

The Japan-U.S. Counterterrorism Alliance **In an Age of Global Terrorism**

by Juan C. Zarate



MARCH 2016

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Acknowledgements

In 2013, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Sasakawa USA, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) established a bilateral commission of distinguished policymakers and scholars to develop a strategic vision for the U.S.-Japan alliance. This report is intended to inform the commissioners' findings, as well as the general public. The author and CSIS thank the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Japan and Sasakawa USA for their generous support.

The author thanks Claire McGillem for her vital research support as well as Andrew Chapman and Tetsuro Sone for assisting with production of this report.

About the Author

Juan Zarate is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Chairman and Co-Founder of the Financial Integrity Network, the Senior National Security Analyst for CBS News, and a Visiting Lecturer of Law at the Harvard Law School. Mr. Zarate also serves as the Chairman and Senior Counselor for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance (CSIF) and a Senior Fellow to the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

Mr. Zarate served as the Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism from 2005 to 2009, and was responsible for developing and implementing the U.S. Government's counterterrorism strategy and policies related to transnational security threats. Mr. Zarate was the first ever Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes where he led domestic and international efforts to attack terrorist financing, the innovative use of Treasury's national security-related powers, and the global hunt for Saddam Hussein's assets. Mr. Zarate is a former federal prosecutor who served on terrorism prosecution teams prior to 9/11, including the investigation of the USS Cole attack. Mr. Zarate has earned numerous awards for his work, including the Treasury Medal.

Mr. Zarate sits on several boards, including HSBC's global Financial System Vulnerabilities Committee (FSVC) and the HBMX FSVC, the Vatican's Financial Information Authority (AIF), the Board of Advisors to the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the George Washington University's Center for Cyber & Homeland Security, America Abroad Media's (AAM) Board of Advisors, the RANE Network Board, the Aspen Institute's Homeland Security Group, and the Coinbase Board of Advisors. He is a senior adviser to several technology companies and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

He is the author of *Treasury's War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare* (2013), *Forging Democracy* (1994), and a variety of articles in *The New York Times*, *Financial Times*, *Washington Post*, *Wall St. Journal*, *LA Times*, the *Washington Quarterly* and other publications. Mr. Zarate has his own weekly national security program on CBSNews.com called "Flash Points." He is a graduate of both Harvard College and Harvard Law School and a former Rotary International Fellow (Universidad de Salamanca, Spain). He has been inducted into the Mater Dei High School Ring of Honor.

Introduction

Japan and the United States face rapidly evolving terrorist threats and groups that have taken advantage of the chaos and conflict in an arc of instability – from Southeast Asia to West Africa. Through the use of the Internet and social media, the violent Sunni extremist terrorist ideology and message have been tailored to individuals and audiences around the world, luring and radicalizing thousands. Terrorist groups like the Islamic State in the heart of the Middle East are seizing more territory, erasing borders, and governing as states. And a variety of terrorist and militant groups globally are taking advantage of ungoverned spaces, weak and corrupt governments, and illicit economies and criminality to strengthen and advance their agendas.

The security implications of this terrorist environment affect all countries, especially those with a global footprint confronting terrorism and its animating ideology. More than ever, capable, willing, and strong allies will need to cooperate closely together to confront the full range of terrorist threats and to anticipate terrorist adaptations. In this security environment, strong allies like the United States and Japan will need to coordinate more closely to confront the evolving threats and find ways of complementing each other’s capabilities and comparative advantages. They will also need to develop new means to shape this environment in line with their national interests.

Fortunately, at the core of the historical alliance between Japan and the United States lies longstanding trust and mutual cooperation on security and defense. The 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty¹ laid the groundwork for a partnership that capitalizes on the relative strengths of each country to contribute to international peace and security. Japan’s dedication to pacifism has defined its role in responding to international and domestic threats.

But as the threat landscape has changed so, too, has the Japanese government’s approach to defense policy. The rise of transnational militancy and terrorism has posed direct threats to the Japanese population. The most recent and horrific example of this violence occurred with the February 2015 beheading of two Japanese citizens by the Islamic State (ISIS or “Daesh”). This tragedy served as a cruel reminder of the necessity for global cooperation in combatting a threat that can have far-reaching and substantial consequences for international security. As the Japanese government reconsiders its role in the global fight against terrorism, it will be crucial to understand its counter-terrorism (CT) approach within the U.S.-Japan alliance framework.

For U.S. counter-terrorism strategy, it is essential to leverage and work with capable and willing allies like Japan. U.S. policy has explicitly shifted over time to rely more heavily on regional partners to address terrorism concerns, especially as groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State establish regional footprints. Such allies are critical to enable regional partners, build partner capacity, and to address the full range of counter-terrorism issues and concerns as they evolve regionally. However, this moment of adaptive threat and uncertainty provides an opportunity for

Japan to play an even more constructive and active role using its expertise, capacity, and experience regionally and internationally.

An Evolving Threat

Across the globe, violent extremist groups represent a diverse set of actors with various local and global grievances, preferred tactics, and ideologies. This global diversity alone poses a challenge to policymakers attempting to craft a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. The rapid pace at which these groups adapt and evolve has highlighted the need for an equally flexible response. The environment in which these groups operate is conducive to change and can exacerbate the scope and scale of their actions.

The attacks on September 11, 2001 marked a turning point in the diffusion of Islamist ideology as a driver of international terrorism. In the past, Islamist militant groups had largely focused their efforts to overthrow local political leadership in order to establish a sovereign state governed by Sharia law.² Osama bin Laden argued for al Qaeda to take an alternative approach that focused on targeting the “far enemy” -- the United States and its Western allies -- to undermine their financial and political support for regimes in the Middle East.³ This marked a shift in the nature of Islamist terrorism as bin Laden’s influence and al Qaeda’s successful violence redefined how this ideology would manifest and where violent Islamic extremists would focus their attention.

The technological innovations that have contributed to revolutionary levels of global interconnectivity have also served to expand the bounds of terrorists’ operational capacities. This environment, coupled with an ideology that serves to justify targeting Western states and actors, has resulted in a wide scope of violence that transcends national boundaries. The Internet has directly facilitated and enabled several significant trends in militancy including widespread and interconnected networks of affiliates and inspired individuals, the quick dissemination of ideology for radicalization and recruitment, and new modes of terrorist financing.

Following 9/11 after the United States and its allies focused CT efforts on diminishing al Qaeda’s core leadership, safe haven, and resources, the group became more dependent on its network of affiliated groups to retain its international relevance. The core leadership of al Qaeda was cognizant of this transition and empowered both formal and informal affiliates to carry out attacks.⁴ From Somalia⁵ to Bali,⁶ al Qaeda’s presence grew geographically, taking advantage of prior relationships, new radicalization, and pockets of Islamist insurgency and instability. Al Qaeda has survived and remained most lethal and relevant through its regional affiliates, like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa, Jabhat al Nusra and the Khorasan Group in Syria, and al-Shabaab in Somalia.

In recent years, the Islamic State emerged from the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq and with newfound recruits and momentum in Syria and Iraq. ISIS established an “Islamic caliphate” in

the heart of the Middle East, erasing borders between Iraq and Syria and taking over major cities like Mosul, Iraq's second largest city. It has established a war economy using a diverse portfolio of oil revenues, taxes/extortion, looted antiquities, and hostage-taking and criminality to run its militant operations and govern the territory it controls. ISIS has competed with al Qaeda on the ground in Syria and for leadership of the global jihadi movement.

ISIS has spread its influence and control globally by capturing the allegiance of former al Qaeda affiliates, like Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Central Asia, and inspiring new actors, as in Libya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, to take up the ISIS banner.⁷ The ISIS threat therefore has migrated beyond Iraq and Syria.⁸ Even if direct links between the ISIS center of gravity in Raqqa, Syria and affiliates in the periphery are currently weak, these relationships could lead to shared information, tactics, personnel, and resources, as has been the case with militant networks in South Asia.⁹ With ISIS's use of the Internet and social media, this connectivity is likely to grow and adapt quickly.

ISIS has extended its reach globally not only by growing a network of associated militant groups but by utilizing the full range of media to spread its message, radicalize, and attract recruits. ISIS has used a disciplined and distributed media campaign – with publications, videos, the Internet, and targeted social media to demonstrate its legitimacy, terrorize opponents, and to radicalize and recruit potential sympathizers. ISIS ability to recruit foreign fighters for its cause is unprecedented, with estimates of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria ranging from 10,000 to 100,000.¹⁰ This successful recruitment has been facilitated by porous borders in the region and a range of social media sites that give militants “wide avenues for recruiting foreigners, organizing travel arrangements, and distributing propaganda to their attentive audience.”¹¹

These recruits also expand the theater of operation with the threat of returning to their home countries with militant skills and intent to attack fellow countrymen. Both homegrown terrorists, who cannot physically travel to the battlefield, and returning foreign fighters can be motivated to execute an attack. The number of lone-wolf attacks has increased, while the ability for security personnel to track and stop potential attackers remains a challenge.¹²

The trend for militant groups to become simultaneously decentralized and more transnational in nature has resulted in new approaches to financing terrorist operations. Groups, particularly ISIS, are turning to local, diversified sources of revenue as opposed to relying heavily on foreign donors or external sources of funding as they had in the past.¹³ As noted, the Islamic State has built a successful war economy on illicit trade of oil, antiquities, fraudulent travel documents, and exploitation of other local resources such as wheat.¹⁴ Al Qaeda affiliates al-Shabaab and AQIM have capitalized on coal smuggling and kidnapping for ransom for major sources of revenue, respectively. Most terrorist groups have used criminality – from bank robberies to extortion – and local trade to fund their operations, and most rely on non-traditional means of moving money across borders, including cash couriers and hawalas (traditional, trusted brokers).

The local sourcing of resources, reliance on non-bank modes of moving money, and cross-border networks that facilitate trade pose a significant challenge for countering terrorist financing.

Japan's Threat Landscape

Though Japan has not been a principal target for the global jihadi terrorist movement, it has not been immune from its effects. The killing of Japanese journalists Kenji Goto and Haruna Yukawa by Islamic State militants was a stark and tragic reminder that Japan – as a nation and its citizens – can be targeted and affected by global terrorism despite its strong pacifist identity. There are both proximate terrorist threats to Japanese interests within the Asia-Pacific region and other risks due to Japan's status as a leader in the global economy.

As early as the 1990s, there have been operational and organizational links between al Qaeda and jihadist groups in Southeast Asia.¹⁵ The U.S. and Japan have worked with allies in the region to reduce this threat, but there has been a resurgence of groups who affiliate themselves with the Islamic State. Notably, Abu Sayyaf and Mujahidin Indonesia Timor (MIT) have rallied around the ISIS cause, prompting Filipinos, Indonesians, and Malaysians to travel to the Iraq-Syria theatre.¹⁶ These groups have also been known to kidnap for ransom and attack security forces in their own countries. In January 2016, coordinated attacks in Jakarta killed eight individuals and brought renewed attention to the challenge of confronting radicalized citizens in Asia. The attack appears to have been funded by ISIS.¹⁷ Other groups, such as the New People's Army (NPA) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),¹⁸ have hybrid insurgent-terrorist characteristics, and these groups have tried to exploit regionally specific factors, such as poor governance and the frequency of natural disasters, to achieve their goals.¹⁹ Most recently, in late 2015, 27 Bangladeshis working in Singapore were arrested for planning to conduct an attack, likely against the government in Bangladesh.²⁰ Japan will remain susceptible to these regional groups and their adaptations, by virtue of its regional proximity and exposure of its commercial interests, citizenry, and diplomats to these regions in turmoil.

In addition to the foreign fighters from the region who have been attracted to join the Islamic State, there have also been a few documented cases of Japanese who have attempted to join the fight.²¹ Despite insignificant evidence that the Japanese population has been vulnerable to radicalization by ISIS, Japan will need to remain vigilant to the adaptive allure of the jihadi narrative to susceptible individuals. In the United States, those suspected of or arrested for support to the Islamic State have been a diverse group of individuals from around the country and have not demonstrated a pattern of particular national or ethnic profiles. Indeed, some radicalized have ranged from recent refugees or immigrants from overseas conflicts to Muslim converts who are American citizens with no connection to the conflicts in the Middle East.

Japanese citizens and interests have been targets of terrorism in the past. The most recent high-profile capture of Japanese journalists was certainly not the first time that Japanese have been the victims of kidnapping by militant groups. Kidnappings of Japanese have occurred in Iraq (by the

Mujahedeen Brigades), the Philippines (Abu Sayyef), and Algeria (the Masked Brigade).²² Japanese citizens have also suffered as a result of broader terrorist attacks. The deaths of Japanese citizens as a result of the attack by terrorist leader, Moktar Belmoktar, and his terrorist organization on the In Amenas oil facility, Algeria in January 2013, along with the deaths of Japanese tourists in the Tunis Bardo National Museum attack in 2015, were stark reminders of the vulnerability of foreign nationals and professionals in vulnerable and crisis regions. Japan's role as a leader in the global economy – as with other Western countries -- leaves its citizens vulnerable to militants who target foreign nationals for propaganda or profit via the payment of ransoms.

Another consequence of Japan's role as an economic power is that Japan's international assets and businesses could be susceptible as targets for terrorists. Militants recognize the strategic value of economic targets, as their destruction can have significant repercussions for the global economy.²³ Recently, Japanese businesses in Thailand were at risk when bombs in Bangkok struck a commercial center.²⁴ Japan, which has consistently had one of the highest outflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) of developed economies,²⁵ has shifted its approach to entering foreign markets as a result of existing risks, including transnational terrorism. Japanese companies more often choose to export to have greater flexibility in making adjustments and to minimize their dependence on physical structures.²⁶ Recognizing this shift, the Japanese government has implemented its Trade Control Policy²⁷ to strike a balance between promoting international free trade while also maintaining certain controls to ensure Japan's national security. Particularly as Japan continues to export heavily to its regional partners, many of which suffer higher rates of terrorist activity, there is an opportunity for Japan to cooperate more closely and lead on more rigorous international export control systems.

Finally, Japan's strategic partnership with the United States has been mutually beneficial for decades, but it also expands the threat landscape for Japan. Rather than worrying exclusively about militants who have grievances with Japan, its government must also be conscious of how threats to the United States and its allies or coalition partners could affect Japan's security. There have been several threats made against Japan specifically for the deployment of Self-Defense Force (SDF) troops to Iraq in 2003.²⁸ In addition, there have been calls targeting Japanese made by the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade and Ayman al-Zawahiri (now al Qaeda's leader) in 2004.²⁹ Such threats to coalition partners and allies of the United States are not unique to Japan, with the bulk of the focus of global terrorist groups remaining on U.S. and European countries (namely, French, Danish, and British) that have deployed forces to battle Islamic militants and terrorists directly.

Despite this potential for increased risk, Japanese citizens clearly value the defense partnership with the United States. As recently as January 2015, a public poll revealed that nearly 83% of respondents agreed that the U.S. alliance helps bolster Japan's security.³⁰ Overall, the benefits of this alliance outweigh any heightened risk of association.

Japan's Approach to Counter-terrorism

Japan's dedication to pacifism has directly shaped the way it contributes to and operates within the global security environment. Japan has consistently been a top donor of foreign aid, providing over \$200 billion to its development efforts over the last thirty years.³¹ There is a clear link between the high value Japan places on foreign assistance and its approach to countering violent extremism (CVE). The Japanese government has developed a security approach that emphasizes prevention rather than response to security threats. However, the post-9/11 threat environment has pushed the Japanese government to consider new approaches to its security, especially with regards to counter-terrorism, in terms of domestic legislation as well as its cooperation with regional and international allies.

Legal Approach

The Japanese government has made sweeping changes to its domestic policies over the last decade in order to reduce its vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks. Between 2002 and 2003, a known al Qaeda operative, Lionel Dumont, had lived and traveled in Japan using a fake passport. A year later, Japanese authorities arrested five men from Bangladesh, Mali, and India who had links to Dumont.³² This incident prompted the government to bolster its terrorism prevention through several reforms, most notably the Action Plan for the Prevention of Terrorism (2004). This act strengthened "...border controls, bomb material controls, the suppression of terrorist financing, the protection of infrastructure, as well as the enhancement of intelligence-sharing mechanisms."³³ The Civil Protection Law, also enacted in 2004, seeks to prepare Japanese citizens for armed attack situations.³⁴

Finally, the Japanese government took legal steps to be able to freeze financial assets of terrorists through revisions to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (2005).³⁵ However, this legislation does not include other assets besides "funds", and it does not allow for Japan to freeze terrorist funds without delay.³⁶ In 2008, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), of which Japan has been a member since 1990, identified several loopholes in Japan's counterterrorist financing mechanisms that needed to be resolved.³⁷ In the 2014 Plenary, the FATF did note that Japan was making progress to enact these measures, though it is unclear what specific CT policies Japan has progressed on implementing.

Recently, Prime Minister Abe has initiated substantial changes to reorient Japan's defense policies in a more seamless manner. The May 2014 Advisory Panel to evaluate the legal basis for Japan's security concluded that Japan needed to play a greater role in the security environment and offered constitutional justification for its expanded global role.³⁸ The government argues that these changes are consistent with Japan's 70-year old posture as a "peace-loving nation,"³⁹ yet they clearly reflect a more proactive stance.

The most noteworthy changes to these policies are: the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas; the protection of weapons/other equipment of the U.S. and other countries' armed forces; multi-national cooperation outside the UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) framework; expansion of Japan's support activities including logistics to armed forces of foreign countries; and the authorization of use of force limited to the minimum extent necessary.⁴⁰ Other defense policy changes that will have a direct effect on CT are the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) and the enactment of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets.⁴¹ The NSC will provide a space for greater interagency interaction on national security issues, while the latter will encourage greater information sharing on CT issues with its allies.

The most recent changes to Japan's CT policies were in reaction to the Japanese hostage situation. The government created a system to gather more information on suspected terrorists within Japan and to also increase its information sharing capabilities for the purpose of protecting Japanese citizens abroad.⁴² The legislation also includes measures for increased security of infrastructure, such as nuclear power plants, and at the borders. Along with an expanded diplomatic strategy in the Middle East and greater assistance to societies in countering radicalization, the counter-terrorism measures were one of three pillars of the government's response to the crisis. This demonstrates a holistic approach to defense that is consistent with Japan's existing policies and is a reflection of the changing threat landscape from global terrorism.

Regional Cooperation

Japan plays a leadership role within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on several issues including regional security. This forum has served as a venue to create a unified regional CT approach that is reviewed on a regular basis. In 2004, regional policy commitments to combat terrorism paralleled Japan's proactive domestic response to the threats it faced at the time. The ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration to Combat International Terrorism was adopted in 2004, and includes several strategies for regional CT cooperation including logistical coordination, collaborating on counterterrorist financing (CTF) efforts, capacity building of regional counter-terrorism law enforcement, and poverty reduction.⁴³

The ASEAN-Japan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue (AJCTD) was created in 2006. Thus far there have been nine dialogues and eleven projects completed addressing a range of issues "including money laundering, aviation security, inland water management, conflict resolution and anti-terrorism, among others."⁴⁴ An updated version of this document was released in 2014, and also includes a joint statement on transnational crime, demonstrating the regional understanding of the interconnectivity of these threats. The document highlights a number of ways in which regional information sharing will be prioritized in combatting terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, sea piracy, arms smuggling, cybercrime, and collaboration on international economic crime.

Regional CT efforts in the last year have been focused on counter-radicalization strategies. As noted previously, Japan has not had many cases of radicalization, whether in the form of homegrown terrorists or in terms of attempted foreign fighters. However, based on the number of foreign fighters from the region,⁴⁵ there has been a collective effort to strengthen CVE activities through greater security and intelligence cooperation in tandem with development, stabilization, and social justice efforts.⁴⁶ The Regional Forum Workshop on Counter Radicalization held in March 2015 included discussions of member countries' experiences at strategic and operational levels including regional law enforcement approaches to deal with online radicalization and the importance of countering terrorist narratives.⁴⁷ Because of Japan's longstanding commitment to international development, there is clearly a role for it to play in the region – in concert with other nations in the region – despite the insignificant evidence of local sources of radicalization.

In addition, the U.S.-Japan-Australia Trilateral Security Dialogue, inaugurated in March 2006, serves as a unique regional security arrangement recognizing the aligned interests and capabilities of three major Pacific powers. For Japan, the security relationship with Australia has evolved to address both transnational threats of concern like terrorism and counter-proliferation to geo-political issues of concern like North Korea's nuclear program and China's expanding military capabilities. In the CT context, Japan's ability to share information, coordinate strategies, and develop broader reach is enhanced by leveraging Australian and American expertise, especially given those countries' deep operational experience against terrorist groups and organizations around the world. This security relationship will serve as another regional platform to deepen Japanese defenses and CT capabilities and reach.

International Cooperation

Japan's defense policy has its roots in the immediate post-World War II security environment when the international community required Japan to take on a role of limited engagement in defense. As a result, development and the use of economic resources have become a core principle of its foreign policy. The institution that is responsible for Japan's official development assistance (ODA) is the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), "one of the largest bilateral development organizations in the world with a network of 97 overseas offices, projects in more than 150 countries, and available financial resources of approximately 1 trillion Japanese yen (\$8.5 billion)".⁴⁸ While Japan continues to fulfill its responsibilities as an economic power by distributing foreign aid as a means to reduce poverty in developing nations, its foreign aid giving is also closely aligned with its broader defense strategy.

JICA's first mission, "addressing the global agenda," is also indicative of its new strategic priority of helping countries to address cross-border issues that pose a threat to the "stability and prosperity of Japan", including terrorism.⁴⁹ Japan's top bilateral recipients of ODA in 2002 (China, Indonesia, India, Vietnam, Philippines) compared to 2013 (Myanmar/Burma, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, India) reflect this change. Japan is expanding its engagement in the Middle East, for which foreign aid is a critical tool. Earlier this year, Prime Minister Abe pledged \$200

million in non-military aid to the Middle East in addition to \$15.5 million towards counterterrorism capacity building assistance in the Middle East and Africa.⁵⁰ Despite the criticism Prime Minister Abe received for announcing this aid in terms of the fight against ISIS,⁵¹ the Japanese government remains dedicated to maintaining its high levels of foreign assistance.

Japan has pursued CT efforts broadly through its aid and grant policies. In Afghanistan, Japan's work through the Asia Development Bank to help build the Ring Road and improve the economic underpinnings and infrastructure of that country has proven a significant element of international cooperation in Afghanistan. The Japanese government has pursued a policy of resolving socioeconomic conditions that are conducive to increased radicalization and terrorism, particularly in Southeast Asia. Its investments through organizations like the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) have allowed Japan to influence economic conditions in conflict zones, including Afghanistan. These efforts focus on capacity building support to enhance grassroots CT coordination, providing countries with legal provisions support on CT issues, and disbursing grants, aid, and equipment to countries to enhance their security.⁵² The recent policy changes undertaken by Prime Minister Abe also allow for the Japanese government to give aid to foreign militaries engaged in non-combatant activities.⁵³ Japan's most recent National Security Strategy calls for increased coordination between Japan's ODA and international peacekeeping operations (PKOs).⁵⁴

Japan's participation in UN PKOs is one way in which it has coordinated with multilateral allies to contribute to international security. The SDF has participated in thirteen U.N. missions, including the ongoing operation in South Sudan, and has also provided support for humanitarian relief efforts and election monitoring.⁵⁵ Japan's Terrorism Response Team-Tactical Wing for Overseas (TRT-2) aids local law enforcement agents in carrying out investigations on terror activity involving Japanese nationals. This mechanism for mutual cooperation was recently utilized in Tunisia, when three Japanese citizens were killed in the terrorist attack on the Bardo National Museum.⁵⁶ Japan's Financial Intelligence Center (JAFIC) also actively engages with international partners on efforts to combat terrorist financing.

Through its participation in the FATF, the Asia-Pacific Group, and the Egmont Group, Japan has helped to establish a framework to exchange information on money laundering and terrorist financing with foreign financial intelligence units (FIUs) on the "condition that there is a framework governing the restrictions on the use of the disseminated information in foreign countries."⁵⁷ JAFIC acknowledges the importance of information sharing between FIUs and monitors types of information exchanges on an annual basis. However, this framework has not been implemented with all of Japan's partners and will require further bilateral negotiations, in addition to more creative implementation of existing structures.

U.S.-Japanese Alliance

Key Operational Activities since 9/11

The U.S.-Japan alliance post 9/11 has led to new forms of cooperation to fight global terrorism. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (2001) provided a legal basis for SDF deployment for U.S.-led CT operations in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.⁵⁸ Consequently, Japanese forces have participated in operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. Japan provided logistical antiterrorism support to the U.S.-led multilateral campaign targeting the Taliban in Afghanistan through refueling missions using Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force Vessels. Though this role was largely symbolic, it was again part of a holistic plan to provide assistance to Afghanistan through support for good governance, improvement of security, and reconstruction assistance.⁵⁹

Japan's involvement in Afghanistan was a direct consequence of the legal action the Japanese government took in response to 9/11. Similarly, the U.S. invasion of Iraq prompted Japan to adopt the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq,⁶⁰ which paved a legal path for SDF deployment to Iraq. This was the first time that Japanese troops were deployed to a conflict zone during ongoing fighting. The commitment of ground SDF in addition to maritime forces was a clear indication of political will from the Japanese government to contribute more fully to global security. Around 1,400 SDF personnel were sent to Iraq between 2003 and 2009,⁶¹ though some were restricted to humanitarian and reconstruction activities as opposed to security and safety maintenance. The latter did not involve use of force, but rather included assistance for “medical services, transportation, storage of goods, communication, construction, repair or maintenance, replenishment or decontamination.”⁶²

The third major example of Japan's operational assistance in coordination with the United States since 9/11 is its creation of a foreign military base for anti-piracy efforts. Japan had already taken measures to combat regional piracy,⁶³ but creating a facility in Djibouti for piracy monitoring purposes was a major step in Japan's role in global anti-piracy.⁶⁴ The United States and Japan recognize the benefits of collaborating on anti-piracy, as their mutual trade interests could be threatened by the exploitation of maritime trade routes by pirates or terrorists operating within these criminal networks. The physical presence of Japanese forces in the region allows for integrated coordination of SDF and U.S. forces in piracy surveillance activities, resulting in increased capacity of both national militaries and a more robust and effective ground response. These efforts also allow both the United States and Japan to adapt their operational response and coordination in the Horn of Africa to address persistent piracy problems in other maritime theaters, like the coasts of West Africa and the trade routes and chokepoints of Southeast Asia.

Together, these three international operations born out of the necessities of the post 9/11 threat environment shape the bounds of SDF personnel engagement. With this as a background and

new political commitment for a greater role internationally, there appears to be an appetite for Japan to play an even greater role, particularly within the scope of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Greater Japanese involvement, capacity, and reach to address the evolving terrorist and related threat environment should strengthen global efforts to fight and prevent such threats.

New Strategy for the Partnership

The shifting threat environment and the growing need for a more expansive Japanese role on international security matters of global concern provide an opportunity to consider a new strategy for security partnership. The current negotiations to reevaluate Japan's defense policies are timed with a new strategy for Japan's security alliance with the United States. The 2015 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation⁶⁵ outline a number of ways in which the countries plan to bolster their security coordination both bilaterally and with other international partners. The plan reflects a more equal distribution of responsibilities for mutual security during both peacetime and under threat, including operational and policy coordination.

The guidelines include a greater integration of U.S. and Japanese forces. The report includes several possibilities for expanded SDF operations such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); air and missile defense; maritime security; space and cyber; peacekeeping operations; partner capacity building; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and noncombatant evacuation operations.⁶⁶ Japan's new Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets was also welcomed by the U.S. government as a policy landmark that will allow for greater exchange of sensitive information both during peacetime and in threatening situations.⁶⁷

The White House has identified two areas as the most pragmatic spaces for an expanded Japanese role in contributing to regional and global security: U.N. PKOs and countering violent extremism.⁶⁸ These areas are indicative of the comparative advantage Japan has in foreign assistance and international development. Japan's aid and development strategies are not only a priority in its foreign policy, but Japanese citizens also agree that Japan should increase its humanitarian support in the Middle East, despite certain perceptions that the hostage crisis was related to this expansion.⁶⁹

As Japan increasingly focuses its aid to programming in the Middle East in alignment with its own security priorities, there is a space for greater collaboration with the United States. The U.S. government has explicitly pledged to support Japan in its CVE efforts through "capacity building assistance for border control in the Middle East/Africa region; enhance diplomacy towards stability and prosperity in the Middle East; and assist in creating societies resilient to radicalization by reducing income disparity and promoting youth employment and education."⁷⁰ This role would strike a balance for Japan in becoming a leader of coordinated CVE while also maintaining its commitment to non-aggression and limited use of force.

Opportunities for Improvement

Because the threat environment is constantly evolving, Japan will need to embed strategic and operational flexibility into its counterterrorism approach and planning and increase its coordination with both the United States and other allies in terrorism prevention and response, as well as post-conflict transitions. In its National Security Strategy, Japan identified ways in which it can improve its deterrence capabilities with regards to the alliance including advanced joint training, joint ISR activities, and joint/shared use of facilities by SDF/USF.⁷¹

Though Japan has a longstanding reputation for its foreign assistance programs, there is room for greater coordination with U.S. priorities in stabilization missions as well as with the recipient country. This could be an opportunity for the U.S. and Japan to have a unified voice in promoting stronger governance, democracy, human rights, and rule of law, both in Southeast Asia and in other regions vulnerable to terrorism.⁷² Japan has repeatedly demonstrated its commitment to eradicating underlying conditions that may give rise or be exploited by terrorist organizations and ideologies, and coordinating aid and development work would be another opportunity to address such conditions.

Partner countries receiving foreign aid also resent the burden of having to accommodate differing priorities, activities, and modes of operation of various bilateral donors.⁷³ If the U.S. and Japan strategically coordinate their development activities in the Middle East and other conflict zones, particularly in consultation with the partner country, they will be able to make a greater impact in CVE activities through more effective aid by removing bureaucratic obstacles and echoing and demanding the same standards.

The FATF has identified gaps in JAFIC's commitment to counterterrorist policies and the incomplete implementation of them. Beyond the FATF's assessment, there is room for closer coordination with the U.S. government on sharing sensitive information, which could be facilitated through the Specially Designated Secrets law. Creative and aggressive information sharing regarding terrorist financing, illicit trade, and financial sector vulnerabilities could prove valuable for both countries, in particular greater collaboration between the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the U.S. financial intelligence unit at the U.S. Treasury, and JAFIC.

With mutual interests in the integrity of the global financial system and the security of the Japanese and American financial and commercial systems, both countries could benefit from more aggressive collaboration, including in the cyber financial domain, to ensure the resilience and redundancy of key systems essential to both nations' economies. Japan can subsequently leverage this increased capacity in anti-money laundering, countering the financing of terrorism, and economic defense and resilience to improve capacity in the ASEAN community.

Recommendations

Japan is a capable and strong ally of the United States with a significant role to play in regional and international CT and security, especially in a dynamic and dangerous environment that will continue to impact Japanese national interests. Japan may want to consider amplifying certain initiatives, efforts, and investments that focus on increasing its information awareness; regional counter-terrorism cooperation; security and related development activities in which it holds a comparative advantage; and greater strategic counter-terrorism coordination internally and with the United States. These efforts would be enabled by Japanese and American efforts to empower and enable allies on the ground – both state and non-state actors and networks – that can help shape the environment in a manner consistent with both nations’ interests and values.

Such initiatives may prove to be opportunities for Japan to increase its role in countering the evolving threat of terrorism internationally, while maintaining relevant policy, defense, and diplomatic constraints on Japanese military commitments. The following are general recommendations for consideration and are not intended to serve as a full complement of specific recommendations.

Intelligence and Information Sharing

Information awareness and analysis – in an era of big data and distributed and open sources of information – are essential elements in understanding threats and devising appropriate and timely policies and strategies. As a result, continued improvements in information gathering, sharing, analysis, and use should be considered:

- Increase intelligence and information collection, analysis, and sharing related to the evolution of terrorist threats and the ideology of violent extremism within the Japanese national security system and with key allies like the United States. An information-sharing effort could be driven in the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue or regionally with a focus on a specific problem – like the growing concern of “foreign fighters” traveling to and from Syria, Iraq, and other conflict zones in the Middle East. This could also include Japan taking the lead on a particular issue or country, where it has deep interests and insights that would be helpful to expand for its purposes and those of key allies like the United States.
- Consider information collection and coordination within the Japanese government regarding hostage-taking, focused on Japanese diplomats, companies, and citizens at risk in conflict zones. Such an effort could become an important locus of information sharing and coordination within the Japanese government and with other governments in the event of another hostage event. This could also involve coordination and training with the Japanese private sector before deployment of Japanese investment or personnel into crisis regions to help with prevention and preparation.

- Review internal measures used to identify, track, and intervene with individuals radicalized by violent Islamic extremism. This could involve working with regional allies like Singapore, which have developed programs to counter radicalization and reintegrate those who have fallen prey to violent Islamic extremism.
- Amplify the sharing of financial intelligence and information between Japan and key partners in the region and the United States, utilizing financial intelligence units (FIUs) to gather and analyze terrorist financing information about groups, networks, cells, and individuals of concern. Japan could lead a targeted effort to focus on particular vulnerabilities – like trade-based terrorist financing or corruption-enabled sanctions evasion – with trusted FIUs through the Egmont Group of FIUs.
- Leverage financial, trade, and commercial information to understand fundamental systemic risks to the Japanese and U.S. financial systems and economies, including cyber vulnerabilities, trade and resource chokepoints, and critical infrastructure protection. This could build on the maritime security efforts coordinated to date and accelerate information sharing, cyber-security, and bilateral responses to ensure economic and financial defenses, resilience, and redundancy.

Japan's Counter-Terrorism Comparative Advantage

Japan maintains advantages in the field of counter-terrorism, given its recent experiences, national expertise (at the public and private sector levels), and political will. Exploring how Japanese assets and expertise can help global capacity to counter the full range of CT problems and threats will be essential and add value to any bilateral or multilateral partnership:

- Continue to develop Japan's investment and aid capacity to help shape environments that are susceptible to violent extremist exploitation. This includes classic aid and investment programs to create necessary infrastructure and economic opportunities in at-risk societies, along with targeted investments and work projects to aid areas and groups aligned with Japanese and U.S. interests.
- Consider taking on more of a leadership role in the foreign donor and investment community to coordinate and harmonize CT-related investments and aid, ensuring consistency of requirements and standards, effectiveness of aid and delivery, and appropriate empowerment of key allies on the ground. The goal should be to achieve the greatest impact and effect of the application of foreign aid and investment in key regions, to include implementation of anti-corruption safeguards.
- Increase Japan's coordination of counter-terrorist financing and anti-money laundering efforts in the region, with a focus on attempts by terrorist and militant actors to evade sanctions and leverage the formal and informal financial systems to raise and move money around the world. Focusing on the convergence of criminal and terrorist activities

and methodologies by Japanese law enforcement and financial experts would help regional players and the global community to identify and address adaptations in the field of illicit and terrorist financing.

- Build the capacity of partner nations, including those outside of Asia, to improve efforts at border controls, financial regulation, and preventative law enforcement efforts. As the Colombian government has done with Afghanistan in the counter-narcotics mission, Japanese law enforcement and regulatory experts might consider deploying to key allied countries outside of its region to improve overall capacity and information sharing in areas in which it has demonstrated expertise.
- Work with the United States and other allies to identify non-state actors, groups, and networks that need financial and other support to counter the manifestations of terrorism and the underlying violent Islamic extremist ideology. This would include working with sub-state groups fighting terrorists, networks of former extremists, private actors and philanthropies to counter terrorism and its ideology at the local and grassroots levels.
- Leverage U.S. and Japanese business ties to improve security cooperation between the public and private sectors, especially where the U.S. and Japan have coincident interests in conflict zones or volatile regions. This could include training, greater information sharing between the public and private sector, and coordinated security operations and protocols.

Leveraging Japanese Self-Defense Forces

Any policy review and assessment must consider the expanded use of Japanese Self-Defense Forces as a vehicle to prevent threats from emerging, build Japanese flexibility and capacity to address evolving state and non-state threats, and facilitate and empower state and non-state partner capacity regionally and globally, in concert with key allies.

- Consider a strategy of using Japanese Self-Defense Forces in concert with forces the United States, especially those with Special Forces capabilities, to build partner capacity and environment shaping initiatives in specific areas of concern – including conflict zones where Japan holds interests and may be vulnerable.
- Commit Japanese forces as part of UN PKOs where Japan and the United States maintain interests and to build Japanese “battlefield” awareness and reach in emerging conflict zones.
- Evaluate the potential use of Japanese Self-Defense Forces for specific missions to protect vulnerable populations, culturally and historically significant sites, and other definable targets susceptible to attack by violent Islamic extremists.

- Expand the anti-piracy maritime role of Japanese forces to address the increasing maritime risks from transnational actors. This could include exercises in regions beyond Asia, with a focus on capacity building for local maritime and coastal security forces.

Strategic Coordination

It is important for Japan to set forth strategies that take into account Japanese national security interests now but also challenge the nation to shape the security environment in a manner that prevents new transnational threats from emerging. Strategies coordinated with key partners and stakeholders and whose execution is monitored and measured will prove most effective.

- Leverage the Japanese National Security Council apparatus to set forth a clear counter-terrorism strategy that ensures that current threats and risks are mitigated and future threats can be addressed. This includes integrating national economic and commercial interests and assets with the security apparatus to ensure that aid, investment, and philanthropy are considered as part of the broader CT strategy and CVE mission.
- Coordinate global and regional strategies and implementation with the United States and key allies, including hostage policy, crisis management, and CVE. Such coordination will involve more direct planning with countries like the United States and Australia, but it may also include new partnerships with like-minded countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, in countering violent extremism and counter messaging.
- Develop a strategy for coordinated security capacity building and training globally that complements and enables Japan's CT strategy, defense posture, and Japan's national security interests broadly. This should be developed and deployed in coordination with key stakeholders and allies, including the United States.
- Develop strategies in coordination with the United States for defense and resilience of national economies, to include cyber-security, critical infrastructure protection, and defense of trade routes and supplies of resources. Any such strategy would need to focus on creating relevant systemic redundancy and resilience, in concert with and help from allies.

These recommendations should form part of a broader set of actions to better plan, coordinate, and execute CT strategies in a manner that improves Japanese security and reinforces the core defense and security partnership with the United States. Many of the tools, capabilities, and relationships built in the CT context will provide benefits for the Japanese national security system well beyond the current terrorism problem. In an evolving threat environment, where both state and non-state actors may present asymmetric threats to national systems and defenses, it will be critical for major economies and countries like Japan to increase their capabilities and cooperation with trusted partners and allies.

End Notes

- ¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), “Japan-U.S. Security Treaty”, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html>
- ² National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton, 2004. *The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. [Washington, D.C.]: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.
- ³ Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Thomas M. Sanderson, “A Threat Transformed,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 8 February 2011, https://csis.org/files/publication/110203_Nelson_AThreatTransformed_web.pdf.
- ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ “Al-Shabaab,” National Counterterrorism Center, http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html.
- ⁶ “The 12 October 2002 Bali bombing plot,” *British Broadcasting Channel (BBC)*, 11 October 2012, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19881138>.
- ⁷ Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” *The Atlantic*, March 2015, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/>.
- ⁸ Eric Schmitt and David Kirkpatrick, “Islamic State Sprouting Limbs Beyond Its Base,” *New York Times*, 14 February 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/world/middleeast/islamic-state-sprouting-limbs-beyond-mideast.html?_r=0.
- ⁹ Thomas M. Sanderson, Rick “Ozzie” Nelson, and Stephanie Sanok Kostro, “Trends in Militancy Across South Asia: A Region on the Brink,” CSIS, 16 April 2013, <http://csis.org/publication/trends-militancy-across-south-asia>.
- ¹⁰ <http://warontherocks.com/2015/02/how-many-fighters-does-the-islamic-state-really-have/>
- ¹¹ Thomas M. Sanderson with Joshua Russakis and Michael Barber, “Key Elements of the Counterterrorism Challenge,” in *Religious Radicalism after the Arab Uprisings*, CSIS, 2015, http://csis.org/files/publication/150203_Alterman_ReligiousRadicalism_Web.pdf.
- ¹² Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “What Does the Recent Spate of Lone Wolf Terrorist Attacks Mean?” *War on the Rocks*, 27 October 2014, <http://warontherocks.com/2014/10/what-does-the-recent-spate-of-lone-wolf-terrorist-attacks-mean/>.
- ¹³ Thomas M. Sanderson with Joshua Russakis and Michael Barber, “Key Elements of the Counterterrorism Challenge,” in *Religious Radicalism after the Arab Uprisings*, CSIS, 2015, http://csis.org/files/publication/Chapter3_Sanderson_ReligiousRadicalism.pdf.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ “Asian Transnational Security Challenges: Emerging Trends, Regional Visions,” The Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research (CATR), 2010, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a556999.pdf>
- ¹⁶ Jacob Zenn, “A Closer Look at Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” *War on the Rocks*, 19 August 2014, <http://warontherocks.com/2014/08/a-closer-look-at-terrorism-in-southeast-asia/>.
- ¹⁷ “Jakarta Terror Attack Was Funded by ISIS: Indonesia Police,” *Associated Press*, January 15, 2016, <http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/jakarta-terror-attack-was-funded-isis-indonesia-police-n497186>.
- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ Takashi Kawamoto, “PacNet #22: A new security policy for Japan: HA/DR capacity building and disaster-mitigation social infrastructure export,” CSIS, 9 April 2015, <http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1522.pdf>.
- ²⁰ Lee Min Kok, “27 radicalised Bangladeshis arrested in Singapore under Internal Security Act: MHA,” *The Straits Times*, 20 January 2016, <http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/27-radicalised-bangladeshis-arrested-in-singapore-under-internal-security-act>.
- ²¹ Alexander Martin, “Japanese Man Suspected of Plan to Join Islamic State,” *Wall Street Journal*, 7 October 2014, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/japanese-man-suspected-of-plan-to-join-isis-1412670792>

- ²² Sara de Silva, “Japan” in *Terrorism in Asia* (forthcoming), International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR).
- ²³ Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Thomas M. Sanderson, “Confronting an Uncertain Threat,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 11 September 2011, http://csis.org/files/publication/110826_Nelson_%20ConfrontingAnUncertainThreat_Web.pdf.
- ²⁴ Atsushi Kodera, “No long-term threat seen in Bangkok blasts: experts,” *Japan Times*, 19 August 2015, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/19/national/no-long-term-threat-seen-bangkok-blasts-experts/#.VeTf7fIVhBd>.
- ²⁵ James K. Jackson, “Foreign Investment and National Security: Economic Considerations,” *Congressional Research Service*, 4 April 2013, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34561.pdf>.
- ²⁶ “Terrorism and International Business,” *Japan Times*, 08 September 2011, <http://www.japantoday.com/category/opinions/view/terrorism-and-international-business>
- ²⁷ “Trade Control,” Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (METI), July 2015, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/external_economy/trade_control/.
- ²⁸ Zachary Abuza, “Japan Vulnerable to Attacks by Jemaah Islamiya,” The Jamestown Foundation, 8 November 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=960&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=239&no_cache=1#.VdYyNvIVhBd.
- ²⁹ Sara de Silva, “Japan” in *Terrorism in Asia* (forthcoming), International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR).
- ³⁰ <http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/tokubetu/h27/h27-CT.pdf>
- ³¹ “Development Assistance from Japan,” The World Bank, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/JAPANEXTN/0,,contEntMDK:20647244~menuPK:1685924~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:273812,00.html>.
- ³² Norimitsu Onishi, “Japan Arrests 5 Who Knew Man Possibly Tied to Al-Qaeda,” *New York Times*, 27 May 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/27/world/japan-arrests-5-who-knew-man-possibly-tied-to-qaeda.html>.
- ³³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), “Action Plan for Prevention of Terrorism,” 2004, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/action.pdf>
- ³⁴ Japan Cabinet Secretariat Civil Protection Portal Site, “What is the Civil Protection Law?” <http://www.kokuminhogo.go.jp/en/about/law.html>
- ³⁵ “Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act,” Government of Japan, 21 October 2005, <http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/4066.pdf>.
- ³⁶ “Mutual Evaluation of Japan,” Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 17 October 2008, <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20Japan%20full.pdf>
- ³⁷ See JAFIC 2014 Annual Report, p. 74-75 for a list of “40 Recommendations and 9 Special Recommendations” and Results from the Third FATF Mutual Evaluation of Japan
- ³⁸ “Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security,” Government of Japan, 15 May 2014, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou2/dai7/houkoku_en.pdf.
- ³⁹ “Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security,” Government of Japan, May 2015, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000080671.pdf>
- ⁴⁰ Ibid.
- ⁴¹ “Japan: Act on Protection of Specially Designated Secrets,” Library of Congress, 23 January 2015, http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_1205404277_text
- ⁴² <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sosikihanzai/>
- ⁴³ “ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 2004, <http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-japan-joint-declaration-for-cooperation-to-combat-international-terrorism-2>

- ⁴⁴ “ASEAN-Japan Dialogue Relations,” ASEAN, 22 January 2015, <http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-japan-dialogue-relations>.
- ⁴⁵ “Southeast Asia: A Re-emerging Theater for Religious Extremism?” CogitASIA, CSIS, 20 August 2014, <http://cogitasia.com/southeast-asia-a-re-emerging-theater-for-religious-extremism/>.
- ⁴⁶ “Chairman’s Statement of the 5th East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” ASEAN, 6 August 2015, http://www.asean.org/images/2015/August/chairman_statement/Chairmans%20Statement%20of%20the%205th%20East%20Asia%20Summit%20Foreign%20Ministers%20Meeting%20-%206%20August%202015.pdf
- ⁴⁷ “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Workshop on Counter Radicalisation,” ARF, March 2015, <http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/library/ARF%20Chairman's%20Statements%20and%20Reports/The%20Twentysecond%20ASEAN%20Regional%20Forum,%202014-2015/14%20-%20Co-Chairs'%20Summary%20Report%20-%20ARF%20Workshop%20on%20Counter%20Radicalisation,%20Kuala%20Lumpur.pdf>.
- ⁴⁸ “Japan International Cooperation Agency,” United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), :8080/fileadmin/DAM/operact/Technical_Cooperation/JICA_Final.pdf http://www.unece.org:8080/fileadmin/DAM/operact/Technical_Cooperation/JICA_Final.pdf
- ⁴⁹ “Mission Statement,” Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), <http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/mission/index.html>
- ⁵⁰ “Japan Pledges \$15.5 Million in ‘counter-terrorism’ aid,” *Al-Jazeera America*, 17 February 2015, <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/2/17/japan-pledge-155m-in-counter-terrorism-aid-to-middle-east.html>
- ⁵¹ “Opposition lawmakers to confront Abe over timing of Jan. 17 anti-IS aid pledge,” *The Asahi Shimbun*, 02 February 2015, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201502020065.
- ⁵² “Japan’s International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation,” Government of Japan, February 2008, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/coop0208.pdf>
- ⁵³ Toko Sekiguchi, “Japan Opens Aid Program to Foreign Troops,” *Wall Street Journal*, 10 February 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-opens-aid-program-to-foreign-militaries-1423568120>.
- ⁵⁴ “National Security Strategy,” Government of Japan, 17 December 2013, <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf>.
- ⁵⁵ “Paths to Peace: History of Japan’s International Peace Cooperation,” Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, 2010, http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_j/info/other/pdf/michi_e2010/michi-e.pdf
- ⁵⁶ Mina Pollman, “3 Japanese Dead in Tunisia Attack,” *The Diplomat*, 20 March 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/3-japanese-dead-in-tunisia-attack/>
- ⁵⁷ “Statements of Cooperation between JAFIC and foreign FIUs concerning exchange of information related to money laundering and terrorist financing,” JAFIC, http://www.npa.go.jp/sosikihanzai/jafic/en/kokusai_e/mousin_e.htm.
- ⁵⁸ “The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law,” Government of Japan, October 2001, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html
- ⁵⁹ For a detailed list of development projects and activities, see *Japan's Contribution to Afghanistan (2007)*
- ⁶⁰ “The Outline of the Basic Plan regarding Response Measures Based on the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iraq/issue2003/law_o.html
- ⁶¹ Mariko Oi, “Japan’s contradictory military might,” *BBC*, 15 March 2012, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17175834>
- ⁶² Mika Hayashi, “The Japanese law concerning the special measures on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq: translator’s introduction,” *Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal Association*, 2004, <https://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/701/13PacRimLPolyJ579.pdf?sequence=1>.
- ⁶³ “Present State of the Piracy Problem and Japan’s Efforts,” MOFA, December 2001, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/piracy/problem0112.html>.

- ⁶⁴ Mohamed Osman Farah, “Japan Opens Military Base in Djibouti to Help Combat Piracy,” *Bloomberg*, 8 July 2011, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-07-08/japan-opens-military-base-in-djibouti-to-help-combat-piracy>.
- ⁶⁵ “The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” Government of Japan, 27 April 2015, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078188.pdf>.
- ⁶⁶ Michael Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, “U.S.-Japan Relations: Strategic Alignment,” *Comparative Connections*, CSIS, May 2015, http://csis.org/files/publication/1501qus_japan.pdf.
- ⁶⁷ “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: A Stronger Alliance for a Dynamic Security Environment, The New Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,” U.S. Department of State, 27 April 2015, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/04/241125.htm>.
- ⁶⁸ “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Japan Cooperation for a More Prosperous and Stable World,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 28 April 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/28/fact-sheet-us-japan-cooperation-more-prosperous-and-stable-world>.
- ⁶⁹ *Yomiuri*, 8 February 2015.
- ⁷⁰ “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Japan Cooperation for a More Prosperous and Stable World,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 28 April 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/28/fact-sheet-us-japan-cooperation-more-prosperous-and-stable-world>.
- ⁷¹ “National Security Strategy,” Government of Japan, 17 December 2013, <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf>.
- ⁷² Ernest Bower, Murray Hiebert, Phuong Nguyen, and Gregory Poling, “Southeast Asia’s Geopolitical Centrality and the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” CSIS, June 2015, http://csis.org/files/publication/150609_Bower_SoutheastAsiaCentrality_Web.pdf.
- ⁷³ Marian Leonardo Lawson, “Foreign Aid: International Donor Coordination of Development Assistance,” *Congressional Research Service*, 5 February 2013, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41185.pdf>.