



Middle East and Nonproliferation: Areas for US-Russian collaboration

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Outline

- **Focus on areas of US-Russian collaboration, not conflict, in the Middle East**
- **Not focus on:**
 - Iran, Pakistan, DPRK (other big proliferation problems)
- **Suggest a framework for moving forward in three areas: Energy, Security, Arms Control**

Iran

- **No signs of Iran moving to give up enrichment program**
 - But interest still in LEU fuel swap deal
- **Need to strengthen context for further sanctions**
 - Improvements in current implementation
 - New ideas for indirect tightening
- **Some ideas discussed here can have a positive impact on Iran**

What are current/future nuclear threats to the Middle East & nonproliferation regime?

- Israeli nuclear program; latent Iranian nuclear program
- Expansion of nuclear energy (Iran first, then UAE, possibly others) with potential to develop latent capabilities
 - Not just interest in reactors, but also fuel cycle plants



Sustainable peaceful nuclear partnership

- Encompassing energy, security and arms control initiatives that reduce the nuclear threat and risks to all while enhancing energy security
- How to do this?

Elements of a framework

- **Reducing nuclear risks**
 - Limit growth of stockpiles of nuclear material
 - Limit risks of terrorist access to nuclear material
- **Improving energy security**
 - Enhancing reliability, affordability, and sustainability
- **Enhancing confidence in countries' intentions related to nuclear energy and proliferation**
 - Limit spread of enrichment/reprocessing capabilities

Principles for initiatives to reduce nuclear risks

	ENERGY	SECURITY	ARMS CONTROL
Reducing nuclear material risks			
Improving energy security			
Enhancing confidence in countries' intentions			

Energy Initiatives

- **Diversify sources**
 - US and Russia should collaborate on energy assessments, not just peaceful nuclear cooperation
- **Regional fuel cycle centers or distributed fuel cycle capabilities across countries**
- **Back end of fuel cycle collaboration**
 - Fuel leasing by major suppliers
 - Regional repository for direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel
- **Nuclear Suppliers Group should adopt Additional Protocol as a condition of supply**

Security Initiatives

- **Expanded Gulf Security Dialogue**
 - To include missile defense
 - Threat assessments re: Iran
- **Nuclear Security Enhancements**
 - Broadened participation in Nuclear Security Summit
 - Confidence-building measures (pledges of no-attack, etc)

Arms Control Initiatives

- **Wider participation by states in the region in global control vehicles**
 - CTBT, BWC, CWC, Additional Protocol
- **2012 Middle East WMD-Free Zone Conference**
- **FMCT**
 - Path 1: transparency measures re: stockpiles of fissile material and/or shutdown facilities
 - Path 2: Use FMCT to ban national fissile material production facilities (enrichment, reprocessing) in favor of multinational approaches

Mitigating Fuel Cycle Risks for Proliferation: FMCT

- **Reshape FMCT negotiations for legally binding e/r restrictions**
 - **FMCT has foundered on stocks vs. new production debate. Shift the debate by requiring multinationalization of all (existing and future) sensitive fuel cycle facilities.**
 - **This would:**
 - level playing field;
 - give FMCT a real disarmament job;
 - divert the “rights” argument away from the NPT.
 - **If not making fissile material for weapons, do we need national facilities?**

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