

THE DUMA-SENATE LOGJAM REVISITED:

ACTIONS & REACTIONS IN RUSSIAN TREATY RATIFICATION DEBATES

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CSIS PONI FALL 2011 CONFERENCE
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ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN RUSSIA'S ARMS CONTROL POLICY MAKING

- Russia's Federal Assembly plays an important role in treaty ratification:
 - Ratification requires a majority vote in the State Duma (lower house), followed by a majority vote in the Federation Council (upper house)
 - If the Federation Council rejects the treaty, the Duma can override with a 2/3 majority
 - Foreign affairs committee chairmen in both houses are essential for shepherding treaties (and they do not always agree)
 - As part of the 2002 Moscow Treaty ratification package, the legislature increased its role in nuclear weapons policy making
- Has policy making become more centralized since Putin took power?
 - United Russia holds the majority of the seats in the Duma (315 out of 450)
 - Communists (KPRF) and Nationalists (LDPR) are in perpetual opposition
 - But...
- Key assumption of my presentation: the degree of cohesion between the executive and legislative branches on (arms control) policy-making is probably a cyclical trend
 - Remember the 1990s debate over START II?

“THE DUMA-SENATE LOGJAM ON ARMS CONTROL: WHAT CAN BE DONE?”

- George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander article from the Autumn 1997 issue of *The Nonproliferation Review*
- Key points:
 - Post-Cold War arms control and nonproliferation agenda (START II and III, CTBT, ABM Treaty) is in danger
 - It’s difficult to obtain legislative consent for treaties because...
 - Legislators in Washington and Moscow are:
 - Focused more on domestic problems than international relations
 - Suspicious of one another’s intentions and have a nationalistic attitude toward arms control
 - Both exercising independence from the executive branch
 - U.S. and Russian administrations may need to do arms control by other means:
 - Reciprocal unilateral measures
 - Political commitments
 - Executive agreements that don’t require legislative ratification
- Research questions: What was the role of Russia’s legislature in ratifying START II, CTBT, the Moscow Treaty, and New START? How difficult was treaty passage? What are some of the “perennial” themes in the debates?

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY II

- *Timeline:*
 - Signed in January 1993 and passed in April 2000 (7+ years)
 - Vote: 288 Y, 131 N, 4 A (Fed. Council vote was not unanimous)
- *Legislature debates focused on:*
 - ABM Treaty (& theater missile defense)
 - Modernization of nuclear & conventional forces (& costs)
 - NATO expansion to Central & Eastern Europe
 - Other: NATO operations in FRY, U.S. nonproliferation sanctions on Russian companies, U.S. strikes in Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan
- *Additional factor:* presidential & parliamentary elections, Western criticism of Russian actions in Chechnya
- *Ratification resolution:*
 - Government to report on strategic nuclear forces (& treaty implementation)
 - START process (START III by Dec 2003) and Russian withdrawal linked to ABM Treaty
 - EOF conditioned on U.S. ratification of 1997 Demarcation Agreement

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

- *Timeline:*
 - Signed in September 1996, though Yeltsin submitted bill only in November 1999 (U.S. Senate rejected in October 1999), and ratified in May 2000 (6 months)
 - Vote: 298 Y, 74 N, 3 A
- *Legislature debates focused on:*
 - U.S.-Russian relationship
- *Additional factor:* India & Pakistan tests
- *Ratification resolution (key themes):*
 - President to ensure funding of nuclear force development
 - Concern about U.S. failure to ratify (use "nuclear components" in "destabilizing anti-ballistic missile systems"?)
 - Call on other countries to ratify as soon as possible

MOSCOW TREATY (SORT)

- *Timeline:*
 - Signed in May 2002, draft legislation submitted in December 2002 and resubmitted in March 2003, ratification took place in May 2003. (One year)
 - Vote: 294 Y, 134 N, 22 A (Majority of N is Communists)
- *Legislature debates focused on:*
 - Nuclear forces funding & concerns about cutting newer systems
 - U.S. upload potential
- *Additional factor:* Duma disagreement with Federation Council (Rogozin vs Margelov) on treaty link to the U.S. invasion of Iraq
- *Ratification resolution (key themes):*
 - President to report on force developments (& treaty implementation)
 - Role of legislature in funding nuclear force R&D, procurement, & reductions; protection of domestic industry; include legislators in interagency planning
 - Withdrawal provisions (missile defenses, strat. forces of “other countries,” not just U.S.)
 - Need additional arms control measures; call on U.S. to ratify the CTBT

NEW START


- *Timeline:*
 - Signed in April 2010, Senate ratified in December, and Federal Assembly ratified in January 2011. (9 months)
 - Vote: 350 Y, 96 N, 1 A (N is Communists and LDPR)
- *Legislature debates focused on:*
 - Missile defense and Prompt global strike
 - Modernization of Russian strategic nuclear forces
- *Additional factor:* U.S. Senate ratification & resolution.
- *Ratification resolution (key themes):*
 - President to adopt nuclear posture program (& report to Duma on progress and funding needs)
 - Monitor offense-defense balance (& “other countries”)
 - Discuss new strat. offensive systems in BCC before deployment
 - Withdrawal provisions
 - Address PGS, space-based weapons, missile defense, and conventional imbalance (instead of starting with TNW)

SUMMARY

- What was the role of Russia's legislature in START II, CTBT, the Moscow Treaty (SORT), and New START?
 - Increase in role of presidential reporting to legislature
 - Increase in legislature's role in nuclear policy making
- How difficult is treaty ratification?
 - Cohesion between committee chairs and administration eased passage
 - Delays in light of domestic politics (and Communists & Nationalists always vote against)
 - Delays in light of U.S. Senate actions, U.S. and NATO military actions
- What are some of the "perennial" themes in the debates?
 - Concern about missile defense and NATO expansion
 - Concern about Russia's nuclear (and sometimes conventional) force development and force and industry modernization
 - Concern about nuclear forces and other potentially threatening capabilities of "other countries"
 - Tendency to interpret U.S. Senate's inability to ratify agreements as intent to develop threatening systems in the future

POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS

- Back to my key assumption
 - The degree of cohesion between the executive and legislative branches on (arms control) policy making is probably a cyclical trend
- Why do the Communists and the Nationalists vote against arms control treaties?
 - No consensus on Russia's identity or foreign policy
- The “Goldilocks conundrum in foreign policy”
 - Pseudo-patriotic isolationism versus Geopolitical utopianism?
- Need to watch Russia's parliamentary politics
 - Development of new political parties & their influence on Presidential elections
 - Elections of 2011 & primaries in some parties
 - Positions of current & former legislators (Kosachev & Rogozin)
- Need to think of how to deal with potential future “logjams”



ОФИЦИАЛЬНЫЙ
САЙТ ПАРТИИ

ADDITIONAL SLIDE FOLLOWS

STATE DUMA ELECTION RESULTS

	2007	2003	1999	1995	1993
United Russia/ Unity + Fatherland All Russia	315	223	73+66	-	-
Communist Party of RF	57	52	113	157	42
LDPR	40	36	17	51	64
Fair Russia/Rodina	38	37	-	-	
Yabloko	-	-	20	45	27
Agrarian		2		20	37
Union of Right Forces/Russia's Choice			29	9	64
Women of Russia				3	21