



Next START Verification, a Step towards Weapons- Centric Verification

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Arms Control Theory as a Roadmap

- Fundamental constraints:
 - Trust is rare in the international system
 - 100% assurance is unobtainable, we seek high-degree of confidence
- Objectives which bound arms control as a tool:
 - Reducing the risk of war occurring
 - Reducing the damage should war occur
 - Reducing the costs of war and competition




Operational Experience

	SALT I	SALT II	INF	START	SORT	NST
Strategic Impetus for US	Missile Gap	A more permanent agreement; establishing limits; MIRVS	INF threatened allies, were destabilizing	Window of Vulnerability	Codifying extant plans	Maintaining AC relationship w/ Russia
Strategic Impetus for Soviets/Russians	Curtailing arms racing; strategic stability	A more permanent agreement; establishing limits; MIRVS	Euro-missiles	Nuclear force was reducing anyway	Russians wanted bilateral treaty w/ U.S.	Little strategic compromise; transparency
Deployed Warhead Limit	N/A	N/A	N/A	6000 (with sub-limits)	1,700-2,200	1550
Deployed Delivery Vehicle Limit	U.S.: 1,710 ICBMs & SLBMs USSR: 2,347 ICBMs & SLBMS	2250 (including heavy bombers)	Banned all intermediate range nuclear missiles	1600 (sub-limit: 154 heavy ICBMs)	No	700
Throw-weight Limits	Partial	Partial	No	Yes	No	No
Non-Deployed Delivery Vehicle Limit	No	No	Banned all INF	No	No	800
Verification	NTM	NTM	NTM/OSI	NTM (including telemetry) & OSI	START verification	OSI to verify data exchanges; NTM

Verification and Monitoring Requirements

- Establish baseline count of all weapons
- Maintain chain of custody
- Prevent undetected reconstitution of capacity



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Weapons-Centric Verification

- Limits
 - Platforms, a hedge and Article VI
 - Specific bans on destabilizing platforms
 - Includes DCA and other NSNW platforms
 - Actual weapons, sub-limits within stockpile
 - No more attribution rules
 - Deployed/non-deployed platforms and weapons
- Deployed Platforms
 - Data exchanges, NTM, and OSI
 - RDE to verify objects declared to be non-nuclear
 - FRODS to distinguish conventional flying units
 - Mandatory telemetry exchanges
- Stockpile and Disposition
 - Establish baseline count of total stockpile
 - MHF portal monitoring
 - Objects entering MHF verified by attribute RDE; non-nuclear on exit
 - Tagged with tamper-indicating RFID
 - Verify monitor dismantled primaries and CSAs



Strategic Impetus for Next START

- United States
 - Reduce Russian strategic capacity
 - Increase insight into Russian force structure development
 - Maintain strategic stability
 - Demonstrate commitment to Article VI
- Russia
 - Strategic stability, to include missile defenses, CPGS, and forward-deployed NSNW
 - Limit and observe US capabilities and recapitalization
 - National prestige
- How to get to the table?
 - Broaden negotiating space to include “red lines”
 - Pursue “peace through strength”

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Next START Verification

- Limits
 - Platforms
 - Destabilizing platforms subject to sub-limits/bans
 - Actual weapons
 - Sub-limits on deployed/non-deployed stockpile
 - End attribution rule for bombers
 - Attribution becomes redundant if deployed weapons are defined and verified
 - If NSNW included, limit DCA
- Deployed Verification
 - Data exchanges, NTM, and OSI
 - Establish baseline count of deployed weapons
 - Manned or remote portal monitoring at WSAs; inspection of platforms
 - One-time inspection in WSA to confirm data
 - RDE to verify objects declared to be non-nuclear
 - Mandatory telemetry exchanges

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Next START Verification Strategic Implications

- Verifying actual number of deployed weapons may alter current strategic guidance
 - Portal monitoring of WSAs and SNDV inspections establish a deployed count higher than NST attribution
 - Guidance may be predicated on NST attribution
- Limiting (not even reducing) DCA may be unequal
 - All US strategic and NSNW platforms will be accounted for by the treaty
 - Russian NSNW platforms may still be outside treaty
 - Any NSNW verification will need to establish host-nation rights, unless mitigated