to get in and see the president, why don't you give him a copy of that book? (Laughter.)

MR. SCHIEFFER: All right. Senator Nunn, do you want to take her on home, here?

MR. NUNN: Well, my final thought would be that I think the main thing that has happened out of these Wall Street Journal articles is that – with Shultz and with Kissinger and Bill Perry and myself – people who have gone through the Cold War – Syd Drell, Max Kampelman, many other people – in fact, something like 65 percent of all the living national security advisors, secretaries of state and secretaries of defense have signed up for this – so it's not just us, it's a lot of very strong people, some of whom –

MR. SHULTZ: Democrats and Republicans, about equal numbers, not partisan.

MR. NUNN: Democrats and Republicans, so we've got a big consensus. We've had four of the top leading former statesmen in Germany just penned an op-ed piece on this subject endorsing this approach, and the same thing in England. And so there is some momentum, but the main thing that's been done so far, I think – and the thing that will pay the most dividends – is we, I think, have made the political ground and intellectual ground safe for young people who will be dealing with this problem to really tackle it.

And that's happening all over, not just in this country, but around the globe. A lot of bright young people are saying, hey, this is something that's going to affect our generation, these old guys have talked about it; now we're really going to try to do something about it. I have a sense of urgency about it, as George said, and one way that I approach this whole thing intellectually, and have for a long time, is asking myself the question, if there was a nuclear explosion and one of the great cities in America went up in smoke – or another city around the world went up in smoke – and hundreds of thousands of people were killed, and the world was

traumatized, the economic system was basically shut down because of lack of confidence, what are the things we would wish we had done to prevent it?

And then, once you make that list, then you say why aren't we doing them now? And let's get started. And that's what we're trying to do. But it'll take some time, but we've unleashed, I think, a lot of creativity out there, with people a lot smarter than I am, that are going to be tackling this business. We have a base camp study going on, we have a verification study going on; we've got a lot of bright people working on it. So, by and large, I think that we're going to have a lot of progress on this, at this point, I'm reasonably optimistic, in a very troubled world.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, thank you very much, gentlemen, on behalf of CSIS and TCU.

(Applause.)

(END)