

**THE CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)**

PRESS BRIEFING ON

THE VISIT OF JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER KOIZUMI

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H. ANDREW SCHWARTZ: Good morning. Welcome to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I'm glad to see you all could join us and nobody is bailing out their basement. (Laughter.)

We have here two of the world's leading experts on Japan and on Asia in general, and I hope you will take advantage of that. I'm here as the Elvis Presley expert and will take all Elvis questions (Laughter.) And with that, I'll give it to Dr. Mike Green.

MICHAEL GREEN: Thank you. In case you hadn't heard, Prime Minister Koizumi is going to Graceland for the ultimate summit cum road trip in the history of U.S. diplomacy.

Kurt and I have both worked on the U.S.-Japan alliance over the past 12 years. And I thought what might be useful for you all, before we get to the specific Elvis questions, is to provide a little bit of historical context because people are going to ask, well, what happens after Koizumi steps down. There is all of this chemistry between the leaders. Won't this just melt away when you have a different set of personalities at the top?

And I think – well, there is no doubt that the Koizumi-Bush chemistry has been really important personally to the president, personally to Koizumi and for the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance. But I think there are broader reasons why there is a strategic convergence.

And to understand that, you only really have to go back about 10 years and look at the U.S.-Japan alliance in 1994, '95 at a time when in a lot of ways the relationship between Tokyo and Washington looked a bit like what you today see between, say, Washington and Paris. It was not a good time. The Japanese side felt set upon by very hawkish U.S. trade policies. The Japanese public was resentful of U.S. bases after the Cold War ended, and particularly in the wake of a very tragic rape incident with a young Okinawan girl by three U.S. servicemen.

Polls showed that the Japanese public was starting to talk about ending the alliance or ending U.S. bases. And a lot of U.S. experts were arguing that the alliance was essentially going to just wither away. And of course it didn't happen. It's, today, the strongest relationship we have probably ever had with Japan.

Part of the reason is that people like Kurt in the Pentagon were alarmed at this. There were very sound defense strategy reasons why we needed a presence in Japan, why we needed a strong alliance to deal with uncertainties about the future of China, or about North Korea.

But a large part of the reason was that the Japanese side took a look at life in Asia without a U.S.-Japan alliance and didn't like what they saw, and saw a China that was growing increasingly assertive. The Chinese tested nuclear weapons in 1994 and 1995. The Japanese government asked them not to, threatened to cut off aid. The Chinese said mind your own business, and continued. There were missile tests around Taiwan. The North Koreans shot a series of missiles around and over Japan, and it became very clear it was a very dangerous neighborhood.

And so in 1996, President Clinton, Prime Minister Hashimoto reaffirmed the vows, so to speak, of the U.S.-Japan alliance. And I think we have been in a steady upward trajectory ever since then. So it is about strategic issues and the realities that the Americans and Japanese people face.

In 2000, during the campaign between governor – then-Governor George W. Bush and then-Vice President Al Gore, a group from both parties -- a bipartisan group -- came together to put forward a kind of manifesto on how we ought to manage Japan relations no matter who won the election. And the central argument was that our Asia strategy needs to be centered on a strong alliance with Japan, and it needs to be a more equal alliance; it needs to be one where we are not just asking the Japanese side to pay a few things, but that we are in fact working together on strategy and bringing to the table our assets of national power.

And it was co-chaired by Rich Armitage and Joe Knight (ph). Kurt and I were both on it. It was a bipartisan strategy. Governor Bush won. And that strategy, which is publicly available from the National Defense University, was in effect the blueprint for the Bush administration for how to deal with Japan policy. And if you read it, you'll see pretty much the game plan that President Bush wanted to follow and followed with Koizumi.

The question was who on the Japanese side would be the counterpart for this. It takes two to tango. And in 2001, when President Bush came in, the Japanese prime minister was Prime Minister Mori, who was incredibly unpopular, under siege, and very close to resigning.

Well, what happened of course is in April 2001, which is shortly after I joined the White House, a maverick politician named Junichiro Koizumi won the LDP presidential election in a most unconventional way. Instead of smoke-filled rooms and deals being cut, he won based on popularity in the party among the rank in file, and he set a new tone.

The president, our president, decided to invite Koizumi to Washington, take his measure, to get to know him, to start working on this vision that he had for the U.S.-Japan alliance, decided in fact to bring him to Camp David for an in-depth discussion. The Japanese side was delighted. One of the first jobs I had in the White House was to decide and negotiate with the Japanese foreign ministry what gift to give the prime minister.

Now, the Camp David meeting was going to be in late June and the Japanese foreign ministry official I dealt with had noticed that Tony Blair in early March had received the Camp David gift of a heavy leather bomber jacket with a fur lining, and pushed very hard for that. And I pointed out that Maryland in late June is not a place where you want to go out in front of the cameras wearing a heavy leather bomber jacket with fur liner.

So we agreed that – also on the list of gifts was baseball and glove, and what better way to convey the common baseball – how many countries around the world are crazy baseball? Not many, but two are the U.S. and Japan. So what better way to show the common affinity of the American and Japanese people? Plus we had heard that Koizumi liked baseball.

So we agreed on that, but the foreign ministry official I dealt with was really nervous that Koizumi might actually throw the baseball with the president. So we went back and forth. And he made me promise that the we would give – the president would give the baseball and the glove, and then that would be it; there would be no catch ball because the Japanese side said, look, you know, what if Koizumi throws the ball and hits the president in the head in front of CNN or what if he throws the ball over the president's head, the president has to run into the woods at Camp David to get the ball. It would be a disaster. So we spent 10 minutes talking about missile defense and three hours talking about this. (Laughter.) And finally we agreed, okay, baseball glove, no catch ball.

Well, the president gives Koizumi the baseball glove, and what do they do? They immediately ignore the bureaucrats and they start playing baseball – throwing the ball, which was a perfect metaphor for how they handled the relationship, and the spontaneity, the confidence, and the flair that Koizumi brought to this.

Prime Minister Koizumi came into office and he promised to do a series of things, and he did all of them. And I think one of the reasons President Bush is particularly fond of Koizumi is not just his flair and his color, but he says what he is going to do; he says what he can't do. He does what he says he is going to do.

He said he was going to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, and he did, especially in the tough time after 9/11. Most world leaders, as you would expect, expressed great sympathy, promised to cooperate with the United States. Koizumi was one of a small handful of world leaders who on his own decided and said to the president this is a war on terror; this is not a law enforcement action, this is not a disaster, a natural disaster; this is a war on terror of epic proportions, and this was very much how Koizumi himself conveyed his thinking about this to the president, and he said you must prevail, and Japan will help – very decisive, very firm.

Japan, as you know, dispatched ships to the Indian Ocean, a detachment to Iraq, to Samoa, took the lead in putting together a coalition to finance reconstruction in Iraq, \$5 billion pledged, and then Japan went around and put pressure on other countries to give

money, a real contrast to the Gulf in '90, '91. So he really stepped up – agreements on realigning bases in Okinawa and moving 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam -- big, big things in the alliance.

Koizumi promised that he would change politics in the Liberal Democratic Party, and that he would dismantle the old – (in Japanese) – the old guard, the old factions. And he did that. And when the factions tried to challenge him on reform, he went to the polls and he crushed them. So he has dealt a real body blow, if not a deathblow, to the old guard LDP factions.

He has changed the style of prime ministers. It will be hard to find someone who has his flair, but I think the Japanese public is going to expect decisive leadership from their prime minister. He promised to change the economy. He privatized postal savings. He changed and privatized the highway corporation. But he really, more importantly, presided over a period when Japanese companies got their balance sheets back in order and Japan started to grow and come out of its 10-year deflationary slump.

He has made Japan a global player. There was a BBC poll done in February. BBC asked 33 countries around the world who contributes to peace and stability. A majority in 31 countries said Japan. It was more than the U.K.; it was more than any other country in the world. Koizumi's style has really brought Japan. Two countries, China and Korea, said Japan does not contribute to world peace and stability, and I'll come back to that.

And he said he would step down – and he is quite popular still, and he is stepping down – so really quite unique. The power of his agenda is clear in the fact that the two leading candidates to succeed him, Mr. Abe, the current chief cabinet secretary, and Mr. Fukuda, his first chief cabinet secretary are both his lieutenants. Fukuda has distanced himself a little bit from Koizumi, but in terms of U.S.-Japan alliance, both are going to continue I think the same trend.

What has not been completed, what is left for Koizumi's successor to tidy up, what has not been part of his legacy is a short list but an important one. I mentioned that China and Korea in this poll think Japan doesn't play a positive role. Much is made of Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. I'm sure we will get questions about it. It's a very complicated issue. The problems with China, the problems in Korea – with Korea go well beyond the shrine issue. Other prime ministers have visited the shrine and not had a problem with China, for example. I think it has a lot to do with Koizumi's assertive foreign policy.

But whatever the take you have on the causes of Sino-Japanese or Japanese-Korea intentions right now, it's a problem; it's a problem for Japan and it's something that the next prime minister is going to have to pay some attention to.

Secondly, Okinawa – good agreement on repositioning forces, but it has to be implemented. It's going to be very hard and very expensive. Third, taxes. The budget

deficit is quite high in Japan. The common wisdom and general sense is that Japan will have to raise the consumption tax. Fukuda will probably do it. Abe is sending signals he won't. That is a tough decision.

And finally agriculture – Japan's – the toughest issue in U.S.-Japan relations people think is BSE, the beef issue; but really it's agricultural protectionism, and the difficulties that the U.S. has had coordinating with Japan and the World Trade Organization and the Doha development round where Japan has not been a player. And the agriculture lobby in Japan has also hobbled Japan's ability to play an active diplomatic role in Asia, to do FTAs and trade liberalization.

So these are some areas that the next guy is going to have to focus on. But set against the larger accomplishments and legacy of Prime Minister Koizumi, I think on the whole he has been the most important and probably the most successful post-war Japanese prime minister. And his personal relationship with the president has been – I can tell you from my own experience in the White House – strategically important but personally really important for President Bush. And he is saying thanks by taking him to Graceland and giving a state visit, but I think also sending a very strong signal about how important U.S.-Japan relations are for the U.S.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Dr. Kurt Campbell.

KURT CAMPBELL: Thanks very much. I like very much the scene setter that Mike just gave you. And there is very little I would disagree with. Let me just add a few points if I can, and one just for context for folks who spend a little bit of time in Asia.

You can go to a city like Shanghai and you visit every couple of months, and it can be astonishing how much the cityscape changes in a short period of time: new buildings, new parks, whole new industries sprout up almost over night. And so there are very visible manifestations of change that you can see and are clear to everyone.

Conversely, you can go to Tokyo, and you can go to the hotel that you have stayed at for 15 years, and you can see the path in the carpet way that you walk to from the desk where you check into the elevator, meet the people who have greeted you for years almost like members of your family. And you can be lulled into believing that Japan is the same as it always has been for years and years and years.

But the contrast is just as there are physical manifestations of change in China, the real areas of change in Japan are in mindsets and attitudes. And those are changing dramatically. And one of the most important catalysts in modern history for how Japan is changing, both in terms of how it sees itself and how it sees the world has been Prime Minister Koizumi.

And here, if anything, I think Mike has not put a fine – has not made this point even clearer, the reality is that we often talk in the United States about transformation where in many respects you see continuity. The fact is Koizumi has been a

transformational leader for Japan, and he has set a benchmark for both how future Japanese prime ministers will act and engage – even people who disagree with his policies will seek to emulate certain aspects of his personal style, his quirkiness, his determination to stand up to bureaucrats, his occasional desire to break off and be his own man and not follow the group in terms of thinking about foreign policy or a range of issues. And you see each of the potential successors trying to emulate certain qualities that he has to try to appeal to base of support in Japan.

So that is sort of the first point. And I would also say that I have been present in meetings between previous Japanese leaders and American leaders, and they do not compare; they don't in any way measure up to the relationship that President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi has. And it has been consequential in a way that I only hope both politicians in both sides of the aisle in the United States come to appreciate. Personal diplomacy between Japan and the United States is actually more important than just about anything else.

And the president – if you can contrast absolute incompetence in Iraq, this is an area which is the reverse: astute, keen observation about how to manage a critical ally in Asia. And it's been one of the most successful foreign policy initiatives of the Bush administration, along with the opening to India, some of the efforts associated with dealing with HIV/AIDS, and how to manage Japan in a very difficult period in Asia – so enormously consequential and important. So I just want to put that on the table. That is absolutely clear. Anyone who tells you that that is not the case is not being honest.

I would also just disagree with Mike with one thing. If you look back at the document that he talked about, this sort of manifesto in 2000 – I looked at it just a couple of days ago, the reality is what the Japan and the United States has accomplished over the last five years is much more dramatic than what is basically a fairly careful document with a couple of modest areas of suggestions where the United States and Japan could work more closely together. So if anything, the vision of the leaders has transcended what some – Japan has put together in 2000 of what they wanted to accomplish – so much more dramatic progress in the relationship over the last four or five years.

That is the good news, and now let's look and think a little bit about the future and areas of vulnerability, the relationship going forward. The clearest area of success for the United States and Japan is what the two countries have accomplished in what we might call out-of-area pursuits. What the United States has helped Japan do is to more affirmatively make a claim as a global player and a global power.

And so you see Japan very effectively wielding its power in a variety of international organizations, much more influentially in the United Nations. Mike has already talked about Iraq, also in Afghanistan. More recently the decision by Japan to back the United States vis-à-vis diplomacy over Iran cannot be underestimated – very important decision on the part of Japan.

I think one of the things that the Iranian leaders were counting on was that there would be tension between the United States along with tension between Beijing in Washington about how to engage Iran. And the fact that Japan has essentially said yes if Iran does not engage correctly on issues associated with its nuclear ambitions, then Japan would unfortunately be forced to contemplate sanctions. That is enormously consequential and important.

I also think further afield in Asia. Japan has also had a fairly important role. What Japan did in the immediate aftermath of the horrific tsunami, indeed having relief supplies and people and doctors on the ground faster than virtually anyone else was also very consequential. So I think if you look at this in terms of circles out of – further out of area in the Middle East, very influential in the part of Japan, further afield in Asia – important.

The one area where I might disagree a little bit – and Mike probably would have more to say it – where I think Japan's foreign policy has not been successful is in Northeast Asia. And it's been unsuccessful on several fronts. One of the most important areas is – ironically is a country that very rarely gets mentioned in Asia, and that is Russia.

What is most significant at a strategic level is that Russia's sole entry point into Asia is through China. And the fact that Russia and Japan cannot seem to find a way to work with one another because of ancient issues associated with problems that, frankly, should be resolved, means that at a strategic level, Russia's energy, weapons, and growing power are channeled through Beijing. That is a significant failing in Japanese diplomacy, and it's a failing of the United States not to push two countries that are actually quite consequential in Asia to work more closely together. That is number one.

Number two, the issue that I worry the most about is actually not Japan-China relations. I think it is almost inevitable that there will be some tension in that relationship going forward. I think it could be managed more effectively but I think we just have to accept that. The area where it is also a shame on the United States for allowing this to come to this level, but what is transpiring between Korea and Japan is truly regretful.

We have a situation more recently in which Korean politicians in a very shameful way describe a potential threat coming from Japan in the region. Now, clearly there is domestic politics afoot, but the sinews in this relationship that had developed between Seoul and Japan and Tokyo have frayed very, very dramatically, and that is not in Japan's interests I would argue.

And then third of course is the relationship between Japan and China. We are going to have a lot of discussion about Yasukuni. My own view is that I agree with Mike that this is an extraordinarily complex issue. It is complex to Japanese friends. It is not complex to others in Asia, just so we are clear about this. And it is now viewed unfortunately as Yasukuni is viewed in many respects as a litmus test.

One of the things that you will find in the United States currently is that there is uniform support over whether Japan is the closest ally of the United States. Everyone now agrees I think, basically, or most people across the political spectrum that U.S.-Japan relations are absolutely essential. And the problem really was never in the Republican Party; it was mostly in the Democratic Party, but most people really appreciate what has been achieved in terms of U.S.-Japanese relations over the last couple of years.

The real debate is how to help Japan in a very difficult situation right now when it comes to Yasukuni. One group argues that this is essentially Japan's business and let them deal with this themselves; they will find their way through that. And I have to say I dearly hope that that is in fact accurate because the reality is that because of Yasukuni and other issues – and you can – I completely accept how complex it is, but because of that, Japan, is losing altitude and air speed, not just in its relations between Japan and China but much more consequentially around Asia as a whole.

And our interests, frankly, are for Japan to be the great player it is. And in fact, because it has lost so much soft power of late, it has hurt the U.S. position badly I would argue because we are so closely aligned with Japan.

So one group argues, yes, let's wait, to Japan, and they will work that out. And we dearly hope that that is the case. And then there is another group that says quietly the United States has to start urging Japan to get over this because you are hurting yourself and you are hurting Asia as a whole. But there is a worry that by doing so, it will trigger concerns that the United States is leaning on its friend, intruding in its domestic affairs in way that is not correct for now.

I must confess that I find myself more in the latter camp than in the previous camp. I am starting to get concerned about what is transpiring vis-à-vis Japan and its position in Asia as a whole. And I would prefer at some level that we have a quiet dialogue that helps Japan appreciate what is transpiring. At the same time I don't come to this easily. And the great hope is that Japan after the next leadership decision will take policies that allow itself to get on to a different set of issues.

The only reason I say this is that I think Japan has every right to continue in this way. And I have studied Yasukuni and I appreciate the history issues associated with it and how complex they are. But the fact is that this issue does not play well in Asia, it just doesn't. It hurts Japan no matter how you spin it, no matter how you conceptualize it. And Japanese leaders have to get beyond this somehow. So that I think is going to be the biggest issue.

I agree with Mike that there are some challenges ahead in the relationship. I am not very worried about those issues. I think they actually can be managed quite effectively if we can deal with the Yasukuni issue.

There is one last issue that I would just like to leave with you with that Mike is actually too modest to discuss. The reality is that the history of this relationship has

always been about three or four people on both sides that are absolutely consequential and make this relationship go, that explain to leaders on both sides why we have to do things a certain way. And we have had the benefit of leaders who have the wit and wisdom to say give me the ball and glove and I'll throw – let's throw it, not matter what the bureaucrats say.

But in reality, the bureaucrats play an enormously consequential and important role. And we think of big transitions normally between a Democratic and Republican administration, right; we don't think of them so much as between two terms, a first and second term. But the reality, the change that we have just seen between the first Bush administration and the second Bush administration when it comes to Asia is dramatic.

With the departure last week of Deputy Secretary Zoellick, the last person in the Bush administration at a senior level that really knows anything about Asia is gone. And the key players that sustain the U.S.-Japan relationship, Mike Green – and Mike Green is at the top of the list – not Rich Armitage; Mike Green. But Rich Armitage is also very consequential – Jim Kelly and others – these people have all left government.

And so we have a situation now at a time where U.S.-Japan relations have ascended to a very high level, higher than anyone could have ever imagined or aspired to, but a lot of the key people that have got it to that high pinnacle, have gone on to do other things. And so I am not worried about Okinawa; I'm not worried about agriculture. I think these issues can be handled with the right people. I don't see those people inside the U.S. government currently that can take U.S.-Japan relations to the next level or at very least to keep it functioning at the plane that we are on today. Thank you very much.

MR. SCHWARTZ: With that, we'll take a few questions. For those of you seated around the table, please click on your microphone and it will help our transcribing process.

Bob Deans.

Q: I'll start.

Dr. Campbell, you could start and Mike could pick up on it. How do you expect this absence of Asia expertise in the administration to play itself out in the coming months, particularly given where we are with North Korea, and would you expect to see any manifestations of the – (inaudible) – to this week?

MR. CAMPBELL: You know, summits are generally and exercise in autopilot. And now the Hu visit to Washington was a notable exception in somehow the autopilot was turned off and the plane crashed into the forest. But the reality is I'm highly confident that this visit will go extremely well.

It does have – the one thing I worry a little – it does have a sort of a nostalgic feel to it, kind of almost a backward kind of loving as opposed to a recognition that we are

dealing with North Korean huge challenges. But I accept that, and look, let's remember, this is really an enormously important set of achievements to celebrate.

I do worry about who are going to be the people that are going to manage Asian relations, and I think privately most people do. And so you have two things that are work: one, a dramatic preoccupation of the United States in Iraq and the Middle East. That is our life; that is our destiny; that is our burden to put in a context the Japanese friends understand. And we have to accept that and that's going to be with us for the next three or five years – three to five years.

The reality over the last couple of years, we have still managed to do great things particularly with Japan, even with this focus. But now that we don't have the same people with this sort of masterful understanding of how to maneuver and to manipulate the bureaucracy, I am anxious. I think there are going to be some people at a junior level that are effective but at the highest levels in the U.S. government, I find it difficult to identify one senior person that I can say, yep, you can go to that person to really get you help on Asia.

MR. GREEN: Kurt is engaging in what in Japan is known as – (in Japanese) – murder by phrase. (Laughter.) Usually it's employed by – (in Japanese) – and you have to pay them off to stop because it gets you in trouble with powerful other people in the system.

This is a very personal trip, and you can tell that from the visit to Graceland. I mean, this is a valedictorian trip for Koizumi. But it does present an opportunity that I think both leaders are going to use to lay down some directions for the next prime minister in Japan.

And they may put out a joint statement. They may do this through speeches, but through a variety of media, I think they are going to start laying out what is enduring about what they have accomplished, and I would expect a particular focus on global cooperation, on building an Asia architecture and cooperative mechanisms that are centered on the U.S.-Japan alliance in a lot of ways, but are transformational in Asia, integrating the two economies. I think they are going to lay out an agenda that either Fukuda or Abe would feel comfortable pursuing.

I also think the summit is important to close the gap on some tactical issues like Iran, and I think the fact that Prime Minister Koizumi is coming to Washington added focus and clarity for the debate on Iran, but also other issues like Burma or how to implement the Okinawa agreement.

So there are consequential things that will come out of it that will have to be implemented and I think the people in place are more than capable to do that because they are in our national interests, in our interests to work on Japan on Iran, on Burma to get this Okinawan realignment fully implemented. It's not about being nice to Japan. These are things that good for U.S. interests.

Q: Let me ask my Taiwan question. Where do you think that Taiwan is going to – do you think in fact Taiwan is going to play a role in this summit? As you know, Japan-China relations have gone sour, Japan relations with Taiwan have actually improved. While the Bush administration has been upset with Chen Shui-Bian has been doing, do you think there is going to be some interaction on Taiwan in this summit?

MR. GREEN: Probably. They are spending a lot of time together. Typically in these summits, the president likes, especially with a counterpart he trusts to do a survey of the region, to get his counterpart's take on what is going on, on the dynamics, the personal relationships with other leaders and how they deal with problems with North Korea or cross-strait stability.

In February 2005, as you know, Charlie, the U.S. and Japan put out a joint two-plus-two ministerial statement saying that the peace and stability of the Taiwan straight is a strategic core objective for the U.S. and Japan. So the two sides have been very open that we each have a stake. We both have one-China policies; we both oppose unilateral changes to the status quo. We have a Taiwan relations act; Japan doesn't. But the basic parameters of each of our policies haven't changed, but I think there is a clear signal that the U.S. and Japan care about stability in the straits. And that sends a signal to both Taipei and Beijing. So it would be natural that they would talk about it.

Koizumi is sometimes thought to be anti-China because of the Yasukuni visits. He is not at all. I think he is quite bullish on Japan-China relations, and, you know wants growth in Japan-China trade and cooperation and so forth. So there is no radical thinking about Taiwan. But I think one interesting trend over the past four years is the degree to which the U.S. and Japan have tightened coordination on the Taiwan issues.

In December 2003, when President Bush got to the point where he had to publicly send a Chen Shui-Bian when Jiabao was here. Japan's representative in Taipei within I think 24 hours sent a similar public message. And there has just been a lot more tightening. And I think that has been good for Taiwan and both when sending signals to Taipei but also sending signals to Beijing. And I think it has helped stabilized the situation and will likely be to some extent a topic of discussion.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Bob?

Q: I'm Bob Hillman with the Dallas Daily News.

How would you assess the tenure of Tom Schieffer as ambassador? He's a close personal friend but he is in a different mode and kind of the older statesman – (off mike).

MR. CAMPBELL: I think it has been very effective actually. What matters most to – I mean, you're a long way from home in Asia, right, and so, you know, there is a tradition of ambassadors being a little out of touch in the sense of wanting to be a little

out of touch. They make their own policy a little bit, and there is a sense of almost being the kind of representative of the U.S. government in that part of the world. So Walter Mondale, Tom Foley have all generally practiced that.

The difference is for each of these previous guys like Mondale and Foley, they had their own independent power base basically, their own political career.

Q: Howard Baker as well.

MR. CAMPBELL: Yeah. I mean, they had a relationship with the president, but they had their own independent power base. Schieffer's power, the ambassador's power derives primarily from an incredibly close relationship, extraordinarily close with the president, which he doesn't wear on his sleeve, but he will occasionally say, oh, yeah, I was – I just got back from the United States where I was at the ranch, you know, and you think, well, what ranch? Oh, the ranch – Crawford obviously – like we all would go to Crawford.

And so he is very close to the president and has used that very effectively. I think he did a great job on Australia and I think he is doing a great job in Japan. So I think it has worked very well. He passes consequential messages. He is extremely discrete. He is an excellent manager. He has used the embassy very well. I just don't have a complaint in the world.

And in fact, when you ask yourself the question, which is – this is probably the answer to my question – who do you look to manage at least U.S.-Japan relations, the ambassador is probably going to have to step up even further than he already has.

Mike, do you –

MR. GREEN: No, I would agree with all of that. And Koizumi knows this and has developed a very good relationship with Ambassador Schieffer, which is important because as close as he is the president, he is not on the telephone with him every day or able to come to Washington every month, so I agree with everything Kurt said.

MR. SCHWARTZ: In the back.

Q: Steve Collison with AFP.

Do you think there is any danger without the kind of motor effects of the good relationship between Koizumi and Bush of the top – and especially sort of going to a presidential election cycle soon – perhaps a little bit of drift in the gains they have made so far in this administration on the U.S.-Japan relations?

And secondly, on the valedictory sorts of visits, we all know how important it is to Bush to have personal relationships with foreign leaders. He had the sort of valedictory visit with Blair a few months ago. Berlusconi was already gone. What

impact does that have on U.S. foreign policy that most of the people he has dealt with the already are now starting to fade away and he still has two years to kind of run U.S. foreign policy.

MR. GREEN: It's an interesting question actually. I don't know the answer. But I do know that or felt that, you know, it can be a little lonely at the top, and to have stalwart friends like Koizumi or John Howard in Australia or Prime Minister Blair matters a lot. And there were times during the early post-9/11 period – you know, it was pretty tough when Koizumi would send handwritten notes – you know, hang in there – very much stood by the president in a personal way in a tough, tough time. And I think people are human, especially presidents, and they probably counted for a lot. And I have no doubt he is going to be a little sad to see Koizumi go.

On the other hand, he knows – the president has met and knows Abe and Fukuda because they were both at one point each Koizumi's deputies. Their track record on the U.S.-Japan alliance is excellent. After 9/11, the dispatch of ships to the Indian Ocean by Japan, the Samoa deployment – I mean, these were all managed by Fukuda as a chief cabinet secretary, and Abe was his deputy. Now, Abe is out there pushing forward key parts of the U.S.-Japan alliance as well.

So these are not strangers at all; they are people who have really been the muscle for Koizumi's visions and both have particular strengths – both Fukuda and Abe – that they bring to this. Abe has a very strategic sense. He is very well read. He speaks to a younger generation of Japanese politicians who want Japan to play an assertive role. Fukuda is very steady, very well traveled. Think Richard Lugar. Kurt made this point after meeting him recently. Richard Lugar – just steady reliable.

So these are both leaders who are going to give a lot of confidence I think to the president when – assuming one of them comes on board. It's not a done deal. There others like Foreign Minister Asa running. The are press reports Fukuda might drop out. It is still months away but I think the field is good from a U.S. perspective.

MR. CAMPBELL: Can I try a slightly different take on that? It's often the foreign policies between "41" and "43" are often compared and contrasted, and they are indeed very different. I think President Bush, Senior, much more traditionalist foreign policy in the mainstream of sort of Republicans four generations. I think President Bush 43 historically will be see as a transformational leader very much out of the mainstream of traditional Republicans, probably comparatively much more like Woodrow Wilson with a highly visionary a little bit of overextension, et cetera, et cetera.

I think the similarities between the two leaders, however, is that they put probably, first of all, enormous stake, but maybe too much, on personal relationships. Personal relationships are important between states, but ultimately relationships are between nations. And I think you have to be careful and not find yourself in a situation that you are influenced one way or the other about a state just because of your personal relationship.

The fact is that it usually is a one-to-one relationship. You are close to those leaders where there is a tight relationship between Washington and that other capital. But the fact is that there are deeper issues at stake that I think American leaders and statesmen always must keep in mind. That is the first point.

The second point is that I do think this is going to be a difficult time for the president going forward. The president – if you look at the more recent Pew polling, which I think are not – that are often caricature in the United States – but it does reflect one powerful reality, however, and that is that those leaders – generally they are European leaders – that decided to make a bet to be with President Bush and to be with the United States, as we would say in English, “come hell or high water” in the post-9/11 world, most of those leaders have had problems subsequently. And that would even include Prime Minister Blair. And you see that in Italy, in Spain, and in fact, indeed, throughout Europe.

And so the current generation, particularly of European leaders are much more careful about the embrace with the United States. And I think probably the president feels that, and it is a constant feature in U.S.-European relations.

Asia has been a different story, and you have – a couple of leaders have really done a remarkable job using this relationship between the – with the United States, using it politically. Prime Minister Howard is the master of this, in which Australian-U.S. relations are extraordinarily close, and he has used it very effectively politically inside Australia.

I think the same can be said, as Mike suggests, vis-à-vis Japan. And there are a couple of other leaders in Asia who have also practiced this. One area where it has failed miserably is obviously between Seoul and Washington.

But I do think the next couple of years are likely to be a little bit more lonely for the president in the sense that he is not going to have the same number of people that he has been through this – what did he used to call it – the day of fire or this time of fire, that he has this personal experience with, like Prime Minister Howard who was here during 9/11 and Prime Minister Koizumi who stood by him as a steadfast friend and as an ally.

And instead the international arena is going to be inhabited more by leaders who have either not experienced 9/11 and the political aftershocks, or who have taken different political lessons, i.e., keep the United States and President Bush at a little bit of a distance because of what it can mean for you domestically inside your own country.

(Audio break, tape change.)

DR. GREEN: (In progress) -- or not all, sort of about the President of the United States being isolated ideologically. There are plenty of like-minded people also coming on to the scene. So where I would agree with Kurt is I think on a personal level it

probably, you know, you have your people who've been through tough, you know, times with you, and you've stood together. And that's got to be important to a leader as it would to anyone.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Kenji.

Q: (Inaudible.) I wonder if you could shed a little light on the – (inaudible) – in light of what's going on in Korea.

DR. GREEN: Well, the U.S.-Japan cooperation on North Korea has been excellent. The press reported when Prime Minister Koizumi went to Pyongyang in September of 2002 that President Bush was unhappy and so forth. Absolutely not true.

Koizumi – I was in Japan in August with Rich Armitage and Jim Kelly. Koizumi gave a heads up to our delegation before most of the senior Japanese government knew. He very much coordinated with Washington and with the president. In the six-party talks the cooperation has been excellent between the U.S. and Japan.

There was a moment in early 2003 when the president was pushing for a multilateral approach when Beijing was trying to construct this as a U.S.-DPRK-China trilateral. And, frankly, there were people in the U.S. government who would have been quite happy to have that and were pushing for that. And it was the president who said I'm not doing this without Japan and Korea and stood very firm to keep Japan in the process. So on North Korea the cooperation has been excellent.

And I think there's a recognition – a clear recognition in this administration that we need to get like this Taepo dong missile launch right because Japan is an independent country and will draw its own conclusions about the reliability of the U.S. And in 1998, when North Korea launched a Taepo dong, people like Kurt made heroic efforts, but there were mixed signals out of Washington. And it undermined confidence in Tokyo in how reliable the U.S. would be. And I think this summit is going to be very important for coordinating but also conveying clearly that the U.S. is on the case and – in the deployment of missile defense assets and in the coordination of messages it's been very helpful. And by the way, I think the fact that the U.S. and Japan have sort of set the mark on this has made it possible for South Korea and even China to send quite a firm message to North Korea, and that flowed, I think, from a U.S.-Japan starting point.

DR. CAMPBELL: Slightly different take. I do agree that – I think the best way to say it is the United States and Japan have coordinated actually quite well – I agree with Mike – on an ineffective policy. So they've worked well together. They've, you know, exchanged, kept each other abreast on a policy that has largely failed vis-à-vis North Korea. And I think the biggest problem – I mean, I think we have two problems. One is that over the last five or six years North Korea has methodically gone about building larger numbers of nuclear weapons. And I think the politics and the political recognition of that has lagged badly in Asia. And there's not a recognition that North Korea has achieved a break out here. I do not agree with my colleagues Ash Carter and Bill Perry

that the best way to deal with this problem is a cruise missile attack on North Korea. I do think, however, that we are faced – the Korean peninsula is the land of lousy options. It truly, fundamentally is. And among all the options, the bad, horrible options that we have to face, the one that I would choose right now, unabashedly, is a much more intensive period of diplomacy. And I think that's just the reality. And I think that has to be led by the United States. And I recognize all the reasons associated with that, all the anxieties about potentially, you know, signaling to North Korea that you are a respectable regime. I actually think you have a much better chance of creating change in North Korea through a policy of engagement than through isolation.

But I also recognize that there are powerful arguments why that could be a mistake. I think, given the fact that we cannot really realistically threaten either further sanctions because we cannot control South Korea or China. They have made their own policy decisions outside of the framework that, largely, the United States and Japan has accepted, and that that is proceeding ahead accordingly. Military options really should be off the table. I mean, again, I worked for Bill Perry; Mike and I both did and have great respect for both he and Ash Carter. You cannot, on the one hand, say, look, President Bush and his team did not plan for what happens after you invade Iraq and at the same time suggest that you deal sort of – you know, with – after, you know, a potential missile attack or a cruise missile attack on North Korea just accept and hope that the aftermath is going to work out.

If you're going to think about something like that, you've got to be ready militarily. You've got to put forces on higher alert, you've got to do an enormous amount of things in Asia that we cannot do right now – for two reasons. One, we are, most of our forces, ground forces and the things that we need to do are in Asia – are in the Middle East, A. And B, politically, we do not have the necessary agreements with other countries in the region, particularly with South Korea. So I'm left with the situation – you know, I understand that no one likes to quote, “reward bad behavior.” But at the same time, I think what we have to start thinking about is diplomacy not as a reward but something that we do when it's in our own best interests. And so we don't withhold diplomacy with the United States as some sort of prize for good behavior. We engage in diplomacy even with odious and difficult regimes because it maximizes our own best interests.

DR. GREEN: One quick response to my friend Neville Chamberlain – just kidding, Kurt. (Laughter.) Just on U.S., Japan, and North Korea. The choices the administration faced – and I was in this – after the North Koreans revealed to us when I was there in October 2002 that there were developing a clandestine uranium enrichment program to develop nuclear weapons – the choices we faced were do we go back and try to capture the plutonium which could yield maybe one weapon a year -- maybe, if they're good from here on and take that and sort of set aside the HEU. Or do we try to capture the HEU program as well? Because the HEU program when it's up and running could produce potentially dozens a year. It's not there yet, but that's the track they're on. And that's the choice we had to make.

I think – Japan came down – the Japanese government came down pretty solidly on the choice of let's -- even if we have to wait, let's get all of it because it is unacceptable for Japan to have a freeze or a partial halt to the plutonium weapons program and leave the uranium enrichment program continuing unfettered. It was a hard choice to make. I think Japan came down more where the administration did; I think China, and to some extent Seoul, came down on the side of, gee, let's come up with an agreement that, just, you know, mainly focuses on the plutonium for the sake of getting an agreement and preventing further deterioration. Hard choices, but on this one I think the strategic calculation in Tokyo and Washington came into line.

The six-party talks are – they are ready to be reconvened. There is no precondition from the U.S. side for North Korea to show up; it's North Korea that's putting on all sort of conditions. I've been in several rounds of the six-party talks and just on my own clocked dozens of hours of time with the North Koreans. There was no shortage of opportunities for bilateral discussions or engagement. The question is at what point do you go forward with a bilateral trip to Pyongyang again? And I would argue that after the North Koreans walked out of the talks and threatened to launch a missile is not the time to send a delegation to Pyongyang. These are tactical differences, and they're very, very hard calls. Nick Kristof of the New York Times I didn't always agree with, but he wrote one thing I completely agreed with when he said everybody who has to work on North Korea in this administration must have done something wrong in past life because there is no good choice. And we spent the next day emailing each other and trying to get the other guy to confess what they had done in a past life to deserve North Korea policy as their punishment. You can have a rebuttal if you want.

Q: Paul Eckert of Reuters. Mike Green touched on it a little bit of the unfinished business on the trade and agriculture front, and it did strike me. I spent most of the 90s in Tokyo when the bitterness of some of the trade disputes – managed trade and car parts and all that came up. That all seems to have receded, but I have wondered, have the Koizumi reforms really affected market access and competition policy in a way that, you know, made it – just reduce all that trade pressure, or is it still lingering there in certain sectors? And if that's the case, is it also the case that, as in the Cold War, Japan gets a bit of a pass on trade issues because of its importance as a security ally?

DR. CAMPBELL: I'll say three things (personally?). There have been some modest improvements in market access, A. B, I think what has largely buoyed Japan economically in the last several years is not simply the addressing of some of the bad loans and debt overhang. But it is, frankly, the profound, deep discovery of China as a vehicle to enhance Japanese manufacturing. I think, actually, there have been a number of studies that suggest that that has been a – perhaps even a larger component of the Japanese revival than domestic changes inside Japan.

It is also the case that it makes this political dynamic so much more interesting and complicated. On the one hand, you've got dramatic economic integration – Mike has made this point before – but also a level of political alienation. Now, it's possible that that can continue for some time, but I would say at some level that becomes potentially

contradictory. The third issue, which is really much more important than the first two, is that most of those companies that were really interested – American companies that were really interested in Japan in the 1970s, the 1980s quite honestly are not interested in Japan as much anymore. They do a little bit. They're mostly interested in Japan potentially as a – if they don't want to have their entire headquarters in China, and they want for schools -- rather pollution reasons, to have a base in Japan. Most of the interests that we see from American companies now in Asia are not about Japan. They're much more about China. So those three issues I think are what's really at stake here.

DR. GREEN: Last year U.S. companies in China made about \$3 billion in profit. U.S. companies in Japan made over \$11 billion. So those companies that are working in Japan – Aflack, GE, Capital, and others – are pretty happy – they're very happy. I think their main concern is that there not be a rollback on reform momentum with the change of leadership in Japan. And I would expect that will be part of the agenda for this summit – is both leaders sending up a signal that they want these reforms to continue. A poll came out yesterday in which 16 percent of the Japanese said, well, maybe it's time to dial back some of the reforms. So I think for U.S. companies that will be important.

The trade battle between the – that you experienced, for example, in the early '90s – between the USDR or Commerce versus Pentagon and NSC and State that were such a feature of U.S.-Japan relations – pretty much evaporated the past five years. One reason was Super 301 – that the – in the world of WTO the legislation that was always used as the stick was taken away.

Another reason, I think, was that, as Kurt said, the focus on China, Japan's economic stagnation. But in the end, maybe the main reason was as the Bush administration got together to talk about Japan's – or economic policy with Japan, the number one issue was getting the Japanese economy to grow. And so, for the first time, really you had a universal consensus where all the strategic thinkers said we've got to work with Koizumi to help the Japanese economy grow for all these strategic reasons that we're going to rely on Japan as an ally. And you had the economic people saying our companies aren't going to keep making money in Japan if the economy is stagnant. So there was a convergence that I think is still the case and explains why you don't have a lot of big friction in the relationship on the economic front that you used to have.

DR. CAMPBELL: Just one thing. I agree that the profit picture – on the face of it, looks like it favors Japan much more dramatically, but I think that that can be slightly misleading. Many American companies deal – and other international companies deal with profits in China in a less open way, A. And I think – what you've got to do is look at the total picture, and one of the thing that's most important as you compare and contrast Japan and China, is foreign direct investment. And the foreign direct investment of American firms in China just completely dwarfs anything that you see vis-à-vis Japan. And so I'm not saying that the U.S.-Japan is not an important economic relationship; it's very important. Much of this, though, is legacy investment in business as opposed to new, fledgling, sort of, let's think about the China market and investing and working in China.

I do think that there are – if you look at people who've spent a lot of time thinking about Asia, many people are starting to get much more bullish about Japan in the future. But I still think that will mean in minutiae areas and certain kinds of exports not the kind of whole scale dramatic movement of operations and manufacturing of the kind that we've seen among a host of American companies over the last five years.

Q: (Off mike.) You seem to be – (inaudible) – coming from Russia. Do you have any comments on this or maybe similar – (inaudible)?

DR. CAMPBELL: I don't think there is any coincidence other than, you know, you just, you know there – you just have meetings, and you just fit them in when you can – probably a nice time right now to visit Graceland as well. I think that for other G-8 members the visit to Russia is a complicated one right now. On the one hand, they sort of welcome Russia's revival economically and, to a certain sense, strategically. I think in certain places in the United States and probably in Japan there are some misgivings about elements of Russian domestic and foreign policy that look to be either contrary to American interests or in some places outright confrontational or competitive. I think there will be some discussions between Koizumi and Bush.

And one of the things – I agree with Mike – one of the things that's happened between the United States and Japan in recent years that doesn't get enough attention – we used to say all the time about the need for strategic dialogue between the United States and Beijing. You want to see real strategic dialogue? It actually happens between the United States and Japan right now where you have long, intense meetings in which every possible subject comes up. And there's discussion about them, and there's reflection. And you contrast that with ever-shorter meetings between U.S. and Chinese leaders with highly scripted and careful words that readers lead to one another that is basically the antithesis of strategic dialogue. So I do think there will be some discussion of Russia.

The one thing I would say, and I would highlight this: I wish the United States would encourage Japan to really find a way to engage Russia more dramatically and strategically, not just because of Japan's own domestic interests of energy and – you know, they've tried this before, and it has failed – but still, I think there's a new strategic calculus that suggests that Russia's line of entry into Asia through China is profoundly not in Japan's interest.

Q: (Off mike) – Nishimura (sp) with Hokaido Newspapers. I see how President Bush is welcoming Prime Minister Koizumi. You can see how he's satisfied with the change or transformation in these five years in Japan. Now, is it fair for us to say that the United States wanted Japan to be – wanted a strong Japan in the Asian area? To what extent does the United States want Japan to be strong in that equation and how they express Japan in the future?

DR. GREEN: I think the consistent theme for the Bush administration has been that strong, an active Japan is in U.S. interests because the U.S. and Japan share common values – that used to be a lot more of a cliché than substance, but increasingly, if you look at what the Japanese government is doing on development assistance or in the G8 context or elsewhere – you can see that these values based on the alliance actually has some operational context and output.

The U.S. has an interest, as Rich Armitage likes to put it, in getting China right. But to get China right, you have to get Asia right. And to get Asia right you really have to have a good, strong U.S.-Japan alliance. You can manage the rise of China and China's growing role by trying to contain it, but in fact, you can't; that won't work. You can try to work out a bipolar condominium with China – between the U.S. and China where you, sort of, accommodate to each other – but that's a bad deal for the U.S. because you're essentially splitting the difference between two different systems.

A much better strategic set up for the U.S. is to have an Asia in which countries that share our values and interests are playing a dynamic, strong role. That's also part of the reason why the U.S. has transformed their relationship with India. It's not about containing China, but it's about setting up an agenda for Asia that is, in effect, one we are comfortable with and one that we want China to sign onto rather than the opposite which would be a kind of bipolar condominium where we're sort of splitting the difference and coming up with a new agenda for Asia that we may not like as much. It's not about containing China; but a strong Japan is very important for that purpose of managing China's growing role.

And globally Japan has been really important. People often forget: Japan is the second largest contributor to the UN, to all of the international financial institutions. In the G-8 context the Japanese government doesn't like to highlight this, but the reality is that the U.S. and Japan are probably more closely aligned than any other two countries in the G-8 because, whether it's on development issues or the global economy or terrorism, Japan has actually become really important to the U.S. as an ally in the G-8. And the Japanese government doesn't like to emphasize that because it's bad politics to be with the Americans and not with the Europeans. And Koizumi has put a lot of effort in trying to pull the Europe and American sides together. So all across the board it's been very significant as a U.S. interest. That's true for this administration I don't know – I think it was very much true for the thinking in the Clinton administration that led to the reaffirmation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance.

DR. CAMPBELL: I don't know. It's hard to predict what the future would hold. I think there'd be elements in the Democratic Party that would argue for a continuing on a strong relationship between the United States and Japan. There are a couple of recent speeches of candidates. Governor Warner gave a speech up in New York which, I mean, looked like it could have been a continuation of this administration's policies in Japan so has Senator Clinton; those are very hopeful signs. Remember the real trade friction foes were primarily in the Democratic Party on Capitol Hill. And I think there has been a

revival – not a revival, a reformation, a recasting of how to think about Japan and a closer set of political relationships going forward.

The question is how to balance and how to engage Japan and China simultaneously. And I think what the Bush administration has managed, which is very hard to do, is to have good relations between the two but at the same time relations between China and Japan may probably have never been worse or haven't been worse for quite a long time. I think the real question for a future administration is whether they would take a more activist approach to try to improve relations with the recognition that that could also backfire. But I do think you could make a case that the United States has an interest in not having as much friction between China and Japan. That's where I think the big debate will be.

DR. GREEN: Although, just to be clear – I agree with that – but I think the – just to be clear – I don't think the Bush administration wants friction between China and Japan. It's not useful right now at all when you're trying to deal with North Korea or avian influenza or regional architecture and the future of APEC and trade liberalization. The debate really comes down to what you do about the historical issue and how much the U.S. should be trying to intervene. And Kurt and I are good friends, but fall off on very different sides of this debate.

The Japanese public opinion polls that far more Japanese oppose – far more Japanese – it's hard to put this because it's all in double negatives – but, basically, if – the polls show that if China is saying don't go to Yasukuni, then a large majority of Japanese say you should go. In other words, the more that there is external pressure, as you know, the more there is an internal push back and sense that, you know, this is Japan's own business -- which is why I think it would be particularly problematic for the American president or the U.S. side to try to push. I think China made a mistake. Hu Jintao was trying actually to get out of the problems with Japan when he stated that if the prime minister doesn't go to Yasukuni then there can be a summit. So I think Hu Jintao was trying to create a sort of positive incentive. But what he did was he created a litmus test which makes it very difficult for prime ministers not to go to Yasukuni because he basically said you can't have a summit with China unless you stop Yasukuni. The Chinese regret that; I think they're trying to find a way out of it and trying to find a way to move forward.

Kurt and I were just in Beijing and in Japan and involved in a lot of discussions with Chinese and Japanese because second track discussions are very useful, and you can clearly sense the Chinese side is trying to find some way to move forward. You can clearly sense that the next prime minister, whether it's Abe, Fukuda, or Aso (sp), is trying to find a way to move forward. And so intervening by the U.S. in this issue I think would actually make the problem worse at a time when there's some prospect it will get better.

On the other hand, what Kurt points to is true because this history issue is not going away; it's going to be a feature. And it's going to be a challenge in Japan's foreign policy into the future.

DR. CAMPBELL: You know, language in these things are important, and they language you use to describe things is significant. I try to use careful language, and I'll try to do so again. I would not use words like press or intervene, ever, and I don't think that is appropriate. And the United States is certainly not China. I think the way China has handled this is completely inappropriately. I would be the first to suggest that.

I do think that the United States has now a unique and very strong relationship with Japan. One of the things that happens in close allies, in close friendships, is that allies come and tell things that are difficult to hear. Prime Minister Blair, when he came to Washington a couple of years ago, told the president, when no one around him wanted to hear this or in fact wanted the information to get to him, what a bad job of post-conflict reconstruction was going on in Iraq and how the ball was badly being dropped. Now people don't like to hear those things sometimes, but sometimes that's what close allies have to do is to explain how certain steps might not be either in your interests or in our interests.

And so what I am not suggesting is pressing, intervening, pressurizing – and that's not – I'm not saying Mike is demagoging this – but it's not what I'm suggesting. What I'm suggesting is that this is about power. It's about influence and it's about prestige – all things that we, the United States and Japan, have very real interests in. And so I am simply suggesting that I think that if you have a very discrete set of issues that you have discussions about this would be one of them. And I think that a robust, mature relationship can handle a discussion around something like this at the highest levels. I believe that. Others will tell me why that that is not the case, but what I worry about is an environment in which we don't say anything at the highest levels. Then that can be misperceived that we don't have concerns about this, and we do. We have profound, deep concerns that Japan is implementing a policy that is hurting Japan in Asia. I don't care as much vis-à-vis China. I care in a larger Asian context, and so that's the only nature of the debate that I can see here.

Does the United States have any role in intervening and pressuring? No. Absolutely not. That would be completely inappropriate. But what I'm suggesting is that our relationship is maturing in ways that are very important. And just as Japan has every right to raise issues about Guantanamo and torture and things like that – as other allies do with the United States – then we should also be able to raise issues that are uncomfortable politically but necessary in a strong, functioning bilateral relationship.

Q: Before we leave, Mike, what's the perfect gift for the president to give to Pyongyang?

DR. GREEN: That's a good question. I'm not – he's given him boots, cowboy boots. He's given him a baseball glove. I still would recommend against the heavy leather bomber jacket -- it is late June.

DR. CAMPBELL: I bet I know what it is.

DR. GREEN: You do?

DR. CAMPBELL : I'll guess. I'll say what it's going to be. It's going to be a very cool, handcrafted guitar – electric guitar of some kind. No – made by one of these very -- guys who also made a guitar for Elvis. And there's going to be a picture of Elvis on one side -- on one, and a picture of Koizumi on the other part of the keyboard.

DR. GREEN: At Yasukuni. (Laughter.)

MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you all for coming.

(END)