


Extended Deterrence and a Nuclear Iran

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Presentation Objectives

- Extended nuclear deterrence theory from the Cold War is still useful!
- Two tools for evaluating the likelihood of future extended deterrence forward deployments:
 - Geography-credibility-survivability
 - Change promptness → change stability
- Two questions:
 - Might Iran forward deploy nuclear weapons to Venezuela?
 - Might Pakistan forward deploy nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia?


Geography-Credibility-Survivability



Rear
(survivable)

Front
(vulnerable)

Geography-Credibility-Survivability



Might Iran Deploy Nukes to Venezuela?

- If Iran forward deployed nuclear weapons in Venezuela, it would gain a new capability to threaten the US:
- The forward deployed forces would not enjoy support from Iran-based forces. There would be little or no prospect for escalation dominance.
- Their survivability would be vanishingly small, as would the credibility of the threat to use them.
- QED: It would be unwise for Iran and Venezuela to agree to an extended deterrence forward deployment.

Change Promptness

Change Stability

- Employing only geography-credibility-survivability, the Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons on Cuba should have been fine!
- Therefore, we need to augment our thinking with analytical tool number 2.
- Changes in promptness cause changes in stability.
- A significant increase in promptness will cause a significant decrease in stability, and vice versa.

Might Pakistan Deploy Nukes to Saudi Arabia?

- Pakistan would gain no new capability to strike Iranian targets by deploying nukes to Saudi Arabia.
- The geography-credibility-survivability test is passed.
- Missile and aircraft flight times in the region are already very short. There would be no significant change in promptness or stability.
- The change promptness \longrightarrow change stability test is passed.
- QED: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia might agree to an extended deterrence forward deployment.

Presentation Summary

- Two tools for evaluating likelihood of future extended deterrence forward deployments:
 - Geography-credibility-survivability
 - Change promptness \longrightarrow change stability
- Two conclusions:
 - Iran probably won't forward deploy nuclear weapons to Venezuela.
 - Pakistan may forward deploy nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia.
- Extended nuclear deterrence theory from the Cold War is still useful!