

**CENTER FOR  
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)**

**SYMPOSIUM ON IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES  
IN THE UNITED STATES**

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TOM SANDERSON: Good morning, folks. Thank you for coming today. We really appreciate your participation. Welcome to the CSIS symposium on improvised explosive devices in the United States. My name is Tom Sanderson. I'm the deputy director of the Transnational Threats Project, your co-host today, along with David Heyman from our homeland security program, the director of it. Special thanks to Bob Leskowski here in the front, who former assistant secretary for infrastructure protection who came to me with the idea this summer and I very much appreciate you having done that.

We're all well aware of the destruction that IEDs are causing in Iraq. Capable of great destruction against armor and human alike, they are responsible for over 40 percent of American military deaths in Iraq. While Iraq provides a large and ready supply of materials for making IEDs, they are also relatively easy to build within a civilian non-war environment. With that, we will have a panel today to discuss from several top officials from across the interagency and at the state level. We are trying to prevent this from happening in the United States, essentially looking at the migration of this technology to the U.S. homeland.

Today's panels will include experts from the FBI, from DHS, from the Pentagon, and from the Michigan State Police. But to begin with, we're fortunate enough today to have with us Secretary Michael Chertoff from Homeland Security, who will lend his insight and guidance on this topic. I would like to turn it now to David Heyman, who will introduce the secretary. David has very ably led the homeland security program here at CSIS. And I think those in government in the room today know what sort of real impact David has made. And we're very lucky to have here. So, David, thank you.

DAVID HEYMAN: Thank you, Tom, and let me join Tom in welcoming all of you here to CSIS and also welcoming the C-SPAN audience, which I believe is here as well. Quick reminder – if you have cell phones, turn them off, and we'll get started. Also, let me extend our deep appreciation and greetings to you, Mr. Secretary from Dr. Hamre who is on travel today and could not be here to join us. So last night we saw the devastation that IEDs have in Pakistan as hundreds of thousands of people waited in line to greet Benazir Bhutto on her return to Pakistan.

And this is not new. We've seen this now across the world. IEDs are the preferred weapon of terrorists. We have seen it in Bali, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, London, Madrid, et cetera. But not in America. So we worry here today about nuclear weapons and dirty bombs, but we haven't seen IEDs. And the question is, should we? That's what our discussion is.

And today, we are pleased to have with us the man who leads these efforts to protect us at home. Few of us have to worry day in and day out if we're going to be

attacked today or tomorrow or the next, or from wildfires to hurricanes, what catastrophe may befall us. As secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff oversees 208,000 men and women who must carry out that duty for us every day.

In a department that is charged with securing our country's borders, ports, transportation systems and critical infrastructure, while ensuring an effective and unified response to major incidents and natural disasters, this is an awesome responsibility and, I would say, a thankless job. So let me start by saying to you, Mr. Secretary, thank you. Thank you for your leadership. You have led us through the merger, one of the largest mergers in the midst of crisis. You are protecting us when we have not had the full situation awareness we seek nor necessarily all the resources and programs we may desire. And everyday, you have led us in trying to get us closer to safe.

I have had the privilege of meeting with the secretary on a number of occasions. And he has an extraordinary gift for understanding and for articulating some of the most difficult and complicated policy issues, all of these frankly in the world of terrorism and homeland security. We are fortunate for this. And he has made a point of putting experienced professionals in the top positions across the department, one of the hallmarks of good leadership.

There are a number of critical issues before the secretary today, before the department, and our nation. IEDs in America is just one of many, but he brings with him his incisive mind, tremendous skill and dedication to this difficult, demanding, and crucial job. And it is our pleasure to have him with us as our guest today. Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome Secretary Michael Chertoff. (Applause.)

MICHAEL CHERTOFF: Well, I want to thank Tom and David for bringing us all here together. I want to thank David for that very fine introduction. Usually, you don't get to hear an introduction like that until you're being buried. It reminds me of the scene in – I think it's Huckleberry Finn where I think it's Tom Sawyer comes back and they think he's been lost in a flood and he hears these wonderful things said about him. And that's one of those rare times like this where you get to hear nice things said about you.

I do want to say that CSIS and David, in particular, have been outstanding in trying to put before the public and before Congress and decisionmakers some very thoughtful and tough-minded analyses of some very challenging policy issues. And I really appreciate his work. I think as we develop the field of homeland security and the doctrine and the theory of what we're doing, having good, thoughtful policy discussion, recognizing these are very difficult issues and they don't lend themselves to bumper stickers or political slogans – that kind of thoughtful discussion is very important. And CSIS has been a leader in making sure that we have a balanced, intellectually honest, and thoughtful view of some of these major, major contentious issues that we have before us.

I also want to thank the panelists who are going to be following for discussing this critical issue. You know, in some ways, the discussion of IED threats is the discussion of

terrorism. Because although we can conceive of a terrorist attack that would be focused on a biological infection or some kind of a chemical spray, the reality is the vast majority of terrorist attacks are conducted with bombs.

And of those, the vast majority are improvised explosive devices; they're not preexisting manufactured bombs that would be used by a military force. And so, it's not surprising that the challenge of dealing with IEDs is one that is a global challenge, whether it is in the war zone in Iraq or Afghanistan or in Europe, where the Germans recently rolled up a plot to use peroxide-based IEDs that caused damage in Germany or in Britain, where we've seen an abortive effort earlier this summer to use vehicle-born IEDs to cause damage in London or whether it's the concern we have in this country about IEDs. And of course, we all remember the bombing of Oklahoma City, which was, in fact, an IED.

So the very essence of what we do in fighting terrorism in a way is a challenge to the issue of IEDs. And that's why – I've got a little display I'd like to put up here because I do think it illustrates and puts in context the whole question of how we look at IEDs. It basically examines the spectrum – I think we've handed this out – going from left to right. And I hasten to add that the left and right have nothing to do with politics. It's just the directional flow of the spectrum. But you'll see that really, the way of dealing with IEDs is recognition that we have many different points in which we can counter an IED threat.

In some ways, it's the expression “left of boom” that captures and articulates this concept; that before we actually have the explosion, there are a series of intervention points, when if we can prevent something from happening, we can stop that boom from taking place.

That begins with deterring and incapacitating those who obtain the funds for IEDs, the development of the organization that's going to manufacture and plant the IED, intercepting the gathering and provision of materials for the IED. And then as we move closer to boom along the spectrum from left to right, we get into the actual detection and disruption of planning of attacks, the on-site blocking of the detonation of a bomb. And then of course, if worse comes to worse and we do have boom – the bomb goes off – our ability to manage and mitigate the consequences does have a major impact in terms of at least reducing the amount of damage and the amount of impact that that bomb does have on innocent people. And finally, there is attribution, which is our ability to go back and find those who caused it.

The reason I lay this spectrum out for you – and I think a lot of you have the handout – is because it's easy to view the issue of IED prevention in a very narrow focus, to look only at the issue of what do we do on site to prevent people from actually bringing in the bomb and detonating it. But actually, if you look at – there we go – if you look at the whole spectrum, you see we have many, many points of intervention where we can stop an IED well before we arrive at the scene where the bomb is being delivered.

And much of what we're trying to do is push that effort to counter the IED as far left as possible: interfering with the obtaining of funds, stopping the organization from developing, preventing people from coming into the country if there are operatives from outside who are going to be the ones who actually manufacture and deliver the bomb, finding ways to disrupt the manufacture of the bomb; making it harder to accumulate the materials that would go into a bomb, making it hard to move a bomb, once it's manufactured, into the site where it's going to be detonated, and ultimately, giving us the ability to detect and defuse the bomb if it's delivered on site.

So I would say that spectrum is something you all ought to bear in mind as you consider the issue of the IED threat. Now, I won't talk about all of those issues. I'll be focused more at the kind of middle of that spectrum in this conversation. It would be a mistake not to recognize that the more we can do left of boom earlier in the spectrum, the less we're going to have to do as we get closer to boom.

A second general observation I'd like to make is, this is not just a federal problem. This is a problem that takes place at all levels of government, state and local. And also, a lot of the role that has to be played in dealing with IEDs is going to be carried out by the private sector. And that's because, certainly when it comes to building the architecture of protection, but also when we talk about the issues of controlling materials that could be the ingredients of bombs, the private sector is going to have to play a major role in that. And how we integrate the private sector with various levels of government in this enterprise is one of the key challenges for Homeland Security as we move forward.

The third element I've got to emphasize is the importance of intelligence. Basically, everything we do in the area of prevention is a trade-off. The more precise the information we have about the source of a threat, the narrower and more focused our intervention is to prevent the threat. That results in reduced disruption and reduced inconvenience to the vast majority of people, and a much more efficient use of our resources to prevent bad things from happening.

When we don't have intelligence and when we don't have information, we have to operate in a much more generalized and, dare I say, blunderbuss fashion. We have to sweep more broadly because we don't know specifically what we're targeting. That means we have to intercept and engage with more people, including more innocent people. We have to take broader counter-measures that will result in more inconvenience and more general disruption to our way of life. That's why the better we hone our intelligence, the better we are in having a focused, less disruptive and less costly intervention to prevent an IED from detonating.

That's one of the reasons why I argue that people who resist intelligence-gathering are often seeing a false trade-off between intelligence collection and security on the one hand, and privacy on the other. I believe that the more focused our intelligence gathering is, the more we can respect the privacy and the way of life of the vast majority of people because we can be very targeted in what we do.

The final thing I want to point out in terms of kind of general observations is the importance of public observation and what I would call public networking in terms of countering the IED threat. It is not an accident or, frankly, not a surprise that many of the plots that have been disrupted over the last few years have been disrupted because individual citizens noticed an anomaly and contacted the authorities.

Earlier this summer, the disruption of the plot to set off bombs in London and Glasgow began with an ambulance driver in London who saw something funny about the way a car was parked outside a nightclub and notified the police. Now that is not government detection; it is not a sensor on every corner; it is not some magic piece of technology. What it is is the fact that ordinary citizens looking around, being alert, and not being embarrassed to speak up actually are a force multiplier for protecting us against IEDs.

I can go back to 2001, when Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, was trying to light his shoe on an airplane. And that seems a little comical sometimes, but let me tell you, had he succeeded in lighting the shoe, the bomb would have gone off and would have caused enormous damage to the plane with a very high likelihood that the plane would have actually been destroyed and crashed with a substantial loss of life. Again, it is the intervention of people and ordinary citizens that is a key element in this strategy.

So, with that, let me try to focus a little bit more on some specific elements of what we are focused on, particularly in the middle of the spectrum. And one theme that is going to be repeated throughout all of the discussion that I have is, this is about risk management; it is not about risk elimination.

I find that a lot of the debate we have about countermeasures tends to fall into one of two extreme categories. One category is, how come we don't have a hundred percent protection? Why can't we guarantee that there won't be an IED? And aren't we a failure because we can't do that? And the other end of the spectrum is, how come we want to regulate business? You know, we're destroying prosperity; we're destroying the economy; it's over-regulation. It's quite obvious both of those perspectives are fundamentally incompatible, and either one of them is actually unsustainable. And I'll give you a concrete example on each end.

One of the challenges that we face is peroxide-based explosives, which are a little harder to detect than nitrogen-based explosives. And we are constantly working – you probably saw a story in the paper yesterday about how we continually challenge our screeners to look for smaller and smaller component parts of detonators, and smaller and smaller elements of what might be built into a bomb, to see if we can run these components by them when they go through the screening process. And we test to failure. The example I use is what they do in the aircraft industry when they roll out a new jet, a new airliner. They put it through maneuvers and they stress it in the air environment in a way that no sane pilot ever would do when you have passengers on board, but that's how you see what the limit is and that helps you to prepare.

So some people say, well, why can't you have a perfect way of banning these things and preventing bomb parts from being smuggled on board? I do have a perfect way. If I were to order that no one can bring any hand luggage on an airplane, that would be a hundred percent guarantee against someone sneaking a bomb on board in their hand luggage. And if I went further and said there has to be a strip search for every person getting on a plane, I could guarantee they're not going to bring any bomb components on.

That is a 100 percent solution. That is an unrealistic solution; it is a solution I don't think a sane person would advocate, but that is, in some sense, a perhaps slightly exaggerated, but not terribly exaggerated example of what you would need to do to have a 100 percent guarantee against something. Likewise, we could ban peroxide. We could make it illegal to manufacture sub-peroxide, but there would be many very, very important and useful functions that we would lose if we were to do that.

On the other end are those people who don't want to have any regulation. Their view is, anything is too much. And there I would say, again, that seems to me to be not only a recipe for insecurity, but actually quite bad for business as well. Because the fact as we all know it is, if a failure to regulate – an undue failure to regulate led to a chemical plant being blown up in the middle of a city and there were drastic and horrible consequences, the resulting reaction, both from a liability standpoint and a probably over-regulation standpoint, would be far worse for business than some judicious regulation up front, to make sure that we are attending to the risk in a reasonable way and reducing it in a reasonable way.

This is about making investments and making preparations before the emergency happens, something that we're, frankly, not always very good at doing in this country. We tend to wait until the emergency and then we kind of overreact. My suggestion here is – and I think smart businessmen see this – we ought to do some judicious regulation up front to minimize – not eliminate, but minimize the risk so we can do it in the coolness of the period before something happens rather than in the heat after a disaster occurs.

With those basic concepts laid out, let me take you briefly through some of what we are doing as part of the Department of Homeland Security's bomb prevention and IED prevention strategy. We've been working on this now for a couple of years; it is a very high priority. I think we have made dramatic strides all across that spectrum from left to right on – I think many of you know that what we are doing and what other agencies are doing will very soon be memorialized in some national-level planning documents, including a Homeland Security presidential directive. But we haven't waited for the paperwork. The paperwork is really going to be what institutionalizes and memorializes what we have put into effect in the real world. Because my concern, frankly, is not words; it's deeds and actions. And that's what we're about.

Let me begin by talking about prevention. And again, just to remind you and put a little place-holder in, I believe the very worst IED attack in terms of casualties, or certainly one of the worst, in Iraq was a casualty – an attack triggered by an individual named al Banna – I think his first name was Hassan al Banna – a couple of years ago in

Iraq, with about 124 people being killed as a consequence of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonating. We know the perpetrator because we lifted his fingerprints off the steering wheel of the VBED that detonated.

Why did we do that? How do we know what his fingerprints were? Because, amazingly enough, he tried to get into the United States a couple years earlier. And it was our capability of targeting him as a potential risk that resulted in him being put into secondary, questioned, and then the officer at O'Hare who did the questioning refused him admission to the country. But we did get his fingerprints. And that's how we know this is the same individual who detonated a VBED a couple years later in Iraq. That is really the left of the spectrum. What that is is using intelligence and analysis to identify someone who is a higher risk of being a bomber, pulling him out, questioning him and keeping him out of the country. If we can do that, that is our optimal strategy against IEDs.

But supposing we can't do that, supposing we have – someone comes in unbeknownst to us, or we have to deal with someone who's a homegrown terrorist. Let me tell you some of the things we're doing first in the issue of prevention. Part of prevention is, if someone is here already and we cannot expel them or incapacitate them, we've got to make it harder for them to get the materials to make bombs, to make improvised explosive devices. And we're very challenged here because it doesn't take a lot of skill to make an IED using household chemicals that you can find in your kitchen, or that you can find if you go to a store like Home Depot or something like that. But we can at least minimize some of the highest-consequence risks: dangerous chemicals.

We know and for a long time we urged Congress to give us the authority to address, and they happily did so, that a large concentration of chemicals located at a plant or in a transit facility near an area which is heavily populated is essentially a ticking time bomb in place. If someone were to detonate it, they would have an in-place capability to cause an enormous amount of damage and destruction.

That's why we have unrolled and we're in the process of now fleshing out our regulations under the chemical security laws that Congress recently passed. Our focus here is dangerous chemicals located near populous areas, or large quantities of dangerous chemicals which might be readily stolen and fashioned into bombs. And we are very close to issuing our appendix A, which is going to set forth the categories of chemicals and the quantities of chemicals that will require people, at the very least, to engage with us about what are the appropriate levels of protection and restricted access that ought to be put into place in order to minimize the risk, although obviously not to eliminate the risk.

And let me pause for a moment and again put this in the context of risk management. It's quite obvious that a high concentration of a chemical like propane or chlorine in outside tanks right next to a school is suggestive of an area where we ought to make sure we have some protection in place to prevent people from attacking and detonating.



At the other extreme, we don't want to ban propane because everybody who has a gas grill has some propane. And although we can imagine that someone might collect propane canisters and fashion a bomb, to simply make propane prohibitive would be enormously damaging, frankly, to our way of life and to a whole variety of beneficial uses.

So because of that spectrum of risk, our theory is, let's put the most protection against the highest risk, and for some of the lower risk we may not actually have a formal protection, but we would want to give guidance to people, including merchants, about what to look for if they see something suspicious, or people seem to be buying lots of propane, or if the acquisition of certain kinds of materials are suggestive someone is building a bomb. This is a risk-balanced approach.

Again, we have to be careful because it easily lends itself to exaggeration one way or the other. But I think if you focus in particular upon consequence as a major variable, you will see that the logic to what we're doing is the most protection and the most restriction with the highest consequence and where the distance between assembly and boom is very short. And particularly when you have chemicals in situ, in a particular location, that distance is short because you don't have to transport them.

I also want to pause for a moment and say we need to look not only at conventional IEDs, which are bad enough, but also at IEDs which could be enhanced with radioactive material. Perhaps because we just concluded or are in the stages of concluding our most recent TOPOFF exercise, which is a nationwide exercise we've engaged in, involving the scenario of dirty bombs going off in Guam, Oregon and Arizona, I have very much present in my mind the fact that a dirty bomb would be worse than a conventional bomb of the same size, worse in part because there would be a huge contamination issue, worse in part because the psychological effect would be even beyond what a conventional bomb is.

And so here again we have to look carefully at materials that might be used as elements to take an ordinary IED and make it into a dirty bomb or a radiological IED. In this regard, I want to observe that although a nuclear bomb would be very, very hard to fabricate and very, very hard to steal, the material for a dirty bomb is unfortunately not that hard to steal or obtain, and it's not that hard to add it to an IED.

In particular, one of the things I'm going to suggest we look at with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is further enhancing the controls we have on materials like cesium-137, which are, you know, important radiological materials used in a variety of medical and similar very important functions that are legitimate, but also when added to an IED would convert it from a conventional device into a dirty bomb device. It's going to require balance.

And sometimes I see that there's a tendency to shy away from these kinds of issues because they're hard; that balance is going to be hard. But I don't think I can afford, in the time remaining to me – I don't think the country can afford – to simply shy

away from hard questions because they're hard. There is a tendency to do that and I'm going to try to make it my business to force us to look square in the face of some of the most difficult issues because even if we may not have a perfect solution, I can guarantee that closing your eyes is the worst possible solution.

Now, what else do we do on prevention? Recognizing, as I said earlier, it's not only us but it's state and locals, we've got to do information sharing and best practices sharing with state and local government and with the private sector. So our Office of Bombing Prevention developed and launched the TRIPwire secure information-sharing portal. What this does is it takes any gaps, some of the best learning about IED developments that we're gaining not only in this country but overseas and actually through DOD and in the theaters of war, it takes that and makes it available in an assimilatable form to federal departments, state and local agencies, and private sector organizations so that they can understand what they need to do in order to adapt themselves to some of these new challenges.

TRIPwire currently has 2,500 users, including 365 state and local agencies and 35 private sector organizations. And we're going to expand it to include additional owners and operators of critical infrastructure. And we want to focus in particular on educating suppliers and employees of potentially dangerous chemicals, through our bomb-making materials awareness program, so that we can give them the kind of awareness that allows them to warn us when they see something suspicious.

Obviously, information has to be incorporated into training, planning and exercising. And that's where our grant program is important in helping state and local governments turn that information that we give them into the tools they need to be able to prevent, detect and, if necessary, disarm bombs.

We have over 100 state and local jurisdictions that we've assisted in creating underwater terrorism prevention plans for 60 high-risk ports across the nation. I was in Philadelphia a few weeks ago looking at some of the equipment that they have been able to acquire through federal funding that gives them a better capability for remote detection and detonation of bombs, so that robots are put at risk rather than bomb disarmament technicians. And we've provided \$1.7 billion to our various homeland security grant programs to allow communities, ports and other government agencies to help increase their capacity to deal with IEDs. We will continue to make IED detection, prevention and disruption a critical focus of our grant program.

Let me move further to the right on the scale now to detection. Let's assume we haven't prevented; let's assume we haven't disrupted; and we're worried about protecting a particular location, so we want to be able to detect bombs. Now let me draw a little bit of a contrast with what we see in the military. The military operating in Iraq operates in an environment in which they have many more potential bomb makers around them than I think we do here, but they also operate within an architecture that is inherently more secure. Typically, they don't use mass transit to get to work, so they don't have to worry about guarding a subway system in Iraq. They generally drive in armored vehicles, so

they don't have to worry about a bomb that would be deflected by armor; they only have to worry about one that can pierce armor.

Obviously, we have a much different set of challenges in the civilian environment. We would destroy our subway and mass-transit systems if we put into effect the kinds of detection and security measures that we operate in the static environment, for example, of the Green Zone in Baghdad or even in the environment of an airport, when you can have people move freely back and forth. So we have to configure our detection capabilities to the reality of the architecture in which we operate.

And let me give you, again, some examples of how we do that. Much of the work we do is in the transportation arena, which is where the federal government has a particularly prominent role. TSA has deployed over 1,500 explosive detection systems and 7,400 explosive trace detection machines at airports around the country in order to screen-check the carry-on baggage. That's obviously an environment where we do have a fair measure of control over the flow in and out so we can use some of the kinds of static detection measures that are most familiar. But we also have to consider that we have other environments where there's more fluid movement back and forth. And we also have to recognize there are inherent limitations in the existing technology for bomb detection and prevention and, frankly, limitations in human ability, which is why we do test our screeners all the time.

So we build layers of defenses. And what do these include? Well, one is our new Bomb Appraisal Officer Program, which we've got in over 100 airports, which is designed to support the screeners with additional technical capability to allow them to identify more difficult-to-detect types of bomb components and detonators, which helps improve the accuracy and efficiency of their screening.

Behavioral Observation – what we call our screening passengers by observation techniques – Program is a new program. We've borrowed this from what the Europeans and the Israelis do, which involves looking at behavior, and training officers to be out in the actual flow at the airport and in the actual flow in some of our mass transit to watch the behavior of people, how they react as they approach the checkpoint, how they react as they're unloading things. And that cues us that there may be some people we want to take a closer look at. This, by the way, is a concept that we've used at the border for many years, which is training people to look for human behavior which is the giveaway as to whether somebody is planning something big.

Some argue that's somehow an invasion of liberty or profiling, but actually I'm going to make the reverse argument. Focusing on behavior as opposed to someone's appearance or ethnic group is exactly what we should be doing, and the better we are at focusing on people based on their behavior, the less we have to interfere with the innocent passenger.

Randomness is another critical tool. You know, one of the things we've observed as we've studied the terrorists' method of operation is they are very dedicated and

committed to planning. And therefore when we disrupt their planning capability by having an element of randomness in our detection, we set them back in terms of their ability to execute. That's why we've got approximately 700 explosive detection canine teams, which we deploy on a random basis and a surge basis from time to time for what we call visible inter-modal – boy, I can't think of the acronym – they're called VIPER teams. What they are, we get basically Coast Guard, TSA, other law enforcement together in a team. We surge into mass transit, we surge into an airport, they're visible, they're opening bags, they have dogs or detection equipment that is seeking to detect explosive residue. And it is that kind of change-up that gives us that additional level of protection of randomness.

We will, of course, continue to work to develop game-changing tools that enhance our capabilities to detect explosives: detection equipment using new technology that can jump the current limitations of the trace technology and the other kinds of detection devices that we currently have, increased study of behavioral analysis and things that may even be subliminal that can be picked up either mechanically or through training of officers. That will be of additional use in helping us to refine our focus on detection when we're trying to protect a particular location.

Considering also tools that will be easier to use to defeat IEDs, whether it's radio frequency jamming, disrupters, quick deployable barriers – all of this is part of a very focused, \$70 million Science and Technology Directorate effort to make IED detection and disruption a critical part of our menu for scientific examination.

Next let's turn to protection. Assuming we can't prevent, assuming we can't detect, how do we harden the target? Again, a lot of that is physical architecture. We've developed over 2,000 buffer-zone protection plans to strengthen high-risk sites and communities against the possibility of a direct attack either from an individual or a vehicle-borne explosive device.

We are mindful of Cole-style attacks, and that's why we've been strengthening our security at ports. And here, again, let me pause and talk a little bit about being balanced, and I'll be very blunt about this. We are spending – we spend an enormous amount of money now focused on containers, and the danger that someone would move explosive devices, particularly radioactive devices or nuclear devices, in a container, cargo container, into our ports and into the country. And that is all money well spent.

But you know what I haven't heard a lot about in all the discussion about protecting the ports, including from some of the most vigorous advocates of worrying about containers? I haven't heard about small boats. A nuclear bomb in a small boat would do every bit as much damage as a nuclear bomb in a container. And if you actually look at what terrorists did in the USS Cole and the Limburg and what they tried to do in the USS Sulivans, common sense would tell you that is a vector we ought to look at.

Well, the good news is, we don't necessarily wait for the conventional wisdom to tell us we ought to focus on something. I have tasked the commandant of the Coast

Guard, Admiral Allen, to work with Customs and Border Protection on a plan to begin much more robust screening and inspection of small boats, including in particular two pilot programs for the detection of radiological and nuclear material on small boats that we have begun in Seattle and that we will shortly begin in San Diego. This is designed to raise the protection level with respect to small boat challenges to something a little bit closer to what we have with respect to cargo.

Are there going to be squawks about this? Absolutely. Are we going to hear from people in the industry who are going to be worried that we're regulating something that's been unregulated? We will. And that's going to bring me back to my risk-management challenge. Are we prepared to get into that reasonable position in the middle, where we take appropriate steps to protect without over-regulating? Or are we going to shun something that seems to be unpopular and takes the very, very dangerous gamble that when something happens, we're going to have some very, very bad consequences?

I might add, as well, before I move on to response, that another critical area we are beginning to raise the bar on is general aviation coming in from overseas. We're doing more under new regulations to require information about who is coming in on those private jets. And we're ultimately aiming to a set of rules that will, in cooperation with our foreign partners, require general aviation from coming in from overseas to actually stop and be screened for dangerous materials before they depart for the United States.

Again, there may be some squawks about it. I can tell you that the president of a prominent charter air company – whose name I will not mention, because I'm going to do him a favor – came to me and actually said, I'm worried about this; I don't know who necessarily gets on my airplanes; I'm worried that we don't have enough of a security system. I think that's very farsighted; I think it's intelligent; and we have taken him up on his invitation to make sure we, again, raise the protective barrier on general aviation.

Finally, let me talk about response. In some ways, that is the element of this that we least like to talk about because it presumes that boom has gone off, and now we're moving to the right of boom. But if you look at what happened in London in 2005, the ability to respond quickly, rescue people, and minimize consequence does make a difference sometimes between a very bad and a horrible outcome.

And that means we have to spend time training and assessing capabilities with respect to response, which is an important part of what we bring to the table. That means we have to work with fire departments. As part of the TOPOFF exercise that we ran this past week, the firefighters – this is a positive development – firefighters in Portland were able to go into the area using radiological detection devices that they routinely wear when they go into an area where there's been an explosion, and that enabled us to get a very quick heads-up that under the scenario it wasn't just a conventional device, but a radiological device. And that has, of course, huge consequences for what you tell the population to do, in terms of mitigating the damage.

All of these things put together are what I think constitute a soup-to-nuts, left-to-right, full-spectrum strategy for countering IED threats. As I say, I look forward to seeing it reduced to writing in very short order, as part of a number of strategic documents. But please understand, we don't wait to tie it all up in wrapping paper and put a bow on it before we implement it. We've had this strategy in place; it is currently working. We expect to continue to build it. And I believe that in so doing, we are continuing to make this country safer.

Thank you very much. I'll be happy to take some questions. (Applause.)

MR. HEYMAN: There will be microphones coming around. Please identify yourself and who your organization is.

MR. CHERTOFF: Yes, Catherine (sp)?

Q: (Off mike.) Why do you think that we have avoided a major IED attack in this country – (inaudible)?

MR. CHERTOFF: Well, first, I do have to say we haven't, because in 1996 there was an IED attack. I would say this, it's a spectrum of things. First of all, I think we've done actually quite a good job of keeping operatives out of this country. And that has been, I think, a major factor. I think that the issue we've had with homegrown terrorists has fortunately been less of an issue than the Europeans have, but I can't say it's a nonexistent issue.

If you look back on the cases that have been brought by the Department of Justice, you will see a number of cases that have disrupted potential attacks. Some of them are pending, and I can't talk about them, like the Fort Dix case, or the JFK bomb plot, but certainly the allegations of those indictments suggest that had we not intercepted them, we would have had a similar problem. And there are a number of other such cases.

So it's a combination of good intelligence, keeping bad people out, disruption, and the fact that I do think that we have, because of the nature of the social fabric of this country, at least have somewhat less of an issue with respect to homegrown terrorism than we've had before.

But I have to tell you, if I look at events like the Virginia Tech shooting, it would not be hard for a small group of individuals, if they motivated themselves, to do damage. We've seen that in the past. We have to be prepared for it. We have to make sure we don't overreact to it. I don't know that the consequence is different whether the person carrying out the attack is articulating bin Laden's creed or some other creed. So we will continue to work to minimize the risk, but I have to be honest and say the risk will remain at least there in some form.

Q: And to follow up, if I could, on some of the news of the day. What's your assessment on Pakistan? Do you believe this was an attack by al Qaeda?

MR. CHERTOFF: I don't want to speculate about that. I think the Pakistanis, obviously, have to be the people who discuss what they have discovered in their investigation.

Q: Ashley Rugby (sp) with Congress Now.

MR. CHERTOFF: I think they want you to stand up, Ashley. (Laughter.)

Q: You laid out a lot of ongoing initiatives, as well as some future initiatives. What do you need from Congress right now moving forward, funding-wise, intel-wise, et cetera?

MR. CHERTOFF: Well, first of all, I would, of course, I'd like to get our appropriations for this year; that would be helpful. Secondly, I do think that as we get into some of these issues, with respect, for example, to making sure we can control the availability of materials that are out there, we may need to have some additional Congressional authority, like we got with the Chemical Security Act.

Sometimes, frankly, what we need is for Congress not to interfere with our ability to regulate something. You know, interest groups are fabulous at pushing back on measures that we want to take. For example, some of our measures with respect to enhancing our ability to control identity documents for people coming across the border, Congress has tried to get us to postpone implementing that. So sometimes not doing things is as helpful as doing things.

Yes, back there.

Q: Mr. Secretary, J.J. Green, WTOP Radio – After the German plot to attack U.S. interests in that country, or I think before it was made public, you decided to go there. What did you learn from that trip, and how does it, if in any way, relate to this process that you're outlining to us now, with the four different steps?

MR. CHERTOFF: I think as my counterpart and friend, Minister Schäuble, the Interior Minister, has made public, we were, obviously, closely working with the Germans in connection with their disruption of the plot. And I've been lucky enough to have some very energetic and wise counterparts in Europe. We've had a lot of ongoing discussion about how to deal with this issue of IEDs, which involves exchanging information, both in respect to people who are dangerous and also techniques and tactics that we ought to be concerned about.

I think that, obviously, we were very focused, as were the Germans, on making sure that this plot did not come to fruition. I hope that, as a consequence of this, the public in Europe recognizes the seriousness of the risk, and supports the government there in taking some of the steps that they need to take in order to make sure they can continue to intercept plots like this.

Q: Thank you. Mary Beth Sheridan from the Washington Post – Mr. Secretary, you talked about how significant of a threat IEDs are, and the prevention efforts. But hasn't the budget for the Office on Bombing Prevention declined quite a bit since it was first founded, and aren't some of these programs like BMAP, they're actually not funded, are they?

MR. CHERTOFF: I'm sorry. I think what you are seeing in the Office of Bombing Prevention funding is what you see with the maturation of a lot of programs. The money begins to migrate from planning and program development into actual implementation and building capabilities and actually doing things operationally.

For example, on some of the original functions, like procuring radiation portal monitors, that's now moved out into areas like DNDO and Customs and Border Protection. A lot of the training is now being funded through our grants program. Our R&D projects are now funded in S&T.

If you look at the total amount of money last year on bombing-related issues – let me give you some statistics: over a billion dollars in TSA on things like detection; additional canine teams and checkpoint technology; \$70 million in science and technology; \$200 million for radiological and nuclear detection equipment for DNDO; and \$340 million for inspection detection technology for Customs and Border Protection; \$200 million for port security; \$175 million for rail and transit security grants.

So although I understand there's a tendency to want to follow a single line item year to year, what you're actually seeing is moving these capabilities of training and implementation out of the policy and program phase and into a much more widely distributed implementation phase. But in terms of overall effort, we are doing more on this arena than we ever have before.

Q: Matt Firkam (sp) with Fox – Mr. Secretary, you said this summer that your gut told you that you thought something might be afoot. What does your gut tell you now?

MR. CHERTOFF: You know, what I said during the summer, if I can give you the whole statement that I made – (laughter) – which I think was actually perhaps expressed a little more colloquially than what the National Intelligence Estimate said, but actually is the identical point – I was very clear. I didn't – we didn't have any specific threat information about an imminent attack that we deemed credible.

But if you looked at the overall picture, developments with respect to training in the tribal areas of Pakistan, some reconstitution of the leadership of al Qaeda and evolution in terms of the way its leadership has been developed, a heightened frequency of public statements, these – and of course the training of an increased focus on Western European operatives, like we've seen in Germany and we've seen in London – of course, I have the benefit in forming my judgments, which is I guess the bureaucratic term for



gut instincts – I have the benefit of being informed by a lot of actual real knowledge of the intelligence, and if I may say, a lot of years working in this area now.

I think what all this boils down to is a strategic environment in which the threat is going to be heightened now, I think, for the foreseeable future. It's certainly not going to be what it was prior to 9/11. I think we've done a lot of damage, and we've done a lot to protect ourselves. But we'd make a big mistake if we thought that the enemy was remaining static. I'm convinced we really rocked the enemy back on its heels when we went after them in Afghanistan and other places.

But there's one thing they have which I think you have to acknowledge, which is they are resilient, they do not give up easily, they do not get complacent, they have very long memories. They still nurse grievances that go back 600 or 700 years. And so what they do is they pick themselves back up and they try to retool themselves.

Now, the good news from our standpoint is, we're doing the same thing. We're retooling ourselves; we're changing our capabilities; we're expanding and trying to look around the corners. What we need in order to continue to do that is the continued support of the American public and the dedication so we don't get complacent, because I have to say, we're not going to get over this in a year or two. I'm pleased to say there does seem to be some more aggressive activity now in some of those tribal areas that is going to be helpful, but we have to recognize – and I think the recent experience in Western Europe highlights the danger that we face, particularly of non-traditional operatives coming into this country, people coming in under the visa waiver program, and thereby avoiding the visa process, and becoming operatives.

And again, that's why we went out of our way to fight very hard – and I want to thank Congress for giving us this – to get electronic travel authorization for visa waiver countries, where we're now going to acquire some more information about people coming in, so we can vet them more thoroughly. That's why some of these intelligence-targeting programs that get controversial, like our automated targeting system – when we can intercept Hassan al Banna, a guy who is a – literally we know to be a vehicle bomber, we can keep him out of the country, that is the best way to move left of boom.

So we're continuing with all that. But I – this is a period where I think we need to be more on our toes rather than spending all our time patting ourselves on the back.

MR. HEYMAN: The secretary has time for one more – oh, two more questions.

MR. CHERTOFF: Yes, I'll move to the other side of the room.

Q: Hi. Eleanor Stables with Congressional Quarterly – you might not want to comment on the 2008 presidential election, but homeland security –

MR. CHERTOFF: You're right, so let's not waste time on it. (Laughter.)

Q: Homeland security is important to the American people; you're an expert on homeland security. Is Rudy Giuliani more qualified to deal with a terrorist attack as president, given that he has experience as an executive during 9/11?

MR. CHERTOFF: You were right the first time – I'm not going to comment on the election. So we'll take that, as a question, back. We'll give two more questions. Yes, in the back there.

Q: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Paul Corson with CNN – we don't see very often anymore the color-coded threat levels. Is there a substitute for that, or some other way the public can really assess when we've moved into a period of greater risk? We're thinking of the election and the candidates out in the public, that sort of thing.

MR. CHERTOFF: Well, of course you did see – we did raise aviation to orange in August 2006; we've maintained it at orange because it was in response to a specific threat. The color codes are still there; we're still at yellow. We have tried, at least during my two and a half years here, that when we have raised it, to be as focused as we can be about where we're raising it. In other words, we try to be as specific as we can be with respect to a particular region or a particular sector of the economy so that we can be as sculpted and as specific as possible.

And there are a couple of reasons for that. First, in some ways, yellow is now more robust than it was several years ago, so there's less reason to go to orange. In other words, as we've raised the base level, the baseline level of security, it's adequate to deal even with this enhanced circumstance.

Second, we tend to raise the color when we want to drive a very rapid, specific reaction with respect to a threat. And there are now pretty well developed plans in the transit sector, in the aviation sector, in private business as well, about what you do when you go to orange or go to red. So if we can raise the level of security over a period of time, we don't need to hit that button and move it that quickly. But we certainly reserve the right to do it.

And then, really the point of the colors is to be transparent to the public; to say, you're going to see more activity, here's why. I tried during the few times that we did raise the level to be as clear as possible about why we were doing it. And so I think it's a system that is still in place, still works well, but we are trying to be as specific as possible when we raise it so we're as informative, and we do only what's necessary, as opposed to more than is necessary.

MR. HEYMAN: Last question.

MR. CHERTOFF: One more. You'd better stand up I think.

Q: Hi. Carol Eisenberg from Newsday – I've heard some grumbling from law enforcement officials in New York in the last few days about the TOPOFF exercise,

raising questions about what is the criteria for choosing the location of these exercises. They were in Guam, Arizona, and I think Washington. And folks in New York, of course, say, well, what about us? What is the likelihood that terrorists are going to attack Guam? Why aren't we seeing this kind of money and investment in training here?

MR. CHERTOFF: Well, in 2005, we did TOPOFF in the New York-New Jersey area and Connecticut. So that – the last exercise we did run in the New York metropolitan area. And we do try to distribute it around in various places. I think that a prior TOPOFF was held in Chicago. But we also try to recognize that although historically the greatest risk has been in the big cities, we can't say that risk is nowhere else. I'll remind you that there were a couple of cases – terrorism cases in Portland and in Seattle. I remember when I was head of the criminal division, we prosecuted those cases. So that it would be a mistake to believe that the Northwest is exempt from this.

And sometimes you want to run the exercise precisely to get parts of the country that may not be thinking about these issues to concentrate and focus on it, as well as to challenge the federal government because we're picking a location that's particularly remote. For example, Guam challenged – allowed the Defense Department to challenge some of its capabilities to move assets over a long distance in a way that would not have been the case in New York.

So I would guess – you know, the analogy I would use, if you go to the gym and you work out, there are some muscles that you work out that you expect to use all the time. But sometimes you want to work out muscles that you don't use very much because you want to make sure your whole body is balanced, in terms of making sure you've got the right level of being in shape. I'm not sure that's the best analogy in the world, but you get the general drift. We can't only focus on the highest-risk places. But we have, actually, if you look back, done a lot of work with those places, as well.

MR. HEYMAN: Thank you very much everyone. Thank you. (Applause.) Thank you, Mr. Secretary for joining us.

(Pause.)

We're going to move right along here and I think the secretary has provided an extensive and comprehensive view of what we have to be concerned about, but also what the government is starting to think about. He mentions that he would like to see this put down on paper and that is in the process. As you know, the president issued a directive on IEDs. And the implementation plan and all of that is being worked out by the agencies. In fact, we have with us today the people from the various places we would want to implement that. Tom will introduce them.

We're going to go quickly through each presentation and we'll join in the discussion afterwards if we have time before 11:30. Tom, do you want to introduce?

MR. SANDERSON: Great, absolutely. And thank you to the panelists for coming. We'll start on my far right with Colonel Michael Mahoney, who is currently assigned as the operations division chief for the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization at the Pentagon. Next to Mr. Mahoney is Charlie Paine, who is the section chief of the Office for Bombing Prevention, OBP, a component of DHS Protective Security Coordination Division. Following Charlie Paine will be Barbara Martinez, a 23-year veteran of the FBI and currently serving as chief of FBI's technical operations branch. And then, immediately to my right is Shawn Stallworth, a commander of the Michigan State Police bomb squad, responsible for statewide activities of his 15-member explosive response unit. And with that, we'll go with the colonel, and thank you.

COLONEL MICHAEL MAHONEY: Thank you very much. And thanks David for having us over here today. I think what you'll find that we're going to talk about here on this very short brief that we put together is it will dovetail in with what Secretary Chertoff has previously briefed everybody. Go ahead and go to the next slide.

As you look at the threat, and as you look at this chart, what you'll see is that there are 200 to 300 IED events that occur every single month outside of Iraq and Afghanistan which means that you have more than, you know, two, three and a half thousand events that occur in the world every year. And so, it's something that we have to pay attention to. And this kind of gives you a scale where that fits in regards to other terrorist events over the spectrum. And this covers down on about the last year. Next slide.

Why this matters to us? One of the things David asked me to talk about is focus a little bit on what we're seeing down-range in theater. And obviously for us, the number one threat to our troops is the IED. And it is very lethal and effective, obviously abundant and cheap, and they have available, and what they consider to be expendable manpower to execute this type of attack. Next slide.

And what is that enemy when you look at it and how do they do it? A couple things to understand is first, they are very innovative. As you look at this slide and work your way around from the top center, that's the VBID, or vehicle-borne IEDs, are very lethal when they do in fact get close enough to a target that they detonate as Secretary Chertoff alluded to a moment ago. The high net explosive weight – if it's larger, it does more damage, especially if it buried and it's close to a vehicle when it detonates.

Your complex ambushes, their efforts to target your first responders, and they continue on through to something that has had some press recently, the explosively formed penetrate and then on through your icon vehicles and your command wire. And that individual that's executing that those type of IEDs; they're innovative and they're adaptive and they learn. That's the bottom line. That's what we have to pay attention to. They are constantly changing, so we have got to be able to change with them. Next.

A couple of things to pay attention to – that when our soldier, state reserve man, or Marines are in theater, what they see from their perspective. And this is out of a front window of a Humvee. And what you see is very restricted, urban, often times congested. In this particular case, the weather was not that great that day so most of the people were not on the street. But there's a lot of debris that's in the area that they have to be able to maneuver through, and so it's very restrictive. Next slide.

And you see something very similar when you go into Afghanistan, where it's very mountainous. You may not have as much urban terrain, but it's very mountainous and it can be very canalizing. And this has an impact on their ability to place an IED in a way that in both theaters where a vehicle is forced to go a certain direction, and so it will be closer to where the IED detonates, they can plan ahead in advance. And it's also because of the type of terrain that you see, with a lot of rocks here. You could hide an IED there. It could potentially be above the ground and it would be easy to miss it when you're looking for it, and the same thing on the picture that I showed there of Iraq with a lot of debris. It's very easy to blend in with that. Next slide.

IEDs of concern – there are two that do concern us, but have a greater impact or a greater effect when they do detonate. And so, we pay attention to them. The first one or the top one is the explosively formed penetrator. And you can see what it does to a vehicle when it hits; there is a lot of penetrations on that vehicle. And then the next one is the underbelly, which you see an armored vehicle there that's been flipped upside down. And so, both of these can be very devastating when they detonate in theater and they have a large impact. So we're paying attention to those. Next slide.

A little bit what JIDO, the Joint IED Defeat Organization, is doing about that – first, where we're located at. You'll see on the right-hand side of the slide that we have four deployed teams to Iraq and Afghanistan that are worried about understanding new tactics, techniques and procedures, the proper deployment of equipment in the theater, the training integration, and they also are involved in the effort to target IED networks and implacers. As you work your way to the left-hand side, you see the Joint IED Defeat Organization headquarters with JFCOM, who we work with, who helps us a tremendous amount in the training arena. And then, finally, of to the far left is the Joint Center of Excellence, which I'll cover in more detail, but out at the national training centers where we've headquartered, our Joint Center of Excellence for training. Next slide.

Some tenets that we have – we're very focused on these tenets. We want to be able to predict and prevent. And then, we want to be able to work our way through as we predict or prevent to actually detect, neutralize. And eventually, as Secretary Chertoff said, if there actually is a detonation, we need to be able to mitigate the effects of that. And you see some of the different technologies that are listed there. And obviously, training is associated with this. And with that, I'm going to go into a little more detail on our lines of operation that fall in on this. Next slide.

First one is attack the network. These three lines of operation that I'm going to talk about: attack the network, defeat the device, and – correction, attack the network,

train the force, and the defeat the device are in priority order. And the reason I mention that is, when we first stood up the organization, defeat the device was the most important thing. We were worried about getting our shoulders up, getting the protection up, but we've realized that there's only so far that can go. So this is now our number one priority, which is to attack the network, to get at that network, to use forensics to identify who's putting the bomb in. Who's the actual trigger man, where's there security, what's their supply line, who's the builder for it, who's the financier; who's the enabler, those types of pieces and parts and to use these tools that you see in the slide to go after it. Next slide.

The next piece, obviously, is training the force. And you see that broken out below the Joint Center of Excellence at the National Training Center. Also, at Fort Irwin is the Army Center of Excellence. The 29 Palms is the Marines Center of Excellence. And then on the right-hand side is Indian Head. You've got the Navy Center of Excellence and then at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, is the Air Force Center of Excellence.

There's three areas that we put – or four areas we put on the slide that are all, they all interact with each other. One in the upper right-hand corner, you see jammer training. We recognize the value of jammers. There is a certain number of IEDs that are put and placed in theater. And they will use a radio or a cell phone or some other form of electronic device to actually trigger that IED. So we have fielded jammers into the vehicles that are in theater and its support of various fixed sites.

In the lower right-hand corner, that slide, one of the pieces you see is surrogate vehicles and training aids. We have found tremendous value in providing vehicles that are as close as possible to the real vehicle into the training base. And we, in fact, are expanding that capability. The same thing could be said for the jammers. Many of these jammers, if you turn them on in the United States, might have an impact on safety of different pieces and parts of our infrastructure, so we use surrogate jammers that we actually provide into the training base. And so, they're set on very specific frequencies. And that way, a training device can be set and synchronized properly so you can get the desired training effect.

And then, the lower left-hand side of this – a tremendous amount of effort is going to improving home-station training that allows those commanders at the various posts, bases, and installations, to improve training for their soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines before they go to the larger training centers of 29 Palms, NTC, JMRC at Fort Polk, or over in Germany and JRTC at Fort Polk.

And then, finally, in the upper left, you see the electronic warfare training that goes with understanding the entire spectrum and the jammers and integrating that with understanding the tactical environment. Next slide.

Finally, the last piece I want to talk to you about is defeat the device. JIDO has spent a significant amount of money working in concert with the services on this line of

operation, just like we have with the other two, to get at various up-arming techniques, jamming techniques, robots, improved vehicle protection, and individual protection. And then, with that, did you want to go into questions or go to the other panel members?

MR. HEYMAN: We'll go down the panel –

COL. MAHONEY: We'll go down the panel. Okay, thank you.

CHARLIE PAINE: Good morning. Thank you for having us and providing the opportunity for us to discuss what is an extremely important issue. I think we've seen the secretary talk about the threat that improvised explosive devices poses to our country. And there are some events that really frame that threat: the Madrid rail bombings in 2004, the Beslan attacks in 2004, and the London bombings in 2005. We had the UK airline plot in 2006 and the London and Glasgow events this year as well as the German terror plot. So we see an assembly of plots in different locations in the world to continually use what is the terrorists' primary weapon of choice and that is improvised explosive devices.

We also see, as the colonel has mentioned, a proliferation in the ability for our enemy to use different technology and to use electronic components and to move beyond the spectrum of capabilities that we experienced prior to this in the criminal world where, necessarily, technology wasn't a factor. We've seen the harness this capability of improvised explosive devices and use it to a great degree in theater. So in order to face an adversary with a deadly tactic, we have to have a coordinated national effort here in the homeland.

And that coordinated national effort has to leverage the things that the colonel is doing every day, taking those things which apply to the threat here at home and to protecting the nation's critical infrastructure, which is owned by 85 percent owned by the private sector. So we have to be able to take the things that the Joint IED Defeat Organization and DOD are doing and apply it across the board in the right places and the right measures so that commerce is maintained, so that we've got the right balance of protection to mobility and freedom, and have some success against this adversary, and stop attacks in the planning phase to the left of boom, as we said this morning.

So I think it's important that, as the role of the Office for Bombing Prevention in DHS, we've got three things that we really kind of concentrate on, and that's the coordination of national efforts and the coordination of national intergovernmental efforts. That's consistent with what the Department of Homeland Security was created to do. The Homeland Security Act says that we will coordinate with executive governments – executive departments and agencies as well as state and local governments. So coordinated action.

Requirements, capabilities, and gap analysis – that's also consistent with the Department of Homeland Security's mission to ensure capabilities in the United States. We deliver a lot of grant funding; we have a lot of programs to ensure capabilities. So we need to understand where we are, what capabilities that we have, and where we need

to go so that we can target in a risk-based method to improve our capability, specifically for preventing bombing.

And additionally, the information sharing and awareness – those are very key functions within the department, so that we can take the information again from the theater and our international partners and put it into a form that becomes knowledge for everything from the state and local law enforcement, who is seated to my left, to the private sector, who has a security, chief security officer who may have to take care of a 50-story building, and do that and maintain commerce and maintain the flow of folks in and out of his business in a way that's specific to their function within society.

So those things, those three things that we do, are consistent with the role of DHS in the intergovernment. And I'll talk about some of the actual activities within those three pillars. As we launch TRIPwire, our information-sharing system, we've got about close to 3,000 users now. That information-sharing system takes information that terrorists are sharing, that terrorists are using, that – on the Internet, as their virtual squad room, as their virtual training area. And we're, again, taking lots of information, turning it into knowledge for those folks who need. Then they can apply to their security principles every day.

It's really about the ongoing security postures that we have, leveraging them without having to take in a huge incremental cost unless it's absolutely necessary and making sure that the things that we're doing every day enhance our security and provide us additional prevention opportunities. If a bombing or a terrorist attack, mind you, is planned along a temporal line of a year, every day that goes by, we have prevention opportunities. And those prevention opportunities to the left of boom, as we've said today, can be in the order of days, weeks, and months, maybe even years. But as we get closer to that device being in place and detonated, our prevention opportunities are in the order of magnitude of minutes and hours and maybe even seconds when the bomb squad is on site.

So a coordinated national effort is extremely important along that prevention timeline. And planning, multi-jurisdiction planning, along with TRIPwire and the analysis of capabilities or other activities that we engage in along that temporal line to give our state and locals the opportunity to prevent attacks. We've done over 2,000 buffer-zone protection plans that are specifically designed to prevent attacks in the planning phase. Those buffer-zone protection plans have specific protective actions that correlate with HSAS so that we know who's going to do something, when they're going to do it, and reducing specific vulnerabilities.

So I really appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today. And that gives you a little bit of an idea of the activities that the department, within my office, are undertaking. And again, a lot of the activities that the secretary discussed with you today across the department all have that prevention value. Those programs are all targeted at reducing the vulnerability of the nation to terrorism, consistent with the reason why we're created. Thank you.



BARBARA MARTINEZ: Good morning and thank you for this opportunity. It's clear that the secretary is formerly a member of the Justice Department because he stole many of our statements. (Laughter.) He's also spoken of several key points that I think are very important to bring out of today's discussion. One is the fact that terrorists' use of IEDs cannot be extrapolated into anything other than a major threat to this nation. The fact is that terrorists wish to use IEDs is why we're here. IEDs cannot be separated from terrorism; terrorism can't be separated from crimes. I think we need to all look at this collectively, that the IED doesn't care if it was placed by a criminal or a terrorist; it's still going to have similar impact to Shawn and the folks up front and the impact it has on the public at large.

The FBI has been involved in IED matters for some time. Since the radical and terrorist activities of the 1960s, the FBI has been called by the IACP and other organizations to establish a national bomb data center and also the Hazardous Devices School. Since 1971, over 9,000 technicians have actually received basic certification at the HDS. Excuse me, currently, there are about 2,900 active technicians and 472 accredited squads, bomb squads, across the United States.

One of the major concerns that the FBI has is of globalization. It impacts not just travel and commerce and communication, but it also impacts terrorism and crime. The dark side of today's flat world is the fact that terrorists can study the tactics in other countries and use them in their own tactics. The example was Madrid; we've heard references to that several times today. Specifically, about TTP development and lessons learned in Madrid, terrorists put the backpacks at the stations where they exploded, on the trains at the stations. But many of the media reports indicated that that actually saved lives because rescuers could actually get to the trains more quickly.

But then, about a year later in London, we saw that that tactic was adapted and those explosives went off inside the tunnel. And media reports said that that had hampered rescue efforts. So I just say that because we need to be careful that as they are watching each other, they are also watching us.

Last year's plot to bomb the airplanes bound from London to the United States is another example. After 9/11, the airline security was tightened regarding what types of things could be taken upon airplanes because we were looking for knives and things like that. So, of course, the terrorists quickly adapted their method; they studied what we did there; they saw how we responded and they quickly adapted, things like cameras and sports drinks so that we would now face a whole new threat.

In the United States, we're concerned that the terrorist tactics used abroad, in theater, and in other countries will migrate this way. We've seen things already move this way, but we are very concerned about suicide bombers. This nation would be remiss if we didn't come up with a strategy to deal with things like that.

Just briefly, I think that as the secretary has adapted some of our concepts, we have a continuum for prevention, preparedness, investigation, and response, as well as attribution of terrorist activities. The FBI has basically been doing this for a long time. We have over 100 joint-terrorism task forces made up of federal, state, and local authorities. Across this United States, we have preparedness efforts, outreach through our WMD coordinators, and special agent bomb technicians who work with metropolitan bomb squads and the private sector on a regular basis to ensure that there are contingency plans in place so that we can actually anticipate some of these activities. We partner with DHS in terms that they provide a lot of money for those activities. They have high visibility to certain commercial sectors and so, those personnel in the field work closely together.

In terms of response, the joint terrorism task forces are not only collecting intelligence, but they're trained and equipped to respond. We have also a robust capability to invest investigate because most crimes of terrorism are also local events. For the feds to think that they would actually handle a terrorist event for which they do have jurisdiction without the work and assistance and knowledge of state and local authorities would absolutely be an erroneous approach.

The state and locals have lived there forever; they understand the territory like the back of their hand, and while the federal authorities have certain responsibilities, they need to have a nice working relationship. I will just close in saying that through the entirety of this effort, the FBI has enjoyed a lot of support from the various different agencies. Charlie and I were working on the report the other – and we dealt with a lot of different people. And I would say that a lot of people are concerned about this effort. And the FBI is certainly continually committed to the security of the nation as well as the public safety at large. Thank you very much.

SHAWN STALLWORTH: Shawn Stallworth from the Michigan State Police. And first, I want to thank Tom and Dave for inviting me to be a part of this panel. And the reason we are here is because the IED threat is real. As a state practitioner in the bomb squad community, one thing has become apparent to me. And that's national level coordination of bombing prevention activities is absolutely crucial.

Public safety bomb squads have been providing explosive response throughout the nation for nearly 40 years. However, IED threat has evolved significantly since then. Now, we must be prepared to defeat LVBIDs, large vehicle bombs, suicide bombers, and homemade explosives. And this significantly challenge our current service-delivery model.

Innovative solutions such as the multi-jurisdictional IED security plans must be executed and implemented if we are to achieve any level of IED security in this country. Last week or earlier this week, while attending the bomb squad commanders conference in Anniston, Undersecretary Jay Cohen made reference to a word, gamechanger. I often myself use the word differencemaker. And I use this with my daughter when she's

competing in basketball or softball about having to make a difference where you're playing.

We must make sure that our bomb technicians are gamechangers in all aspects. One of the things that you may be surprised to learn is that, currently, bomb technicians are the standard, the current standard, is 16 hours a month. I think that we all agree, those that are aware of the complexities involved of mitigation of explosive devices along with the sophisticated technologies that are available to be used to mitigate them, the 16 hours is not nearly enough.

Now, consider what our adversaries are doing, their resolve. They are continuously studying our activity so that they can exploit our vulnerabilities. I submit to you that we need to make sure that our bomb squads and bomb technicians become gamechangers.

As an elected member of bomb squad – of the National Bomb Squad Commander's advisory board, which serves as the leadership element, giving advice to federal agencies and support for bombing-prevention activities. I had the opportunity to discuss with many the challenges that face state and local bomb technicians on a day-to-day basis. The one thing that is expressed over and over again is the lack of a perceived support in terms of equipment. Let me say to all of you in attendance today, a national level effort to provide that equipment, necessary equipment to mitigate and defeat IEDs is necessary.

Now, all of the discussions that we've had were about national policy as it relates to bombing prevention are absolutely necessary. But the expression of words by mouth or on paper are only that. When and only when the words become flesh will we achieve the level of IED security that truly safeguards the lives and protects the critical infrastructure of this country from the IED threat. Thank you.

MR. HEYMAN: Great. Thank you, Sean, and thanks to the rest of our panelists. For the Q&A session, again, please just identify yourself and your organization and take advantage of the great expertise we have up here.

MR. SANDERSON: I'm going to take the opportunity to take the first question if people want to get ready for their own questions. I'd just like to ask any of the panel members – I think we're all interested in this. We see, as everyone says, the pervasive nature of IEDs across the globe and particularly in terrorists' hands. And we talk about it in America today. Could one or two of you give your perspective on what the threat is here? Is this something we need to be concerned about? Is this something that's a long way down the road? We clearly have a presidential directive, so somebody thinks it's important. But I would like to hear anyone's perspective on that.

MR. : I myself – actually, every morning when I wake up, I'm in disbelief that we haven't already been attacked. And so, everyday, one of the things that I challenge my guys is to make sure that everything that we have, everything that we do, is in

preparation for attack that day. And so, absolutely I think that we need to make sure as a nation – not just a bombing prevention community – but as a nation, that we perceive this threat as real because it is.

MR. : I think it's important to answer that question in a couple of ways. If we say threat and get into the clinical definition of a particular group who has the capability and the intent, then we might take away from the actual conversation that we want to have. And the conversation that we want to have is each of us here charged with protecting the nation from the terrorist threat, every time our Blackberry rings late at night, we wonder if it's the beginning of what we know is a storm that has gathered, it's gained strength, and it's moving this way. So if that is a specific, technical threat in the intelligence sense of the word, I don't know. But we see that our adversary continues on a year by year basis to take IEDs and try to influence political systems or strike fear into populations. So yes, it's a threat and yes, we must be prepared. And I really think it's great that we're having this conversation.

Q: Art Kellerman (sp) – I'm a health policy fellow with the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee. The secretary wisely made a comment. He said, this is about risk management; it's not about risk-elimination. We know that no matter how good we may be or how fortunate we've been, an event could happen in the future. Back in June, the committee on which I serve held a hearing and heard testimony from national experts and trauma and emergency care that in most of the major cities in this country today, trauma centers, burn units, EMS services are at or above capacity now.

Just dealing with the urban trauma and challenges on a day-to-day basis – hospitals are diverting about a half a million ambulances a year. I know, as a clinician, that IEDs create highly complex injury patterns, burns, multi-system trauma, far more challenging than a car-crash victim. Do you all feel that on a national level, we have paid enough attention to that part of the right of boom, which is managing hundreds of critically injured casualties out of Metro Center, out of Grand Central, or some other densely located civilian area when we're having trouble taking care of three victims from a car wreck in a major U.S. city.

MS. : One of the efforts some years ago, 1996 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation dealt with weapons of mass destruction issue, and that was one of the key considerations in that whole effort. It was to actually take from the military side and put into the civilian communities the abilities to predict and prevent and respond to the use of chemical, biological, or radiological materials. One of the continuing challenges from the Health and Human Services has been capacity. The ability to surge capacity was dealt with. I think Mario Morales was our representative from the HHS on this particular issue, and he even stated that because it's a private sector and we had funding tied to it – to the medical services sector – that was something that was made very difficult for the federal government to really change. So that is one area that is going to have to probably be looked at in the future.

Q: I'm Christine Wormuth, a senior fellow here at CSIS, and I had two quick questions. One, I've often heard with respect to homeland security issues generally – not with respect to countering the IED threat – a lot of complaints from state and local law enforcement officials about the lack of information sharing at the federal level. And I'd be interested in your reactions, since we have a mix of federal and state representatives to talk about the quality of that information-sharing relationship right now and how it does relate to IEDs.

And then, picking up on what Mr. Stallworth said about the need for more bomb detection equipment and material, if Mr. Paine could talk a little bit about the grant program and your reaction as to A, do we have sufficient programs in place from the federal level to try and help provide that equipment and how does the federal government determine – how does DHS determine – how to allocate that equipment given that presumably the resources are finite? What's the sort of calculation for looking at risk and figuring out which municipalities should get more versus others? Thank you.

MR. PAINE: Well, I'll talk first about the information sharing. I'd have to say that we are increasingly enjoying a better information-sharing environment, particularly in this area. I won't speak to the broader sense of your question, but with tripwire, we are providing information again. I think it's really important when we discuss information sharing that we – I mean, there's a lot of information. There are any number of websites and things. But to take information and provide it within a context that provides knowledge and changes procedures, changes the way our state and locals or our private sector partners view how they should conduct daily business, because now they have knowledge of a terrorist tactic, technique, or procedure, that's what's important. I think that is the penetration that we're looking for in the information-sharing environment. So it's improved a great deal and we've got a lot of potential to increase as we're expanding tripwire to the private sector by the end of this year. So I think there's good news stories in that sense.

I think over the last few months, as we've developed some of these strategic documents that are being discussed today, the information sharing among the inner agency on the programs, on the things that we're doing, has really improved. The national bomb squad commanders advisory board, for instance, has an initiative that is to intensify their training and knowledge for large vehicle bombs. As a result of that, you've had federal program managers and state and locals sit at the same table to determine which activities, which order they need to occur, things that are ongoing. In some cases, not new activities, but just a coordination of the existing ones to the greatest benefit, to provide the capabilities down to the state and local. So information sharing, definitely, is a horizon that is looking very good.

As far as allocation of grants or equipment, I won't get into risk calculations and things like that, but I will say that it is the fidelity that we look for to properly provide grants to ensure that capabilities are achieved. We could have a huge volume of grants, and even perhaps – just for sake of conversation – triple the volume of grants that we put toward this area, and if the fidelity is not there to ensure that we get the right capabilities

to these guys at the state and local level, then really we won't be as effective, and again, it doesn't go back to that prevention value that every activity that we engage in has. So I hope I answered your question – looking for that fidelity and allocation of those grants and priorities. And I think you're going to see that IEDs is a priority; and I think with our capability analysis process, we've got that fidelity with the bomb squads.

Q: (Inaudible) – Washington Post. Colonel, could you talk a little bit about whether the Pentagon side is completely satisfied with its ability to transfer lessons learned in the broadest sense from Iraq to civilian and domestic side. Can you talk about given what the secretary said was a very different threat environment – (inaudible) – more sophisticated versus less sophisticated. You can't armor holes in Washington and New York or put bomb jammers everywhere. What are the most important lessons that need to be learned from the military's experience domestically on IED?

MR. : Well, without getting into the specific tactics, techniques, or procedures, when you ask what lessons are learned, many lessons are learned and in fact we have representation on the Joint IED Defeat Organization from federal agencies where they're personnel are literally – the distance from my office to where you sit, there are people from other agencies that sit right there and we share information on a daily basis. In fact, they help inform our decisions often times, because there's pieces and parts to this when this started that we were not as experienced in, and we needed a lot of help from people such as the FBI and the ATF and the Secret Service to educate us as to how to approach these types of bombs. And then, now there's been an exchange of information that's gone back and forth.

I think what's critical to understand is that JIDO, or the Joint IED Defeat Organization, has been given a lot of authority to assume risk in various tactics, techniques, procedures, and technologies that it develops. And we have that authority where what we enjoy is significant support from Congress, the administration, the Defense Department, and support from our coalition and partner allies that helps us to extract various technologies, information and techniques and procedures and share those with our own federal agencies. Our primary responsibility is to act as a technical advisor, because frankly the federal agencies have a tremendous amount of experience that already exists.

Q: Let me follow up with that. I wanted to ask you in addition to those best practices, how do you envision the departments' role? Should we have a consolidated and concerted campaign in America of IEDs? What is the Defense Department responsibilities and role in terms of homeland defense?

Oh, it's going to be passed to the Department of Homeland Security. That's interesting.

MR. PAINE: Thank you, Colonel. Thank you, sir. May I have another? (Laughter.) I'll talk to that a little bit, and Barbara, chime in when we get into the law enforcement piece. The Department of Defense EOD teams, for instance – I'm a 22-year

veteran of Navy EOD, so I'll speak from experience – the Department of Defense EOD teams provide military assistance to civil authorities when they are either technically overwhelmed, or overwhelmed by number of calls for service or the type of calls for service or geography in any number of situations. So I would expect that in a campaign, if you will, of IED incidents – and incidents include those things which don't detonate, and those calls for service, which can overwhelm the state and locals when a threat increases.

You might remember on 9/11, there were any number of vehicles that were believe to be suspicious. And so when we look at the difference between something unattended and then going into something suspicious, now you're looking at a call for service from a public safety bomb squad, a sap on the resources of a jurisdiction or jurisdictions, and so that coordinated effort within a multi-jurisdiction plan for IED security that includes DOD is the picture – the model that we're moving toward. And so, now you've got a lot of assets out there and you've got steady state security that is sustainable. And you've got threat-initiated security that mitigates risk based on whatever threat, whatever target, again, so we're not going across the board with everything that we've got all the time.

COL. MAHONEY: And I specifically wanted him to do that and sort of tee that up from that perspective. And when the military supports anything, whether it's with the domestic or whether it's overseas, I mean, we have to take into account what would be the significance of this campaign? How large is it, if there was a concerted campaign. We have to look at what exactly the number of resources we have in the immediate area, if it's a localized campaign that is available to provide the support that he's talking about, how much time do we have to react? Those are the type of issues that we've got to take into account when we leverage resources and move towards trying to solve a problem.

Q: One last question following up on this. Lieutenant, if you could speak to, are you prepared for receiving FBI/ATF/DHS and Defense Department assets, should there be a campaign in Michigan?

MR. STALLWORTH: Absolutely. We on a regular basis work with both the National Guard and the Army that are in close proximity, and often times, particularly on the military ordinance, we'll receive a call for service on military ordinance and that's certainly the responsibility of the military. And so, we actually may go out and secure that item until the arrival of the military. So certainly, that working relationship has already been developed on the military side for military ordinance and certainly could be translated for an IED campaign.

Q: (Off mike) – a question on the conventional side of this threat. After the Murrah bombing, there was some effort to improve our surveillance regarding the acquisition of large quantities of fertilizer, for example. How well are we doing that? And I compare that to the reality that with the Murrah building, Timothy McVeigh got to his target. With the World Trade Center first bombing, they got to their target. Even the Glasgow bombers in central London got to their target. How do you assess whether we

have any realistic chance of detecting a bomb versus detecting the bomber? My thought is, if we don't get the bomber, chances are in a convention sense, will we really detect the bomb before it gets close to its intended target?

MR. : That's a universal question. Well, first I would like to – I'm not quite sure what you meant by the conventional sense.

Q: Non-nuclear, non-radiological –

MR. : Absolutely, IED. Well, obviously, you can't protect every target all the time. And you have to understand what might be a target. And in the vast commercial sector, we live in a free and open society. So you're right, and you're really reinforcing the point that you've got a prevention timeline; and along that prevention timeline, we have to continually look for those opportunities to reduce the materials that terrorists have access to to build the devices. But you have to do that in an organized fashion, because we saw in the Northern Ireland conflicts that we did some things in the U.K. in regard to ammonium nitrate, which was quickly overcome by adding some household ingredients. So I'd just like to say that we have to be intelligent in the way that we approach this and that you're absolutely right – it's a statement of the obvious – that we cannot stop every single incident all the time. But what we have to do is we have to understand the terrorists' tactics, techniques, and procedures, understand those targets that our adversaries most probably will attack, and use existing security policies and improve or enhance those to give us the greatest chance of success.

Q: (Off mike, inaudible.)

MR. : In my opinion, I think it's the greatest threat to this country. With respect to whether we have all the tools, you have to look at it from a capabilities standpoint, and so there is elements of capabilities in terms of training personnel. There is a tendency to focus on the number of personnel, and I think what we also need to look at is the quality of personnel. And so, in terms of whether the bomb technicians that are currently out there – do they necessarily have all the skill sets that are necessary to defeat the threat of VBIDs and RCIDs and suicide bombers. I think we're working in that direction. I don't know necessarily that we're not there yet, but I think there is a lot of work to be done in those areas. And so, we need to continue to move towards making sure that those bomb techs that are out there, again, what the number is actually going to be required, if there is a campaign, I don't know, but the ones that we do have, we have to make sure that they are prepared to mitigate the threat.

Q: A number of these attacks in Europe have occurred around the time of changes in political power or prior to elections – Madrid, disrupted plot in London occurred right after Gordon Brown came in. I wonder if there is intelligence to suggest that our upcoming elections makes us particularly vulnerable and whether any particular actions are being taken to guard against that?



MS. : That's an intelligence and preparation dichotomy. The interesting thing about terrorist planning is they do watch those vulnerable times. They look at holidays. They look at anniversaries. Might they want to attack us on 9/11 again? Would that just really get the media's interest that we really didn't do anything since 9/11, despite the layers of security based on the intelligence and the fact that you just can't stop everybody? My analogy is, it's like being a goalie. You're going to stop them nine times out of 10, but when you don't stop that last one coming in, you've failed. That's why we're fulltime employees. That is what we're always looking at.

Terrorists are fulltime employees as well. I don't think terrorists and criminals are going to get a job change anytime soon. These people are committed. We need to be equally committed. They're going to try to outsmart us in every step of the way. One of the reasons we have to be very careful about not telegraphing our countermeasures is so that we can stay ahead of them. Doesn't take but a minute that we get something out there that they can defeat that and counter our counter. So quite frankly, we need the help of the public, their understanding. Someone mentioned that they didn't see the threat level change so often anymore. I think that's a conscious decision to make sure that everybody – that they still have faith in the color system, because they didn't see it changing with every fluctuation. The secretary said we're more prepared now at yellow and I think that's an important fact too.

But your question is very interesting. They're going to look at anniversaries. They're going to look at vulnerabilities. The more they know about our vulnerabilities, the more vulnerable we are. And on the other hand, of course, we have to just keep looking at them the same way. This is a global war.

MR. : I'd like to follow up a little bit on that in that, again, as part of a conversation, we always seem to search for that intelligence fax that comes in and says, today, at the Sears Tower, a large vehicle bomb at x address. And I think the fact that you've asked the question about do you believe a terrorist would employ an improvised explosive device to influence our election, and we have upcoming elections, that in itself is somewhat of an intelligence estimate. And that in itself is a bit of an understanding of the threat that we face. And so, really, to face a threat that you've stated there, you need an enduring, coordinated effort within the nation at all levels, because we can't afford to wait for that intelligence fax to come in and then spring to action with these things that we haven't been maturing over a period of time. With a coordinated effort, we can have even progress across all levels and continually reduce or mitigate that risk.

Q: A couple years ago, the area, we had the sniper events around here. As so often happens in these kinds of things, the first thing we ended up doing because of some early information was chasing white vans. You couldn't drive four feet without getting stopped. It turned out, the vehicle was totally different. Have we learned any lessons, and can anything we do prevent that sort of thing from happening in this kind of event?

MR. : Yeah, I've got a follow up to that. Do you have a white van?  
(Laughter.) Right, I won't speak to the law enforcement piece of it, but I will say that we

understand a great deal from that particular incident. And we understand that multi-jurisdiction planning is a very important element of ensuring that you've got a coordinated response at steady state, that's every day, and threat initiated when things happen. And so, I believe understanding those security partners in that area and what they bring to the fight, when they need to bring it, and how much they need to bring, is very important. So absolutely, I believe we've gotten better and I think there are a lot of lessons learned in the law enforcement arena from that sniper incident.

But it stands as an outstanding example of the impact of what an IED threat or attack might bring to a particular area. It's a shining example. And again, reinforcing why we're here today.

MR. SANDERSON: Let me ask the last question, because we're out of time, and I'd like each of the panelists to address this. What you have in front of you, folks from the Hill, folks from the think tank community, people who want to help. What are the challenges that you would like our assistance on? Maybe each of you could talk a little bit about some of the things we need going forward, starting with the lieutenant?

MR. STALLWORTH: As I mentioned earlier, the one thing that I feel is just critically important is to achieve that national coordination. We talk about duplication of effort and also when you look at – there was some discussions about grants and making sure that people had the right equipment.

And let me just give you, for example, I was recently made aware of a situation where a team – a bomb squad – received an award allocation of about \$200,000 for a, what they call, a total containment vessel, which is basically a piece of trailer that allows you to actually safely transport an explosive device from an area or location where it really couldn't withstand a detonation. However, there were two teams that were within a 20-mile radius that actually got that award allocation that could have supported that team, should they need it, because it's not a tool or a piece of equipment that is used frequently. It's only in certain situations.

And so, when we talk about moving forward, the national level coordination of all the activities, the bombing prevention activities across all levels of government to make sure there is no duplication of effort and making sure that there is integration of all those activities across all the disciplines and across all levels of government are just extremely important.

MS. MARTINEZ: I don't think I'm really allowed to ask for anything. But I would say that a lot of hard work and effort has gone into the development of supporting what the president has stated was a very important initiative. It's taken a little longer than probably everyone thought it should, but at the same time, a tremendous amount of work and thought has gone into this. You could tell from the level of involvement and specificity of the secretary's comments that he is personally involved. Many other high-ranking officials are personally involved. And obviously, the president has taken personal involvement. I would, I guess, ask for people's patience and support in

understanding that this is not a closed discussion by any stretch of the imagination. And if there are good ideas that haven't been expressed, please call me. Thank you.

MR. PAINE: I'd just like to say that one of the fundamental things that's required is happening here today. It's an awareness of the threat and an awareness that we need to take action. That probably is the foundational thing that each of us in our roles here from either academia, the legislative, or executive branch, or the private sector, everyone needs to understand that this is a threat and then have some effective leadership in their particular area to reduce the risks to the United States and their assets in the private sector. So that's the most important thing.

And if each of us do that in our roles and each of us continue to reinforce the team that we've built as we've had to do some of the strategic planning here as the president has asked, then I think as we move forward, we will get that even progress; we will continue to reduce that risk; we will ensure that the capabilities reside at the state and local levels where they need to. And our roles and responsibilities will not overlap unnecessarily. So that's really – I believe it's an awareness of the threat and leadership in your area of responsibility to continue to keep this as a discussion in the United States because again, it's a storm that has formed and is continuing to gain intensity and is moving this way. Thank you.

COL. MAHONEY: As I look out here in the audience based off the context of the question, frequently there are members of Congress or staffing organizations, people from the administration, from within the department and other agencies that will become, and when we're in various meetings similar to this or at a smaller scale even, and we're getting into very specific details, what we have found within JIDO, or the Joint IED Defeat Organization, is the last question is always, what can we do to help? And the reason that is, is because people, I think, understand that there is a threat and they want to help. And so, JIDO enjoys significant support. And I mentioned that a minute ago – we have a risk tolerant environment that we're allowed to work in, because we have support from Congress, both sides of the aisle, the administration, the department, the agencies, our international partners that come and work with us. It makes a big difference.

I mean, I have a training mission that I'm getting ready to send somewhere, and it's not people that are in uniform that are going to go and do the training; it's someone from the agency that's going to go do that. Those type of things occur all the time because we need help. And I guess what I would say is what we need help with is we need help with continued support. That's it. Thank you.

MR. SANDERSON: Well, let me wrap up here. This has been extremely informative in raising our awareness. I think a lot of people when they watch the news and they see Pakistan and Iraq and they wonder about America, this has been educational for me and for – I think – the people here. There's a number of people who have made this possible. Let me point out in the back we have Ethan Waise (ph) and Laura Gunderson from Homeland Security, John Mateo, Wes, Jacqueline Harnin, and thank Bob Leskowski. On behalf of Tom Sanderson transnational threat program and CSIS

want to thank you all for coming. And I especially want to thank Lieutenant Stallworth, Barbara Martinez, Charlie Paine, Colonel – Colonel back from 18 months of service in Iraq – thank you for your service, and thank you all. We look forward to seeing you next time.

(END)