Statement before the
U.S. - China Economic and Security Review Commission

“China’s Strategic Aims in Africa.”

A Testimony by:

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Introduction

Chairwoman Cleveland and Vice Chairwoman Bartholomew, thank you for the opportunity to testify.

China is deftly using its military engagement to advance its strategic objectives in sub-Saharan Africa and in the wider world. Its military activities are part of—not separate from—its broader goals in the region. Beijing’s framing of its security assistance to African partners as mutually beneficial and in protection of its overseas interests obscures China’s long-term goals for economic ascendancy, an expansive global logistics network, and influence in multilateral bodies.

The U.S. Congress has several opportunities to address the economic and political implications of China’s security activities, as well as to increase U.S. influence in sub-Saharan Africa. However, because many African leaders and publics regard Chinese security activities as advantageous, the United States should refrain from dissuading African leaders from cooperation with China. Instead, the United States should prioritize expanding U.S. security partnerships, focusing security issues of shared concern, and partnering with African and external partners to evaluate economic investments with national security implications.

In my testimony, I will describe the range of Chinese security sector activities in sub-Saharan Africa, explain how these seemingly disparate engagements combine to advance Chinese strategic objectives, and conclude with recommendations for congressional action.

China’s Evolving Security Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa

China is both a historical security partner and a new power in sub-Saharan Africa. Beijing, for instance, was the primary source of aid for the Tanzanian military in the 1960s. This included small arms, trucks, antiaircraft guns, medium tanks, patrol boats, and landing craft. China also supported many of the region’s ruling parties during their fight for independence in the 1970s, including FRELIMO in Mozambique and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe. In the past three decades, Beijing’s security engagement in the region has expanded and deepened in line with its broader “going out” strategy initiated in the late 1990s. China has ramped up its participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations, strengthened its bilateral security partnerships, and tapped its private sector companies to secure security contracts.

China has shifted from a minor to major player in UN and African Union (AU) peace operations in the past two decades. Its involvement has expanded both quantitatively and qualitatively, with greater numbers of personnel committed and a steady increase in presence in new countries.

In the early 2000s, Chinese troop contributions in sub-Saharan Africa numbered in the low hundreds. As of February 2020, China has more than 2,000 soldiers and staff deployed to UN peacekeeping missions in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, South Sudan, and Sudan. Of the UN Security Council five permanent members, China has become the largest troop contributor and second largest financier of UN peacekeeping operations. China also has stepped up its support to the AU’s peace and security architecture. At the 2015 Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China pledged $100 million of free military assistance to support the establishment of the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Responses to Crisis (ACIRC). While some these commitments have not materialized, scholars note that Beijing in February 2018 delivered $25 million to the AU logistics base in Douala, Cameroon, as a portion of the $100 million.

China has doubled down on its bilateral partnerships, increasing its official representation in African capitals, conducting military exercises, and expanding high-level visits and professional training, as well as participating in humanitarian and medical missions. Most notably, it established its first overseas base in Djibouti in August 2017. According to a RAND study in 2014, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has attaché representation in one-third of African nations, and 75 percent of these countries have attachés in China. Between 2003 and 2016, China conducted 13 military exercises, 22 naval port calls, and 259 senior-level meetings. Moreover, Beijing has focused on security professionalization training, inviting tens of thousands of African military officers to China for workshops. China is also active in medical and humanitarian missions. Last month, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) delivered medical protective gear, including protective goggles and face and nose masks, to the South African National Defense Force to assist in the Covid-19 response. The PLA sent three military teams, including doctors and staff from a military hospital in Beijing, to set up an Ebola treatment center in Sierra Leone in 2014. Its Navy deployed the “Peace Ark” hospital ship, providing free health care in Djibouti, Kenya, the Seychelles, and Tanzania in 2010.

China’s state-owned enterprises and private sector also have played a significant role in China’s growing military footprint in the region. In 2019, China accounted for approximately one-fifth of arms exports (19 percent) to sub-Saharan Africa, second only to Russia. While mostly small arms and light weapons, Chinese arms manufacturers have started to sell more advanced armament to African militaries.

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technologies, including the CH-3 unmanned aerial vehicle and battle tanks to support Nigerian operations against Boko Haram. China’s tech companies and private security companies (PSCs) are also in the mix. With the involvement of Chinese IT firm ZTE, China has provided loan-financed sensitive IT networks for the region’s armed forces. Chinese PSCs, even before the advent of the Belt and Road Initiative, were operating in the natural resources sector and providing services to small businesses in the region. According to a China Africa Research initiative policy brief, there has been a measurable increased in PSC activity in sub-Saharan Africa recently. Chinese PSCs have found a “profitable niche” protecting Chinese VIPs and serving as armed personnel on Chinese vessels transiting high-risk waterways off the Gulf of Guinea and Horn of Africa.

China Leveraging Military Engagement to Advance Economic and Political Objectives

Beijing routinely couches its security engagement as part of its protection of its overseas interests and provision of global goods in sub-Saharan Africa. This is only part of the story. China’s security activities are intrinsically connected to other goals, including fueling its economic growth, expanding its logistic footprint, and sharpening its political influence in multilateral forums.

China’s responsibility to protect its citizens abroad is a key driver of its increased security engagement. With as many as one million Chinese migrants or temporary workers living in Africa, Beijing is under pressure to respond when its nationals are threatened by armed conflict, xenophobic riots, criminality, terrorism, and acts of piracy. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), there have been more than 150 violent incidents involving Chinese citizens in sub-Saharan Africa in the past decade. Since 2004, China has conducted 16 non-combatant evacuations, including in CAR, Chad, Libya, and Yemen. Many scholars believe the turning point was in 2011 when 13,500 Chinese were stranded in the middle of the Libyan civil war. The Chinese government, which lacked an indigenous capacity to evacuate its citizens, rented three cruise ships and 100 buses from Greece to rescue its nationals. This “lesson of blood” was a direct cause of the shift in China’s Africa policy. China’s shambolic response to Libya hastened plans to pre-position its military and logistic chains to more swiftly respond to these types of emergencies. It presumably also spurred

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13 Data compiled from The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), https://acleddata.com
the Chinese film industry to churn out films, such as *Wolf Warrior 2*, depicting a former Chinese special forces operator who saves fellow citizens from African unrest.16

China’s objective to present itself as a ‘responsible’ world power is another driver of its security activities in Africa. China is using its counter-piracy and peacekeeping mission to cast itself as a responsible power. When there was a surge of pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia in the late 2000s, China responded to a series of UN Security Council resolutions that requested foreign governments fight piracy in the region. China deployed naval ships to deter, prevent, and repress acts of piracy off the Horn of Africa. This Chinese effort remains separate from the multinational combined joint task force, which works with the European Union’s Operation Atalanta’s counterpiracy mission. China has touted its deployment as contributing to the safe navigation of the seas and protection of maritime commerce, noting a decade later that its navy “rescued or aided more than 60 Chinese and foreign ships.”17 China has a similar objective in its peacekeeping missions. According to one scholar, Beijing regards its peacekeeping deployment in Mali as a means to boost its image, diplomatic outreach, and soft power in Africa. China has stressed that its contributions are “helping the countries in question to effectively assume their responsibilities for the protection of their own nationals.”18

At the same time, China’s security engagements advance its economic interests in the region and in the wider world. As professor Lina Benabdallah notes, Beijing blends trade and investment deals and cultural exchanges with arms sales, medical assistance, troops training, anti-piracy drills and other programs.19 Specifically, she cites the military base in Djibouti where investment deals and development projects were included in the base package deal. China built a $4 billion railway to connect Djibouti with Ethiopia, constructed a $3.5 billion international free trade zone, and funded a $300 million water pipeline.20 Beijing’s intertwined security and economic interests has provided it with significant leverage over Djibouti, pressing the small African government to hand over the strategic Doraleh Container Terminal. In 2019, the *Wall Street Journal* indicated that if China assumed control of the terminal, its vessels would receive priority handling and lower docking fees, enabling them to ship “as much cargo as possible in the shortest time” to European markets.21 China’s eyeing of the Doraleh Container Terminal also has implications for the U.S. military; former AFRICOM commander Thomas Waldhauser told

18 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China’s Evolving Role as a UN Peacekeeper in Mali,” United States Institute of Peace, September 2018
Congress that he was concerned that Chinese moves to assume control of the port could lead to restrictions on U.S. access.22

China also advances its economic objectives through peacekeeping and counterpiracy missions. While Chinese peacekeepers are deployed in five countries, it is notable that some of its major peacekeeping contributions have happened where China has significant economic interests. China has one thousand Chinese peacekeepers in South Sudan, where the state-run China National Petroleum Corporation operates extensive energy projects.23 Its counterpiracy mission off the Horn of Africa and recent exercises in the Gulf of Guinea24 serve a dual purpose, addressing insecurity while enabling China to secure maritime shipments along major sea lines of communication (SLOCs) linking Africa to Chinese ports.25

In addition, Chinese security engagements in sub-Saharan Africa improve the PLA’s overall operational readiness and military access. Its peacekeeping deployments provide an opportunity to build up field experience abroad. According to the European Parliamentary Research Service, China dispatched troops to Mali in part to test their mettle in a hostile environment, as well as try out new military weapons and equipment.26 China’s military base in Djibouti and its investment in civilian ports—at least 46 in sub-Saharan Africa, according to CSIS research27—extends the reach of its navy and strengthens its power projection capability. In December 2018, the Department of Defense noted that China has used its requests for military access, logistics, or basing agreements—typically in countries where China has economic investments—to adapt to evolving requirements to operate in far-flung maritime environments and sustain military power at greater distances. Moreover, its exercises showcase China’s close partnership with African allies and U.S. adversaries, such as Russia. In November 2019, China conducted a trilateral exercise with Russia and South Africa to demonstrate its ability to project power, only the second time a PLAN fleet crossed the equator into the Indian Ocean.28

Finally, Chinese military activities, including professionalization courses and peacekeeping missions, increase Beijing’s political influence with African counterparts and at the UN and other multilateral forums. China uses its training programs to cultivate current and future African security leaders. In 2018, China invited military representatives from 50 African countries and the African Union to discuss defense and security cooperation at the newly inaugurated China-

Africa Defense and Security Forum. According to one study, a senior African officer, who attended both U.S. and Chinese professional military education programs, recalled that the Chinese curriculum promoted a narrative of U.S. neo-imperialism in Africa. These investments have paid off for the Chinese government; former Congolese President Joseph Kabila, for example, received training from the PLA National Defense University before ascending to power in 2001. China also uses its contributions to peacekeeping and burgeoning relationships with African governments to argue for more senior positions at UN bodies and galvanize support for Chinese political positions. China secured an appointment for one of its diplomats as the UN envoy for the Great Lakes over the objections of the United States. Beijing has argued that it should take over the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), a position which has traditionally been reserved for French nationals. In 2019, China trumpeted African support for its handling of the protests in Hong Kong and to reject international criticism for its mass detention of ethnic and religious minorities in Xinjiang.

**Recommendations for the U.S. Congress**

The U.S. Congress has several opportunities to shape Chinese security engagements while increasing U.S. influence in sub-Saharan Africa. It is important to note that most African leaders and publics do not regard Chinese activities as negative, and U.S. condemnation of Chinese engagements, especially peacekeeping, military exercises, or training, will be poorly received by African counterparts. Indeed, African leaders want more, not less, engagement from China. In 2019, the AU issued a statement noting that while the AU respects and appreciates China’s position on non-interference, “we would like to explore ways in which China can increase its support to the conflict mediation effort in the future, making use of the extensive leverage it brings to the table.”

Instead of just countering Chinese engagement in sub-Saharan Africa, it is more productive to expand bilateral and multilateral U.S. security partnerships in the region, address security issues of concern to African publics, and develop a shared framework for evaluating economic investments with national security implications.

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• **Oppose a U.S. Military Drawdown.** U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper’s mulling of a drawdown in U.S. military presence in Africa has alarmed African partners, including Senegalese President Macky Sall who said that withdrawing U.S. troops would be “a mistake, and it would be very misunderstood by Africans.” It would also have negative effects on U.S. programs and resources overseen by other departments and agencies that work closely with the U.S. military. Moreover, it would provide an opening for China and other U.S. adversaries to claim that they are more reliable security partners. While the Pentagon is responsible for a final decision on the disposition of U.S. forces, Congress has an important role in continuing to press the Department of Defense to commit to a significant presence in the region.35

• **Increase Military Training Programs.** The U.S. education and training programs offered to African security sector professionals is essential for maintaining U.S. leadership. In response to questions from Senator Deb Fischer in March 2020, Army Secretary McCarthy and Army Chief of Staff General McConville noted that the Army is reviewing an increase in ally and partner Invitational-Professional Military Education (I-PME) participation by 10 percent for FY21-FY22, and by up to 50 percent over FY22-25. If authorized, this measure would preserve and strengthen U.S. ties to African counterparts.

• **Expand United States Participation in United Nations operations.** The United States has less than 30 individuals assigned to UN peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa, which undercuts its position vis-à-vis China. It also negatively compares to European and other Western allies, who have become more involved in UN operations. Even if the United States Declines to send troops to UN missions, the Stimson Center says the U.S. soldiers could serve in short-term, independent coalitions of the willing alongside the UN to provide initial assistance with stabilization. The United States could also appoint more flag officers to lead UN missions, as it did in 2012-2013 in Liberia.

• **Prioritize African Security and Humanitarian Concerns.** In contrast to the U.S. focus on counterterrorism, most Africans are concerned about the economy and humanitarian


and infectious disease challenges. The United State has an opportunity to positively contribute to these issues while indirectly challenging Chinese efforts. The U.S. role in the G7++ Friends of Gulf of Guinea Group, which addresses threats of piracy, armed robbery, and other illicit maritime activities, is a good example of this approach. Similarly, the U.S. military played essential roles in the Ebola response in West Africa in 2014, Cyclone Idai relief efforts in Mozambique in 2019, and is currently assisting partners to curb Covid-19’s spread in the region. The U.S. Congress could ask the U.S. military to increase this capacity and seek out similar interventions to showcase U.S. commitment to sub-Saharan Africa.

- **Promote Multilateral Approaches to National Security Infrastructure.** Several U.S. allies and nontraditional partners have echoed U.S. concerns about Chinese-linked security and economic investments. The U.S. Congress could request the Department of Defense, as well as other departments and agencies, host African governments and key external actors—France, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, United Arab Emirates, and United Kingdom, among other countries—to formulate guiding principles for foreign investments in critical infrastructure, such as seaports, military installations, and satellite programs. This approach also would help the United States do a better job of tracking Chinese activities and distinguishing between projects that are benign and those that are more threatening to U.S. interests. Lastly, the U.S. Congress should press for financing—in partnership with multilateral development banks—of some critical infrastructure, as well as establishing monitoring and oversight boards for foreign investments, similar to Côte d’Ivoire’s task force on China-backed projects and the U.K.’s cyber security evaluation center oversight board.