



RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS OF NON-NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

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Introduction

- Research Question: What are Russian Perceptions of Non-Nuclear Deterrence?
- Russian Assumptions
- Current Confines of Non-Nuclear Deterrence



Doctrine

- Military Doctrine (2010, 2014)
- Russia Understands Nuclear Weapons Cannot be a Panacea
- Kokoshin and Pre-Nuclear Deterrence
- “Strategic Gesture”




Roles, Targets, and Intentions

- Early Stage: Targets Depth and C2
- As Escalation Continues: Targets Shift to Civilian Politico-Economic Infrastructure
- Non-Nuclear De-Escalation?



Kremlin Approval: Capabilities

New Strike Platforms



Improved Missiles



Leadership Views

“...Russia has the will to use them [Russia’s non-nuclear deterrent] if it satisfies the national interests of our state and our people.” –V.V. Putin



Naval Launch Point Coverage



Yellow Rings: 1,300 km



Red Rings: 3,000 km

The Syrian Testing Ground

Russian Cruise Missile Launches



Implications

- A New Coercive Toolkit
- Weakens Traditional Conventional-Nuclear Firebreaks
 - Strategic Effects without Crossing the Nuclear Threshold
- Likely to Encourage Escalation and Crisis Instability

Complex Response

- “Shaping the Environment Before Crisis and Conflict”
 - Diplomatic/Messaging
 - Denial
 - Capabilities

