

AN APPROACH FOR RESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR SUPPLY AFTER FUKUSHIMA

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Outline

- Context
- Why need “responsible” nuclear supply?
- Potential Approaches
 - Vendors
 - Bilateral/unilateral governments
 - Multilateral/international
- Questions for discussion

Starting point

- **Conventional wisdom:** Nuclear supply follows free market competition and nuclear suppliers only need to follow government legal restrictions
- **Reality:** **Government policies** have huge impact on terms of nuclear supply, from NSG guidelines to nuclear cooperation agreement requirements to export financing terms. **Suppliers** make choices based on their risk assessment. **Recipients** (operators, governments, financiers) can increase or reduce risks.
- **Responsible nuclear supply:** Requires efforts by **governments** and **suppliers** and **recipients**.

Is there a universal definition of responsible nuclear supply?

- No. Increasing talk of “nuclear governance” as it relates to nuclear safety & nuclear security, particularly post-Fukushima.
- Nuclear governance as it relates to nonproliferation handled under NPT, Nuclear Suppliers Group.
 - NSG not universal, but members generally follow principle of “no undercut”.

Defining responsible nuclear supply

- MINIMIZES OR DOES NOT INCREASE RISKS OF RELEASE OF RADIATION TO THE ENVIRONMENT, PEOPLE OR SOCIETY
- Radiation release could come from
 - Nuclear explosive
 - Radiological dispersal device
 - Accident
- Elements of responsible nuclear supply
 - Nonproliferation
 - Nuclear security
 - Nuclear safety

Is responsible nuclear supply different after Fukushima? **Yes**

- Not because Fukushima could have been prevented by better nuclear governance, but impact possibly could have been mitigated with **better nuclear governance** in place.
- **Also, pause in construction** could affect scale, pace & costs.
- **Some suppliers will get out of the game**
 - Siemens already; Japanese?
 - Question of markets – without a domestic market can exports be competitive?
- **Before Fukushima, cost paramount. Safety after?**

Is responsible nuclear supply different after Fukushima? **No**

- **Nuclear “newcomers”** that go forward (e.g., Vietnam, UAE, Saudi Arabia) won’t be as constrained as existing nuclear power states
 - By public opinion
 - By need to “retrofit” existing reactors
 - By need to revamp existing regulatory systems
- **Holistic approaches for the system** more difficult to engineer than patchwork regimes so any changes likely to be incremental

Bottom Line

- No matter what, need to shape nuclear energy to reduce risks. Long-term sustainability of nuclear energy likely requires more global governance in following areas:
 - Nuclear safety
 - Nuclear security
 - Fuel cycle limitations (enrichment/reprocessing) for nonproliferation reasons.
- Will require all states, all stakeholders to reduce risks.

A few governance objectives

□ **Enhance focus on security**

- Nuclear Security Summit 2014
- World Institute for Nuclear Security
- Better adherence to international standards (amended CPPNM)

□ **Limit amount of directly weapons-usable nuclear material growth**

- Discourage Pu, HEU use in civil cycle
- Promote LEU, open fuel cycle, limiting spread of sensitive fuel cycle facilities

□ **Reduce risks from the fuel cycle** – not just front end (enrichment, fuel) but also back end (spent fuel, waste).

Approaches

- **At vendor level**
 - Codes of conduct, etc.
 - Self-regulation approaches
- **Unilateral/Bilateral government actions**
 - Export licensing
 - Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
- **Multilateral/international**
 - Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines

Nuclear Governance: Vendor Approaches

- **Nuclear Principles (Nuclearprinciples.org); 2011**
- **Vendors:** CANDU, Ge-Hitachi, Westinghouse, Atomstroyexport, Areva, Mitsubishi, Atmea, Toshiba
- **Principles:**
 - Safety
 - Security
 - Environment
 - Compensation for Nuclear Damage
 - Nonproliferation
 - Ethics
- **Dual-use exporter voluntary actions**
 - E.g., Oerlikon's sharing of information with government about rejected export requests

Nuclear Governance: Unilateral, Bilateral Approaches

- **Export licensing**
 - Equipment
 - Technology, know-how (Part 810 in U.S. system)
- **Export promotion**
 - **Governments can choose not to single out nuclear energy (a la Sarkozy) but offer comprehensive energy advice**
 - Promote *all energy options* (especially efficiency) and *all approaches*, including regional facilities, cross-border electricity transmission, regional fuel cycle centers
- **Nuclear Cooperation Agreements**
 - Can go beyond NSG requirements (e.g., Additional Protocol, fuel cycle assurances)

Nuclear Governance: Multilateral, International Approaches

- Within the Nuclear Suppliers Group
 - Additional Protocol as condition of supply
 - Greater transparency and harmonization of nuclear cooperation agreements
- Promote multinational voluntary approaches
 - Enrichment providers should open up to investment (e.g., KEPCO, US LES)
 - Reinvigorate global campaign for international repository
 - Fund regional storage repositories
- Reshape FMCT negotiations for legally binding e/r restrictions
 - Require multinationalization of all sensitive fuel cycle facilities to level the playing field; give FMCT a real disarmament job; divert the “rights” argument away from the NPT
 - Argument: If not making fissile material for weapons, do we need national facilities?

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