

## The START Ratification Debate

As the fight over New START ratification gets closer to a Senate vote, PONI has decided to catalog the arguments flying back and forth over the treaty's ratification.

PONI hopes to contribute to the public discourse on New START, to produce a more productive dialogue away from general calls of support or opposition, to discussion of the specific merits and faults of the treaty. This effort is not meant to either support arguments for or against ratification, but to help the public understand and evaluate the arguments for and against ratification.

The debate over New START is long and complicated, and therefore, the arguments are organized in the following way:

1. New START and U.S. Deterrence
2. New START and Verification
3. New START and Counting Rules
4. New START and the International Community
5. New START and the Ratification Process

We encourage readers to comment or e-mail PONI if you think there are additional objections to New START that should be included.

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## New START and U.S. Deterrence

### Arguments Against New START

### Arguments For New START

#### Missile Defense—Preamble

#### *Mitt Romney, Former Massachusetts Governor*

New START does limit U.S. missile-defense options... New START's preamble not only references missile defense, it accedes to Russia's insistence that there is an interrelationship between strategic offensive weapons and missile defense.

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#### *Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense*

First, the treaty will not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor impose additional costs or barriers on those defenses. As the administration's Ballistic Missile Defense Review and budget plans make clear, the United States will continue to improve our capability to defend ourselves, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners against ballistic missile threats. [\[Read More\]](#)

#### *Dr. James N. Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary, Policy Department of Defense*

The New START Treaty addresses missile defenses in two places: the Preamble and Article V. First, the Preamble of the Treaty states that there is an interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms, and that current strategic defensive forces do not threaten to undermine the effectiveness of the Parties' strategic offensive arms. Given that the United States has only thirty Ground Based Interceptors and

Russia will likely field well over 1,000 ICBM and SLBM warheads under the Treaty, U.S. missile defenses can increase very significantly and the same would remain true. It is also important to note that the Treaty's preambular statement is not legally binding, and therefore does not require or prohibit either side from doing anything. [\[Read More\]](#)

### **Missile Defense—Bilateral Commission**

#### ***The New START Working Group, The Heritage Foundation***

The most serious threat to missile defense in the New START Treaty is contained in the power given to the Treaty compliance forum, the Bilateral Consultative Commission. The New START Treaty, like the START I Treaty, allows “Viability and Effectiveness” changes without Senate advice and consent.[45] However, the BCC authority in New START is much broader because the all-important definitions and Agreed Statements in the Treaty’s Protocol can be changed by the BCC. Viability and Effectiveness changes are not supposed to impact the rights of the parties, but in arms control, as with the tax code, changing definitions can have substantive effects. [\[Read More\]](#)

#### ***Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary Department of State***

I also want to make clear that Article XV of the Treaty authorizes the Bilateral Consultative Commission to make changes in the Protocol without resorting to the Treaty amendment procedures only where such changes do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty. A similar provision was contained in, and successfully implemented under, the START Treaty. [\[Read More\]](#)

#### ***Senator Dick Lugar, Republican***

Governor Romney offers additional treaty misreadings and myths that have been refuted explicitly in Congressional hearings. The Bilateral Consultative Commission has no power to “amend the treaty with specific reference to missile defense,” as he contends. In fact, the Commission cannot change anything

in treaty text or make changes that “affect substantive rights or obligations under this Treaty.” [\[Read More\]](#)

### **Missile Defense—Withdrawal Statement**

*Robert G. Joseph, Former Ambassador, Former Special Assistant to President George W. Bush, and Senior Director for Proliferation Strategies, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense, U.S. National Security Council Staff*

As for implicit constraints on missile defenses, Russian officials have stressed what they call the “legally binding” protocol language which notes the “interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms.” Foreign Minister Lavrov has repeatedly stated that Russia will be entitled to withdraw from the Treaty if there is a change from existing levels in the “quantitative and qualitative” capacities of U.S. strategic defenses. By doing so, Moscow may desire to gain leverage over the future direction of U.S. missile defense programs – development and deployments of future systems that are necessary to defend the United States and our friends and allies. [\[Read More\]](#)

*Hilary Clinton, Secretary of State*

Russia has issued a unilateral statement on missile defense expressing its view. We have not agreed to this view and we are not bound by it. In fact, we’ve issued our own statement making clear that the United States intends to continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems. Nothing in the treaty will constrain our missile defense efforts. [\[Read More\]](#)

## Missile Defense—Resolve to Develop Missile Defense

***Baker Spring, The Heritage Foundation,  
F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National  
Security Policy***

It is quite clear that the U.S. and Russia do not agree on the advancement of the U.S. missile defense program. This necessarily raises the question of why the Obama Administration accepted limitations on the missile defense options of the U.S.—despite the fact that these limitations appear to be contrary to the White House’s own declared policy and its assertions regarding the meaning of these provisions within the treaty. Similar unanswered questions arise regarding other flaws, as well. [\[Read More\]](#)

***Dr. James N. Miller, Principal Deputy  
Under Secretary, Policy Department  
of Defense***

As the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, our budgetary plans, the U.S. unilateral statement, and extensive testimony by Administration officials all make clear, the United States will continue to expand and improve missile defenses as necessary. [\[Read More\]](#)

## Missile Defense—Silo Conversion

***Robert G. Joseph, Former Ambassador,  
Former Special Assistant to President  
George W. Bush, and Senior Director for  
Proliferation Strategies,  
Counterproliferation, and Homeland  
Defense, U.S. National Security Council  
Staff***

We know there are restrictions on missile defenses in the Treaty, both direct and possibly indirect. Article V prohibits the future conversion and use of ICBM and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors. While the Obama Administration has stated it has no intention to convert such launchers for missile

***Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State***

The treaty does contain language prohibiting the conversion or use of offensive missile launchers for missile defense interceptors and vice versa. But as General O’Reilly, our Missile Defense Director, has said, it is actually cheaper to build smaller, tailor-made missile defense silos than to convert offensive launchers. And the treaty does not restrict us from building new missile defense launchers, 14 of which we’re currently constructing in Alaska. [\[Read More\]](#)

defense, the previous administration did undertake such conversions. And future administrations might also find the conversion option attractive. As Dr. Kissinger testified before this Committee: “I would also have preferred to avoid prohibiting the use of missile launching sites for strategic defense as unnecessarily limiting strategic options of a future president.” [\[Read More\]](#)

### Prompt Global Strike

***John Bolton, Former US Ambassador to the United Nations, American Enterprise Institute Senior Fellow***

Less well-understood--but profoundly misguided--is the treaty's return to outmoded Cold War limits on weapons launchers, which will require the United States, but not Russia, to dismantle existing delivery systems. This could cripple America's long-range conventional warhead delivery capabilities, while also severely constraining our nuclear flexibility. We will pay for this mistake in future conflicts entirely unrelated to Russia. [\[Read More\]](#)

***Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense***

Furthermore, the New START does not restrict our ability to develop and deploy prompt conventional strike capabilities that could attack targets anywhere on the globe in an hour or less. The treaty's limit of 700 deployed delivery vehicles combined with the associated ceiling of 1550 deployed warheads accommodates the limited number of conventional warheads we may need for this capability. We are also currently examining potential future long-range weapons systems for prompt global strike that would not be limited by the treaty. [\[Read More\]](#)

## Nuclear Arsenal Modernization

### *Senator John McCain, Republican*

The May 2009 report by the bipartisan Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission articulated to Congress the dire need for modernization of the nuclear weapons complex. At that time, the Commission stated that, while the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has a reasonable plan, they lack the necessary funding to implement it properly. The administration's ten-year modernization plan that accompanied the New START Treaty – also referred to as the 1251 report – was expected to address these funding concerns. However, testimony before the Committee has made it increasingly clear that the President's plan may not meet our full recapitalization and modernization needs. [\[Read More\]](#)

### *Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser during the Ford and George H.W. Bush administrations, and Jake Garn is a former Republican senator from Utah*

That is a fair question, but this issue will exist whether the treaty enters into force or not. The treaty permits modernization by both sides. Each side is equally advantaged or disadvantaged. But we will only be disadvantaged by what we choose not to do with respect to modernization. Concerns about modernization, therefore, are not an argument against the treaty. They are an argument for building a political consensus between the administration and Congress on what needs to be funded now and what can be deferred. [\[Read More\]](#)

### *Steven Pifer Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe Director, Arms Control Initiative The Brookings Institution*

Seventh, some argue that further reductions in the U.S. strategic arsenal would be risky without a plan to maintain a robust U.S. nuclear deterrent. In fact, the administration requested \$7 billion in the FY 2011 budget for the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) weapons activities, a 10 percent increase compared to the previous year. The administration has stated that

it intends to spend \$80 billion over 10 years for NNSA weapons activities and the nuclear weapons complex, as well as \$100 billion over 10 years to maintain and modernize strategic delivery systems. [\[Read More\]](#)

## Nuclear Reductions and Deterrence

*Eric Edelman, Under-secretary of defense for policy, 2005–2009, distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments*

With regard to the overall question of deterrence I hope the Senate will carefully examine the launcher limit of 700 deployed (with an additional 100 non-deployed launchers) to determine for itself if this limit meets the requirements of deterrence. In September 2008, Secretary Gates and then Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman produced a joint DoE-DOD White Paper “National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century” that suggested a force of roughly 900 launchers was needed for purposes of deterrence. As recently as last fall the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright, during an exchange with Senator Thune in the SASC, said he “would be very concerned” if the launcher limit dropped below 800. What has changed? Why are 700 deployed launchers now sufficient? How will the U.S. maintain a resilient triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and manned bombers in the medium term? [\[Read More\]](#)

*Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense*

America’s nuclear arsenal remains a vital pillar of our national security, deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and partners. As such, the first step of the year-long Nuclear Posture Review was an extensive analysis which, among other things, determined how many delivery vehicles and deployed warheads were needed. This in turn provided the basis for our negotiations. The results of those studies give me confidence that the Department of Defense will be able to maintain a strong and effective nuclear deterrent while modernizing our weapons to ensure they are safe, secure, and reliable, all within the limits of this new treaty. [\[Read More\]](#)



## New START and Verification

Arguments Against New START	Arguments For New START
<b>Verification</b>	
<p><b><i>Paula DeSutter, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance</i></b></p> <p>The Administration is asserting that this treaty has a “robust” verification regime, and essentially that it is effectively verifiable. But it is certainly much less verifiable than the original START. The Administration has argued that less verification is needed now. To me, at lower numbers the consequences of circumvention or cheating are more dangerous and destabilizing, particularly in the absence of robust missile defenses. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>	<p><b><i>Dr. James N. Miller Principal Deputy Under Secretary, Policy Department of Defense</i></b></p> <p>As Secretary Gates has testified, one of the greatest contributions of this Treaty is its strong verification regime. The Treaty's verification and data exchange provisions will increase transparency and confidence in the numbers and status of Russian nuclear forces, without imposing significant burdens on our ability to operate U.S. nuclear forces. On-site inspections are a linchpin of the Treaty's verification framework. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>
<b>Verification—Telemetry</b>	
<p><b><i>Eric Edelman, Under-secretary of defense for policy, 2005–2009, distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments</i></b></p> <p>Moreover, given the telemetry exchange provisions, whereby each side determines the information to be shared, we may have additional gaps in understanding ongoing and future Russian strategic force improvements. The Obama Administration argues that this change in monitoring posture will not affect the ability to verify New START limits because these limits are different than under START I. While perhaps technically true,</p>	<p><b><i>Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary Department of State</i></b></p> <p>The regime is based on an extensive set of data exchanges and timely notifications regarding all strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty, two types of on-site inspections, exhibitions, locational restrictions, and additional transparency measures, including the use of unique identifiers on each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber. Although telemetry from missile flight tests is not required to verify the provisions of the New START Treaty, the Treaty includes</p>

<p>New START is being advertized as a means of strengthening predictability. Yet, because of changes in the telemetry regime, we will have less transparency into Russia's modernization. This is likely to undermine confidence and predictability. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>	<p>provisions regarding the exchange of some telemetric information as a means of enhancing transparency and predictability. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>
<p><b>Verification—Cheating</b></p>	
<p><i>Paula DeSutter, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance</i></p> <p>The Russians can do so much under this treaty to advance and expand their strategic forces over the length of the New START treaty and our ability to determine whether or not they are doing that and whether it violates the treaty is very, very low. The degree of verifiability if very low. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>	<p><i>Dr. James N. Miller Principal Deputy Under Secretary, Policy Department of Defense</i></p> <p>U.S. force structure plans under the treaty will further strengthen deterrence of Russian cheating or breakout. Because the United States will retain a robust triad of strategic forces, any Russian cheating or breakout under the treaty would have little effect on the assured second strike capabilities of U.S. nuclear forces. In particular, the survivability and responsiveness of strategic submarines at sea and alert heavy bombers will be unaffected by even large scale cheating. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>
<p><b>Verification—Previous Cheating</b></p>	
<p><i>Senator Jim DeMint, Republican</i></p> <p>Worse, the New START was crafted without a serious review of past treaty violations. A recent compliance report shows that Russia continually violated the original START. But the administration has turned a blind eye and is permitting even more lax procedures. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>	<p><i>Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary Department of State</i></p> <p>Regarding the recently released 2010 Compliance Report, I want to point out that Russia was in compliance with START's central limits during the Treaty's life span. Moreover, the majority of compliance issues raised under START were satisfactorily resolved. Most reflected differing interpretations on how to implement START's complex inspection and verification provisions. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>

## New START and Counting Rules

Arguments Against New START	Arguments For New START
<p><b>Russia Will Reduce Anyway</b></p> <p><i>Eric Edelman, Under-secretary of defense for policy, 2005–2009, distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments</i></p> <p>It is easy to understand why this lower limit was appealing to Russian officials since their launcher numbers appear to be dropping below 700 as a consequence of the aging of their systems and problems with their foundering modernization plans. But is a treaty that requires no elimination of nuclear force structure by Russia while forcing the U.S. to reduce launchers in the U.S. national interest, particularly given U.S. global responsibilities for providing extended deterrence to its allies a requirement which Russia does not face. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>	<p><i>General Kevin P. Chilton, Commander, United States Strategic Command</i></p> <p>First, New START limits the number of Russian ballistic missile warheads that can target the United States, missiles that pose the most prompt threat to our forces and our nation. Regardless of whether Russia would have kept its missile force levels within those limits without a New START treaty, upon ratification they would now be required to do so. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p> <p><i>Pavel Podvig, physicist trained at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation Research Associate.</i></p> <p>I can easily see how, once the arms control process is broken, its authors will be complaining about "unconstrained growth" of the same Russia's nuclear numbers they say are in "dramatic decline" today. We've seen that before.</p> <p>Some in the United States may still decide that the difference between a Russian strategic force of 1500 or 2500 nuclear warheads is not significant enough to be worth the price of a treaty that would constrain U.S. programs. There is half a point here - the numbers don't really matter. At this point the real benefit of the arms control process is in cooperation, trust- and confidence-building, and better communication that creates an environment that allows working on a much broader set of security issues than simple cold-war style bean-counting. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>

<p><b>Russia Will Shift to Bombers</b></p> <p><i>Mitt Romney, Former Massachusetts Governor</i></p> <p>Counting multiple-warhead bombers as only one warhead, as New START does, is a problem for America, not a plus. Yes, we currently have more long-range bombers than the Russians. But Russia has embarked on at least one new long-range bomber program. Russia also is developing a new long-range air-launched nuclear cruise missile. We, on the other hand, are doing neither. Russia will have modern bombers and modern missiles; we will not. It should come as no surprise that they are happy to undercount nuclear warheads on bombers. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>	<p><i>General Kevin P. Chilton, Commander, United States Strategic Command</i></p> <p>The New START bomber counting rules are unlikely to result in a reduction in Russian nuclear bomber forces, but these platforms have much less potential to be destabilizing, and we will retain the option to sustain equivalent capabilities. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>
<p><b>Russia Will Build Rail ICBMs</b></p> <p><i>Mitt Romney, Former Massachusetts Governor</i></p> <p>The absence of any mention of rail-based launchers should be remedied. U.S. advocates of the treaty say that if Russia again inaugurates a rail program, as some articles in the Russian press have suggested it might, rail-mobile ICBMs would count toward the treaty's arsenal limits; opponents say that no treaty language supports such an interpretation. Russian commentators have said that rail-based systems would be discussed by the BCC. Such ambiguity should be resolved before the treaty is approved, not after. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>	<p><i>Steven Pifer Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe Director, Arms Control Initiative The Brookings Institution</i></p> <p>It is correct that the treaty's definitions do not specifically define a "rail-mobile ICBM launcher." U.S. negotiators did not pursue this because the Russians retired their rail-mobile ICBMs prior to the beginning of the New START negotiations...Part One of the New START Protocol defines an ICBM launcher as "a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM." This would capture under New START's limits any rail-mobile ICBM that the Russians might choose to deploy in the future. It is difficult, moreover, to give credence to the notion that a U.S. administration would sit back while the Russians deployed rail-mobile ICBMs and claimed that they somehow were exempt from the limits of New START. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>

<b>Russia Will MIRV</b>	
<p><b><i>Mitt Romney, Former Massachusetts Governor</i></b></p> <p>Contrary to our long-held policy objectives, New START gives Russia an incentive to MIRV its weapons — that is, equip single ballistic missiles to deliver warheads to different targets. START I, on the other hand, limited the weight of ballistic missiles as well as MIRV testing and deployment, and by doing so significantly restrained MIRVing. Because all these limits are absent in New START, virtually the entire Russian nuclear-missile arsenal could be MIRVed. This would reverse decades of progress. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>	<p><b><i>Senator Dick Lugar, Republican</i></b></p> <p>Governor Romney offers additional treaty misreadings and myths that have been refuted explicitly in Congressional hearings...He also bemoans that New START does not “apply the MIRV limits that were part of the prior START treaty.” But there were no MIRV limits in START I, and START II never entered into force. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>
<b>TNWs are Unrestricted</b>	
<p><b><i>Senator Jim DeMint, Republican</i></b></p> <p>The Obama administration champions the fact that the treaty would limit both countries to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads each. But Russia could maintain its huge stockpile of roughly 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons, thousands more than the United States has, because the treaty doesn't restrict those types, which can also be affixed to rockets, submarines, and attack aircraft.</p> <p><b><i>Mitt Romney, Former Massachusetts Governor</i></b></p> <p>We should not countenance Russia’s ten-to-one tactical-nuclear-weapons advantage. These weapons constitute a real threat to our forces abroad, and to our allies in Europe and Asia. Russian-military spokesmen have asserted that they will rely on their tactical nuclear weapons to dominate regional or local conflicts near their borders. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>	<p><b><i>Senator Dick Lugar, Republican</i></b></p> <p>Russia does have more tactical weapons than we do, but he distorts their value by implying that they constitute a serious missile threat to Europe. In fact, most of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons either have very short ranges, are used for homeland air defense, are devoted to the Chinese border, or are in storage. He also ignores that our NATO allies have endorsed the New START Treaty. A Russian attack on NATO countries is effectively deterred by NATO conventional superiority, our own tactical nuclear forces, French and British nuclear arsenals, and U.S. strategic forces... Rejecting the Treaty would guarantee that no agreement on tactical nukes would occur. It also would mean giving up our human verification presence in Russia that has contributed greatly to strategic stability under the expired START I Treaty. Having inspectors on the ground in Russia has meant that we have not had to wonder about the make-up of Russian strategic forces. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>

## New START and the International Community

Arguments Against New START	Arguments For New START
<p><b>Russian Cooperation</b></p> <p><i>Eric Edelman, Under-secretary of defense for policy, 2005–2009, distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and Robert Joseph, under secretary of state for arms control and international security, 2005–2007 and a senior scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy</i></p> <p>It is hard to imagine that a healthy relationship with Russia could be undermined by the Senate’s duly deliberating about the treaty on more or less the same timeline that has governed every other arms-control agreement. Furthermore, in the wake of Russian statements opposing further U.S. and EU sanctions against Iran, and its fueling of Iran’s nuclear reactor in Bushehr, it is a stretch to see the reset as contributing much on the Iranian front.</p> <p>...</p> <p>Twenty years ago, the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (which included Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger) made the following observations about arms control with Russia: “When arms-control agreements are valued mainly for the international good will they are expected to generate, and only secondarily for their effects on arms, then our political leaders will always be under pressure to reach agreements by making concessions on arms. . . . A good arms agreement will be consistent with our long-term military strategy. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>	<p><i>Hilary Clinton, Secretary of State</i></p> <p>A ratified New START Treaty would also continue our progress toward broader U.S.-Russian cooperation, which is critical to other foreign policy priorities, including dealing with Iran’s nuclear program, cooperating on Afghanistan, and pursuing increased trade and investment. Already, the negotiations over this treaty have advanced our efforts to reset the U.S.-Russian relationship. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>

## Nonproliferation

***Senator Jon Kyl, Republican***

Here’s what we’ve done in disarmament already: the U.S. has reduced its nuclear weapons stockpile by 75 percent since the end of the Cold War and 90 percent since the height of the Cold War (this doesn’t even include the NEW START figures). The U.S. has not conducted a nuclear weapons test since 1992. It has not designed a new warhead since the 80s nor has it built one since the 1990s. We have pulled back almost all of our tactical nuclear weapons, and in the new NPR, we will retire our sea launched cruise missile.

And what has this ‘leadership’ gotten us? Has it impressed Iran and North Korea? Has it kept Russia and China and France and Great Britain and India and Pakistan from modernizing (and in some cases growing) their nuclear weapons stockpiles? [\[Read More\]](#)

***William Perry, Former Secretary of Defense under Bill Clinton***

If we fail to ratify this treaty, the United States will have forfeited any right to provide leadership in this field throughout the world. [\[Read More\]](#)

***James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense under Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford***

For the United States at this juncture, to fail to ratify the treaty in the due course of the Senate's deliberation would have a detrimental effect on our ability to influence others, with regard to particularly the nonproliferation issues. [\[Read More\]](#)



## New START and the Ratification Process

Arguments Against New START	Arguments For New START
<p><b>Unreleased Negotiation Record</b></p> <p><i>Senator Jim DeMint, Republican</i></p> <p>The treaty's negotiating records would provide some much-needed clarity. The Obama administration, however, is refusing to provide them to the Senate... What is the administration trying to hide? No action should be taken toward ratifying the New START treaty until the White House provides these documents. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>	<p><i>Rose Gottemoeller Assistant Secretary Department of State</i></p> <p>To those who may have concerns regarding alleged back-room deals during the Treaty negotiations, let me state unequivocally today on the record before this Committee, as I have done previously before the Foreign Relations Committee, that there were no/no secret deals made in connection with the New START Treaty; not on missile defense or any other issue. Everything we agreed to is in the Treaty documents transmitted to the Senate on May 13. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p> <p><i>Kingston Reif, Director of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; and Travis Sharp, Center for a New American Security Research Associate</i></p> <p>While childhood lessons ("sharing is caring") and platitudes ("what do you have to hide?") suggest that the Obama administration ought to comply, sharing New START's negotiating record with Senate Republicans is unwarranted. In fact, sharing the record might delay the approval process and would confuse key issues, misinterpret ratification precedents from previous arms control treaties, and undermine future US diplomacy based on flimsy evidence. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>



Process Bias	
<p><b><i>Senator James Inhofe, Republican</i></b></p> <p>While it is understandable that the Obama administration and Senate Democrats would want to stack the deck of witnesses with those who support their position, not allowing a single witness with a view opposed to the treaty hinders the Senate from making a well-informed decision and is downright undemocratic...</p> <p>Serving on both of these committees, I have watched as we have had, to date, no fewer than 15 hearings with 26 different witnesses providing their opinions of the accord. Except for two neutral witnesses who expressed caution and addressed several critical concerns, every single witness that has been allowed to testify has been a supporter of the New START. Such an incomplete approach to this important issue is a disservice to both the U.S. Senate and the Americans we each represent. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>	<p><b><i>George P. Shultz, U.S. secretary of state from 1982 to 1989; Madeleine K. Albright, secretary of state from 1997 to 2001; Gary Hart, Former Democratic Senator; and Chuck Hagel, Former Republican Senator</i></b></p> <p>Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has urged the Senate to ratify the treaty, and seven former Strategic Command (STRATCOM) chiefs have called on Senate leaders to move quickly. In addition to our military leadership, there is overwhelming bipartisan support for the treaty among national security experts. Also, officials from the past seven administrations, Republican and Democrat alike, testified before Senate committees in support of the treaty. In fact, the number of Republican former officials testifying outnumbered the number of Democrats. <a href="#">[Read More]</a></p>