

Next Steps in Arms Control: Restoring Consensus on U.S. Nuclear Policy

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


Continuity and Consensus After New START

- **Competing Prague visions: eventual Road to Zero, but need deterrence for the indefinite future**
- **Road to Zero is a vision, but not an end in itself: strategic force reductions must be judged as a means to the end of national security.**
- **The partisan New START debate was a catalyst to renew attention to the nuclear enterprise and help pave the way forward for a shared and bipartisan understanding of a sustainable nuclear deterrent.**
- **A grand bargain: delivery vehicle & stockpile modernization in tandem with cuts**

No Shortage of Documentation

- 2001 NPR: New Triad, responsive infrastructure
- Taiwan ('06), Barksdale ('07)
- 2007 Defense Science Board Report ("Chiles Report")
- 2008 DoD Task Force ("Schlesinger Report")
- 2008 DoD/DoE: *National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century*
- 2008 Gates Carnegie speech
- 2009 Strategic Posture Commission Report
- 2010 NPR
- 2010 SSMP Report



The Grand Bargain

- Apr 2009 Prague speech
- Apr 2010: New START signed

- May 2010: SSMP report, “1251 Report”
- Nov 2010: 1251 Report Update
- Dec 2010: Presidential commitments
 - \$7.1 B in FY10, \$7.6 B in FY12
 - \$189 billion for nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles over the next decade.
 - Avoid further BMD limits
- Dec 2010: Senate approves New START, with certain provisions in Resolution of Ratification

New START: Less than Meets the Eye?

Figure 1: U.S. and Russian Deployed Warheads and Delivery Vehicles as of February 5, 2011²⁶				
Category	United States	Russian Federation	Allowed under New START	Number to Reduce (US/Russia)
Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, and Deployed Heavy Bombers	882	521	700	182 / NA
Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers	1800	1537	1550	250 / NA
Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs, and Deployed and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers	1124	865	800	324 / 65

– Time will tell, how historic.


Next Steps

- **Tom Donilon, Mar 29, 2011**
 - DoD “will review our strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile...”
- **Rose Gottemoeller, Apr 2010**
 - New START “setting the stage for further arms reductions.”
- **Gary Samore, May 2011 *Arms Control Today***
 - Dyad vs. Triad
 - “some unilateral steps that the US could take”
 - De-alerting
- **Ellen Tauscher, Jul 1, 2011**
 - “As we undertake deeper reductions, we have a responsibility to hedge against geopolitical or technological surprise.”
- **Possible single ceiling for stockpiles, perhaps sublimits**
- **Should pursue transparency**

Concerns about Deeper Reductions

- **Nonproliferation: friends and allies may doubt extended deterrent commitments**
- **Nonproliferation: potential adversaries may be emboldened**
- **Credibility: Reduce robust and flexible options available to President**
- **Strategy: counter-force vs counter-population strategies, de-alerting**
- **The next “concrete step” in arms control is to sustain the New START bargain and implement modernization. Deeper reductions can follow later.**

Delivery Platform Service Lives



The Post-New START Environment: House-passed FY12 NDAA

- **Links progress of New START implementation to progress in modernization**
- **New annual “1251” report**
- **Hedge force reductions tied to responsive infrastructure: progress on CMRR, UPF, LEPs**
- **Counterforce strategy, deterrence review**
- **Future reductions with Congressional approval (either by treaty or ordinary statutory authority)**
- **Non-strategics in Europe**
- **ROSA-like report on delivery systems**
- **Senate NDAA**

Non-Deployed Hedge Force

- **Certain underlying facts remain unchanged:**
 - **Relationship between the potential for hedge reductions and a responsive infrastructure**
 - **Hedging against geopolitical and technical uncertainties**
 - **1994, 2001, 2010 NPRs**
- **Perry: Prague speech was, “in a sense, the most recent formulation of the ‘lead but hedge’ policy”**
- **Changing hedging rationales may upset rather than help forge domestic and allied consensus**

Looking for a Path Forward

- Stay the modernization course, make progress before additional cuts
- Caution on changing deterrence philosophy
- Focus on stability and capabilities, not numbers or Zero
- Avoid BMD/CPGS linkage
- Protect delivery system flexibility and resilience
- Avoid repeats of old “new” foodfights
 - RRW, RNEP, B-61, the 3 Rs (refurbish/reuse/replace)
- Less is more: smaller yields, smaller numbers
- CTBT easier with modernization than without
- Transparency

If You Want Reductions, Prepare for a Sustainable Deterrent

- **Creating a sustainable, robust, and credible nuclear deterrent is the best way to defuse opposition to reductions and restore consensus**
 - **For indefinite future, probably beyond our lifetimes**
 - **Ourselves and for our allies**
 - **Robust and credible US deterrent supports rather than undermines nonproliferation**
 - **Flexible and resilient, second to none, holding at risk whatever potential adversaries value**
 - **Attention to both stockpile and delivery systems**
- **Neither easy nor inexpensive**
 - **What price continuity, consensus, deterrence?**