2024 Global Forecast: A World Dividing

PART IV

Vying for Influence in the Global South

EDITORS
Craig Cohen & Alexander Kisling
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About the 2024 Global Forecast

The last two years have witnessed significant developments that brought geopolitics back to center stage and exacerbated global divisions. The CSIS 2024 Global Forecast—A World Dividing—offers insights from dozens of our scholars on the most urgent questions in the year ahead around security, technology, geoeconomics, alliances, and international diplomacy.

This fourth and final installment of A World Dividing analyzes the key areas that will define the fierce battle for influence in the Global South. CSIS experts offer diverse views on regional diplomatic strategy, the humanitarian agenda, global health leadership, climate adaptation, and global food and water security—challenges that will determine geopolitical power and shape the future of the global order.

This volume follows the first three installments of A World Dividing, which explore the myriad issues facing U.S.-China competition in 2024, the rapidly shifting contours of global economic and technology competition, and the outlook for the conflicts raging in Europe and the Middle East.

Together, the four volumes of A World Dividing offer a range of perspectives on the most significant challenges we face in 2024—and the solutions needed to strengthen the global posture of the United States and its allies.

We invite you to explore our 2024 Global Forecast to deepen your thinking on these critically important issues.
Contents

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

2 Humanitarian Challenges in the Global South Are the Unintended Face of U.S. Foreign Policy
    Michelle Strucke

6 Four Tests of U.S. Resolve in Global Health in 2024
    J. Stephen Morrison

11 The Contest for Leadership to Address Climate Change Impacts
    Noam Unger

15 Russia Is Manipulating the Global South with Food
    Caitlin Welsh

REGIONAL STRATEGIES

20 India and the Global South: Past Obstacles and Future Partnership
    Richard Rossow

23 Keeping the U.S. Lead in Southeast Asia
    Gregory Poling

26 Estranged Neighbors: The Decline of U.S. Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean?
    Ryan C. Berg

29 Trust Deficit: Historical Obstacles Hamper U.S. Relations in Africa
    Mvemba Phezo Dizolele

33 Contributors

39 Endnotes
Strategic Priorities
Humanitarian Challenges in the Global South Are the Unintended Face of U.S. Foreign Policy
Images of human suffering have flooded Americans’ screens over the past three years, appearing on smartphones and on buses, inside kitchens and schools, and at dinner. Images like Afghans hanging off a C-17 aircraft during the 2021 U.S. evacuation by military airlift of more than 122,000 people from Afghanistan. Images of Palestinians in Gaza holding the lifeless bodies of their small children. Videos of throngs of famished people in Gaza reaching for an aid vehicle carrying the limited amounts of food allowed into the otherwise blockaded territory. Images from Turkey of parents marking the rubble where they believed their children were as they desperately awaited search-and-rescue teams following the 2023 earthquake. And images that are lesser viewed, but nonetheless painful, such as those depicting mass graves in Tigray, Ethiopia or Sudanese internally displaced persons fleeing Darfur to refugee camps in Chad.

These images have something in common for U.S. foreign policy: they tell the devastating story of the consequences of siloed foreign policy efforts on people’s lives. For many U.S. policymakers, humanitarian crises in the Global South are an inconvenient distraction from what conventional wisdom deems to be real foreign policy and national security objectives. Nevertheless, each image illustrates a crisis whose human effects may have been preventable, which makes it all the more tragic.

The year 2024 continues a moment in which Americans are daily consumers of the human impacts of foreign policy. As a new generation of Americans enters adulthood with a more critical view on U.S. engagement abroad, waning interest in international affairs, and an appetite for social media that confirms their existing perspectives and provides a constant stream of the most incendiary content, U.S. policymakers must adapt.¹

In particular, the structure of foreign policy decisionmaking, which overfocuses on regional experts who lead with security concerns and renders issues like human rights and humanitarian considerations technical inputs, at best, and inconvenient road-
blocks, at worst, must be reconsidered. This same structure rewards key U.S. allies and partners with special treatment, allowing them exceptional assistance and access to U.S. policymakers even in the face of the most egregious acts, such as the brutal murder by Saudi Arabia of U.S.-based journalist Jamal Khashoggi or the attempted assassination by India of an American activist on U.S. soil. While strong relationships with both countries serve critical strategic interests of the United States, compartmentalizing these issues rather than giving them the public condemnation and weight they deserve comes at a cost to the people around the world who look to the United States as a purveyor of democratic values. Keeping these discussions out of public view also signals insecurity rather than strength; as a nation that asserts the strategic advantage of its alliances and partnerships, the United States must have enough confidence to call out egregious behavior of a partner government in the short term in favor of ensuring that the long-term relationship with the country and its people is future-forward. This shows that the United States stands with a country’s people over the long term, and the relationship can withstand the shocks and stresses that will come with changes in government and leadership over time.

The U.S. federal government national security and foreign policy community comprises compassionate civil servants, service members, and politically appointed leaders who work unrelenting hours making policy decisions in real time whenever a crisis throws the apparatus into overdrive. Those same decisionmakers are subject to a funding structure that underfunds and devalues the functions of foreign policy meant to lead—in particular, diplomacy before military engagement. The oversized voice of defense in national security discussions has meant that the U.S. Department of Defense is often called upon to engage in humanitarian leadership outside its core expertise, simply based on capacity.

Preventative nondefense approaches to crisis escalation, such as building capacity of partner nations to respond to their own crises and efforts to anticipate and prevent atrocities, are less the focus of U.S. spending than crisis response. In 2022, the U.S. government spent nearly $12 billion on humanitarian assistance and remained by far the world’s leading humanitarian donor. And the United States continues to be among the world’s most generous nations, ranking fifth in the world in 2023, with private charitable donations passing $499 billion in 2022. Yet a fraction of the assistance the U.S. government provides is focused on prevention.

One argument explaining the lack of investment in prevention relates to the pressing need to address crises happening right now. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) anticipates that 300 million people will be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2024. Its own funding appeal—if fully funded, which has not happened in recent history—would serve only 181 million people, leaving a significant gap. Undoubtedly, a U.S. contribution to the $46 billion the United Nations and partner organizations have requested will be significant and yet a drop in the bucket of the overwhelming need.

The reality is the landscape of need is changing. Humanitarian needs are becoming increasingly concentrated in some of the most difficult places to access. The International Rescue Committee, in its watch list of the top countries whose humanitarian situation is expected to deteriorate in 2024, highlighted 20 countries that together represent 86 percent of all humanitarian need globally. Eleven of the 20 are in Africa, many sharing borders with each other. Humanitarian needs are also becoming more concentrated in countries facing multiple overlapping crises—entrenched poverty, food insecurity, protracted conflict, debt distress, and the intersection of climate change impacts.

This constellation of challenges demonstrates a level of complexity that humanitarian aid alone cannot address. It means that the tool kit the United States has to address these complex challenges may involve confronting uncomfortable truths about U.S. policies or the policies of allied or partner governments that sit outside the technical realm of assistance. Humanitarians are first to say this, famously decrying the limits of their approach when they describe that only political solutions will end protracted conflict and development approaches are needed to address the root causes of humanitarian suffering.
The Global South is home to the vast majority of countries facing humanitarian need. Yet for those countries in the Global South for which national security interests are a top U.S. concern, aid professionals are considered technical experts and urged to stay in their lane.

Continuing to silo these experts is a missed opportunity for the United States. United States Agency for International Development administrator Samantha Power is the most high-profile leader the U.S. aid agency has seen, with broad expertise in human rights and foreign policy. For the first time, her role has been included in the membership of the National Security Council. Yet her voice in foreign policy discussions is muffled. With 17 agencies in the U.S. government providing foreign assistance, it is time the United States reconsidered its approach to galvanizing their expertise. This could help usher in needed credibility in U.S. foreign policy that would appeal to a new generation and diminish the ugly face Americans see in images around the world of the effects of siloing the experts who understand best the human consequences of crises.
Four Tests of U.S. Resolve in Global Health in 2024

J. Stephen Morrison
Senior Vice President and Director, Global Health Policy Center
In many important respects, the United States is looking impressively strong—indeed, it is getting stronger—providing good reason to be hopeful. At the same time, high caution is in order. Multiple geopolitical crises dominate, and, as seen in 2023, these can crowd out high-level attention to global health priorities.

As 2024 opens, the picture is decidedly mixed—almost bipolar—as to whether the Biden administration in its global health diplomacy will be successful in both managing its geostrategic rivals and in strengthening its partnerships in Africa and Asia through 2024 and into 2025 and beyond.

In many important respects, the United States is looking impressively strong—indeed, it is getting stronger—providing good reason to be hopeful. At the same time, high caution is in order. Multiple geopolitical crises dominate, and, as seen in 2023, these can crowd out high-level attention to global health priorities. So too, a possible democratic crisis amid the dueling 2024 election/Trump prosecution seasons, combined with the possibility of a second Trump term, fuel uncertainty that could easily cloud U.S. diplomatic action in global health in 2024. Geopolitical rivals and Global South partners already have begun to seriously question the sustainability of U.S. commitments. That noise is only going to get louder. In 2025 and beyond, the internal threats to the United States’ future could, under a worst-case scenario, chip away at the integrity of U.S. leadership in global health. Or the future could be entirely different and far more positive. As 2024 unfolds, attention should be on four principal tests of U.S. resolve.

Sources of Hope

The Biden administration is steadily gaining greater capabilities to lead in global health, particularly in managing China and repairing its damaged credibility and standing in the Global South. Anger and skepticism among partners in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere is the result of the raw sovereign nationalism that dominated the calculations in Washington and the capitals of the other major powers during the most acute and harrowing periods of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020–2021. The healing season has begun.

A new generation of leaders has taken the reins at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Security Council Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense, the United States Agency
for International Development’s (USAID) Bureau for Global Health, and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). A very able envoy currently leads the U.S. delegation to the pandemic instrument negotiations. These ambitious, dynamic leaders are unburdened by the Covid wars, pragmatic and results-based, and focused on building relations across the aisle to sustain the bipartisanship that has undergirded U.S. global health leadership in the past few decades. In the global arena, they are pushing an activist diplomacy focused upon a new form of partnerships and alliances that strengthen both regional and national capabilities, combining traditional global health with health security.

The United States is actively building new institutional assets while undertaking serious reform of existing institutions. Inaugurated in 2023 were the White House’s Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy, the new Department of State’s Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy, and the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Health (ARPA-H), modeled after the Department of Defense’s (DOD) experimental agency, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Undergoing overhauls are the CDC, the vision for NIH’s future, and the mechanisms for holding into account the disparate elements of DOD contributions to health security.

A few important factors help stabilize U.S. leadership. Funding for global health may not be growing, but it has proven relatively steady, with bipartisan support in Congress. In the midst of the accelerating U.S.-China confrontation and the standoff over Covid-19 origins, senior-level dialogue on health security between the two superpowers ceased. But the prospect of a resumed high-level exchange never died, and the Xi-Biden summit at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in November 2023, marked a warming restabilization, including a commitment to collaborate on curbing production and export of the precursors of fentanyl.

The Tests of U.S. Performance in 2024

Whether new U.S. strengths translate in 2024 into serious progress in global health, both in managing geopolitical tensions and rebuilding trust and confidence in the Global South, is an open question. The same is true for whether the gains prove durable and can withstand a possible Trump presidency.

- In 2024, the Biden administration’s performance in four areas will be critical in judging whether significant progress has been achieved that can be carried into the future.
- The administration is called upon in 2024 to demonstrate its commitment and resolve to sustain, in league with its allies, and most importantly, its partners in the Global South, the three foundational legacy instruments that have changed the course of global health over the past two decades. These comprise PEPFAR, the Global Fund, and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, all of which are in cycle.
- Two questions will dominate 2024: will the White House in 2024 deliver ample appropriations for PEPFAR? Second, as the Global Fund and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, are each approaching their multiyear replenishments, will administration leadership fuel the political momentum essential to bring each process to a successful conclusion?
- The administration is called upon in 2024 to lead in helping land the pandemic instrument negotiations at a promising spot. That won’t be easy, since divisions between the Global North and Global South remain stark, and expectations of what the process can generate have jumped outside the boundaries of reality from all directions. Debate centers on access and benefit sharing; One Health (incorporating the health of humans, animals, and ecosystems); research and development (R&D), including intellectual property and technology transfer; and financing to create capacity. Megathemes that have emerged out of the pandemic experience that will drive discussions well into the future: the norms of equity, access, and the imperative to invest in distributed power and capabilities in the world’s regions.
The United States is the single power in the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) that can be most truly effective in brokering compromise, aligning expectations with reality, and driving toward a text that is reasonable, fair, and pragmatic, while avoiding undermining intellectual property protections and unachievable financial and other commitments. Remarkably, both Russia and China have stood on the margins of the negotiations and have elected thus far not to be spoilers. Time, of course, matters. Interestingly, the deepening international anxiety over possible electoral outcomes in the United States and elsewhere in 2024 may help push the negotiators to the finish line. It is fueling that argument that the United States and other parties to the INB must mark significant diplomatic progress by the time of the World Health Assembly in May 2024 and get as close to closure as possible by the end of 2024.

- The United States needs to restore a serious high-level dialogue with China to prepare for the next unknown pathogen of pandemic potential. If it does not, it is choosing to live with a dangerous strategic gap that could quickly come back to haunt both the United States and China in the future.9

- Estrangement over Wuhan and the deadlock over Covid origins have created barriers reinforced by domestic politics in both countries. That situation, luckily, is easing somewhat, as the U.S.-China relationship has restabilized in 2023. The United States and China now have a modest window to test whether a senior dialogue can indeed begin in non-flashpoint areas of common interest where commonsense, pragmatic solutions are within reach. Cooperation is deepening in curbing the flow of precursor elements to fentanyl to the United States from China. Talks could kick off on any of a number of compelling and timely issues: climate and health; artificial intelligence and biotechnology; laboratory biosafety; R&D clinical trials through corporate and university partnerships; aging; financing capabilities in low- and mid-income countries; and strengthening the health workforce. Tacitly, the United States and China are contributors to the Pandemic Fund.10 On workforce issues, the United States and China already have each registered their shared early interest in the Global Health Emergency Corps, begun under the World Health Organization to create a health security leadership network, expand interoperable surge capabilities to address dangerous outbreaks, and build regional capabilities.11

- How and whether the United States effectively approaches the runaway health and humanitarian crisis in Gaza will be decisive in 2024 in shaping its standing in global health. Already, this burgeoning crisis has eaten away at U.S. credibility, fueling regional instability and deepening alienation from the United States. There are steps that the United States can and should take now to address how to avert Gaza slipping into a permanent wasteland with no path out.12 These include U.S. policy pronouncements on adherence to international humanitarian law; conditioning future U.S. security assistance; forming an ad hoc coalition focused on dramatically expanding the flows of medicines, food, fuel, and water; and expanding the technical and logistical support of CDC and USAID.

Reputations Are Fragile

Diplomacy will be instrumental in 2024 in achieving U.S. critical, priority goals in global health. Unlocking compromise solutions to the pandemic instrument negotiations—avoiding a damaging deadlock—demands much serious diplomatic work and White House backing. The same is true of preserving the long-term vitality of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, the Global Fund, and PEPFAR. The United States needs to also recognize that its effectiveness, credibility, and protection of U.S. national interests, as they pertain to health security and the ethical norms that underlie global health, rests on courage and risk-taking. That is certainly true in considering how and when to engage China at a high level on health security and how and when to confront the human catastrophe in

J. Stephen Morrison
Gaza for which the United States is now being held, in part, to account.
The Contest for Leadership to Address Climate Change Impacts

Noam Unger
Director, Sustainable Development and Resilience Initiative, and Senior Fellow, Project on Prosperity and Development
Countries across the Global South, are already affected by a litany of damaging climate change impacts and have fewer resources to help them cope, which is cause for collective concern.

Midway through the 28th UN Conference of the Parties (COP28) climate negotiations in Dubai, Ephraim Mwepeya Shitima, the Zambian chair of the African Group of Negotiators, publicly registered disappointment with the direction of the conference while attempting to shift the outcome. He saw the climate change adaptation emergency facing Africans as the central issue and sought greater assistance from world leaders, noting, “Adaptation is a matter of survival for us in Africa, it is a life and death issue.” A similar echo came at the conclusion of the conference from Saber Hossain Chowdhury, the envoy from Bangladesh, when he also underscored adaptation as a “life and death issue” while urging, “We cannot compromise on lives and livelihoods.” As the United States and the People’s Republic of China continue to grapple for partnerships across developing countries to shape regional trajectories and the global order in their strategic interest, calls from the Global South to avert, reduce, and address climate change impacts will only grow in the coming year and beyond. Leadership in this space is an issue on the rise that is as relevant for global alliances as it is for moral, economic, and security interests.

In the context of climate change, adaptation is not about stemming or reversing greenhouse gas emissions. The latter has been, and continues to be, a focus of international negotiations and essential societal and industrial shifts. However, as ambitious mitigation goals continue to slip out of reach—and even if the world does achieve them—billions of people in places highly vulnerable to climate change-induced hazards will continue to be dramatically affected for decades. The impacts of climate change on malnutrition, malaria, diarrhea, and heat stress alone are projected to cause around five million additional deaths between 2030 and 2050. Countries across the Global South, in particular, are already affected by a litany of damaging climate change impacts and have fewer resources to help them cope, which is cause for collective concern. As the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy observes, climate change poses a major risk to national security and is associated with “increasing humanitarian need, food insecurity and health
threats, as well as the potential for instability, conflict, and mass migration."  

Adaptation is a banner that stretches across varied activities ranging from enhancing climate information services and developing disaster early warning systems to building climate-resilient infrastructure, boosting sustainable agriculture, and providing innovative insurance coverage. Public and private investments in these activities are prudent and can be highly effective. For example, $1 billion of adaptation investments to protect assets from coastal flooding could yield $14 billion in savings through reduced economic damages.\(^5\) Additionally, a recent study of companies shows that the benefit-to-cost ratios for resilience-building investments may range from 2:1 to 15:1.\(^6\) For companies in emerging markets and developing economies seeking to continue business operations even as regular water sources are compromised, the benefit-to-cost ratio of implementing alternative water collection measures may be as high as 50:1.

Nevertheless, paying the costs to attain compelling benefits can be tricky. Recent analyses forecast that within the current decade alone, developing countries around the world would collectively have to spend between $215 billion and $387 billion each year in investments to adequately adapt to climate change.\(^7\) Since many countries across the Global South are burdened by debt-exacerbated financial crises, it is no wonder they use diplomatic opportunities and multilateral forums to demand greater climate finance from wealthier nations far more responsible for climate change in the first place. Assessments show developed countries spend less than $25 billion annually on climate change adaptation finance for developing countries. Even though such tallies may be incomplete because some countries and programs are not included, the gap between current contributions and global need is certainly daunting.\(^8\)

For its part, the U.S. government has already begun its salvo in the realm of adaptation and resilience support for developing countries—a field of influence and competition poised to grow. Most recently, on the multilateral front at COP28, U.S. vice president Kamala Harris pledged $3 billion on behalf of the United States to the Green Climate Fund, hoping to add to the $2 billion the United States already provided to the largest international fund supporting climate-vulnerable developing countries as they adapt to the impacts of climate change and transition to cleaner energy.\(^9\)

The U.S. administration has also been building a signature American initiative, the President’s Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience (PREPARE), since President Biden first announced it in 2021. PREPARE is billed as a U.S. effort to assist more than half a billion people in developing countries as they adapt to and manage the impacts of climate change by 2030. To do this, the initiative mobilizes 19 agencies of the U.S. government and a growing number of private sector partners to collaborate and focus on actions like boosting the availability of reliable climate information, strengthening early warning and emergency management systems and building climate-resilient infrastructure.\(^10\) These initiatives and other recently branded U.S. efforts all hinge on funding subject to congressional appropriations.\(^11\) So bipartisan congressional understanding about the foreign policy and national security implications of supporting the Global South to better manage climate risks is essential.

China’s government is also highly engaged in countries across the Global South through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund, and other diplomatic efforts. When taking into account other official flows in addition to official development assistance, Beijing has outspent Washington by a factor of more than two to one in developing countries since the launch of BRI, and even though such spending from China is down significantly from the middle of the last decade, China is still the largest single source of international development finance.\(^12\) Although the many infrastructure investments directed by the People’s Republic of China around the world offer ample opportunities to incorporate climate-resilient approaches, and even though China is effectively eighth in the world among climate-related finance providers via multilateral development banks and multilateral climate funds, it may be a challenge to grasp the extent of China’s climate change adaptation support.\(^13\) That challenge is,
in part, because under the UN climate regime, China is not on the 1992-era list of wealthy countries responsible for climate finance. Quite self-servingly, China is not part of the development finance reporting systems used by the United States and many other leading economies. The Paris Agreement on climate left the lines between developed and developing countries blurry, and even though language on “common but differentiated responsibilities” ostensibly meant China and other countries that have developed dramatically in recent decades could be official, transparent contributors to climate finance targets, they have not taken that step.

The United States and China will have near-term opportunities to step up their responses to climate change adaptation needs in the Global South. Much of the focus of international climate-related negotiations will gravitate back to questions of who can offer how much to assist highly vulnerable countries. Since the current internationally agreed annual climate finance target expires in 2025, the preparations for and events of COP29, which will take place in Azerbaijan toward the end of 2024, will be marked by even more vociferous calls by developing countries to help them defend against calamitous impacts on populations, the environment, supply chains, health, and stability, with global ripple effects. Given its status as an economic powerhouse and the world’s largest current emitter of greenhouse gases, China’s role as a contributor will again be on the table.

As Senegal’s climate minister Madeleine Diouf Sarr noted on behalf of the group of least developed countries, the consensus reached in Dubai in 2023 “highlights the vast gap between developing country needs and the finance available” given debt crises and “fails to deliver a credible response to this challenge.” In the eyes of the Global South, powerful countries that help the world craft a more credible response will be better positioned to lead on many other pressing international issues. Ideally, this situation will spur competition while also prompting pragmatic collaboration—as encouragingly glimpsed through the recent U.S.-China Sunnylands agreement—because the scramble to manage climate change impacts is about more than just a charm offensive for greater alliances with the Global South. Poorer resilience to the impacts of climate change around the world will have direct and costly implications for conflicts, economic shocks, the spread of diseases, and other transnational threats.
Russia Is Manipulating the Global South with Food

Caitlin Welsh
Director, Global Food and Water Security Program
Today’s global food security crisis is not only about the millions of innocent people around the world whose food security has deteriorated due to Russia’s invasion but also about attempts by Russia to manipulate these countries through its own exports.

Wars, wherever they happen, worsen food insecurity, and the impact of conflicts on hunger is usually local or regional. The conflict in Gaza, for example, has led to a collapse of food supply chains there, with the entire population requiring emergency food assistance and many at risk of famine. Elsewhere, bad actors—whether repressive regimes, terrorist organizations, or violent gangs—may withhold food in exchange for a population’s support.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine, food insecurity has increased not only within Ukraine but also worldwide. The population Russia seeks to manipulate is not local but global—particularly, the Global South. The United States has responded with muscular diplomacy and funding for global food security. While U.S. global food security leadership is exemplary, the extent to which the United States is factoring Russia’s manipulation through food into its global food security efforts is unclear. To better blunt the impacts of Russia’s rising influence in the Global South, the United States should target more assistance to the countries whose reliance on Russian food imports is growing. And the United States should strengthen support for Ukraine’s agriculture sector, thereby increasing Ukraine’s food exports and giving countries in the Global South an alternative to Russia’s grains.

Ukraine’s agriculture sector remains a primary front in Russia’s war as Russia realizes numerous benefits in undercutting Ukraine’s production. Agriculture is a top source of revenue for Ukraine, providing 10 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) and 41 percent of its export revenue before the war. Damages and losses for Ukraine’s agriculture sector were estimated at $40.2 billion in early 2023; both almost certainly increased throughout the year as Russia terminated the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023 and immediately intensified attacks on Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure. Unsafe conditions in the Black Sea have forced Ukraine to route more exports overland through neighboring EU countries, leading to trade disputes that threaten unified European support for Ukraine and drain EU resources.
By the end of 2023, Ukraine is expected to have exported approximately 37.6 million tons of grains, a nearly 25.5 percent decline from 2020–21, the last harvest unaffected by the war. As Ukraine exports less food to the world, good growing conditions have helped Russia’s exports surge. In the 2023–24 growing season, Russia is expected to export a world-record-setting 50 million metric tons of wheat, 28 percent more than Russia had exported before the war and over four times as much wheat as Ukraine is predicted to export in 2023–24.

While Ukraine’s agricultural market share has contracted, Russia’s has expanded, including in the Global South. Prior to Russia’s invasion, 33 countries, including many in the Middle East, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, imported 30 percent or more of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine. According to unofficial estimates, Russia’s exports to the Middle East, North Africa, and East Africa have increased since Russia invaded Ukraine.

With increasing conspicuousness, Moscow is aiming to exchange its food for influence. In early 2022, former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev noted that food was Russia’s “silent . . . but menacing” weapon. In mid-2023, Russian president Vladimir Putin did not mince words when he declared Russia “has the capacity to replace Ukrainian grain” since Russia’s “harvest is again expected to be perfect this year.”

Russia’s attempts to exert influence through food have been met with some success. In 2022 and 2023, several of the countries that voted against UN resolutions condemning Russian aggression were those most reliant on Russia for wheat imports. Even more countries reliant on Russian wheat were infamous “fence sitters,” abstaining from voting altogether. Leaders in many of these countries have echoed Russia’s false narrative that Western countries had sanctioned Russia’s food and fertilizer exports and that these purported sanctions, and not Russia’s war, had caused global food insecurity to soar. A country may rely on imports for various needs, like energy or arms, but disruptions in food supplies can immediately ignite public discontent, sometimes threatening a leader’s hold on power. Recent history has reinforced this lesson, making leaders eager to secure sources of imports, even (or especially) from countries like Russia.

Despite Russia’s attempts to buy influence through food, other countries in the Global South have publicly criticized Russia’s disruptions to global agriculture markets, particularly Moscow’s July 2023 decision to terminate the Black Sea Grain Initiative. A top Kenyan official called the decision a “stab in the back,” while leaders of numerous other countries, including Egypt, South Africa, India, China, and Turkey, as well as African Union chairman Azali Assoumani, entreated President Putin to reopen Ukraine’s grain trade. Instead of rejoining the Black Sea Grain Initiative, Russia has taken advantage of food-insecure nations’ reliance on Russia’s supplies to increase its own exports. In September 2023, Putin announced an agreement among Russia, Turkey, and Qatar to move one million tons of Russian grain to “the neediest countries” in Africa. In November 2023, according to Russia’s Ministry of Agriculture, Russia began shipping free grain to six African countries, as Putin had promised at the Russia-Africa summit in July. Except for Somalia, each of the recipients of Russia’s free grain—Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Eritrea, Mali, Somalia, and Zimbabwe—abstained from UN votes condemning Russia’s war in Ukraine or voted against the resolutions.

Global food prices reached an all-time high when Russia invaded Ukraine, and since this time, the United States has led the public diplomacy campaign to pin blame for the crisis rightfully on Moscow. From the G7 to the UN General Assembly to the African Union to countless other high-level engagements, the United States has decried Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s agriculture sector, its blockade of Ukraine’s grain exports, and the malnutrition that has ensued worldwide. Washington has matched its rhetoric with new funding and programming to address rising food insecurity, including an expansion of Feed the Future, increased donations to the UN World Food Programme (WFP), cementing the United States as the top donor (Russia is 44 on the list of top donors to the WFP); and the U.S. State Department’s announcement of a new initiative.

Caitlin Welsh
to improve production of nutritious crops in African countries, the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils (VACS), for which $160 million has been pledged to date.\(^6\)

The goal of these initiatives is to increase food security and nutrition among the world’s most vulnerable people and improve their countries’ agriculture systems, reducing their reliance on imports for their food security—with the additional benefit of diminishing the potential of countries like Russia to manipulate them through free and low-cost food. The extent to which the United States is aiming to counter Russian tactics through U.S. food security assistance is unclear. For example, no Feed the Future countries are located in North Africa or the Middle East, where Russia’s market share is growing fastest, though some VACS programming will target this region.\(^7\)

Today’s global food security crisis is not only about the millions of innocent people around the world whose food security has deteriorated due to Russia’s invasion but also about attempts by Russia to manipulate these countries through its own exports. Further, diminishing countries’ vulnerability to Russian influence is not only about helping these countries through U.S. food security assistance but also about continuing to support the recovery of Ukraine’s agriculture sector from the effects of Russia’s war. The United States announced the Agriculture Resilience Initiative (AGRI) for Ukraine in mid-2022 and to date has pledged $350 million in support of the initiative.\(^8\) The United States is a top bilateral supporter of Ukraine’s demining efforts, and demining is a prerequisite to recommencing agricultural activity across thousands of acres of Ukraine’s farmland.\(^9\)

While noteworthy, this assistance is a small fraction of the funding needed to rebuild Ukraine’s agriculture sector from Russia’s attacks and an even smaller fraction of total U.S. funding for Ukraine’s war efforts. Beyond continuing to support Ukraine’s defense capabilities through robust military assistance, Congress should direct more U.S. funding to Ukraine’s agriculture sector. Ukraine’s economic recovery hangs in the balance—along with food security for millions that rely on Ukrainian exports for food. Moreover, in the struggle to secure international opposition to Russia and support for Ukraine—particularly in the Global South—funding Ukraine’s agriculture sector increases Ukraine’s exports, weakening the potency of the “silent weapon” of Russia’s food.
Regional Strategies
India and the Global South: Past Obstacles and Future Partnership

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To the American mind, the “battle for the Global South” conjures up images of U.S.-China competition. . . . Within its own neighborhood, India will never cede leadership to either China or the United States.

India’s Changing Leadership of the Global South

Since gaining independence from the British in 1947, India has viewed itself as a natural leader of the Global South. From the 1955 Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations to the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement as a middle path during the Cold War to the 1964 creation of the Group of 77 (G-77) under the United Nations, India has continuously positioned itself as the leading voice of developing nations.¹

India frequently engages, and sometimes leads, a range of organizations meant to provide alternatives to non-Western leadership on global issues. These include BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and India’s own India-Africa Forum Summit. India’s leadership of the Group of 20 (G20) in 2023 focused on giving voice to the Global South among its main objectives. However, the practical utility of these forums is limited. Given China’s leadership ambitions and participation in several common forums such as BRICS, the SCO, and the G20, India already realizes that sharing leadership with China is tricky.

Despite frequent engagement, Indian influence on global affairs has historically been limited to intellectual leadership. India has not been a major economic partner to many nations; it has had a modest budget for international aid and a miniscule foreign service, providing humble contributions to global development institutions.²
Despite limited influence on global affairs, India has the economic and military heft to be influential in its own neighborhood. It is further strengthened by its historical societal and cultural bonds with other South Asian nations. While attempts to create a strong regional organization in the form of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have floundered, India has led smaller initiatives with sub-groups of nations in its region and shown a renewed focus in recent years in improving bilateral ties with most neighboring nations.  

**Diverging Approaches to the Global South**

The United States and India have dramatically improved security and commercial ties over the past two decades. Yet the two nations often have a difficult time building shared approaches to global issues. For instance, the countries continue to fight on global trade issues. They also have very different reactions to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Even within India’s own neighborhood, the two countries have often had different approaches.

For instance, despite being a significant donor to Afghan reconstruction in the period between Taliban governments, Indian officials privately complained the United States did not effectively engage India in their planning and talks with the Taliban ahead of U.S. withdrawal. Moreover, the United States was critical of efforts to thwart free and fair elections ahead of Bangladesh’s recent national election, while India was pleased to see the Awami League-led government remain in office, irrespective of a viable electoral opposition, as the status quo favors Indian interests. The United States is aggressively pursuing sanctions and drawing down development assistance to squeeze the military junta in Myanmar. By contrast, India believes engagement is a better way to shape political evolution. The differences continue even in Sri Lanka: after the conclusion of the decades-long civil war in 2009, the United States pushed Sri Lanka to bring government perpetrators to justice, whereas India focused on reconciliation.

**Way Forward**

The divergent approaches on key issues in India’s own neighborhood have been and will continue to be among the most volatile elements of U.S.-India ties in the years ahead. The countries, however, share an interest in preventing further security inroads by China, especially in maritime nations like Maldives and Sri Lanka.

If the United States wants India’s support in its endeavors to engage the Global South, U.S. officials must redouble efforts to find shared approaches in India’s region. This means occasionally putting U.S. interests second and applying resources in ways that augment India’s regional approaches. It also might mean taking steps in South Asia to augment India’s role as a regional leader. Efforts aimed at boosting India-led infrastructure projects with partner nations, supporting India-led humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions in the region, augmenting India’s expanding healthcare cooperation, and reinforcing India’s start-up initiatives with its neighbors may prove effective.

India and the United States have shared interests in a wide range of issues. The United States could be more deliberate in streamlining this assistance alongside Indian efforts. India will not blindly follow the United States on global issues, especially those related to the Global South. However, India shares U.S. concerns about China’s global ambitions. Balancing U.S. interests with partners like India will take nuance and trust. The United States must find meaningful ways to support India’s initiatives in its own neighborhood. Simultaneous support in key areas of cooperation, with a clear alignment on issues, will go a long way.
Keeping the U.S. Lead in Southeast Asia

Greg Poling
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with Andreyka Natalegawa
Washington has an opportunity to distinguish itself by pursuing initiatives that promote mutual prosperity, security, and above all the sovereignty of Southeast Asian nations and their populations.

Elites in the United States have reached a bipartisan consensus that the country is locked in a competition with China. During a November 2023 meeting with U.S. president Joe Biden in San Francisco, Chinese president Xi Jinping implicitly accepted that framing. The competition is likely to last decades and will include military, economic, and especially normative competition. It will be a struggle over the system itself—whether the rules-based order the United States helped craft, which most of the international community has come to embrace, will adapt and endure or be replaced, at least in part, by China’s preferred norms. The struggle over the way the system works cannot be won just in Washington, Brussels, or Tokyo, where the leaders of the so-called Global North are already in broad agreement. It will be determined in the Global South, where developing states and their five billion citizens will decide which rules best align with their interests and values.

China’s immediate neighbors in Southeast Asia are at the front lines of that competition. The contest for influence between China and the United States (and like-minded partners such as Japan and Australia) is arguably more heated and impactful than anywhere else. The countries of Southeast Asia are not aligning uniformly with either U.S. or Chinese preferences, and their future choices will vary from issue to issue. Contrary to the often gloomy, and almost always anecdotal, headlines of declining U.S. influence, the stated preferences of Southeast Asian publics and elites tell a different story. Neither China nor the United States can claim to be running away with the competition for regional influence. But many Southeast Asians express more affinity for the United States than for China. Given that soft power advantage, Washington is better positioned than Beijing to win the normative battle in Southeast Asia.

In early 2023, CSIS gathered and weighted all recent public and elite opinion polling in the region related to perceptions of China and the United States. There were considerable gaps, as there were throughout the Global South, where major polling firms tend to operate rarely if at all. But the data that exist are
good news for the United States. In the Philippines and Vietnam, large majorities prefer the United States to China. The United States also leads among Indonesians and Thais, though by narrower margins. In all those countries, China provokes much stronger negative feelings than the United States does. The United States maintains a soft power advantage in the four largest countries of Southeast Asia, which account for more than 550 million of the region’s nearly 700 million people. Only in Malaysia and Singapore do publics clearly prefer China to the United States, and in Singapore, this is mitigated by an elite preference for the United States.

The picture, however, is not entirely rosy for the United States. When asked which country is more economically important for the region, regional publics and elites choose China in every case except the Philippines, where the public is undecided. This is, unfortunately for the United States, an accurate reflection of reality. China is the top trading partner of every country in Southeast Asia, out-invests the United States everywhere but Singapore and Thailand, and is the leading bilateral provider of development assistance in every country except the Philippines. The silver lining for the United States is that China’s economic edge in the region does not seem to be boosting its popularity, which would suggest that it cannot necessarily buy its way to victory in the competition over international norms and institutions. Frequent calls from the region for enhanced U.S. economic and trade engagement demonstrate that Southeast Asian elites hesitate to rely too much on China and instead prefer to seek out and build a broader range of close economic ties with other partners.

The United States must focus its attention on better understanding Southeast Asian elite and public perspectives and fine-tune its engagement to meet the needs and demands of the region on their own terms. At a time when Beijing remains obstinate in disregarding the agency of its small-state neighbors, Washington has an opportunity to distinguish itself by pursuing initiatives that promote mutual prosperity, security, and above all the sovereignty of Southeast Asian nations and their populations. The future of U.S.-China strategic competition in Southeast Asia will rest, in part, on the extent to which the United States meets the moment, actively listens and engages with its partners, and develops and acts on an agenda that capitalizes on Washington’s soft power and normative advantage.
Estranged Neighbors: The Decline of U.S. Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean

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U.S. interest is not in blocking China’s engagement in LAC but rather in creating an environment in which LAC countries have a realistic chance of protecting their principal interests in remaining open societies instead of continuing lopsided relationships of dependency with Beijing.

In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the United States retains residual influence through shared history, culture, language, and migration. But the region’s “muscle memory” has undergone rapid changes. Gone are the days when Washington was first on LAC’s speed dial; here are the days when many countries seek distance—often equal distance from both Washington and Beijing. Others wholeheartedly embrace Beijing’s presence to consolidate domestic political projects and pursue national development goals.\(^1\)

Since the early 2000s, U.S. influence in its shared neighborhood has declined noticeably, with the concomitant rise of China as either the top trading partner or second-largest trading partner of every country in the region. In part, waning U.S. influence is a direct result of U.S. policies that neglected the region and took its relative peace and stability for granted.\(^2\) Yet, it also reflects a voracious Chinese appetite for LAC’s commodities—a partial economic complementarity that China discovered in the late 1990s and early 2000s and has leveraged to influence much of the region and pursue its strategic goals. One (albeit imperfect) example of China’s advance in LAC concerns the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2016, zero countries in the region had acceded to the BRI, but by 2022, 22 of the 35 Western Hemisphere countries had acceded.\(^3\) Assuming the United States and Canada will not join BRI any time soon, and considering LAC maintains seven countries that recognize Taiwan—the largest concentration of any region in the world—China has convinced 22 of 26 eligible countries to join BRI in a matter of five years. Arguably, some of the largest holdouts—Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia—do not matter as much, given China’s ability to project influence in these countries in other ways.\(^4\) BRI or not, Brazil was the top destination for Chinese foreign direct investment in 2021. In just one example of strategic investment in sensitive areas, Chinese companies control over 10 percent of the country’s power transmission capacity.\(^5\)

In many ways, declining U.S. influence in LAC mirrors that across other parts of the so-called Global
South. But growing U.S. strategic insolvency in LAC is arguably much more concerning and impactful on U.S. national security and prosperity. Most of the region has pursued a foreign policy variably referred to as “neutrality,” “non-alignment,” or “active non-alignment.”6 Countries in LAC have focused principally on internal development, exiting the confines of the middle-income trap, and keeping their distance from global hot spots. Moral appeals and value-based approaches have failed to yield closer alignment with the United States. More and more, China’s transactional approach appeals to regional leaders because it is devoid of moralizing and replete with speedier shovels in the ground that align with LAC’s frequent democratic election cycles. Too often, the United States has been hamstrung trying to fight something with nothing.

The reality is that China is not going anywhere.7 Analysts who speak of extirpating Chinese influence in the region are unserious. Their plans, if followed, would do grave harm to the residual influence the United States still possesses in its shared neighborhood. Instead, the United States should pursue a three-pronged strategy to address burgeoning Chinese influence in LAC: insulate, curtail, and compete.8 The strategy is realistic in that it assumes current funding levels across the region remain constant for development, security assistance, and trade promotion initiatives. In fact, LAC is likely a region the U.S. government would shift funding away from in the face of a major contingency in the Indo-Pacific theater. In short, the United States must find a way to do more and be more strategic with the same without an influx of additional resources.

Fundamentally, the strategy of insulate, curtail, and compete seeks to fortify U.S. partners and allies in LAC to engage with China on less asymmetric terms. The strategy involves bolstering the region’s democratic institutions, building more robust party structures, enhancing cybersecurity, and ensuring better human rights practices. U.S. interest is not in blocking China’s engagement in LAC but rather in creating an environment in which LAC countries have a realistic chance of protecting their principal interests in remaining open societies instead of continuing lopsided relationships of dependency with Beijing.

When the United States asks partners and allies in LAC to curtail cooperation with China, that request must be made with humility and recognition that democratically elected leaders incur a cost. Ideally, the request to curtail participation in Chinese initiatives and development projects goes hand in hand with competition—a U.S.- or U.S. partner-backed alternative offer that competes with proper environmental standards, anticorruption safeguards, transparent terms, and local consultation processes.

Policymakers often get distracted by flashy Chinese infrastructure projects in LAC—new ports, roads, airports, and satellite ground stations.9 Undoubtedly, these projects have allowed China to win hearts and minds in the shared neighborhood. However, lag times in construction, permitting, and financing mean these are often yesterday’s projects. Instead, U.S. policymakers should train their focus on what China calls “new economies”—technology-driven industries over whose dominance the preponderance of global economic power and the future of global economic governance will be determined. U.S. policymakers specializing in LAC have yet to engage in a forward-thinking discussion on where U.S. resources are best focused in LAC, but they would be wise to consider who builds the future of LAC’s information communications technology, cloud computing centers, artificial intelligence research labs, and semiconductor manufacturing capacity, among other cutting-edge industries of the future.10

A strategy to compete with China in LAC necessitates a positive agenda that speaks to the hopes and aspirations of the United States’ closest neighbors. It also requires broadening the aperture through which the United States sees the region, too often dominated by the negative agenda of drugs, crime, and illegal immigration. Yet, given that great power rivalries have always had a way of involving the Western Hemisphere, the United States must act quickly to avoid strategic insolvency or face the steep bill.11
Trust Deficit: Historical Obstacles Hamper U.S. Relations in Africa

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U.S. prioritization of Europe in Africa dilutes the U.S. brand and undermines U.S. standing among Africans who have come to see the United States as an extension of the former colonial powers.

U.S. relations with African countries are defined through great power competition optics. Seen from Washington, Paris, or London, this competition has come to mean the struggle for hegemony between the United States, China, and Russia.

This competition, which is reminiscent of the Cold War, has focused in great measure on Africa because of the growing strategic importance of the continent. Africa’s natural resources, rare earth mineral reserves, forests, rivers, and youths are critical for the future of the world. Consequently, Africa is the target of a new scramble for resources. It is often described as the continent of the future, but whose future is it?

While the hegemonic powers seek to defeat each other in this quasi-zero-sum scramble, Africans see the competition as a positive development. Seen from African capitals from Cairo to Abuja to Kinshasa, Addis Ababa, and Pretoria, great power competition provides Africa with much-needed options and choices.

As such, African countries and leaders welcome the competition, but they are not interested in the ideologies underpinning it in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. Rather, they seek to maximize the opportunities that the competition affords regardless of who offers them.

The United States, however, has not fully recognized and appreciated this African perspective. In Africa, the United States needs to overcome a few structural obstacles and chart a new course.

The Old Colonial Posture

Compared to old European powers, the United States, China, and Russia share a significant advantage in Africa. None maintained a colony on the continent. But while China and Russia have successfully exploited their noncolonial status in Africa, the United States has not. For historical reasons, the United States works in close partnership with former colonial powers, which is a problem for the United States in Africa.

Sixty years after most African countries achieved their independence, U.S. policymakers still view
Africa primarily through the same European colonial lens they did in 1945. The default U.S. position on Africa is to either defer to Europeans or outsource its engagement to former colonial powers. Not only do Africans resent this treatment, which de facto ignores their sovereignty and independence, it undermines the possibility of strong relations and partnerships between the United States and these countries.

It has been evident for a while now that Europeans do not understand Africa given the fast-changing dynamics on the ground. Recent events in the Sahel and former French colonies underscore Europe’s disconnect from the realities of the continent. For instance, for years, France failed to appreciate the regional and national dynamics and growing public discontent against its Africa policy, which remained colonial, exploitative, and paternalistic in nature. Anti-France sentiment and France’s failure to change course effectively created room for a string of coups d’état and for Russia and its portfolio of mercenary outfits, such as the Wagner Group, to gain a foothold in Mali and the Central African Republic, former French spheres of influence and control. The United States is now scrambling to chart a course of engagement in that space.

U.S. prioritization of Europe in Africa dilutes the U.S. brand and undermines U.S. standing among Africans who have come to see the United States as an extension of the former colonial powers. Notwithstanding the fact that Africa has 54 countries, deference to Europe is a serious obstacle to the conception of a needed, mutually beneficial, and comprehensive U.S.-Africa policy. Nowhere else in the world does the United States prioritize former colonial powers over independent, sovereign states. African countries want closer ties with the United States; if the United States is not receptive, they will go elsewhere. China, Russia, India, Turkey, and other non-Western middle powers are strengthening their partnerships with African countries across all sectors.

**Lingering Cold War Mindset: United States vs. Them**

The Cold War left a negative legacy, defined by wars, dictatorships, and economic underdevelopment. Africans fought and distrusted each other over foreign ideologies. In the end, the politics and economics of the Cold War set African countries back decades. They have been struggling since to catch up with the rest of the world.

The African economies that have posted an acceptable performance did so after the Cold War. The great power competition offers an opportunity to catch up, and they welcome assistance and support from any quarter.

Yet, the United States approaches this round of competition in a fashion reminiscent of the Cold War. In the past, U.S. foreign policy was about defeating communists and their allies and preserving the hegemonic status of the United States. Today, it is about denying China and Russia access, protecting the homeland by fighting terrorists in Africa, and asking Africans to pick sides. As in the past, this approach mostly focuses on short-term U.S. security concerns but does not promote sustainable relations with Africans; it makes Africans suspicious of U.S. motivations. They see major commitments to security and humanitarian programs, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), by far outweigh private sector and foreign direct investment.

What these countries seek but do not receive from the United States is massive investment in sectors that bolster human security. China, Turkey, India, and other U.S. competitors have committed tremendous financial capital in Africa, which serves as the foundation of their strong partnerships with Africans.

In Asia, U.S. Cold War policy enabled the emergence of strong partnerships with South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, countries that faced great governance challenges but benefited from sustained U.S. engagement. However, this policy did not enable the emergence of any such partnership in Africa. The current approach to great power competition, which focuses on denying China and Russia access, does not promise a better outcome.

**Values and Cultural Wars**

In a world of diverse, competing value ecosystems, U.S. insistence on African countries adopting Amer-
ican values often leads to adversarial relations and counterproductive outcomes. The United States exports its cultural wars to Africa, giving them prominence in diplomatic relations and branding them as the defense and promotion of universal values. Africans see this approach as overreach, bullying, and lack of respect for their values. The United States overestimates its influence and demands too much for too little in return; it talks too much and promises a lot but does not meet expectations. Consequently, Africans are more comfortable with other partners that do not impose their values on them.

The United States would do better in Africa by designing a dynamic and flexible policy that is free of European colonial legacy. Such a policy must be less prescriptive and more attentive to the needs and conditions of African countries and promote mutually beneficial bilateral relations.
Contributors
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Endnotes
HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH ARE THE UNINTENDED FACE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY


FOUR TESTS OF U.S. RESOLVE IN GLOBAL HEALTH IN 2024


THE CONTEST FOR LEADERSHIP TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS


6 Veronica Chau et al., “Financing Climate Adaptation and Resilience Is Good for Business and the World,” Boston Consulting Group, December 6, 2023,


11 Other initiatives include the Agriculture Innovation Mission for Climate, a joint effort with the United Arab Emirates, or the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils, which the U.S. State Department launched in early 2023 at CSIS in partnership with the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and the African Union.

12 Bradley C. Parks et al., “Chapter 1: Belt and Road Reconstruction—From Fire-Fighting to Future-Proofing,” in *Belt and Road Reboot: Beijing’s Bid to De-Risk Its Global Infrastructure Initiative* (Williamsburg, VA: AidData, 2023), 9, https://docs.aiddata.org/reports/belt-and-road-reboot/Belt_and_Road_Reboot_Chapter_1.pdf. Parks et al. note the gap between the United States and China has been closing recently, however, due to reduced flows from China and an expansion of U.S. activities through the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. Additionally, over the past decade, the Group of Seven collectively went from matching China’s global development spending to outspending China by almost two-to-one.


14 Jessop, Stanway, and Abnett, “COP28 Calls.”

15 “Reaction to the Final COP28 Climate Deal,” Reuters.


**RUSSIA IS MANIPULATING THE GLOBAL SOUTH WITH FOOD**


9 Dmitry Medvedev (@medvedev_telegram), “Наша еда против их санкций” Telegram, April 1, 2022, 12:00 a.m., https://t.me/s/medvedev_telegram/29.


INDIA AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH: PAST OBSTACLES AND FUTURE PARTNERSHIP


KEEPING THE U.S. LEAD IN SOUTHEAST ASIA


ESTRANGED NEIGHBORS: THE DECLINE OF U.S. INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN?


