Universal Social Media:
Inserting the Public into Nuclear Use Decision Making

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What is Universal Social Media?

- The "extreme limit" of social media

- Ubiquitous, uninterruptable, and understandable social communication

  - ✓ Everyone is connected
  - ✓ Can't be turned off or censored
  - ✓ Immediately translated into local language

Bottom Line Analysis

In our scenario:

1. Universal Social Media (USM) has a net-negative effect on nuclear deterrence that cannot be easily mitigated.

2. USM exacerbates the "asymmetry of stakes" between the adversaries in our scenario.

Methodology Breakdown

- Describe the emerging technology
  - Universal Social Media (USM)
- Characterize the operational circumstance
  - China losing a war to US & Japan
- Identify relevant USM instances
- Assess how instances impact decision calculus
  - DO JOC quad methodology
- Assess overall effect on deterrence

How does Universal Social Media influence China's nuclear decision calculus when losing an <u>important</u> conventional war to the United States and Japan?

- Turmoil in the Middle East limits oil exports
- China and Japan in economic recession
- Massive oil reserves found in contested East China Sea
- China attacks Japanese forces to secure access, initiating war and drawing the United States into the conflict

China is losing a war in which the stakes are high

Key Assumption: CCP Perceives Its Position as Fragile

- 73% of Chinese think China would win a war against Japan and even the United States
  - Losing an important war would shake confidence in, and legitimacy of, CCP
- CCP fears *any* social action
  - Social action has dramatically increased by 1,000% over 17 years
  - On-line dissent allowed, but <u>not</u> calls to action
- Most CCP officials believe social media leads to unrest
  - Social media users more likely to engage in protest
  - China spends more on domestic security than national defense

Use the DO JOC Method to Assess Instances

Action to deter: CH use of nuclear weapons
US perspective of CH Calculus

Example quadrant with USM instances:

Cost of Action	Cost of Restraint
1. Instance 1 2. Instance 2	1. Instance 3 2. Instance 4
Benefit of Restraint	**Benefit of Action**
1. Instance 5 2. Instance 6	1. Instance 7 2. Instance 8

Cost of Restraint

1. **CCP lies about winning war**
2. **"CH is winning" lie exposed**
3. **CH public tweets location of CH forces**
4. **CCP lies to CH public about US preparing to launch nuclear weapons (Case 2)**
5. CCP lies to CH public about US preparing to launch nuclear weapons (Case 3)

Blue = Strongly positive for deterrence
Green = Weakly positive for deterrence
Orange = Weakly negative for deterrence
Red = Strongly negative for deterrence

CH Public Tweets Location of CH Forces

- Leads to:
  - US military/intel opportunity to target CH forces
  - Chinese military/intel concern about survivability
  - Both nations' publics reacting volatilely, leading to protests, OR
  - ROW public is alarmed; Chinese public rallies
- Raises the CCP's cost of restraint
- Significantly weakens deterrence

CCP Lies to CH Public about US Preparing to Launch Nuclear Weapons

- Chinese public might:

1. Support nuclear use
   - Decreases cost of action
   - Weakens deterrence

2. Demand nuclear use
   - Increases cost of restraint
   - Weakens deterrence

3. Support negotiations
   - Gives CCP a way out
   - Lowers cost of restraint
   - Strengthens deterrence

All the options benefit the CCP. They would probably know which one the public would support (we don't).

Populating the DO JOC Chart

Action to deter: CH use of nuclear weapons
US/JP perspective of CH Calculus

Cost of Action	Cost of Restraint
A. CH goods boycott F. CH or US public reveals respective nuclear forces generating (Case 1) F. CH or US public reveals respective nuclear forces generating (Case 2) F. CH or US public reveals respective nuclear forces generating (Case 3) F. CH or US public reveals respective nuclear forces generating (Case 4) H. US/JP governments use USM to evacuate potentially targeted cities J. CCP reveals to public that CH is losing war. (Case 2) K. CCP lies to CH public about US preparing to launch nuclear weapons (Case 1)	B. CCP lies about winning war C. "CH is winning" lie exposed D. CH public tweets location of CH forces G. Chinese public discovers CH is losing war I. CCP suppresses antiwar protestors (Case 1) I. CCP suppresses antiwar protestors (Case 2) J. CCP reveals to public that CH is losing war. (Case 1) K. CCP lies to CH public about US preparing to launch nuclear weapons (Case 2) K. CCP lies to CH public about US preparing to launch nuclear weapons (Case 3)
Benefit of Restraint	**Benefit of Action**
	H. US/JP governments use USM to evacuate potentially targeted cities

Action to deter: US/JP continuation of war
CH perspective of US/JP Calculus

Cost of Action	Cost of Restraint
E. CH declares it is willing to negotiate F. CH Public exposes CH forces deploying (Case 1 and 3) F. CH Public exposes CH forces deploying (Case 2 and 4)	
Benefit of Restraint	**Benefit of Action**

Blue = Strongly positive for deterrence
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Assessment

1. Net-negative impact on deterrence
   - Nuclear force locations and CH public unrest probably overwhelm weaker positive effects of USM
   - Risky to exploit without deep understanding of adversary's public's reaction
   - Can't be mitigated by the very nature of USM
   - Inserts the public into nuclear use decision making

2. Exacerbates the "asymmetry of stakes" between the adversaries.
   - CCP is vulnerable to effects of USM; US less so