

JUNE 2024

# "BENDING" THE ARCHITECTURE

## REIMAGINING THE G7

PROJECT CHAIRS

John Hamre  
Victor Cha

PROJECT CO-DIRECTORS

Emily Benson  
Max Bergmann  
Erin Murphy  
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A Report of the CSIS Korea Chair

CSIS

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &  
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This is a non-partisan and collaborative effort of CSIS expertise on Asia, Europe, sustainable development, and economics. We sought advice and input of almost three dozen former G7 sherpas, sous-sherpas, and yaks and representatives of the G7, European, and Asian diplomatic communities. This report’s analysis and recommendations, however, do not necessarily reflect the views of these individuals.

This project is supported by CSIS and the Federation of Korean Industries.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The global governance system is in disarray. The UN Security Council is frozen by geopolitical rivalry and two wars. Other institutions such as the G20 and World Trade Organization (WTO) are underperforming. Time does not allow for building a new governance institution—but requires the “bending” of existing ones to meet the moment. This CSIS report speaks to the global need to elevate the Group of Seven (G7), a bloc of industrialized democracies—the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union—to foster a more stable and predictable world order. This analysis offers the following recommendations on reimagining the future G7 as a critical institution of global governance:

- Over the last half-decade, G7 leadership summits have identified nine global priorities: (1) the Indo-Pacific; (2) economic resilience and security; (3) food security; (4) digital competitiveness; (5) climate; (6) Ukraine; (7) sustainable development; (8) disarmament and non-proliferation; and (9) labor.
- The G7’s scope has expanded, but its representation of the global economy and population has declined, highlighting the need for reform to enhance capabilities and legitimacy without sacrificing the G7’s trademark informality, trust, and effectiveness.
- The G7 should create an informal “troika” of the previous, current, and next G7 hosts to manage a consensus-based approach to agenda setting. This ensures consistency and follow-through on issues from one host to the next.
- The G7 should expand membership to include Australia and South Korea. They bring significant capabilities to the nine priorities identified by G7 leaders, are like-minded partners, and display the trust and reliability required of G7 members. These two countries perform as well, if not better than, current G7 members in the nine priority issue areas. They also address Europe’s overrepresentation and Asia’s severe underrepresentation in the group.
- The G7 might recognize other high-performing actors (e.g., Spain) as dialogue partners or associate members. The G7 should also consider consolidation of the European Council and European Commission into one seat.
- The G7 should establish a formal leader-level outreach mechanism to the Global South and middle-power economies to demonstrate inclusivity and confer legitimacy on the body as a global governance institution. The outreach partners should include the African Union, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, the G20, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

While the current G7, a decade old in its practices and membership, has performed admirably, the pace of change engendered by new disruptive technologies and old geopolitical rivalries now requires innovation beyond comfort for some. Inaction precipitates a vacuum that may be filled with forms of rule that are less desirable and even dangerous. The recommendations contained in this report are necessary prerequisites for the incarnation of tomorrow’s G7 global governance mission.



# A WORLD IN TURMOIL

**A**t a time of global turmoil when traditional institutions of global governance are underperforming, the Group of Seven (G7), a bloc of industrialized democracies which includes the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, is needed now more than ever to foster a more stable and predictable world order.

This CSIS report offers recommendations to empower a future G7 as a critical institution of global governance. The work presented here is a non-partisan and collaborative effort of CSIS expertise on Asia, Europe, sustainable development, and economics. The authors sought advice and critical input from almost three dozen former G7 point persons—so-called sherpas, sous-sherpas, and yaks—and representatives of the G7, European, and Asian diplomatic communities. This report does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of these participants.

The international system is changing at a pace not seen since the end of World War II. In the geostrategic space, wars in Europe and the Middle East, cohesion among a bloc of autocratic powers, and heightened proliferation threaten a new Cold War and pose major challenges to the peaceful status quo. At the same time, emerging and critical global issues such as artificial intelligence (AI), resilient supply chains, advances in synthetic biology, pandemic preparedness, and sustainable development demand new standards and norms, as well as cooperative and sustained action.

The current architecture of global governance is ill-suited to meet these challenges and opportunities. The United Nations, particularly the UN Security Council (UNSC), has failed to address human rights abuses, anti-democratic behavior, and aggression globally. The G20, once a stabilizing force that helped address the 1997 Asian liquidity crisis and the 2007-08 global financial crisis, is now hamstrung by geopolitical rivalry. The WTO, established to uphold rules and norms for the

global trading system, has expanded membership to more than 160 countries, making it difficult to make decisions or enact the reforms necessary to regulate the current trade landscape. Changes in the operative space of the international system have led large emerging and middle powers to organize a proliferation of ad hoc groupings, including the Quad, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, AUKUS, U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateralism, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Others, such as the BRICS partnerships, are also growing in membership and seeking to diminish their dependency on the U.S. dollar. Likewise, the G20 has welcomed the African Union to its ranks. Though these minilaterals allow new forums for marginalized voices, they are not yet in a position to set new rules of the road or replace institutions such as the UNSC or WTO.

Dealing with these potentially existential issues will require a level of trust and capability, as well as a track record of working together. It will take real conversations among leaders, not a set of talking points or a lowest-common-denominator joint statement to produce solutions that are lacking in these larger groupings.

Trying to devise a new institution would take decades, with no promise of success. The current pace of change in world affairs requires a “bending” of existing institutions to meet the challenges of global governance. As a grouping of like-minded, advanced industrialized democracies, the G7 is the only institution today that can step into this role. But this requires a reimagination of the G7 not of the past two decades but of the next two, that can find solutions to global problems, capitalize on future opportunities, and engage with critical voices from emerging and middle-power economies. This report offers recommendations focused on agenda setting, institutionalization, and membership of the body.





# THE GLOBAL ROLE OF THE G7

**G**7 leaders have come a long way since their initial gathering in 1975 to address the oil shock and to coordinate monetary policies. In the past few years, the G7 leaders' statements have taken on a more urgent, expansive, and unified tone as the world has grappled with a range of existential issues, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, multiple financial crises, climate change, supply chain resilience, and wars in Ukraine and Gaza.<sup>1</sup> In the past few years, it has become clear that the significant global challenges today have created demands for the G7 to actively execute across its expansive domain of responsibilities. Table 1 lists the top nine global priority issues of the G7 leaders over the past half-decade, derived from text analysis of G7 leaders' statements between 2018 and 2023.

There is no denying that G7 leaders are willing to shoulder global responsibilities to meet the demands of a new era. Yet at the same time, the G7 commands a smaller portion of the global constituency. Even as the G7's agenda has grown global, its representation as

a share of the world's population and global economy has declined over time, raising questions about its legitimacy outside of advanced industrialized democracies. At the same time, global challenges highlight the need for other capable countries to step up and help shoulder the burden of an expanded agenda.

This confluence of necessities—the need for the G7's expanded scope, the need for effective institutions of global governance on the international stage, and the need for more inclusive representation of actors to manage the global challenges ranging from war to pandemics to the AI race—requires the G7 to “bend” and embrace a set of reforms to meet the moment. Reform and reimagination of the G7 will have to be done in a way to maintain the pieces that make it an effective and special grouping but allow it to effectuate its expanded scope and be an effective leadership organization.



**Table 1: Top Nine Priorities of G7 Leaders, 2018 vs. 2023**


Rank	Priority
1	The Indo-Pacific
2	Economic Resilience and Security
3	Food Security
4	Digital Competitiveness
5	Climate Change
6	Ukraine
7	Global Economy, Finance, and Sustainable Development
8	Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
9	Labor

Note: G7 priority issues were derived from text analysis of G7 leaders’ statements between 2018 and 2023, calculating the number of times that a specific issue is mentioned in the texts. The study team then calculated the percentage change in the number of occurrences over time. Based on this percentage change, the top nine priority issues were derived.

Source: CSIS Korea Chair analysis of G7 communiqués and statements.


**Figure 1: G7 Leaders’ Priorities by Topic, 2018-2023**

Frequency of mentions in G7 communiqués/declaration based on the 20 topics highlighted in the G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué in 2023



Source: CSIS Korea Chair analysis of G7 communiqués and statements.

**Figure 2: The G7's Declining Share of the World Economy and Global Population, 1975–2022**



Note: Share of GDP (current USD).

Source: Data aggregated by CSIS Korea Chair from “GDP (current US\$),” World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>; and “Population,” World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>.



# RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REIMAGINING THE G7

## RECOMMENDATION 1

### **Create a Consensus-Based Approach for G7 Agenda Setting**

Traditionally, the G7 has been an informal grouping. Former sherpas praise the informality as contributing to the grouping's flexibility, nimbleness, frank consultative process, and ability to act quickly on issues.

The downside, however, is that informality leads to inefficiency around agenda setting and discontinuity from presidency to presidency. For example, the 2023 Hiroshima G7 statement laid out an ambitious global agenda for member countries ranging from AI norms to cyber defenses to economic security, but the agenda for the 2024 Apulia G7 meeting, chaired by Italy, largely ignored these issues and has turned to migration from North Africa.<sup>2</sup> While both sets of issues are important, the discontinuity in the agenda-setting function is suboptimal. It conveys confusing signals to the international community, precipitates a lack of follow-through, and exacerbates a lack of oversight on announced commitments.

- **Create an informal “troika” of past, current, and upcoming G7 hosts to complement the work of individual country secretariats.<sup>3</sup>**

While respecting the privilege of the host country to shape the annual agenda, the informal troika's main focus would be to ensure the continuity of core issues, including economic security, emerging technology, China, and Ukraine. These issues may change over time as they are resolved or as new challenges arise.

- **Build a task force structure for key, pressing issues to ensure continuity and follow-through.**

Task force-like structures, in the form of working groups, expert groups, and other such forums, already exist within the G7, but these could be repurposed in a way to ensure (1) completion of commitments from previous G7 presidencies; and (2) the tracking of agenda items for follow-on work in the next G7 presidency. Since approximately



2010, the G7 has had in place a mechanism to track accountability for G7 commitments to global development, but no such mechanism to track accountability for other political and economic commitments exists. This could be accomplished through explicit task forces, which could change focus and composition as needed. For example, G7 governments could explicitly agree to sunset task forces after a set number of years, and G7 members could also introduce new task forces to address emerging challenges.

■ **Consider a bifurcated agenda process.**

This process would include two to three items that are core interests to the greater G7 and one to two items of critical importance to the host. The agenda could be determined by the G7 “troika”—consisting of the current G7 president alongside the countries holding the most recent and the upcoming G7 presidency—with input from other G7 countries through existing consultation mechanisms.

## RECOMMENDATION 2


### Expand the G7 to Include Australia and South Korea

The current composition of the G7, now a decade old, represents a declining portion of the world’s population and global economy. Moreover, changes in the G7’s membership have been part of the organization’s identity as it has evolved over time to meet different challenges (Figure 3).

Increasing membership is not without controversy. Some former sherpas see it as a potential slippery slope where the G7’s effectiveness is sacrificed for the desire for greater inclusiveness and representation.

Two factors, however, weigh in favor of expansion. First, the extent to which the G7 members have enlarged the scope of their responsibilities requires new players with critical capabilities to fulfill the mission. Second, the G7’s current membership is disproportionately dominated by Europe (six out of nine seats, including

**Figure 3: A Brief History of G7 Membership**



Source: “About the G7,” G7 Italia 2024, <https://www.g7italy.it/en/about-g7/>; “The History of the G7,” Federal Government of Germany, <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/service/the-history-of-the-g7-397438>; and “G7/Summit of The Eight: History and Purpose,” U.S. Department of State, June 3, 1997, [https://1997-2001.state.gov/issues/economic/summit/fs\\_summit\\_history.html](https://1997-2001.state.gov/issues/economic/summit/fs_summit_history.html).

the European Council and European Commission); has only one country to represent the whole of Asia; and excludes any voice representing the developing world.<sup>4</sup> This composition is ill-suited for a reimagined G7 to play the role of the preeminent institution of global governance.

Australia and South Korea fall in the “sweet spot” of expanded G7 membership and enhanced effectiveness. Former sherpas argued that any new members must support the G7’s mission, share its political values, be responsible stewards of the international economy, and have the capabilities, commitment, and, importantly, the trust of the other G7 members. Australia and South Korea, respectively the 12th- and 13th-largest economies in the world, easily meet this bar.

- **Trust and Responsibility: Both Australia and South Korea have demonstrated records as trustworthy and responsible public goods providers.**

The two U.S. allies have fought on the side of democracy and a rules-based order in every major war since World War I and the Korean War, respectively. They have been exemplary leaders in contending with challenges that preoccupy the G7 leaders. Today, Australia has stood up like no other to unfair economic coercion by China, and it is instrumental to the critical mineral resiliency of the industrialized democracies. South Korea is a major provider of economic and indirect military assistance to Ukraine, and it is a critical player in protecting emerging technology supply chains. Both have demonstrated a leadership role in a host of global issues prioritized by the G7 (Figure 4). Both have been constructive members of the G20, demonstrating strong cooperation with the United States across administrations.

- **Performance: Australia and South Korea are outperforming some current G7 members in areas deemed critical to G7 leaders.**

Former sherpas noted that any new members must enhance, not detract from, the effectiveness of the G7. At the outset of the G4/5, the original members had outsized influence and economic prowess, but

that is not the case today. New members should be more representative of the type of advanced and industrialized economies of the future to be fit to deal with those challenges.

Figures 5 and 6 show how Australia and South Korea are outperforming several current members on the nine priorities identified by the G7 over the last half-decade of leaders’ statements.

- **Representation and Values: Australia and South Korea “balance out” the non-European composition of industrialized democracies.**

A reimagined G7 should be more representative of the world as it is and will be, not as it was. The current G7 is Eurocentric and has only one Asian nation representing the entire region. As Figure 2 shows, and as suggested in the performance criteria, the G7’s share of the world economy and population is declining, calling into question how its members could speak for markets larger than them in terms of GDP or population size. Australia and South Korea would bring representation for two advanced countries in the Indo-Pacific region, with the latter demonstrating significant advancements in the economies of the future, including computing, AI, and technology.

- **Recognize other high-performing actors.**

The metrics in Figure 6 show that other European countries, such as Spain, perform respectably in the nine priority areas identified by G7 leaders and could be considered as regular dialogue partners.<sup>5</sup> The G7 should consolidate representation from the European Council and European Commission, which now occupy two seats.

### RECOMMENDATION 3

## Establish a Formal G7 Outreach Mechanism

Any expansion of the G7, whether to a G9 or beyond, will be met with staunch criticism by some within and outside of the body. Outreach to the so-called Global South, and emerging and middle-power economies, is necessary if a reimagined G7 were to truly fulfill the role of becoming the preeminent global governance insti-

**Figure 4: Australia’s and South Korea’s Convening Roles in Priority G7 Issues**

AUSTRALIA	
Name of Summit	Month/Year
World Health Summit Regional Meetings	April 2024
ASEAN-Australia Special Summit	March 2024
7th Indian Ocean Conference	February 2024
2023 FIFA Women's World Cup	July 2023
2nd ASEAN Regional Forum on Nuclear Risk Reduction	March 2023
1st Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) Negotiating Round	December 2022
Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference	July 2022
Virtual WTO Ministerial Meeting	October 2020
G20 Brisbane Summit	November 2014

SOUTH KOREA	
Name of Summit	Month/Year
2025 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit	2025
Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REALM) Summit	September 2024
2024 Korea-Africa Summit	June 2024
AI Seoul Summit	May 2024
Third Summit for Democracy	March 2024
16th Seoul ODA International Conference	September 2023
4th Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) Negotiating Round	June 2023
2023 Korea-Pacific Islands Summit	May 2023
19th International Anti-Corruption Conference	December 2020

Source: CSIS Korea Chair.

**Figure 5: Ranking of Country Performance along Identified Issue Areas**

The nine priority G7 issue areas are (1) the Indo-Pacific, (2) economic resilience and security, (3) food security, (4) digital competitiveness, (5) climate, (6) Ukraine, (7) sustainable development, (8) disarmament and non-proliferation, and (9) labor.

G9		
Rank	Country	Average Rank
1	United States	3.68
2	Germany	4.26
3	United Kingdom	4.31
4	Canada	4.65
5	Australia	5.02
6	France	5.08
7	Japan	5.15
8	South Korea	5.47
9	Italy	6.56

Note: G9 adds Australia and South Korea. The average rank is ordered from 1 (best) to 9 (worst). Although the G7 leaders have identified the “Indo-Pacific” and “disarmament and non-proliferation” as priority issue areas, there are no available performance metrics to assess and rank progress in these two areas. The methodology for this ranking can be found in endnote 6.

Source: CSIS Korea Chair.

**Figure 6: Comparison of Country Performance across Identified Priority G7 Issue Areas<sup>6</sup>**

Economic Resilience and Security			Food Security		
Rank	Country	Average Rank	Rank	Country	Average Rank
1	Germany	4.05	1	France	3.00
2	United Kingdom	4.35	2	United Kingdom	3.40
3	United States	4.55	3	Canada	4.00
4	Australia	4.80	4	Japan	4.20
5	Canada	4.85	5	United States	5.60
6	Spain	5.35	6	Germany	5.80
7	France	5.45	7	Australia	6.20
8	Japan	6.10	8	Spain	6.40
9	South Korea	6.35	9	Italy	7.80
10	Italy	7.55	10	South Korea	8.60
Total Number of Indicators (20)			Total Number of Indicators (5)		

Digital Competitiveness			Climate Change			Ukraine		
Rank	Country	Average Rank	Rank	Country	Average Rank	Rank	Country	Average Rank
1	United States	3.19	1	Germany	3.12	1	United States	1.00
2	United Kingdom	4.16	2	United Kingdom	3.70	2	Germany	2.00
3	South Korea	4.41	3	Spain	4.15	3	France	3.00
4	Germany	4.96	4	France	4.79	4	United Kingdom	4.00
5	Canada	5.09	5	Italy	5.45	5	Italy	5.00
6	Australia	5.43	6	United States	5.67	6	Spain	6.00
7	France	5.54	7	Japan	6.48	7	Japan	7.00
8	Japan	5.75	8	Australia	6.61	8	Canada	8.00
9	Spain	7.31	9	Canada	7.09	9	South Korea	9.00
10	Italy	7.64	10	South Korea	7.21	10	Australia	10.00
Total Number of Indicators (160)			Total Number of Indicators (33)			Total Number of Indicators (1)		

Sustainable Development			Labor		
Rank	Country	Average Rank	Rank	Country	Average Rank
1	Canada	4.48	1	Germany	3.32
2	United States	4.82	2	Canada	3.65
3	France	5.11	3	United States	3.97
4	Australia	5.13	4	Australia	5.00
5	United Kingdom	5.20	5	France	5.62
6	Germany	5.34	6	United Kingdom	5.76
7	Japan	5.49	7	South Korea	6.15
8	South Korea	6.16	8	Japan	6.74
9	Spain	6.39	9	Spain	7.26
10	Italy	6.57	10	Italy	7.41
Total Number of Indicators (70)			Total Number of Indicators (34)		

Note: The 10 countries in this ranking include all members of the G7 plus Australia, South Korea, and Spain. Average rank is ordered from 1 (best) to 10 (worst). Although the G7 leaders have identified the “Indo-Pacific” and “disarmament and non-proliferation” as priority issue areas, there are no available performance metrics to assess and rank progress in these two areas.

Source: CSIS Korea Chair.



tution. The tradition of consultation with developing countries might be institutionalized as an official consultation by the annual G7 president and foreign or finance ministers, as well as both before and after the convening of the leaders’ meeting. This would ensure linkages with developing economies, demonstrate inclusivity, and confer more credibility and legitimacy on the G7. The issue areas in the near term should focus on pursuing development and climate goals, implementing new norms and standards (e.g., AI and emerging technologies), and strategic signaling and shaping, particularly with respect to China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This outreach should be extended to the African Union, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, the G20, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

These organizations and countries represent voices from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Islamic world, ensuring better communication but also limiting the size of the G7 to ensure the optimal equilibrium in maintaining the G7’s effectiveness.



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# CONCLUSION

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# G7 ITALIA

## 2024

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**T**he scope of disruption brought on by new emerging technologies as well as old geopolitical rivalries and territorial aggression presages that the world of tomorrow will not look like the world of today. Current institutions have proven incapable of carving out a path forward that capitalizes on the opportunities created by disruption and also guards against the erosion or even usurping of the core values, norms, and ethics of the rules-based order established after World War II. A confluence of forces has made it incumbent upon a reimagined G7 to fill the leadership void. While the current G7, now a decade old in its practices and membership, has performed admirably, the pace of change now cresting requires innovation beyond what may seem comfortable to some. Inaction, moreover, precipitates a vacuum that others may seek to fill with less desirable and even dangerous forms of rule. The recommendations contained in this report are by no means comprehensive, but they are necessary prerequisites for the incarnation of tomorrow's G7 as the preeminent institution of global governance.

## ABOUT THE PROJECT CHAIRS

**John Hamre** was elected president and CEO of CSIS in January 2000. Before joining CSIS, he served as the 26th U.S. deputy secretary of defense. Prior to holding that post, he was the under secretary of defense (comptroller) from 1993 to 1997. As comptroller, Dr. Hamre was the principal assistant to the secretary of defense for the preparation, presentation, and execution of the defense budget and management improvement programs. In 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appointed Dr. Hamre to serve as chairman of the Defense Policy Board, and he served in that capacity for four secretaries of defense. Before serving in the Department of Defense, Dr. Hamre worked for 10 years as a professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. During that time, he was primarily responsible for the oversight and evaluation of procurement, research, and development programs, defense budget issues, and relations with the Senate Appropriations Committee. From 1978 to 1984, Dr. Hamre served in the Congressional Budget Office, where he became its deputy assistant director for national security and international affairs. In that position, he oversaw analysis and other support for committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Dr. Hamre received his PhD, with distinction, in 1978 from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C., where his studies focused on international politics and economics and U.S. foreign policy. In 1972, he received his BA, with high distinction, from Augustana College in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, emphasizing political science and economics. The following year he studied as a Rockefeller fellow at the Harvard Divinity School in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

**Victor Cha** is senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at CSIS. He is also the distinguished university professor and professor of government at Georgetown University. He was appointed in 2021 by the Biden administration to serve on the Defense Policy Board in an advisory role to the secretary of defense. From 2004 to 2007, he served on the National Security Council (NSC) and was responsible for Japan, Korea, Australia/New Zealand, and Pacific Island nations. Dr. Cha was U.S. deputy head of delegation at the Six Party Talks and received two outstanding service commendations during his tenure at the NSC. He is the author of seven books, including the award-winning *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford, 1999) (winner of the 2000 Ohira Book Prize), *The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future* (Ecco, 2012) selected by *Foreign Affairs* as a “Best Book on the Asia-Pacific for 2012,” *Powerplay: Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia* (Princeton, 2018), and *Korea: A New History of South and North* (Yale, 2023). Dr. Cha is a two-time Fulbright scholar, former Olin fellow at Harvard, and former Hoover, CISAC, and Koret fellow at Stanford. He currently serves on 10 editorial boards of academic journals and is coeditor of the Contemporary Asia book series at Columbia University Press. He serves on the board of the National Endowment for Democracy and is a senior fellow at the George W. Bush Institute. He is also a foreign affairs contributor for MSNBC and NBC News. Dr. Cha received his PhD, MIA, and BA degree from Columbia University and a BA Honors from Oxford University.



## ABOUT THE PROJECT CO-DIRECTORS

**Emily Benson** is director of Project on Trade and Technology, and senior fellow of Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she focuses on trade, investment, and technology issues primarily in the transatlantic context. Prior to joining CSIS, she managed transatlantic legislative relations at a European foundation, focusing on trade relations and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. She also worked to combat money laundering via the illicit flow of art from conflict zones and spent several years at an international law firm focused on sanctions and export controls. During graduate school, Emily spent a summer in the trade section at the EU Delegation to the United States, working on digital regulation and trade remedies. Her commentary and research have appeared in publications such as the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Foreign Policy*, and *Politico*, and she is regularly quoted in domestic and international news outlets. She received her joint BA in international affairs and political science from the University of Colorado and her MA in political science from the University of Geneva in Switzerland. Fluent in French, Emily has lived abroad in France, Indonesia, and Switzerland.

**Max Bergmann** is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS he was a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focused on Europe, Russia, and U.S. security cooperation. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then secretary of state John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Before serving in the State Department, Bergmann worked at the Center for American Progress as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann holds a master’s degree in comparative politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a bachelor’s degree in political science from Bates College. His recent commentary has been published in outlets such as *Politico*, the *Washington Post*, *Foreign Affairs*, and *Sasakawa USA*.

**Erin Murphy** is a senior fellow for the Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She has spent her career in several public and private sector roles, including as an analyst on Asian political and foreign policy issues at the Central Intelligence Agency, director for the Indo-Pacific at the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, founder and principal of her boutique advisory firm focused on Myanmar, and an English teacher with the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program in Saga, Japan. Murphy received her master’s degree in Japan studies and international economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and her bachelor’s degree in international relations and Spanish from Tufts University. She was also a 2017-2018 Hitachi international affairs fellow in



Japan with the Council on Foreign Relations. Murphy is also the author of *Burmese Haze: US Policy and Myanmar’s Opening-and Closing* (Association for Asian Studies, 2022).

**Caitlin Welsh** is the director of the Global Food and Water Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she analyzes the drivers and consequences of food and water insecurity around the world, including for U.S. national security. Her specific areas of focus include the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine on global food security and nutrition, food insecurity in the U.S. military, and the coherence between U.S. global water security policy and U.S. global food security policy. Prior to joining CSIS, Ms. Welsh served for over 12 years in the U.S. government, including at the National Security Council and National Economic Council as director for global economic engagement with responsibility for the G7 and G20, and at the U.S. Department of State’s Office of Global Food Security, where she served as acting director. Ms. Welsh was a presidential management fellow at the U.S. African Development Foundation and a Peace Corps volunteer in Morocco. She has testified before Congress on global food security on multiple occasions, and her analysis has been featured in the *New York Times*, CNN, NPR, PBS, the *Wall Street Journal*, *The Economist*, *Financial Times*, *Foreign Policy*, BBC, *Newsweek*, and other outlets. Ms. Welsh received her BA from the University of Virginia and MPA from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and hails from Erie, Pennsylvania.

# APPENDIX A

## List of Performance Metrics Databases

Index Name	Number of Metrics	Index Source
Climate Change Performance Index 2024	19	<a href="https://ccpi.org/ranking/">https://ccpi.org/ranking/</a>
Green Future Index 2023	6	<a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/04/05/1070581/the-green-future-index-2023/">https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/04/05/1070581/the-green-future-index-2023/</a>
Renewable Energy Statistics 2023	8	<a href="https://www.irena.org/Publications/2023/Jul/Renewable-energy-statistics-2023">https://www.irena.org/Publications/2023/Jul/Renewable-energy-statistics-2023</a>
Global AI Index	8	<a href="https://www.tortoisemedia.com/intelligence/global-ai/">https://www.tortoisemedia.com/intelligence/global-ai/</a>
Global AI Vibrancy Tool	22	<a href="https://aiindex.stanford.edu/">https://aiindex.stanford.edu/</a>
Global Innovation Index 2023	105	<a href="https://www.wipo.int/global_innovation_index/en/2023/">https://www.wipo.int/global_innovation_index/en/2023/</a>
ITU ICT Development Indicator 2023	12	<a href="https://www.itu.int/hub/publication/d-ind-ict_mdd-2023-2/">https://www.itu.int/hub/publication/d-ind-ict_mdd-2023-2/</a>
World Digital Competitiveness 2023	13	<a href="https://www.imd.org/centers/wcc/world-competitiveness-center/rankings/world-digital-competitiveness-ranking/">https://www.imd.org/centers/wcc/world-competitiveness-center/rankings/world-digital-competitiveness-ranking/</a>
Economic Complexity Index 2021	1	<a href="https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/rankings">https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/rankings</a>
FM Global Resilience Index 2024	19	<a href="https://www.fmglobal.com/research-and-resources/tools-and-resources/resilienceindex/explore-the-data/?">https://www.fmglobal.com/research-and-resources/tools-and-resources/resilienceindex/explore-the-data/?</a>
Global Food Security Index 2022	5	<a href="https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index/">https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index/</a>
Gross National Income (2022)	4	<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/">https://data.worldbank.org/</a>
Human Development Index (HDI)	5	<a href="https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI">https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI</a>
IMF Financial Development (FD)	9	<a href="https://data.imf.org/?sk=f8032e80-b36c-43b1-ac26-493c5b1cd33b">https://data.imf.org/?sk=f8032e80-b36c-43b1-ac26-493c5b1cd33b</a>
IMF Global Financial Development Database	23	<a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/data/global-financial-development-database">https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/data/global-financial-development-database</a>
Official Development Assistance Provision (2022)	2	<a href="https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/ODA-2022-summary.pdf">https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/ODA-2022-summary.pdf</a>
Sustainable Development Goals	18	<a href="https://dashboards.sdgindex.org/">https://dashboards.sdgindex.org/</a>
World Competitiveness Ranking (2023)	9	<a href="https://www.imd.org/centers/wcc/world-competitiveness-center/rankings/world-competitiveness-ranking/">https://www.imd.org/centers/wcc/world-competitiveness-center/rankings/world-competitiveness-ranking/</a>
World Talent Ranking (2023)	34	<a href="https://www.imd.org/centers/wcc/world-competitiveness-center/rankings/world-talent-ranking/">https://www.imd.org/centers/wcc/world-competitiveness-center/rankings/world-talent-ranking/</a>
Ukraine Support	1	<a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/">https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/</a>

## APPENDIX B

### List of Conference Participants for the G7 Working Group Conference on May 8–9, 2024

The individuals listed below (ordered alphabetically by surname) are not responsible for the analysis, opinions, and recommendations in this report.

#### **Sarah Ahn**

*Economic Minister, Embassy of the Republic of Korea*

#### **Matthew Aks**

*Vice President, Policy Research at Evercore ISI; Former Director for Global Economic Engagement at the National Security Council*

#### **Caroline Atkinson**

*Senior Global Strategist, RockCreek; Trustee and Member of the Advisory Council, IISS; Former Head of Global Policy, Google; Former Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics Affairs of the National Security Council and G7/G20 Sherpa to President Obama*

#### **Jacques Audibert**

*Secretary General, SUEZ SA; Former Diplomatic Advisor and G7/G20 Sherpa to President François Hollande; Former Director General of Political Affairs and Security, Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, France*

#### **Emily Benson**

*Director, Project on Trade and Technology and Senior Fellow, Scholl Chair in International Business, CSIS*

#### **Max Bergmann**

*Director, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and Stuart Center, CSIS*

#### **Creon Butler**

*Director, Global Economy and Finance Programme, Chatham House; Former Director for International Economics Affairs, National Security Secretariat, UK Cabinet Office and G7/G20 Sous-Sherpa*

#### **Kurt Campbell**

*22nd Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State*

#### **Victor Cha**

*Senior Vice President for Asia and Korea Chair, CSIS; Distinguished University Professor and Professor of Government, Georgetown University; Former National Security Council and Director for Asian affairs under the George W. Bush administration*

#### **Hyundong Cho**

*Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the United States; Former First Vice Minister of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

#### **Chul Chung**

*President, Korea Economic Research Institute (KERI) & Chief Research Officer, Federation of Korean Industries (FKI)*

#### **Sara Cohen**

*Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Canada to the United States*

#### **Axel Dittmann**

*Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Germany to the United States*

#### **Charles Edel**

*Senior Adviser and Australia Chair, CSIS*

#### **Matthew P. Goodman**

*Distinguished Fellow and Director of the Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, Council on Foreign Affairs; Former Senior Vice President for Economics and Simon Chair in Political Economy, CSIS; Former Director for International Economics on the National Security Council under the Obama Administration*

#### **Jordan Guthrie**

*Economic Counsellor, Embassy of Canada*

#### **John Hamre**

*President and CEO, and Langone Chair in American Leadership, CSIS; Former Deputy Secretary of Defense*

#### **William Heidt**

*Senior Director, Vriens & Partners; Former U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia; Former G7 Foreign Affairs Sous-Sherpa to President Barack Obama*

#### **Christopher Johnstone**

*Senior Adviser and Japan Chair, CSIS; Former Director for East Asia, National Security Council*

#### **Ellen Kim**

*Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Korea Chair, CSIS*

#### **Ángeles Moreno Bau**

*Ambassador of Spain to the United States; Former Secretary of State for Foreign and Global Affairs*

#### **David Mortlock**

*Chair, Global Trade & Investment, and Managing Partner of the Washington Office, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP; Former Director for International Economic Affairs at the White House National Security Council and G7 Yak to President Barack Obama*

#### **Erin Murphy**

*Senior Fellow, Asia Program, CSIS; Former Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency; Former Director for the Indo-Pacific, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation*

## **Paul Myler**

*Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Australia to the United States;  
Former Assistant Secretary, North East Asia and Assistant Secretary,  
India and Indian Ocean with the Australian Department of Foreign  
Affairs and Trade (DFAT)*

## **Jovita Neliupšienė**

*Ambassador of the European Union to the United States;  
Former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania*

## **Francesc Pont Casellas**

*Head of the International Economy and G20 Unit and G20 Sous-  
Sherpa and Coordinator, Office of the Prime Minister of Spain*

## **James Roscoe**

*Deputy Head of Mission, British Embassy Washington*

## **Christina Segal-Knowles**

*Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for International  
Economics; U.S. G7/G20 Sous-Sherpa*

## **Kelly Ann Shaw**

*Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Project on Prosperity and Development,  
CSIS; Partner, Hogan Lovells; Former Deputy Assistant to the President  
for International Economic Affairs and Deputy Director of the National  
Economic Council and G7/G20 Sherpa to President Donald Trump*

## **Mark Sobel**

*Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Economics Program, CSIS; U.S. Chairman,  
Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF); Former U.S.  
representative, IMF and G7/G20 Finance Sous-Sherpa*

## **Federico Steinberg**

*Visiting Fellow, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, CSIS; Senior  
Analyst, Elcano Royal Institute and Lecturer, Universidad Autónoma*

## **André van Wiggeren**

*Head of the Political Department,  
Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands*

## **Caitlin Welsh**

*Director, Global Food and Water Security Program, CSIS;  
Former Director for Global Economic Engagement, National Security  
Council & National Economic Council and G7/G20 Yak and Acting  
Sherpa to President Donald Trump*

## **Clete Willems**

*Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP;  
Former Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economics,  
Deputy Director of the National Economic Council and G7/G20 Sherpa  
to President Donald Trump*

## **Mitoji Yabunaka (Virtual)**

*Specially Appointed Professor, Osaka University;  
Former Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs*



## ENDNOTES

- 1 See “G7 Leaders’ Statement,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 16, 2020, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100021631.pdf>; “2021 G7 Leaders’ communiqué: Our shared agenda for global action to build back better,” European Council, June 13, 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/06/13/2021-g7-leaders-communiqué/>; “G7 Leaders’ Communiqué,” Prime Minister of Canada, June 28, 2022, <https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2022/06/28/g7-leaders-communique>; and “G7 Leaders’ Statement,” White House, December 6, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/12/06/g7-leaders-statement-6/>.
- 2 See “G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué,” The White House, May 20, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/g7-hiroshima-leaders-communiqué/>; and “The Italian Presidency,” G7 Italia 2024, <https://www.g7italy.it/en/>
- 3 Thanks to Matthew Goodman for this specific recommendation.
- 4 In 2005, the United Kingdom and France pushed to include five emerging economies into the group: Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa. These countries would join the talks periodically, leading those particular meetings to be referred to as G-8/5 or G13. The effort was short-lived and eventually the G20 was founded.
- 5 While not listed, India ranked below Italy in overall performance metrics.
- 6 Figure 6 presents the comparative rankings of countries across seven key issue areas consistently identified in G7 leaders’ statements. The seven key issues include (1) economic resilience and security, (2) food security, (3) digital competitiveness, (4) climate, (5) Ukraine, (6) sustainable development, and (7) labor. The average ranking of each country is based on 323 performance metrics (where 1 is highest) for the seven issue areas. In cases where metrics employed scoring systems from 1 to 100 (100 being the highest), the research team converted these to a ranking system (with 1 being the highest). The team then took the average ranking of all the performance metrics in each issue area to determine a final average performance ranking for each country. The number of performance metrics for each issue area are: economic resilience and security (20 metrics), food security (5 metrics), digital competitiveness (160 metrics), climate (33 metrics), Ukraine (1 metric), sustainable development (70 metrics), and labor (34 metrics). The full list of indexes used is included in Appendix A. The complete list of indicators used is available upon request.

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