



The Weight of History and Alliances in South Africa's Geopolitical Turbulence

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INTRODUCTION

On his first visit to the United States in June 1990 following his release from Robben Island prison, Nelson Mandela spoke at a townhall meeting at the City College of New York.¹ During the event, Jewish community leaders confronted Mandela twice over the closeness of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). According to these leaders, Mandela had met with Yasser Arafat, whom he had praised three times over six months after his release from prison. Additionally, they claimed Mandela had told Muammar Gaddafi that he shared his views and applauded Gaddafi on his record on human rights and his drive for freedom and peace around the world. Mandela had also praised Fidel Castro as a leader of human rights. The Jewish community leaders asked that Mandela denounce and distance himself from these leaders.

Mandela pushed back. “One of the mistakes, which some political analysts make,” he said, “is to think that their enemies should be our enemies. That, we can and will never do.” He went on to explain that the ANC had its own struggles and was grateful to the world for supporting it. Nevertheless, it was an independent organization

with its own policy. The ANC’s attitude toward any country was determined by the attitude of that country toward their struggle. “Yasser Arafat, Colonel Gaddafi and Fidel Castro support our struggle to the hilt,” Mandela continued. “There is no reason whatsoever why we should have any hesitation about hailing their commitment to human rights as they are demanding in South Africa.” He went on to say that the ANC identified with the PLO because, like the ANC, they were fighting for the right to self-determination. “The ANC, however,” he further explained, “has never doubted the right of Israel to exist legally.”²

Thus, four years before the end of apartheid and his own election to the presidency, Mandela had clearly and unequivocally laid out the foundation of what would become South Africa’s foreign policy: a commitment to morality in global affairs. The ANC, which has been in power since 1994, has not wavered from that stance since. This position, however, has been a source of contention between the United States and South Africa, in large part because the United States seeks to influence South Africa’s relationships with its allies. Over the years, these tensions have manifested themselves differently, whether over South Africa-China joint military exercises

or South Africa’s position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The tensions further escalated in December 2023, when South Africa brought a case against Israel to the International Court of Justice accusing Israel of genocide against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby deemed South Africa’s case “meritless, counterproductive and completely without any basis in fact whatsoever.”³ This simmering tension came to a full boil with the second Trump administration, which immediately put South Africa in its crosshairs. President Trump has suspended all aid to South Africa, expelled South Africa’s ambassador to the United States, and falsely claimed that Afrikaners were targets of race-based discrimination, clearing the way for Afrikaners to relocate to the United States as refugees. This tension culminated in a now-infamous Oval Office visit by South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, in which he was ambushed with videos and printed articles purporting to prove there is a “white genocide” in South Africa.⁴ With U.S.-South Africa relations at their lowest in decades, it is unclear whether this increased pressure will deter or encourage South Africa from forging closer ties with the United States’ competitors.

Just as South Africa envisions itself as a “Rainbow Nation,” so too does it aspire for global institutions to create avenues for a rainbow world—a world with diversity of choice in leadership, partnership, and ideology.

What remains true is that just as South Africa envisions itself as a “Rainbow Nation,” so too does it aspire for global institutions to create avenues for a rainbow world—a world with diversity of choice in leadership, partnership, and ideology. In 1994, after more than four decades of apartheid, Nelson Mandela became the first Black president of South Africa. On Mandela’s inauguration day, he declared: “Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another and suffer the indignity of being the skunk of the world. Let freedom reign!”⁵

With its independence closely following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Republic of South Africa emerged into a unipolar world dominated by institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Notably, these institutions were led by Western countries—many of which had supported the apartheid regime and even designated the freedom fighters as terrorists. Conversely, during the liberation struggle, China and the Soviet Union supported the freedom fighters. This solidarity has not been forgotten as Russia and China have emerged as key development partners, providing a necessary counterbalance to the dominance of Western development policies. South Africa’s grievances with the international order stem from its apartheid-era experience and a perceived lack of global support, both of which have driven its commitment to advocate for what it views as rightful causes today.

Furthermore, the formation of the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as a challenge to the G7 bloc reflects a collective effort to democratize the international order. BRICS aims to provide an alternative platform for cooperation and development that prioritizes the interests and needs of emerging economies, primarily in the Global South. For South Africa, participation in BRICS represents a commitment to a multipolar world where equality and democracy are defined by a country’s ability to choose policies and partners that best suit its unique context and aspirations. South Africa’s vision of a multipolar world aligns with both its quest for global justice and equitable governance and its internal commitment to diversity. By championing a global order that respects the sovereignty and choices of all nations, South Africa seeks to ensure that no country is subjected to Western domination. This approach underscores the belief that true equality and democracy are about having the freedom and agency to shape one’s own destiny, both domestically and on the international stage.

HISTORY, GRIEVANCES, AND AMBITIONS

To understand the brutal history of apartheid is to largely understand the state of South Africa today. Apartheid was a system of institutionalized and legalized racial segregation in South Africa that formally began in 1948. Before apartheid was codified, however, racial segregation was already taking root. Apartheid was built upon South Africa’s colo-

nial past, having been colonized first by the Dutch and then by the British. South Africa secured its independence from Britain in 1910, at which point control of the country was left to the white settlers in the region. Between 1910 and 1948, the white population consolidated its control over the state. The Bantu Land Act of 1913, for example, limited the land ownership of Black Africans in South Africa to **7 percent** of the country and prohibited Black Africans from purchasing land from white people (and vice versa). Segregation legislation such as the Bantu Land Act formed the building blocks of formalized apartheid.

Formal apartheid began in 1948 with the initial victory of the National Party, an Afrikaner ethnic party led by Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd. Leonard Thompson, author of *A History of South Africa*, describes four beliefs that formed the core of the apartheid system. Firstly, the South African population was delineated into four racial groups: White, Coloured, Indian, and Black. Secondly, the white group was declared “the civilized race” and was therefore entitled to have complete control over the nation. Thirdly, white interests took precedence over Black ones, and the state had no obligation to ensure equality among the races. Lastly, whites were merged into a single nation, while Africans were divided into 10 different nations (“the Homelands”). This made the white nation the largest in the country.

Under apartheid, segregation pervaded every aspect of society. Black Africans could not purchase or own land outside of the Homelands—effectively stripping them of their South African citizenship. In urban areas, the Group Areas Act segregated people into neighborhoods by their race, displacing thousands of Black, Indian, and Coloured South Africans and breaking apart communities. This also meant that Black people living in segregated urban areas, for example, could not own the homes they lived in.⁶ Schools were racially separated, with Black schools being grossly underfunded. Black people were forced into manual labor and low-paying jobs.⁷

These are just a few examples within the expansive system of apartheid. To be Black in South Africa during apartheid was to be a non-citizen, without rights, under constant persecution.⁸ Under such dire oppression, liberation movements cropped up in resistance to the apartheid state. The best-known movement was the ANC, the party of numerous well-known South African freedom fighters like Nelson Mandela, Winnie Madikizile-Mandela, Oliver Tambo, and Walter Sisulu. After the Sharpeville Massacre

of 1960, where the South African police opened fire on protestors, killing 69 people, the ANC formed a controversial militant wing called uMkhonto we Sizwe, or MK.⁹

After decades of immense struggle and strife—as well as international pressure from the mid-1980s onward—apartheid came to an official end in 1994, and the ANC was seen as the national movement responsible for the development. The ANC, then registered as a political party, won the 1994 elections, and Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as president of South Africa. Under his leadership, he sought to unify South Africa into one “Rainbow Nation” where citizens would be able to enjoy their rights and privileges regardless of race. Mandela was successful in unifying a deeply divided country into a shared national identity, but social divides and economic disparities persist to this day.

Two of South Africa’s strategies to create a more equitable society—the Land Expropriation Act and the Black Economic Empowerment Act—have caught the attention of the Trump administration as evidence of racial discrimination against the white minority in South Africa.¹⁰ Since entering office in 2025, the Trump administration has cited these policies as evidence of so-called racial discrimination against the white minority in South Africa. The administration’s actions have drawn sharp criticism from South African officials, who argue that the policies are constitutional tools to redress apartheid-era injustices, not vehicles of racial persecution.

Post-apartheid South Africa struggles with deeply entrenched xenophobia and xenophobic violence against African migrants, refugees, and their economic enterprises. During apartheid, white elites used migrant labor to weaken Black South African power. Today, xenophobic attitudes reflect an attempt to reclaim the unfulfilled promises of the post-apartheid era, fueled by high unemployment and poverty rates.¹¹ Further, politicians use anti-immigrant rhetoric to scapegoat African migrants for the government’s failings.¹² Beyond social marginalization and discrimination, xenophobia discourages foreign investment from African countries, disrupts the small businesses that are frequently targeted in xenophobic attacks, and endangers diplomatic relations.¹³ While South Africa wants to play a leadership role at the continental level, it must overcome internal struggles with xenophobia.

ECONOMY

South Africa has the continent’s most industrialized, technologically advanced, and diversified economy.

This mixed economy has propelled South Africa into the upper-middle-income country category, a status only a handful of African countries have achieved. In 2024, South Africa registered a nominal gross domestic product of \$373 billion—Africa’s highest—and \$62 billion in gross foreign exchange reserves, thus outperforming Nigeria and reclaiming its ranking as the continent’s largest economy.¹⁴ South Africa has leveraged its advanced economy, strategic location, and well-developed infrastructure to position itself as a key hub for regional and continental trade. Furthermore, South Africa views its role in Africa as advocating for countries with less leverage, while also seeing itself as a key economic trade partner for nations that lack similar access to global markets.

Due to its economic and financial standing, South Africa has been able to play a significant role as an emerging market leader and a regional power both at the African Union and on the world stage. South Africa is the only African country that is a member of the G20, the exclusive multilateral forum for international economic cooperation, of which it assumed the presidency in 2025. As a host of the G20 summit this year, South Africa focused focus on three key issues: inclusive economic growth and food security; artificial intelligence and data governance; and innovation for sustainable development.¹⁵

South Africa anchors Africa’s banking industry and is home to four of the continent’s top six banks, which account for half of the continent’s total assets.¹⁶ As a financial hub for Africa, South Africa enables investment and cross-border trade and financing in the continent—an important tool for African businesses and development projects, as capital and credit are otherwise scarce and expensive. Additionally, South Africa is a leading proponent of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), viewing it as an opportunity to expand market access and promote industrialization across the continent. Strengthening AfCFTA will boost Africa’s global trading position by unifying the continent’s voice and expanding its influence in international trade negotiations. AfCFTA also aims to reduce African dependency on non-African trade partners and shift Africa’s role in global trade from exporting raw materials to supplying value-added goods.

The automotive industry employs over half a million people in South Africa, contributes 4.3 percent to its gross domestic product, and accounts for 18.1 percent of the country’s total exports.¹⁷ Although the largest automotive export

markets are in Europe and North America, South Africa’s location affords car manufacturers low production costs and access to markets. South Africa’s developed infrastructure—including ports, road networks, and railway lines—facilitates the movement of goods across the continent and around the world. The manufacturing sector has benefited from preferential trade agreements, such as the U.S. Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and EU initiatives.

South Africa holds large mineral reserves, including diamond, gold, coal, manganese, and platinum. The country ranks among the world’s top producers of many of these resources, with estimated total annual revenue from mining at around \$34.8 billion.¹⁸ The mining industry is not only an important pillar of the economy, but it has also given South Africa expertise and knowledge that, when combined with financial backing, provides South African companies great leverage in critical mining projects across Africa.

One of the greatest obstacles that hinders the performance of South Africa’s national economy is its mixed and diverse nature. The government controls or owns stakes in around 700 enterprises, spanning key sectors including energy, transportation, telecommunications, financial services, transport, agriculture, and tourism.¹⁹ This means that the government wields tremendous power over the economy beyond the traditional regulatory prerogatives. South Africa watchers often point to inefficient government bureaucracy, restrictive labor regulations, and political instability as key factors undermining the economy. The government, along with parliament, has initiated policies to help reform important parts of the economy, but with only limited success. The national unemployment rate rose to 33.2 percent from 32.9 percent in the second quarter of 2025, with youth unemployment at a worrisome 46 percent.²⁰ The energy sector has been particularly affected by ineffective ANC policies; since 2008, South Africans have been subjected to rolling blackouts, or “load-shedding,” to prevent the collapse of the electrical grid. The frequency of these blackouts has only increased over time, and they can now last anywhere between two and eight hours.²¹ These power shortages have disrupted economic activity and increased operating costs for businesses due to their reliance on power generators. The energy shortfall affects infrastructure and all sectors of public life, including education and public health.

In 2024, the political debate in South Africa was dominated by the state of its flailing parastatals (state-owned

enterprises), corruption, economic mismanagement, income inequality, and poor service delivery. These failures have been almost entirely attributed to the ANC's governance, as its leadership over the last 30 years has been characterized by state capture, inefficiencies, and scandal after scandal.²² In 2024, the ANC was forced to form a coalition with the Democratic Alliance after receiving only 40 percent of the popular vote, breaking decades of political dominance. In many ways, the 2024 elections were seen as a referendum on the ANC's leadership; now that the country has a government of national unity, economic management is expected to be more rigorous.

Lastly, South Africa has emerged in the past 25 years as the largest beneficiary of AGOA, Washington's premier trade promotion program with Africa, which offers a host of African products duty-free access to the U.S. market. South Africa, more than any African country, has taken advantage of this program to expand into export sectors geared toward the U.S. market; as a result, today it represents Africa's most diversified economy. Although AGOA expired on September 30, 2025, the Trump administration has signaled support for a one-year extension.²³ However, South Africa's continued standing as an AGOA beneficiary is not guaranteed.

Since Donald Trump assumed the U.S. presidency in 2025, the U.S.-South Africa bilateral relationship has sharply deteriorated. U.S. concerns over South Africa's domestic and foreign policies, including the controversial Land Expropriation Act, perceived anti-American rhetoric, and South Africa's deepening ties with Iran, Russia, and China have pushed the diplomatic relationship into its most turbulent state since the end of apartheid.²⁴ In February, the U.S. government paused development aid and dismantled USAID, severely affecting South Africa's healthcare sector, particularly the treatment of HIV/AIDS. This abrupt policy change led to job losses, as funding for the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) accounted for about 18 percent of the country's healthcare budget.²⁵

In August, President Trump announced a 30 percent tariff rate for South Africa, one of the highest on the continent. South Africa's automotive and agricultural industries are vulnerable because the United States is the third-largest destination for its exports. Higher tariffs may mean that South Africa's largest employers need to lay off workers. The governor of South Africa's central bank estimated that the tariffs could cost the country up to 100,000 jobs.²⁶

The diversity of the country's economic portfolio is such that South African financial influence is omnipresent across the continent, whether one speaks of investment, financial products, or agriculture. Accordingly, South Africa remains an indispensable economic power.

GREAT POWER COMPETITION

South Africa maintains complex relations with great power competitors owing to the country's unique liberation struggle, its post-apartheid politics, and its evolving patterns of global trade and development. Echoing a position held during the Cold War, South African political leaders from the long-ruling ANC use the language of neutrality and non-alignment to describe their foreign policy today. As thought leaders on the African continent and within the Global South, the South African political establishment believes that the Cold War era was destructive to Africa's political and economic development. For this reason, South Africa has worked to embed the notion of creating a multipolar world into both the ANC's foreign policy platform and the African Union's Agenda 2063, its long-term strategic vision of the continent.²⁷

In practice, however, South Africa post-Mandela has drifted away from a strictly nonaligned position to one that could be more easily viewed by Washington as aligning with Russia and China. South Africa sees a far more relevant model of development in China than it does in Western nations: Over the span of two generations, China has moved from an agrarian to an industrial economy and has lifted hundreds of millions of its citizens out of poverty, and as such China is viewed with reverence among many South African political leaders.²⁸ Pretoria is also keen to maintain friendly relations with Beijing, as China's investments help to employ millions of South Africans.²⁹ Despite South Africa's outspokenness on issues related to global human rights and justice, particularly in Palestine—an advocacy stance it has championed for decades prior to the current conflict there—it remains largely quiet regarding, for example, China's treatment of its minority Muslim Uyghur populations or its threatening moves against pro-democracy groups at home or in Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Over the last decade, China has emerged as South Africa's largest trading partner, with exports from South Africa to China totaling approximately \$12 billion in 2023 and imports from China reaching \$21.5 billion. The United

States and Germany followed as key destinations for South African exports that same year, receiving \$8.2 billion and \$7.5 billion, respectively. The same countries ranked as South Africa's second- and third-largest suppliers for imports, albeit flipped, with Germany accounting for \$8.4 billion and the United States for \$7.3 billion.³⁰

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But even beyond the obvious economic and political ties, South Africa sees in China an important counterbalance and bulwark against the U.S.-led Western hegemonic world order that they perceive as dominating all matters of global debates—including issues of peace and security, global finance, justice, the environment, and intellectual property. This latter issue became an especially painful irritant in South Africa's relations with Global North countries—and the United States in particular—during the Covid-19 pandemic, when Western countries refused to waive vaccine patents so that pharmaceutical labs in South Africa could produce sufficient vaccines for the continent. There was little precedent for waiving such intellectual property rights, though, and Washington instead led a global effort to donate Western-produced vaccines to the continent, thereby reinforcing an antiquated donor-grantee relationship and leaving African nations waiting the longest to procure vaccines, even after many in the Global North had received multiple doses.³¹

When it comes to Russia, South African leaders in the ANC harbor an appreciation and even nostalgia for what they remember as Russia's support to the ANC during its fight against apartheid. (Former South African Foreign Minister Nalendi Pandor was particularly fond of reminding U.S. officials of Washington's decades-long support of white minority rule and its designation of the ANC as a terrorist group.³²) Much of the ANC's leadership received various forms of training and education in the Soviet Union; even today, the youth wing of the ANC

sent election monitors to observe and endorse Russia's fraudulent elections in Crimea, while party leaders—including the president and the foreign minister—have gone to great lengths to refrain from criticizing Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. However, not all South Africans support these stances. In particular, the country's white minority population bristles at the ANC's closeness to Russia. In more recent years, strategic Russian investments in sectors like mining have helped Russian oligarchs with ties to President Putin develop relations with ANC party leaders; such relations even prompted corruption allegations when it was uncovered that a Russian oligarch had financed an ANC party conference in the lead-up to the presidential elections.³³

Perhaps most importantly, South Africa sees both China and Russia as allies, as they both championed the inclusion of South Africa in the creation of the BRICS organization more than a decade ago, a group which has emerged as a central component of South Africa's foreign policy aimed at promoting a multipolar world. While not explicitly opposed to Western interests, South Africa has sought to use its voice inside of groups like the BRICS, G20, and even G7—where it has recently been granted observer status—to advocate for Global South perspectives. It has gone further in advocating for fundamental reforms of the UN Security Council, arguing that it and other Global South countries should be afforded permanent seats, as well as in reforming the management and the mandate of global financial institutions to better serve the needs of developing countries.³⁴

On many of these calls for reform, the United States and European allies have appeared open to South Africa's lobbying and acknowledged the need to modernize these institutions to better reflect the world's changing distribution of power, influence, wealth, and population. During the Biden administration, for instance, there was a genuine sense of trying to court South Africa, sensing that its drift into a more Eastern-oriented, anti-West orbit was perhaps accelerating. President Biden hosted President Ramaphosa in the Oval Office in 2022, his first time hosting an African head of state as president, while U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled to South Africa more than any other African country and chose it as the location to launch the administration's 2022 Africa strategy. Under the second Trump administration, the pendulum has swung from trying to build a stronger partnership with South Africa to adopting a more adversarial approach.

VISION OF GLOBAL ORDER

South Africa makes no secret of promoting a new world order updated for the twenty-first century, not based on power, but based on adherence to a rules-based international system that applies equally to all countries, regardless of size, wealth, or military prowess. As former Foreign Minister Pandor recently told a Council on Foreign Relations audience, “We’ve got to rethink the multilateral system, ensure it’s more fair, more open, transparent, and democratic.”³⁵ In pursuit of this vision, South Africa has displayed a multipronged approach: working through existing global institutions such as the G20 from the inside, seeking to reform institutions such as the United Nations and Bretton Woods from the outside, and creating or expanding new institutions that better serve the interests of the Global South. However, the pursuit of these goals can often appear both self-serving and contradictory.

Pretoria revels in using the tools of the international system in ways that work to its benefit while highlighting the West’s use of the same institutions to advance its own agenda.

For example, on issues of global justice, South Africa spearheaded a landmark case at the International Court of Justice to bring genocide charges against Israel for the war in Gaza, over Western objections.³⁶ However, Pretoria sought to animate the rules-based international order it champions against Israel at virtually the same time as South African officials resisted pressure to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin following an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for his crimes in Ukraine.³⁷ While Putin ultimately chose not to attend the BRICS summit in South Africa, the case is reminiscent of an incident in 2017 when ICC indictee Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan was allowed to travel freely to South Africa for an African Union summit despite South Africa’s legal obligation to detain him under the terms of the Rome Statute.³⁸ While South Africa at the time argued that its domestic law granting sitting heads of state immunity superseded the ICC indictment, many contend that Pre-

toria’s opposition was grounded more in its belief that the ICC had been unfairly used by Western states to unduly target Africans; at the time, the ICC had only indicted Africans.³⁹ While some argue that South Africa is just being opportunistic, Pretoria revels in using the tools of the international system in ways that work to its benefit while highlighting the West’s use of the same institutions to advance its own agenda.

At the same time, South Africa continues to use its voice within global institutions to reform them from the inside. At the United Nations, South African officials felt misled during their time as a nonpermanent member of the Security Council when, in 2011, they voted to authorize a NATO air campaign—ostensibly under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine—to avoid what appeared in the moment to be a potential genocide of citizens in Benghazi, Libya, by long-time dictator Muammar Qaddafi.⁴⁰ Pushed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, the mission quickly transformed into a campaign to remove Qaddafi from power and has since led to more than a decade of violent instability emanating across Saharan Africa from Libya. South Africa’s experience on the Security Council during this period, which coincidentally also included other BRICS countries Brazil and India, led Pretoria to advocate for fundamental reform of the council, including adding permanent African seats for itself and others. Short of that, South Africa has also sought to make more use of the UN General Assembly to get around the use of the Security Council’s veto and give countries an equal say in global debates. A case in point is Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, where South Africa has used multiple General Assembly votes to rally African states to express a neutral stance toward the war.⁴¹

Finally, South Africa’s role in the BRICS organization has become central to its foreign policy. It seeks to expand and elevate the grouping to serve as a counterweight to the current Western-dominated world order, instead striving for a multipolar global order. Through BRICS, South Africa has advocated for the creation of a BRICS bank, currency, and trade architecture that would circumvent—or, at the very least, weaken—the dominance of Western-controlled institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in setting the global rules for lending and borrowing.⁴² Pretoria has also been a chief advocate for the expansion of BRICS, with four new countries joining the grouping at the 2024 summit hosted by South Africa.

CONCLUSION

South Africa, rooted in its history, grievances, and aspirations, champions a multipolar world whereby no single country or block can impose its will over others. Through participating in diverse global institutions and championing the AfCFTA, as well as by leveraging its position in BRICS and the G20, South Africa elevates African countries and their concerns to the international sphere. Reaping the benefits from its relationships with China, Russia, and the United States, South Africa demonstrates that great power competition is not a zero-sum game—it is instead an exercise in choosing what best suits one’s specific context and partnering without restrictions. As Africa’s biggest economy, South Africa is playing an instrumental role in advocating for reforms in the global financial architecture, as well as in the UN Security Council, to foster a more equitable and inclusive global order. While the nation navigates hurdles facing its young democracy, hopes for the Rainbow Nation continue to evolve.

However, South Africa’s foreign policy is not without its complexities and criticisms. While it espouses a commitment to international law and justice, its selective engagements in global justice issues have drawn scrutiny. The country’s alignments with China and Russia illustrate the pragmatic balancing act it must navigate to protect its economic interests and global influence. Yet, South Africa’s overarching goal remains clear: to contribute to a fairer, more transparent global order that accommodates the diverse perspectives and aspirations of nations across Africa and the wider Global South. ■

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ENDNOTES

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