

# HITTING THE 'SNOOZE' BUTTON ON NUCLEAR SECURITY:

Stuxnet and the Wake-Up Call It Should Have Been

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# The risk of nuclear terrorism may be one of the gravest threats of our time



**Cyber attacks could  
facilitate acts of nuclear  
theft or sabotage**

# Stuxnet: A Case Study

- ◎ Operation Olympic Games lasted from 2006 until 2010, though Stuxnet is still in the wild
- ◎ Precision cyber weapon targeted on Natanz, a hidden Iranian uranium enrichment facility
  - > Part of a clandestine nuclear program
  - > Air-gapped, geographically hidden

# Why should we worry?

- Natanz: by any measure, a hard target
  - > What happens when more accessible facilities, like power plants, are attacked?



- Stuxnet: precision weapon targeted on a specific facility with limited potential for radiation release
  - > This will not necessarily be the case in future attacks

# A variety of nuclear systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks with physical consequences



## Power Generation

- Sabotage
- Radiation release



## Physical Protection

- Theft
- Sabotage



## Fuel Processing

- Theft
- Sabotage



## Materials Accountancy

- Theft
- Diversion

# Has Stuxnet motivated any reforms in facility security?

- ◎ Some recent movement on regulations
  - > Not necessarily a product of Stuxnet
  - > Implementation not yet adequate
  - > Relevant areas not always covered (e.g. nuclear materials accounting)
- ◎ Facility security measures have not kept pace with the threat
  - > Laptops, flash drives
  - > Digital systems
  - > Inadequate security measures (e.g., firewalls, airgaps, antivirus)
  - > Outdated safety analyses

# What is slowing progress?

**Complexity of  
Digital/Physical  
Systems**

**Compliance  
Mindset**

**Uneven  
Distribution of  
Limited Human  
Capacity**

**Bureaucratic  
Inertia**

**Cost**

**Bridging  
Technical/Policy  
Language Gap**

# How can we move forward?

- ⦿ Re-examine existing principles and implement best practices for cyber at nuclear facilities
  - > e.g., controlling laptop entry
- ⦿ Consider implementing modern technical solutions
  - > Revolutionary vs. evolutionary
- ⦿ Work to address human capacity issue
  - > Support IAEA training efforts
  - > Explore options for a global cyber capability

# Thank You!

