

AUGUST 2015

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FEDERATED
DEFENSE
PROJECT

Tailoring the Global Network for Real Burden Sharing at Sea

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A Report of the Federated Defense Project

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ISBN: 978-1-4422-4112-1 (pb); 978-1-4422-4113-8 (eBook)

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Acknowledgments

The Federated Defense Project is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report. The findings, opinions, and omissions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of CSIS, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Executive Summary

The U.S. Navy's requirement to implement a long-standing rhetorical commitment to partnerships at sea was articulated in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, confirmed in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, and most recently reiterated in *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready*.¹ The Navy's current efforts to implement that requirement, however, have fallen short, particularly in terms of offsetting the risks of divesting maritime presence while ensuring operational access. This project will discuss the Department of Defense's identified need for deeper partnerships, the U.S. Navy's key role in addressing that need, the most promising maritime partners the Navy might identify to meet its particular presence and deterrence challenges, and the ways it might pursue them.

As an unclassified, service-specific look at a particular defense policy area, *Tailoring the Global Network for Real Burden Sharing at Sea* examines what the Navy can do from the bottom up when considering a validated, relevant strategic imperative for deeper, more structured partnerships that target the needs of the joint force and help it move forward. While the Office of the Secretary of Defense continues to work a top-down approach, the Navy must begin to shape its own future by pursuing initiatives which seize those opportunities that are readily apparent from a maritime perspective.

Deeper defense cooperation is no longer a policy choice; rather, it is a reality and a necessity, given U.S. defense budget projections against global operational requirements. As such, this project finds that the Navy has yet to move beyond simply taking what it can get from maritime partners. The new goal of Navy partnerships must be to build up the kind of technical interoperability, common operational experience, and prioritized areas of mutual security interest that have become so vital to collaborative defense policies in the twenty-first century. While the new *Cooperative Strategy* is encouraging rhetoric, the attention it pays to enhancing the global network of navies must drive a more comprehensive approach to answering higher strategic guidance if it is to ensure that U.S. efforts to get meaningful, reliable contributions from partners do not miss worthwhile bets or open new vulnerabilities. As Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert stated upon the revised strategy's release, presence remains the Navy's priority—and partnerships will

1. Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready* (CS21R), March 2015, <http://www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf>.

become increasingly vital to maintaining it.² More important than ever for the U.S. Navy, though, is the establishment of a *partnered presence that deters*.

2. Admiral Jonathan Greenert, interview with Admiral James Stavridis, CSIS Maritime Security Dialogues, Washington, DC, March 13, 2015, <http://csis.org/event/cooperative-strategy-21st-century-seapower-forward-engaged-ready>.

1 | Introduction

In the May 2014 issue of *Proceedings Magazine*, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert and Vice Admiral James Foggo III penned a noteworthy article, “Forging a Global Network of Navies,” which champions the various security benefits of maritime cooperation in the pursuit of contemporary U.S. foreign policy objectives.¹ The article builds on a long-standing U.S. Navy tradition of internationalism, tracing back to the earliest observations that some aspects of operating at sea are universal—namely, that seafarers share common hardships and opportunities that predispose navies to collaboration. The U.S. Navy formally articulated that collaborative outlook on the provision of security in the global maritime commons in the 2007 edition of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*.² The revised *Cooperative Strategy* renews this emphasis on partners as increasingly important to the core functions of the Navy.³ Inasmuch as the Navy’s arguments about a “global network” are not new, they amount to a rededication by the U.S. Navy to the promise of partnerships in an era of diverging defense resources and requirements—an era that portends greater reliance on collective action at sea than ever before. However, a more comprehensive approach to developing the collaborative efforts of key navies is required if a growing American dependence on allies and partners is ultimately to serve U.S. security interests.

Whether implementing “building partner capacity” initiatives, providing security assistance, or pursuing “federated defense” approaches (as an ongoing CSIS analysis terms it⁴), the United States has long recognized the importance of allied and partner contributions to mutual interests in a challenging international security environment. Current defense strategic guidance⁵ sources contend that the global security outlook appears to be deteriorating in ways both anticipated and unforeseen, with the potential for local shocks to hold strategic consequences for nations now inextricably intertwined. Former secretary

1. Admiral Jonathan Greenert and Rear Admiral James G. Foggo III, “Forging a Global Network of Navies,” *Proceedings Magazine* 140, no. 5 (May 2014), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2014-05/forging-global-network-navies>.

2. Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (CS21), October 2007, http://ise.gov/sites/default/files/Maritime_Strategy.pdf.

3. CS21R.

4. *Federated Defense Project Concept Overview* (Washington, DC: CSIS, December 16, 2013), http://csis.org/files/publication/131216_FederatedProject_Concept_Overview.pdf.

5. Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (2012 Defense Strategic Guidance or DSG12), January 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf, and *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (QDR14), March 2014, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf constitute the Department of Defense’s current strategic guidance.

of defense Chuck Hagel put a fine point on the military threat posed by the spread of precise weaponry when he called last year for improved technological innovation to check the steady erosion of U.S. power projection capability witnessed over the last generation.⁶ And while many observers cited the unpredictability of the present international environment, none projected the scope and speed of developments in Ukraine, Iraq, and Syria that would lead NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg to label 2014 a “black year for security.”⁷

This challenging environment looks worse still through the lens of persistent U.S. defense spending reductions that began in 2011 but worsened in 2013 with the sequester mechanism contained in the Budget Control Act. Alongside his fellow service chiefs, Admiral Greenert testified before Congress on the damaging impacts several years of declining defense budgets and blind cuts have had on the military’s surge capacity and war-fighting employability.⁸ He reprised that message in his Fiscal Year 2016 Presidential Budget (PB16) submission testimony with a call for new strategic guidance, should sequestration return, pointing out that the Navy’s “degraded readiness posture has also affected our ability to satisfy contingency response requirements”; in addition, the “overall impact of budget shortfalls in the past three years has manifested in the continued decline of our relative war-fighting advantages in many areas” such that deterrence and the ability to counter anti-access/area-denial developments are at great risk.⁹ Yet, a path toward legislative action to amend or repeal the Budget Control Act discretionary spending caps before they return in 2016 remains elusive.¹⁰ Admiral William Gortney, commander of U.S. Northern Command, commented early in 2015 that, perhaps for the first time in history, the United States is shifting from a prolonged war campaign to its customary post-conflict drawdown in a less secure environment than when the military last built up.¹¹ *One of the last factors left for military planners to consider* in such a security setting, absent increases in defense top-line funding or a new domestic political consensus on what missions the armed forces might divest, *is to share the burdens of underwriting international security* through improved international partnerships.

6. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, “Defense Innovation Days” (opening keynote remarks, Southeastern New England Defense Industry Alliance, Newport, RI, September 3, 2014), <http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1877>.

7. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg of NATO, “Opening Speech” (remarks at Munich Security Conference, Munich, Germany, February 6, 2015), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_117320.htm.

8. Admiral Jonathan Greenert, *Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Impact of Sequestration on National Defense*, January 28, 2014, [http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Greenert/Testimony/150128%20Chief%20of%20Naval%20Operations%20\(CNO\)%20Adm.%20Greenert%20Statment%20and%20Slides%20before%20Senate%20Armed%20Services%20Committee.pdf](http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Greenert/Testimony/150128%20Chief%20of%20Naval%20Operations%20(CNO)%20Adm.%20Greenert%20Statment%20and%20Slides%20before%20Senate%20Armed%20Services%20Committee.pdf).

9. Admiral Jonathan Greenert, *FY 2016 Posture Hearing Opening Statement before the House Appropriations Committee—Defense*, February 26, 2015, <http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Greenert/Testimony/150226%20CNO%20HAC-D%20Hearing%20on%20Budget%20Opening%20Remarks.pdf>.

10. John T. Bennett, “Prospects Dim for ‘Ryan-Murray II’ Budget-Relief Deal,” *DefenseNews*, January 3, 2015, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/congress/2015/01/03/price-enzi-deficit-budget-gop/21111261/>.

11. Admiral William Gortney, “Keynote Address” (remarks at U.S. Naval Institute West Conference 2015, San Diego, CA, February 10, 2015), <http://www.usni.org/events/2015-west-conference/on-scene-report/2015-02-10>.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense identified this imperative in both the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance¹² and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),¹³ and is working toward a top-down review of opportunities for deepening partnerships. Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, in commenting on the strategic thought behind the department's FY 2016 budget request, reaffirmed the QDR priority to strengthen key alliances and partnerships even if funding trend lines improved.¹⁴ Similarly, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey observed in his July 2014 *Foreign Policy* article titled "Bend of Power" that preserving a U.S. military capable of the "direct application of force" will require "like-minded nations . . . to contribute to the collective defense."¹⁵ Part of Chairman Dempsey's prescription is to assume a more agile posture of *dynamic presence* so as to meter forces to provide a minimum deterrent in areas of key strategic interest and to respond to crises globally.¹⁶ This is, of course, precisely what the Navy traditionally does, and what it is struggling to keep doing. Given the unanimity on what a perplexing strategic environment the United States finds itself in, it would appear the most destabilizing thing the U.S. government could do is to maintain the same approach to strategy and force planning it has always used in order to preserve a status quo that is changing underneath its keel. *Continuing to aspire to be the security exporter of first resort globally could lead to highly unfavorable outcomes for U.S. foreign policy.*

It is, therefore, incumbent upon the services to prepare themselves for growing challenges to the present international order, and specifically to preserve our military advantages where possible. The Navy has a particular interest in approaching this subject comprehensively from the bottom up, taking into account its well-established relationships and the unique war-fighting requirements of the maritime domain in which it is expected to operate and prevail. The Navy is well aware that its readiness challenge runs far deeper than the Budget Control Act. In 2010, the then chief of naval operations Admiral Gary Roughead perceived the approaching storm of fiscal constraints for a fleet that had in fact shrunk during years of record-breaking military spending and faced startling recapitalization requirements in the larger context of what was expected to be a considerable defense drawdown.¹⁷ More than a decade of unchecked combatant commander demand for steady-state naval presence during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars compelled the Navy to achieve consistent deployment numbers with a shrinking pool of ships by sacrificing some maintenance and training for the fleet that remained. Were sequester-driven cuts never to return,

12. DSG12.

13. QDR14.

14. Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, "Opening Session Speech" (remarks at U.S. Naval Institute West Conference 2015, San Diego, CA, February 10, 2015), <http://www.usni.org/events/2015-west-conference/on-scene-report/2015-02-10>.

15. Martin E. Dempsey, "The Bend of Power: How the U.S. Military Can Overcome the Challenges of Complexity in a Rapidly Changing World," *Foreign Policy*, July 25, 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/25/the-bend-of-power/>.

16. Deputy Secretary Work attributes the term to General Dempsey and goes on to describe it as the concept behind an effort to suppress, out of necessity, rampant combatant commander demand for forces. Deputy Secretary Bob Work, "A New Global Posture for a New Era" (remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, September 30, 2014), <http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1890>.

17. Admiral Gary Roughead, "Keynote Address" (remarks at U.S. Naval War College Current Strategy Forum 2010, Newport, RI, June 8, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r_hcXPzQgOo.

the Navy would still face several years of intense restorative maintenance and extended deployments before it could stabilize the management of the fleet's rotational forces.¹⁸

From the perspective of a global Navy wrestling with competing imperatives—(1) to maintain high-readiness forces for forward presence, and (2) to build a capable future force in sufficient capacity—the wisdom of higher defense guidance directing enhanced international partnerships is readily apparent. Even taking into consideration current plans to divest some maritime presence requirements¹⁹ and return the focus to future force structure investments,²⁰ the nation's fleet already finds itself in a situation where it needs to begin counting on, and planning for, allied and partner contributions as a way to offset risk, and that includes looking at *the role of allies in upholding conventional deterrence*. Surely, military planners must not allow a “supply-based” global force management scheme to muddy U.S. thinking on which types of force packages achieve credible deterrence and which merely reinforce presence;²¹ it follows that the partnerships called for in strategic guidance will principally only be as good as the credible deterrent capabilities they bring with them. Assuming the Budget Control Act remains the law of the land and sequestration once again compounds the Navy's resourcing dilemma, the service's incentive to offset risk through more fundamental and pervasive partnering approaches only grows.

In sum, deeper defense cooperation is no longer a policy choice; rather, it is a reality and a necessity, given U.S. defense budget projections against global operational requirements, and for no service so much as the Navy. As such, the Navy is—with some laudable exceptions to be highlighted later—behind the curve on consciously moving beyond merely taking what it can get from partners. The U.S. Navy must build up in its maritime partnerships the all-important qualities of war-fighting capability, technical interoperability, common operational experience, and prioritized areas of mutual security interest. The service might, as a result, pursue a comprehensive approach to meeting the intent of higher strategic guidance, thereby ensuring U.S. efforts to garner meaningful, reliable contributions from partners who do not jeopardize promising opportunities or open up new vulnerabilities at sea. With the 2014 QDR, the U.S. military has already accepted the risk of relying more on allies and partners. Now, even as the U.S. government espouses more enlightened self-interest in the potential gains to be won from consciously cultivated security cooperation, it must redouble its partnership efforts if the United States is not to compound its problems.

This paper will review the Navy's central role in addressing the Department of Defense's identified need for reliable partnerships and speak to key opportunities and challenges the

18. By the time of the PB16 release, Deputy Secretary Work, Admiral Greenert, and U.S. Fleet Forces Commander Admiral Philip Davidson had each publicly observed this so-called readiness trough; however, their estimates varied as to when the Navy might regain stability.

19. Deputy Secretary Work, “A New Global Posture for a New Era.”

20. Admiral Jonathan Greenert, *Chief of Naval Operations' Navigation Plan 2015–2019*, http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/140818_CNO_Navigation_Plan.pdf.

21. Captain Robert Rubel, “Straight Talk on Forward Presence,” *Proceedings Magazine* 141, no. 3 (March 2015), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-03/straight-talk-forward-presence>.

Navy might consider in fulfilling that role. It will offer fundamental *principles* of a more comprehensive approach to maritime partnerships, weigh the best *prospects* for a more virtuous network of navies, suggest *proposals* to begin tailoring the network to the Navy's ends, and distill *priorities* the Navy can articulate in the context of wider defense cooperation initiatives already under way. Through a targeted development of high-potential partnerships, the paper concludes, the Navy might point the way for the joint force in controlling its exposure to the risks of strategic instability in places of prime U.S. interest, while each service recalibrates to full readiness at higher capability but reduced capacity.²²

22. In a pre-PB16 conference call with media and think tanks held on February 2, 2015, Deputy Secretary Work and Admiral Sandy Winnefeld indicated the Navy will reach restored readiness within the FYDP under the president's plan.

2 | What the Global Network Is, and What It Needs to Be

Admiral Greenert correctly states that the global network of navies is “already underway.”¹ He cites several contemporary examples of ad hoc cooperation covering a considerable swath of naval activities from humanitarian assistance to maritime security, each of which demonstrates the utility of willing partners combining operations to stabilize local situations and uphold global norms. The Navy has consistently operated with key allies since the end of World War II—in service of NATO and Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty commitments, principally—and it has studied coalition best practices in earnest since the first post-Cold War contingencies made clear to U.S. policymakers the political-military benefits of multilateralism.² In some respects, American sailors feel the profits and drawbacks of combined naval operations more innately than they do those of joint coordination between the services. Yet, there is a difference between what the global network is today and what it needs to be if it is to serve U.S. interests going forward.

The notion of a global network traces its origins to former chief of naval operations Admiral Mike Mullen’s concept of “global maritime partnerships” (the so-called thousand-ship navy) for the protection of international norms in a new security era characterized by diffuse transnational threats.³ The 2007 *Cooperative Strategy* built on that construct to claim the function of sea power as a “unifying force,” even as the distinction between war and peace blurs and challenges to the maritime commons abound.⁴ Every two years since the release of that document, the U.S. Naval War College’s International Seapower Symposium has garnered wide and increasing interest from foreign heads of naval service in the prospects for greater collaboration at sea.⁵ The global network construct itself advances the conclusion that the fiscal challenges many nations face make an open, adaptable network

1. Greenert and Foggo, “Forging a Global Network of Navies,” 25.

2. Gary E. Weir and Sandra Doyle, eds., *You Cannot Surge Trust: Combined Naval Operations of the Royal Australian Navy, Canadian Navy, Royal Navy, and United States Navy, 1991–2003* (Washington, DC: Naval History and Heritage Command, 2013).

3. Vice Admiral John G. Morgan and Rear Admiral Charles W. Martoglio, “The 1,000 Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network,” *Proceedings Magazine* 132, no. 11 (November 2005), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2005-11/1000-ship-navy-global-maritime-network>.

4. CS21.

5. In September 2014, 72 chiefs of naval service, 21 heads of coast guard, and 75 additional flag officers and civilian leaders attended the twenty-first iteration of the International Seapower Symposium (ISS). See the U.S. Naval War College’s repository of ISS conference proceedings at <https://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/International-Sea-Power-Symposium-Proceedings.aspx>.

more important than before the global financial crisis,⁶ a theme seen reiterated in the revised *Cooperative Strategy* completed in March 2015.⁷

If the U.S. Navy has signaled consistently for a decade its interest in growing the network of navies, then how is it not currently leveraging Department of Defense implementation of strategic guidance on security cooperation? The answer can be seen in the very institutional thinking traced above; it relates to how the Navy conceives of allied and partner contributions—namely, as a universal good but in many respects an afterthought, or something nice to have if it can supplement U.S. plans.⁸ Such an outlook belies a persistent, but increasingly questionable, belief in sufficient U.S. military capability and capacity to “go it alone.” Crucially, it also places artificial limits on the kinds of contributions the U.S. seeks out and can reasonably expect to garner from key nations. So, while the thousand-ship navy appropriately focused on building consensus for common action in areas of mutual interest globally, it touted low barriers to entry.⁹ Consequently, it largely relegated its security contributions to low-end missions that could be described as pressurizing ungoverned spaces. The 2007 *Cooperative Strategy* that followed confirmed that the United States expected allied and partner contributions to remain firmly in the realm of maritime security (or constabulary) operations. That the number of foreign attendees at successive International Seapower Symposiums continues to be used as an indicator of interest by the U.S. Navy suggests the service remains seized with the quantity of partnerships over their qualities.

None of this is to overlook the sheer normative force for stability on the seas that can be accrued by including as many of the world’s navies as possible in a common articulation of values. Even if the global network’s instantiation to date has been more aspirational than practical, the bedrock of wide-ranging commitment to the freedom of the global maritime commons remains necessary to perpetuate the current international order. Combined military operations other than war (or lower-end missions) are not easy either, as the battles between even treaty allies over the proper role of naval forces in counterpiracy, for example, would indicate.¹⁰ Finally, if the sea service’s extant maritime security cooperation policy is any guide, building basic partner capacity requires the coordinated efforts of eight organizations in the Navy alone, not to mention dedicated investment by each of the five Navy regional service component commands responsible for execution.¹¹

6. Greenert and Foggo, “Forging a Global Network of Navies.”

7. CS21R.

8. Rear Admiral Michael Smith, “Strategic Cooperation: Everybody Wins,” *Proceedings Magazine* 139, no. 3 (March 2013), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013-03/strategic-cooperation-everybody-wins>.

9. Geoff Fein, “‘Global Maritime Partnership’ Gaining Steam at Home and with International Navies,” *Defense Daily*, October 25, 2006, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/DEFENSE_DAILY_25OCT06_Global_Maritime_Partnership_Gaining_Steam_At_Home_And_With_International_Navies.pdf.

10. A debate between NATO and the EU over whether counterpiracy efforts should include action ashore was widely reported in 2012, and in the end limited the more expansive EU operation to a single air strike ashore.

11. Department of the Navy, *Maritime Security Cooperation Policy: An Integrated Navy–Marine Corps–Coast Guard Approach*, January 2013, http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Res%20Maritime%20Security%20Cooperation_An%20Integrated_USN-USMC-USCG_Approach%20w%20PCN.pdf.

If a broadly interpreted, lowest-common-denominator network for naval cooperation ever proved suited to the times, it is no longer adequate to meet U.S. needs against the backdrop of increasing vulnerabilities and declining national defense budgets that clearly seizes the Navy today.¹² This is part of what makes prescriptions to grow, as opposed to deepen, the global network so underwhelming. At the same time the network grasps a role for partners to help “deter or limit future conflict,” the Navy’s action plan as currently construed emphasizes broader participation (“no contribution too small”) over improving the effectiveness of the most likely war-fighting contributions. By contrast, *prescriptions to deepen the network*—which surely would benefit from a balance between the high end and the low end of operational capability—*require a shift from broad statements of principle to a series of focused, targeted, and explicitly linked efforts with tangible promise.*

A few of those efforts are under way—specifically with the navies of the United Kingdom, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and, to a lesser extent, Australia—and they are undoubtedly crucial, though only in the case of the Royal Navy has planning been linked publicly by the Navy to a renewed, replete U.S. focus on deepening war-fighting partnerships at sea.¹³ In general terms, the Navy was quick to discuss how a more collaborative scheduling of deployments and theater security cooperation between long-standing allies might help address a mismatch between the supply of and demand for U.S. maritime forces,¹⁴ but more work seems to be going into changing U.S. force apportionment to the combatant commanders than improving outreach to allies. At a CSIS event on maritime cooperation with Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michelle Howard headlining, both the German and Norwegian chiefs of naval service emphasized that key navies in the global network do not hear enough specifics from the U.S. Navy on what it would like them to contribute.¹⁵ Even if those calls can be dismissed, the feedback from another ally suggests this is a common sentiment. In January 2015, the UK Royal Navy’s attaché to the United States cautioned that how drastically the U.S. Navy alters its global forward presence in the coming years will set limits on international cooperation at sea.¹⁶

To the extent that the deeper U.S. Navy cooperation now envisioned with the Royal Navy in terms of common force planning, employment, and mutual technology

12. Rear Admiral William K. Lescher, “Department of Defense Briefing by Rear Adm. Lescher on the Fiscal Year 2016 Navy Budget in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” February 2, 2015, <http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5585>.

13. An article by the Navy Chief of Information Office, “US, UK Navies Sign Framework for Future Cooperation,” December 15, 2014, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=84898, addresses agreement between the two navies on a document called *Combined Seapower: A Shared Vision for Royal Navy–United States Navy Cooperation*, by far the most aggressive force integration effort ever conceived by two major naval forces.

14. Smith, “Strategic Cooperation.”

15. At this public event held on September 15, 2014, Rear Admiral Lars Saunes, Royal Norwegian Navy, pointed out that it falls on larger navies to invite smaller ones to share global burdens. Similarly, Vice Admiral Axel Schimpf, German Navy, lamented the absence of credible pathways to partnership on a global scale. See “Cooperation to Counter 21st Century Maritime Domain Challenges” (CSIS Europe Program Conference, Washington, DC, September 15, 2014), <http://csis.org/event/cooperation-counter-21st-century-maritime-domain-challenges>.

16. Commodore Richard Allen, naval attaché at the British Embassy, made that comment in public remarks on January 14, 2015, at the Surface Navy Association National Symposium. Note that this level of concern comes from an ally in what must be considered the “gold standard” of global partnership on the high seas.

investment¹⁷ indicates wider movement afoot on the U.S. Department of Defense’s partnership outlook, the Navy should highlight where it is replicating that model. If, on the other hand, the 2012 US-UK Statement of Intent¹⁸ and the 2014 Combined Seapower Vision reflect a unique approach given the historically “special relationship” between our two nations¹⁹ (as well as the unmistakable thrust of the Royal Navy’s future development strategy in particular),²⁰ the principles inherent in that approach warrant attention so they can be applied wherever else possible.

Additionally, as extensive as U.S. Navy cooperation with, say, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has become in recent years, it has yet to be connected definitively with the global network of navies itself, or with broader Department of Defense–driven security cooperation innovations. The virtues inherent in a JMSDF surface combatant’s cooperative deployment with U.S. Forward Deployed Naval Forces (where that ship assumed strike-group level command and control responsibilities within the *George Washington* Carrier Strike Group), or in the five year-old “Letter of Understanding” between the U.S. Navy’s forward deployed destroyer squadron and the JMSDF’s First Fleet Escort Flotilla,²¹ differ from most other maritime security cooperation initiatives. They should be captured in the Navy’s discourse on tailoring the global network, and tailored requirements should visibly shape the complex exercises in which capable navies like the Royal Navy and the JMSDF routinely participate.

17. Department of the Navy and Navy Command Headquarters, *Combined Seapower: A Shared Vision for Royal Navy–United States Navy Cooperation*, December 10, 2014, <http://www.navy.mil/docs/RN-USN%20Combined%20Strategic%20Narrative%20CNO-1SL%20Signed.pdf>.

18. The January 2012 DoD-MoD agreement is intended to drive cooperative carrier airpower training while the Royal Navy goes without a carrier for several years. See <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/number-10-press-briefing-us-and-uk-defence-cooperation>.

19. See Rear Admiral Kevin Donegan’s post on the Navy Live blog, “The Next Chapter of the Special Relationship in the Maritime Domain,” January 8, 2015, <http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2015/01/08/the-next-chapter-of-the-special-relationship-in-the-maritime-domain/>.

20. Admiral Sir George Zambellas, “Credible Maritime Partners in the 21st Century” (remarks at CSIS International Security Program Conference, Washington, DC, July 30, 2014), <http://csis.org/event/credible-maritime-partners-21st-century>.

21. Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System, “US, JMSDF Navy Strengthen Alliance,” April 4, 2014, <https://www.dvidshub.net/news/124195/us-jmsdf-navy-strengthen-alliance#.VOdzMvnF9Gg>.

3 | Principles of a Comprehensive Approach

In considering some principles of a more comprehensive partnership approach, it is worth recalling that there is a perceptible ceiling in U.S. naval strategic thought on what kinds of partner contributions can really be expected in a contingency. It is a dynamic that has always driven the Navy's stated force structure requirements higher in pursuit of the nation's interest, but it seems patently unattainable in the forecasted budget environment. The global network as currently imagined, for instance, has conspicuously little to say about partner contributions involving combat incident to operations at sea.¹ The 2007 *Cooperative Strategy* considered sustaining "cooperative relationships with more international partners" wholly apart from "credible combat power" to assure access and deter regional aggressors.² The maritime strategic documents of the 1990s treated partnerships at some distance; coalition operations were seen to reflect the inescapable political realities of modern warfare, yet hardly more.³ Perhaps the absence of an identified adversary in these strategies prevented contextual considerations about *which* partners might be willing to contribute *what* in a given scenario. Yet, even the heralded maritime strategy of the 1980s—every bit a threat-based plan involving specified requests for allied support—recommended increased U.S. Navy carrier strike group and logistics sustainment capacity to account for the risk of allied nonparticipation in responding to Soviet aggression.⁴

If one accepts there is work the Navy must always be prepared to do beyond the day-to-day maritime security operations already straining fleet capacity across the globe (work requiring naval presence capable of transitioning to combat operations on short order, in a few key regions at least), an excursion looking into what might order our thinking about partner contributions is as worthwhile as it will be difficult. In more regions than once

1. Greenert and Foggo, "Forging a Global Network of Navies," 29.

2. CS21.

3. The Navy's 1994 naval strategy, "Forward . . . From the Sea," focused on how enduring U.S. forward presence would demonstrate the intent and capacity of the U.S. Navy to come to the aid of allies and friends. See Department of the Navy, *Forward . . . From the Sea*, November 1994, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/fromsea/forward.txt>. Navy-commissioned studies of partnership at the time found that the benefits of international legitimacy outweighed the "presumed mission-area training decrements from learning to adapt to foreign forces." See Thomas J. Hirschfeld, *Multinational Naval Cooperation Options: Final Report* (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1993), 52.

4. John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, eds., *Naval War College Newport Papers*, vol. 33, *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008), 94–96, 100–102, <https://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Press/-Newport-Papers/Documents/33-pdf.aspx>.

anticipated, even lower-end steady state operations in the current milieu may require the kind of credible war-fighting capability needed to assure access and deter adventurism from propelling crises.⁵ What kind of Russian navy presence, for instance, must a routine U.S. “engagement” patrol five years from now expect to encounter in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea?⁶ With questions like that in mind, what types of contributions should the U.S. Navy seek going forward? Allied and partner contributions must bring added *interoperability*, *transparency*, *predictability*, and finally *capability* to the global network in order to relieve some of the U.S. Navy’s burden in the near- to midterm.

Interoperability

If a global network is to have an impact beyond closer maritime security cooperation, burden sharing will require improved **interoperability**, which has both a technical and an operational aspect. The Department of Defense’s full-court press on innovation, acquisition reform, and technology “offsets” is intended to reverse a decline in the United States’ present war-fighting advantages by introducing disruptive technologies at best cost. Although international cooperation on these various initiatives is often mentioned,⁷ it is clearly not a focus of any one of them, and, as will be addressed later, significant pressures running counter to closer collaboration persist. Still, broader defense industry trends would suggest partnerships in the arenas of research, development, and procurement will be required for a third offset strategy to help the U.S. military pace the most stressing threats to its qualitative technological superiority and operational freedom of action.

Today’s defense market is increasingly globalized, and the U.S. government drives a mere 8 percent of global research and development.⁸ Because most technological innovations are now achieved in commercial industry, where key nontraditional suppliers eschew defense-related business on practical or principled grounds,⁹ the U.S. government is poorly positioned to access efficiently both the critical components of today’s programmed future force as well as potential game changers for the longer term. These trends are compounded

5. A Heritage Foundation comprehensive index assesses the U.S. Navy’s capability at “marginal,” due in part to this reality. See Dakota L. Wood, ed., *2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Assessing America’s Ability to Provide for the Common Defense* (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2015), 247–254, http://ims-2015.s3.amazonaws.com/2015_Index_of_US_Military_Strength_FINAL.pdf.

6. See Sam LaGrone, “NATO Commander Breedlove: Imported Russian Missiles Have Turned Crimea into a Black Sea ‘Power Projection’ Platform,” *USNI News*, February 25, 2015, <http://news.usni.org/2015/02/25/nato-commander-breedlove-imported-russian-missiles-have-turned-crimea-into-a-black-sea-power-projection-platform>.

7. See, for example, Undersecretary of Defense Frank Kendall, “Better Buying Power 3.0” (remarks at CSIS International Security Program Conference, Washington, DC, September 19, 2014), <http://csis.org/event/better-buying-power-30-discussion-under-secretary-frank-kendall> or Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, “The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and Its Implications for Allies and Partners” (speech delivered at the Willard Hotel, Washington, DC, January 28, 2015), <http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1909>.

8. David J. Berteau, Scott Miller, Ryan Crotty, and Paul Nadeau, *Leveraging Global Value Chains for a Federated Approach to Defense* (Washington, DC: CSIS, December 2014), http://csis.org/files/publication/141216_Crotty_LeveragingGlobalValueChains_Web.pdf.

9. William J. Lynn III, “The End of the Military-Industrial Complex,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2014, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142199/william-j-lynn-iii/the-end-of-the-military-industrial-complex>.

by long-recognized domestic legal barriers related to domestic content regulations, joint ventures, and technology transfer,¹⁰ which have prevented the Department of Defense from making it easier to do business with American companies and their foreign commercial competitors. At the same time, the list of other major defense suppliers (predominantly European) with which the U.S. government will be able to do business is likely to change¹¹ in light of continuing declining European defense spending.¹² Dynamics like these are driving the Department of Defense’s “Better Buying Power” initiatives for improved outreach in global markets. Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics Frank Kendall now delivers a clear message of U.S. government intent to “strike a balance” between foreign and domestic sources for future capability, including multinational cooperation on future U.S. procurement contracts.¹³ In a similar vein, Defense Technology Security Administration Director Beth McCormick’s cooperative security technology initiatives are aimed at communicating U.S. government preparedness to share more with those in need who will reciprocate best practices.¹⁴

While challenging, the Navy’s voice on which opportunities for technological innovation to pursue—whether burgeoning domestically or abroad—must be loud in such a fraught defense acquisitions environment. Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition Sean Stackley has observed that anticipated budgets are driving the Navy to place affordability on a par with speed, power, and payload in defining requirements, and to leverage design and support costs held elsewhere (i.e., in private industry) when possible so the Navy can focus on developing advanced weapons systems.¹⁵ Which maritime-related innovations does the U.S. Navy want to see thrive in a global research and development setting in which the United States exercises less control? Where can partnered investment improve access to a globalized defense market?

Perhaps the Navy should not focus on cooperative development, except where we share interests with partners in broadly compatible capability sets (rather than specific or niche requirements). But the process of partnership-driven investing itself might become a touchstone for the wider corporate defense acquisition reform effort if the Navy makes clear that achievable projects would yield efficiency benefits in the affordability and suitability of its

10. Berteau, et al., *Leveraging Global Value Chains*; Lynn, “The End of the Military-Industrial Complex.”

11. Munich Security Conference 2015, “Munich Security Report 2015,” 44–45, <http://www.eventanizer.com/MSC2015/MunichSecurityReport2015.pdf>.

12. David Berteau, “European Defense Trends: Briefing Update” (Washington, DC: CSIS, January 5, 2015), http://csis.org/files/publication/150105_Berteau_EuropeanDefenseTrends2014_BriefingUpdate_Web.pdf.

13. Valerie Insinna, “Pentagon’s Acquisitions Chief to Promote U.S. Defense Tech at IDEX,” *National Defense*, February 23, 2015, <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1755>.

14. Director Beth McCormick, Defense Technology Security Administration, Department of Defense, “Securing Defense Technology in a Globalized Marketplace” (remarks at Hudson Institute Conference, Washington, DC, December 17, 2014), <http://www.hudson.org/events/1214-securing-defense-technology-in-a-globalized-marketplace122014>.

15. Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition Sean Stackley, “Atlantic Council Defense-Industrial Policy Address” (remarks at Atlantic Council headquarters, Washington, DC, January 7, 2015), <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/webcasts/discussion-with-the-hon-sean-stackley-assistant-secretary-of-the-navy>.

own forces, finally striking an appropriate balance between joint interdependence¹⁶ and international interoperability. An early model for this approach might end up being the much-maligned littoral combat ship program, as foreign interest is reportedly growing in the modified “frigate” version of the ship where (depending on the variant) either the hull or the combat system were developed internationally, and whose potential for various naval warfare applications is clearly broadening.¹⁷

Of course, there is also a crucial operational (or procedural) facet to interoperability. A sustained commitment of resources is required when building perpetual maritime competency and reliability in both allies and partners so they can begin to share the burdens of global security. Much of this effort will continue to fall on deploying U.S. strike groups and amphibious ready groups to sustain. However, the interactions brought about by those assets must also become more integrated and lasting than a single foreign ship the U.S. Navy might bring alongside for portions of a deployment. Additionally, afloat staff planning and technical expert interactions must advance if interoperability for more complex operations is ever to be achieved. Deeper engagement with partners in the form of advanced exercises, staff liaison officer exchanges, cooperative deployments, and combined operations can actually accelerate complementary capability investments that are relevant enough to compensate for any capacity shortfall in the Navy’s inventory.

Deputy Secretary Work highlighted interoperability as a preeminent factor in the pursuit of the third offset, stating that the United States will not benefit from “standing there all alone with beautiful technologies that keep our edge, but no more interoperability, no allies that can really join with us when we go to war.”¹⁸ The U.S. military’s comfort level in exploring how to leverage technological breakthroughs with allies and partners remains to be seen, while known difficulties in achieving deeper interoperability between existing U.S. and foreign forces fail to receive adequate consideration. The perennial challenges of data and communications networking between U.S. and foreign systems come to mind immediately when thinking through combined naval operations. As central as information exchange platforms like the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) have become to coalition warfare, those systems do not address the need for tactical data sharing and real-time decision support that actually enable greater combined interoperability.¹⁹ Similarly, progress has been slow even where interest in cooperative opportunities has coalesced around advanced networking to support

16. Admiral Jonathan Greenert recently addressed the elusive balance in seeking joint interdependence in “Navy Perspective on Joint Force Interdependence,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 76, no. 1 (2015): 10–14.

17. “Lockheed: Move toward Multimission Frigate Boosts International Interest,” *Inside the Navy*, February 20, 2015, <http://insidedefense.com/inside-navy/lockheed-move-toward-multimission-frigate-boosts-international-interest>.

18. Work, “The Third U.S. Offset Strategy.”

19. See Stephanie Hszieh, George Galdorisi, Terry McKearney, and Darren Sutton, “Networking the Global Maritime Partnership,” *Naval War College Review*, Spring 2012, <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/493473de-ac4b-4f0a-b1b3-3671efdbd0af/Networking-the-Global-Maritime-Partnership.aspx>. The authors find that the “effectiveness [of coalitions] is directly proportional to their ability not only to *communicate* but to *network*. . . . But as nations and navies proceed along different technological development paths . . . their ability to interoperate effectively is often challenged.”

better interoperability in missions such as air and missile defense.²⁰ *The Navy's most valuable partners within the global network, then, will be those navies with which the United States works most often, and specifically those who benefit from operationally driven command and control integration* (both technical and procedural) *developed with the U.S. Navy over time.* How sustained and exhaustive any demonstration of deep interoperability is will ultimately determine whether a given partner should be prioritized for enhanced cooperation at sea.

Transparency

Freer information and materiel exchange in our military-to-military engagements would undoubtedly help potential contributors to a global network deepen their cooperation with the United States. An early 2015 CSIS study on the institutional foundations of “federated defense” approaches found that the success of any cooperative endeavor in security will inevitably be “predicated upon the U.S. ability and willingness to provide assistance and/or equipment to partner nations.”²¹ While the U.S. government has traditionally expressed that willingness—and, indeed, remains very active in the field of security assistance—neither a 2010 executive branch push to simplify security assistance processes nor subsequent efforts to execute identified reforms has been able to spur export control legislation revisions or overcome cultural resistance to greater synchronization between cabinet agencies in the application of technology security policies.²²

Defense Security Cooperation Agency Director Vice Admiral Joseph Rixey, and others, strive to better align security cooperation activities with higher guidance²³ and ensure the foreign military sales process does not hinder the advancement of international relationships.²⁴ Yet, the shift to a security cooperation paradigm that evolves toward more multi-lateral sharing arrangements and defaults toward openness with military-technical information will be slow in coming. Nothing like the NATO Investment Division's dedicated focus on multilateral capability-related information sharing is likely to be replicated elsewhere, and lingering U.S. concerns over the ability of some nations to safeguard

20. An article by Brad Hicks, George Galdorisi, and Scott C. Truver identified multilateral interest in sea-based missile defense with Japan, ROK, and Australia (“The Aegis BMD Global Enterprise: A ‘High End’ Maritime Partnership,” *Naval War College Review*, Summer 2012, <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/36199513-956d-4ca5-9f52-8f63342b1240/The-Aegis-BMD-Global-Enterprise--A--High-End--Mari.aspx>). Those projects are moving forward, but the pace is quite slow. Australia's Hobart class is now a “project of concern” for Canberra, and even Japan has yet to receive the Cooperative Engagement Capability that forms an integral component of integrated fire control for advanced air defense.

21. Stephanie Sanok Kostro and Rhys McCormick, *Institutional Foundations of Federated Defense* (Washington, DC: CSIS, January 2015), 2, http://csis.org/files/publication/150105_Kostro_InstitutionalFoundations_Web.pdf.

22. *Ibid.*, 8–10.

23. Vice Admiral Joseph W. Rixey, “The Future of the Security Cooperation Enterprise” (opening remarks, International Security Program Conference, CSIS, Washington, DC, September 18, 2014), <http://csis.org/event/future-security-cooperation-enterprise>.

24. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Synchronizing to Meet Customer Expectations,” *2014 Strategic Plan: Vision 2020*, <http://www.dsca.mil/2014-strategic-plan-vision-2020/synchronizing-meet-customer-expectations>.

classified military information²⁵ undoubtedly extends even to some NATO allies. *The Navy's most likely partners within the global network, then, will be those navies with which the United States shares information most freely, and specifically those groups of navies who benefit from comparable military-technical information sharing arrangements with the U.S. Navy.* How established, reciprocal, and rigorously delimited any demonstration of **transparency** is will ultimately determine whether a given partner should be prioritized for enhanced cooperation at sea.

Predictability

The principle of **predictability** can be found at the core of the challenge associated with partnerships. With rare exceptions, it is unreasonable to expect military-to-military interactions to alter (let alone overcome) the limits placed on potential areas of cooperation imposed by the reality of political will. Therefore, simplicity must characterize the global network: regular communications are essential to tackling complex modern security problems, and the list of strategic priorities must be kept short. Where allies and partners can agree with the United States that Iran,²⁶ China,²⁷ and now Russia²⁸ are actively pursuing the ability to carve out maritime exclusion zones from the global commons (and that as of yet none has been offered significant enough incentives to change course),²⁹ the identification of a common threat can animate the global network. Where there is growing understanding that the strategies of China and Russia are specifically intended to cleave allies and partners from one another, thus undermining the international order by which like-minded nations of the global network have prospered, the Navy has predictable partners with which to share the burdens of security.

To encourage predictability in our potential partners, the Navy must also embrace renewed openness to commonality and even interdependency, where appropriate, in order to reduce feelings of uncertainty in those partners about the United States' intentions. These things also stand to help the U.S. military avoid costs over time. A candid expression of U.S. export imperatives in the maritime domain, combined with genuine, demonstrated interest in imported capability solutions, would permit the Navy to build commonly

25. Department of Defense, Defense Technology Security Administration, *DTSA Strategic Plan 2013*, 8, http://www.dtsa.mil/about-dtsa/DTSA_Strat_Plan.pdf.

26. Anthony H. Cordesman, with Aaron Lin, *The Iranian Sea-Air-Missile Threat to Gulf Shipping* (Washington, DC: CSIS, February 2015), http://csis.org/files/publication/150219_Cordesman_IranAirSeaMissileThreat_Web.pdf.

27. Jeffrey A. Bader, "The U.S. and China's Nine-Dash Line: Ending the Ambiguity," Brookings Institution, February 6, 2014, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/06-us-china-nine-dash-line-bader>.

28. Dmitry Gorenburg, "Russian Naval Capabilities and Procurement Plans," *Russian Military Reform*, January 14, 2015, <https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2015/01/14/russian-naval-capabilities-and-procurement-plans/>. See also Paul N. Schwartz, "U.S. Navy Deploying New Measures to Counter Russian Cruise Missile Threat" (Washington, DC: CSIS, March 2015), http://csis.org/files/publication/150311_russian_cruise_missiles.pdf.

29. Michael McDevitt, "Beijing Leaves Little Room for Compromise in South China Sea," *Interpreter*, January 12, 2015, <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/01/12/Beijing-leaves-little-room-for-compromise-in-South-China-Sea.aspx?COLLCC=2173728751&COLLCC=1337164628&COLLCC=3682426882&>. See also Damien Sharkov, "Russian Navy to Focus Strategy on Arctic Zone and Black Sea," *Newsweek*, December 9, 2014, <http://www.newsweek.com/russian-navy-will-focus-strategy-until-2030-arctic-zone-and-black-sea-290496>.

equipped and more predictable partners. Interdependence is not necessarily required for enhanced war-fighting capability; however, encouraging it (where suitable) stands to place other navies at the center of constellations within the network—even, perhaps, those whose funding is not likely to increase appreciably for the foreseeable future. Just as with joint interdependence, the benefits of selective international interdependence—borne of deep common operational experience, mutual interest, and clear-eyed threat assessment—are evident if the Navy is realistic about the means at its disposal in leading a broad coalition of interest in the present international system. Overall, *the Navy's most reliable partners within the global network will be those expressing common values through their actions, such that they can assume key roles in building the capacity of new partners.* Political will aside, how closely the operations and missions of key navies within the network align with the U.S. Navy will ultimately determine whether a given partner should be prioritized for enhanced cooperation at sea.

Capability

It is likely that concerns over fleet capacity initially drove the Navy to consider innovations such as combined force allocation, with an eye toward the “interchangeability” between inventories held by our most capable long-standing allies.³⁰ Inherent in interchangeability, though, is a certain level of **capability**—such as one nation’s land-based maritime patrol aircraft for the next—if it is to offset the risk of declining U.S. Navy capacity for sustained, combat-credible forward presence. While the global network may not need much foreign full-spectrum capability, it will need more net capability across the spectrum of operations than the United States can likely provide, including some combat capability where the Navy requires added war-fighting capacity, and some constabulary maritime security capability where the Navy needs to address a difficulty sustaining even more moderate presence. *The Navy's most valuable partners within the global network will be those few expeditionary navies currently in existence, but also other highly capable regional navies, and perhaps even those navies in a given region with advanced expertise in specific areas* (littoral anti-submarine warfare, for example). How affordable, available, and sufficient any potential international contributions will be to the U.S. military will ultimately determine whether a given partner should be prioritized for enhanced cooperation at sea.

30. Smith, “Strategic Cooperation.”

4 | Prospects for a More Virtuous Global Network

With some principles for a more comprehensive approach in mind, it is possible to consider which partners the Navy might prioritize in tailoring the global network. The right standard for the largest nodes in the network should be where there is already (1) capability across much of the spectrum, (2) a general agreement of purpose for naval forces, (3) expeditionary employment, and (4) ongoing active partnership outreach. Partners with these qualifications are the most valuable when considering the deterrent value of a global network for near-term challenges. They are also the partners of greatest potential if a more virtuous, self-sustaining global network of active security-exporting navies in the midterm is of interest to the United States. Finally, they are the partners representing some potential for the global network of navies to inform the development of the U.S. Navy—how it maintains a balance between capability and capacity investments—in the longer term.

As previously discussed, such a high standard will not be suitable for many other valuable network nodes. There remain key partners that contribute capability along the war-fighting spectrum, and for which the above principles would indicate potential for the Navy to offset satisfactorily the risks associated with its circumstances, chief among them the likely need to reduce presence in certain regions in the near- to midterm. While not an exhaustive list, the foreign navies reviewed here are included to illustrate where partnerships—from well-established and active, to underdeveloped, to nascent—hold out good prospects for constituting a global network more suitable to U.S. interests.

Established Relationships to Deepen for Greater Effect

UNITED KINGDOM

As a model of deepened partnership, one need look no further than the relationship between the U.S. Navy and the United Kingdom's Royal Navy. Surely, conclusions reached in a drastic, budget austerity-driven 2010 strategic review have seen Great Britain's navy undergo a significant drop in readiness, the decommissioning of more ships than it has

built, and the temporary divestment of its carrier-based air power projection¹ and airborne maritime patrol² capabilities. Yet, the Royal Navy is building two new aircraft carriers that will be able to employ the vertical takeoff and landing variant of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Similarly, major recapitalization efforts are under way in the surface force that will replenish the backbone of the British fleet to a level that could add capability to modern carrier strike groups.³ For many years, Royal Navy surface combatants and fleet auxiliaries have steamed with U.S. formations on deployment, routinely plugging into (and leading) mission-specific combined task forces in the Middle East. The Royal Navy also maintains mission-tailored operations globally, notably in places such as the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea, where its established relationships could help grow the global network.

Recent developments place the Royal Navy in a class by itself for deepening highly relevant partnerships for the most stressing looming challenges, however. First Sea Lord Admiral Sir George Zambellas is prioritizing credible, “battle-winning” capability development over capacity, with an intent to supplement U.S. formations for any major operation⁴ and cooperatively develop high-cost programs such as the common missile compartment for Great Britain’s next strategic deterrent submarine.⁵ Since 2011, the Royal Navy has—at a low investment level, admittedly—explored the technological capability inherent in its Type-45 destroyers for ballistic missile defense applications, an initiative encouraged by information sharing on the part of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency.⁶ Since 2013, Royal Navy pilots have operated from U.S. aircraft carriers in order to maintain the skills required to reconstitute carrier-based power projection within the British inventory.⁷ The UK and French governments continue to advance their maritime defense industry cooperation (in unmanned systems and precision air-launched munitions, specifically),⁸ and a British ship was deployed for the first time as part of a French carrier task force contributing to real-world combat operations against Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria.⁹ Of all

1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 2015* (London: Routledge, 2015), 57–158.

2. Ben Farmer, “Britain Forced to Ask NATO to Track ‘Russian Submarine’ in Scottish Waters,” *Telegraph*, December 9, 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11283926/Britain-forced-to-ask-Nato-to-track-Russian-submarine-in-Scottish-waters.html>.

3. UK Ministry of Defence, Royal Navy, “£859m Orders Placed for Equipment for Navy’s Next-Generation Frigates,” February 20, 2015, <http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2015/february/20/150220-shipbuilding-investment-announcement>.

4. Zambellas, “Credible Maritime Partners in the 21st Century.”

5. William J. Brougham, briefing at Sea, Air, and Space Symposium, Washington, DC, April 8, 2014, <http://news.usni.org/2014/04/09/document-ohio-class-replacement-2014-briefing-slides>. See also Jon Rosamund, “Next Generation UK Boomers Benefit from U.S. Relationship,” *USNI News*, December 17, 2014, <http://news.usni.org/2014/12/17/next-generation-u-k-boomers-benefit-u-s-relationship>.

6. Richard Scott, “UK Extends Sampson Radar Experimental BMD Research,” *IHS Jane’s 360*, May 15, 2014, http://www.janes360.com/images/assets/877/48877/maritime_ballistic_missile_defence_in_a_UK_context.pdf.

7. Shannon Smith, “IKE Trains British Soldiers,” *Navy.mil*, May 17, 2013, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=74220.

8. French Ministry of Defence, “France and UK Agree on Defence Cooperation Projects,” *France in the United Kingdom* (Franco-British communiqué, Paris, January 31, 2014), <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/France-and-UK-agree-on-defence>; IISS, *The Military Balance 2015*, 57–158.

9. UK Ministry of Defence, Royal Navy, “HMS Kent Enters Gulf with French Carrier Group,” February 26, 2015, <http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2015/february/26/150226-kent-joins-french-carrier-group>.

these cooperative efforts, though, none comes close to the potential impact of recently agreed U.S.-UK combined sea power initiatives such as mutual interoperability and coordinated capability development. Although even the landmark *Combined Seapower* agreement¹⁰ puts off combined force allocation (against U.S. combatant commander operational plans as well as day-to-day presence requirements), the plans it contains for near-term reductions in duplicative partner capacity-building efforts can serve as a model by which to grow the network of navies more efficiently.

FRANCE

Most of the recent U.S. and French combined military activity has been focused on halting the progress of terrorist insurgencies in North Africa and the Middle East; however, it is important to note that bilateral cooperation on real-world operations between the nations is at a high watermark.¹¹ Chairman Dempsey recently visited the French Navy nuclear-powered carrier *Charles de Gaulle* in the Persian Gulf while it conducted airstrikes against Islamic State group targets.¹² France's demonstrated ability to expand its sphere of military-to-military influence in Africa beyond the Sahel—most conspicuously with Algeria,¹³ the former colony whose bloody break from France reshaped both nations—holds out promise that Paris envisions a role in expanding the global network. The country's advanced defense industry, active foreign military sales posture, and improving cooperative development efforts (weak within NATO but increasingly imaginative on a bilateral basis) seem to equip it well to do just that. More fundamentally, France's commitment to maintaining a sea-based strategic nuclear deterrent capability, nuclear-powered attack submarines, and expeditionary naval forces able to project power ashore place it in a small club of highly potent, full-spectrum navies.¹⁴ There are valid concerns about France's ability to allocate defense resources at the levels requested in its recent five-year budgets,¹⁵ but they are one of the few European states postured to direct at least one-fifth of defense spending toward future capability investments.¹⁶

JAPAN

The Japanese Navy is highly capable and deeply interoperable with the U.S. Navy. However, the JMSDF did not align well with the United States in terms of regional outreach and expeditionary operations until a few years ago, when China's increasingly assertive employment of the People's Liberation Army (Navy) it had built up over the previous decade prompted a fundamental defense review. Japan is now poised for what its government

10. Department of the Navy and Navy Command Headquarters, *Combined Seapower*.

11. IISS, *The Military Balance 2015*, 57–158.

12. Missy Ryan, "Alliance against Islamic State Deepens, but U.S. Still Shoulders Bulk of Burden," *Washington Post*, March 8, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/alliance-against-islamic-state-deepens-but-us-still-shoulders-bulk-of-burden/2015/03/08/1927bf8e-c5c0-11e4-a199-6cb5e63819d2_story.html.

13. IISS, *The Military Balance 2015*, 57–158.

14. Eric Wertheim, "World Navies in Review," *Proceedings Magazine* 141, no. 3 (March 2015), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-03/world-navies-review>.

15. IISS, *The Military Balance 2015*, 64–68.

16. Munich Security Conference 2015, "Munich Security Report 2015," 19.

refers to as a more “proactive contribution to peace”¹⁷—a fundamental change in how it envisions the use of sea power that promises four distinct benefits for the global network: (1) more reciprocal “limited collective defense,” in practice, of U.S. forces; (2) increased regional capacity-building efforts driven by the view of its head of navy that “the ‘virtual’ chain of cooperation in maritime security breaks at its weakest point”;¹⁸ (3) new openness to defense exports; and (4) renewed emphasis on modernization. The current Japanese administration has much work ahead of it domestically to see these reforms through, but, if successful, they would lead to more general agreement of purpose with the U.S. Navy on a very influential regional force’s suitable role in backing up norms for use of the global commons.

Even if U.S. interest in exporting cooperatively developed ballistic missile interceptor technology abroad was what prompted Japan to loosen its export guidelines, the Japanese defense industry was already producing hardware of great interest to potential partners.¹⁹ From regional states seeking entry-level maritime domain awareness capabilities to more established navies recapitalizing major fleet components, Japanese industrial expertise in affordable diesel-electric submarines and maritime patrol aircraft saw them challenge U.S. and European sales as soon as the policy shifted.²⁰ Japan seems poised to make major submarine construction (or at least design and module fabrication) deals with Australia, India, and possibly Thailand²¹—which would do the United States a service as it struggles to reconcile military-military cooperation with political censure over the Thai army junta currently ruling in Bangkok.

Japan’s new security posture can also be seen in its defense spending, which has grown year-on-year over the last three budget cycles.²² Increasing expenditures are permitting the expansion and modernization of an already formidable surface combatant fleet, the purchase of a greater number of indigenously built submarines, and procurement of U.S. rotary wing anti-submarine, mine warfare, and troop transport aircraft.²³ While Japan builds on a strong foundation of interoperability with the U.S. Navy in this fashion, its amplified naval profile has fueled new security arrangements with Indonesia and the Philippines.²⁴ More recently still, Japan has expressed interest in operating more regularly

17. IISS, *The Military Balance 2015*, 222.

18. Admiral Tomohisa Takei, “The Commanders Respond: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force,” *Proceedings Magazine* 141, no. 3 (March 2015), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-03/commanders-respond-japan-maritime-self-defense-force>.

19. Edyta Grabowska, “Rising Security Threats Sustain Expenditure on Military Naval Vessels Platforms, Finds Frost & Sullivan,” PR Newswire, January 15, 2015, <http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rising-security-threats-sustain-expenditure-on-military-naval-vessels-platforms-finds-frost-sullivan-300020461.html>.

20. Kyle Mizokami, “Japan’s Emerging Defense Export Industry,” *USNI News*, February 23, 2015, <http://news.usni.org/2015/02/23/japans-emerging-defense-export-industry>.

21. *Ibid.*

22. “Under Abe, Japan Eyes Record Defense Spending,” *Nikkei Asian Review*, January 15, 2015, <http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Under-Abe-Japan-eyes-record-defense-spending>.

23. Wertheim, “World Navies in Review.”

24. See Nani Afrida, “Indonesia to Ink Defense Agreement with Japan,” *Jakarta Post*, February 14, 2015, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/02/14/indonesia-ink-defense-agreement-with-japan.html>; “Japan, Philippines Defense Chiefs Agree to Cooperate on Maritime Security,” *Japan Times*, January 30, 2015,

in the international waters of the South China Sea²⁵ and extending newly minted economic cooperation with India into the security arena.²⁶

SOUTH KOREA AND AUSTRALIA

These two regional navies may have dissimilar profiles today, but together they will prove crucial to the success of the U.S. strategic rebalance toward Asia. On the one hand, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) is entirely aligned with the U.S. Navy on its dedication to out-of-area operations, functional interoperability, and partnership outreach. On the other, the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) is increasingly aligned with the U.S. Navy in terms of highly relevant capability, but it has a much shorter track record of participation in international coalitions. Admittedly, these two navies hold different security purposes for their governments, yet each is a middleweight navy on a trajectory to modernize its force, further tighten ties with the U.S. Navy, and play very positive roles in the deterrent effect of an enhanced network.

The ROKN is well along the path to modernization, possessing growing numbers of multi-role surface combatants, amphibious warships, mine warfare capability, and domestically constructed air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarines from German manufacturers. Korea's fast combat support ships also permit the free movement of scalable task groups for training and operations.²⁷ The ROKN and U.S. Navy sustain a noteworthy bilateral training schedule²⁸ (there were two such exercises in the opening months of 2015), and the annual Foal Eagle series opened up to Australian, British, Canadian, Danish, and French participation in 2015.²⁹ To the extent that Korea can assume the role of regional naval capability exporter it envisions,³⁰ and demonstrate—through trilateral exercises of opportunity with the United States and Japan—the type of engagement being encouraged with agreements such as the Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Concerning the Nuclear and Missile Threats posed by North Korea,³¹ its maritime forces will represent a valuable node in any global network of navies.

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/30/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-philippine-defense-chiefs-agree-cooperate-maritime-security/#.VPi-xfnF9Gj>.

25. Tim Kelly and Nobuhiro Kubo, "U.S. Would Welcome Japan Air Patrols in South China Sea," Reuters, January 29, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/29/us-japan-southchinasea-idUSKBN0L20HV20150129>.

26. "Japan Wants Closer Maritime Security Cooperation with India," *Zeenews India*, January 17, 2015, http://zeenews.india.com/news/india/japan-wants-closer-maritime-security-cooperation-with-india_1531963.html.

27. Natalie Staples, "Republic of Korea Navy Cruise Training Task Group Visit Sydney," *Navy Daily, Royal Australian Navy*, October 10, 2014, <http://news.navy.gov.au/en/Oct2014/Fleet/1480/Republic-of-Korea-Navy-Cruise-Training-Task-Group-visit-Sydney.htm#.VPZ2PPnF9Gh>.

28. Some of them were recently profiled in Katrin Katz, "Key Resolve and Foal Eagle: Past as Prologue on the Peninsula," *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Brief* (Washington, DC: AMTI/CSIS, March 4, 2015), <http://amti.csis.org/key-resolve-and-foal-eagle/>.

29. Oh Seok-min, "S. Korea, U.S. to Stage Annual Joint Military Drills Next Month," *Yonhapnews*, February 24, 2015, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2015/02/24/64/0401000000AEN20150224002851315F.html>.

30. "South Korea Submarine Import and Export Behavior," *NTI Analysis*, July 13, 2013, <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/south-korea-submarine-import-and-export-behavior/>.

31. U.S. Department of Defense, Ministry of Defense of Japan, and Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, *Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Concerning the Nuclear and Missile Threats Posed*

Australia, for its part, is in the process of reclaiming its erstwhile amphibious warfare³² and area air defense capabilities with vessels designed by Spanish shipbuilder Navantia. While the Hobart anti-air warfare destroyer program is behind schedule and the Canberra amphibious ship may not support sustained fixed-wing aircraft operations, both classes of ship can be expected to upgrade Australia's war-fighting contributions significantly by the end of this decade. Plans to procure and field advanced U.S. manned and unmanned maritime patrol platforms are also moving quickly.³³ The RAN has always maintained an expeditionary profile alongside deployed U.S. forces, from serving in standing combined task forces in the Middle East, to contributing a ship to deploying U.S. strike groups, to embedding one of its ships in the U.S. Forward Deployed Naval Forces stationed in Yokosuka, Japan.³⁴ Crucially, the Australian government's 2014 *Defence Issues Paper* looks beyond RAN-U.S. Navy cooperation, beyond even the possibility of increased U.S. Navy operations out of Australian ports,³⁵ and recognizes that today's security environment demands that Australia increase its operational profile and outreach to partners in the wider Indo-Asia Pacific region.³⁶ The RAN chief of service Vice Admiral Tim Barrett just this year stated his intent for Australia to lead in ensuring that the "changing balance of different national capabilities and interests [in the region] is managed in an orderly way."³⁷

OTHER LEADING MARITIME NATIONS OF NATO

Key navies within the NATO alliance—those of Spain, Italy, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark—possess a wealth of advanced maritime capabilities. Taken individually, none of these navies is particularly large, but a combination of three factors makes them particularly attractive partners in deepening the global network: (1) quality capabilities in some quantity; (2) active and collaborative defense industrial partnerships injecting commonality into that capability set; and (3) deep interoperability after years of NATO-driven employment. The convergence around common designs and weapons systems, such as that seen between the Aegis combat system-based air defense frigates of Spain and Norway, rivals that between the JMSDF and ROKN. The inherent flexibility of Aegis-equipped ships is now well known from the U.S. Navy's growth into foremost ballistic missile defense roles, but the consortium of Dutch, German, and Danish surface combatants built around

by North Korea (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, December 2014), <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Trilateral-Information-Sharing-Arrangement.pdf>.

32. Eric Wertheim, "Combat Fleets," *Proceedings Magazine* 141, no. 2 (February 2015), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-02/combat-fleets>.

33. Ibid.

34. News Corp Australia Network, "HMAS Sydney to Join US Aircraft Fleet in Yokosuka, Japan," *Daily Telegraph*, April 26, 2013, <http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/national/hmas-sydney-to-join-us-aircraft-fleet-in-yokosuka-japan/story-fncvk70o-1226629789743>.

35. Jason Scott and David Tweed, "U.S. Navy Considers Setting Up Ship Base in Australia," *BloombergBusiness*, February 10, 2015, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-10/u-s-considering-basing-navy-ships-in-australia-greenert-says-i5yxouxp>.

36. Australian Department of Defence and the Defence White Paper 2015 Expert Panel, *Defence Issues Paper 2014*, 6, 16–17, <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defenceissuespaper2014.pdf>.

37. Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, "The Commanders Respond: Royal Australian Navy," *Proceedings Magazine* 141, no. 3 (March 2015), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-03/commanders-respond-royal-australian-navy>.

the SMART-L and APAR radars³⁸ also shows promise for growth into integrated air and missile defense. Many of these navies maintain capable submarine services, and some are progressing through purchases of German-made AIP boats.³⁹ Spain and Italy should be highlighted for their amphibious air assault capability, which consists of one small carrier multipurpose ship each that will be able to employ the F-35B STOVL Joint Strike Fighter.

Rather than complicate the defense landscape in Europe, multinational procurement arrangements like the ship inventories mentioned above serve to increase competition as well as commonality.⁴⁰ The NH-90 NATO Frigate Helicopter, for instance, while not without the production problems often found in large programs,⁴¹ injected interoperability into allied and partner naval rotary wing aviation over the past decade. NATO's Sea Sparrow consortium has been so successful that its Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile program continues to define sea-based weapons system requirements for at least ten allied and partner navies.⁴² In this competitive context, German industry has emerged as a global exporter to rival France, and as a leading provider of submarines, exporting four out of five diesel-electric boats it produces to a host of countries, including India, Brazil, South Korea, Chile, and Colombia, as well as AIP boats to South Korea and others.⁴³ When production runs are shorter and cooperative programs involve fewer partners, as is the case with joint shipbuilding of frigates by French and Italian companies,⁴⁴ NATO standardization guidelines ensure that sensors and communications networks are able to interoperate.⁴⁵

A NATO standing force was used for the first time following the invasion of Crimea to deter Russian adventurism in the Black Sea,⁴⁶ but where NATO or EU political dynamics preclude expeditionary employment, each of these navies has demonstrated a willingness to conduct out-of-area exercises or coalition operations convened by the United States. Taken together, the navies of NATO's leading maritime nations provide a baseline of war-fighting capability, long experience in command and control arrangements involving U.S. senior leadership, and a vibrant source of military-technical activity. They also have a

38. Christopher Cavas, "Aboard Danish Frigate, Clean Lines and Room to Grow," *DefenseNews*, November 20, 2014, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20141120/DEFREG01/311200043/1001/DEFSECT>.

39. Wertheim, "World Navies in Review."

40. Berteau, "European Defense Trends," points out that defense spending reductions in Europe have forced both consolidation in the European defense market and improved sales to the Middle East and Asia.

41. "NH90: Europe's Medium Helicopter Gets New Order Despite Issues," *Defense Industry Daily*, June 22, 2015, <https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/nh90-europes-medium-helicopter-contender-04135/>. See also Gareth Jennings, "Germany Approves Sea Lion Helo Procurement," *HIS Jane's 360*, March 4, 2015, <http://www.janes.com/article/49746/germany-approves-sea-lion-helo-procurement>.

42. Raytheon, "Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM)," <http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/essm/>.

43. "Germany Submarine Import and Export Behavior," *NTI Analysis*, August 16, 2013, <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/german-submarine-import-and-export-behavior/>.

44. "Construction Begins Italian Navy's Eighth FREMM Frigate," *Naval Technology Industry News*, March 2, 2015, <http://www.naval-technology.com/news/newsconstruction-begins-italian-navys-eighth-fremm-frigate-4522784>.

45. See the NATO Standardization Office's unclassified web presence at http://nso.nato.int/nso/nso_today.html.

46. Steven Beardsley, "NATO Maritime Group Enters Black Sea as Ukraine Crisis Continues," *Stars and Stripes*, March 4, 2015, <http://www.stripes.com/news/nato-maritime-group-enters-black-sea-as-ukraine-crisis-continues-1.332693>.

proven track record of local area engagement that could be leveraged under the banner of the global network: German naval outreach in the Baltic Sea⁴⁷ and Spain's cooperative efforts in the Mediterranean and eastern Atlantic,⁴⁸ for example, embody the virtues sought by other navies assuming a role in the network's expansion.

CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND

Despite high-profile (and occasionally long-standing) political disputes over energy and environmental policies,⁴⁹ transparency consistently characterizes the defense relationship between each of these nations and the United States. Beyond that important bedrock, though, only dependability—particularly the solid alignment between all three governments on the general purpose for naval forces (at least on the lower end of maritime missions)—qualifies the Canadian and New Zealand navies as good prospects for deeper maritime cooperation.

The Royal Canadian Navy has taken steps to retain and modernize both its submarines and its frigates,⁵⁰ so the potential for undersea warfare contributions will uphold that key facet of the service's legacy. Although Canada identified the need to reconstitute its expeditionary logistics and surface warfare capabilities, in similar fashion to the UK Royal Navy its fleet was forced to temporarily divest those elements of a complete maritime force. Strong U.S. Navy training support in these mission areas through the end of the decade should accompany the type of shrewd and appropriate recognition Admiral Greenert bestowed on a Canadian frigate returning from a Middle East maritime security deployment.⁵¹

For its part, the Royal New Zealand Navy is upgrading its Australian-built frigates for point air defense self-sufficiency, and it retains a modicum of auxiliary capability to constitute afloat forward staging base-like operations in the Asia-Pacific region.⁵² As Admiral Greenert recognized in early 2015 with a visit to Auckland and Devonport,⁵³ New Zealand's commitment to maritime security and humanitarian assistance is steadfast, and its

47. Vice Admiral Andreas Krause, "The Commanders Respond: German Navy," *Proceedings Magazine* 141, no. 3 (March 2015), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-03/commanders-respond-german-navy>.

48. Vice Admiral Jaime Muñoz-Delgado y Díaz del Río, "The Commanders Respond: Spanish Navy," *Proceedings Magazine* 141, no. 3 (March 2015), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-03/commanders-respond-spanish-navy>.

49. On the current strain in U.S.-Canada relations due to the proposed Keystone pipeline, see Demetri Sevastopulo, "Relations Tepid between US and Canada," *Financial Times*, April 1, 2015, <http://www.ft.com/cms/0/2b663538-d6fd-11e4-97c3-00144feab7de.html#axzz3WNH0Wi61>. The deep freeze in U.S.-New Zealand relations in the mid-1980s over nuclear weapons had a direct impact on bilateral naval cooperation, yet the 2010 Wellington Declaration and the 2012 Washington Declaration successfully cleaved nuclear issues from otherwise exemplary—and still improving—cooperative security initiatives.

50. Wertheim, "World Navies in Review."

51. See Royal Canadian Navy, "HMCS *Toronto* Receives U.S. Navy Meritorious Unit Commendation," news release, February 20, 2015, <http://www.navy-marine.forces.gc.ca/en/news-operations/news-view.page?doc=hmcs-toronto-receives-u-s-navy-meritorious-unit-commendation/i6javsw1>.

52. Wertheim, "World Navies in Review."

53. Michael Daly, "US Chief of Naval Ops in NZ," *Stuff.co.nz*, February 12, 2015, <http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/66086687/US-chief-of-naval-ops-in-NZ>.

necessarily multilateral outlook⁵⁴ positions it well to build partner capacity broadly, which could free an evolving Royal Australian Navy for higher-end mission investments over time.

The Canadian and New Zealand navies look set to remain small, but they must add quality if they are to be a key participant in a tailored global network. Targeted modernization would enable them to rekindle the deep interoperability with U.S. naval forces each has enjoyed in previous decades. The U.S. Navy should encourage them to seek quantity as well as quality, however, as a marginal Canadian and New Zealand presence within the network would reflect poorly on the normative element of a post-World War II international order essentially devised by the Atlantic Charter nations.⁵⁵

Underdeveloped Relationships Worth Expanding

SINGAPORE AND SWEDEN

While it might seem a strange pairing, these two navies on opposite sides of the world occupy similar niche roles as small, accomplished forces with outsized impacts in their respective regions. They also have a connection via previous military sales, as Sweden's expertise in submarine construction saw Singapore purchase retired diesel-electric boats in the mid-1990s and then retrofitted AIP boats within the last decade.⁵⁶ Both navies focus on littoral operations, prompting each to pursue cutting-edge stealth technologies in their small surface combatants and to maintain functional patrol and mine-countermeasures capabilities. Each has operated out of their region as part of international coalitions in the Middle East,⁵⁷ and each has a track record of littoral warfare training with the U.S. Navy: Sweden's deployment of an AIP submarine to San Diego for anti-submarine warfare training with the U.S. Third Fleet in recent years was a resounding success in that it confirmed the need for U.S. sonar and maritime patrol upgrades,⁵⁸ while the U.S. Navy is now on its second forward deployment of the new littoral combat ship out of Singapore to work alongside the Formidable-class frigates, as well as a litany of foreign (often British, Australian, and New Zealand⁵⁹) visiting ships.⁶⁰ Both could fill critical war-fighting gaps in the global

54. Rear Admiral Fred Keating, naval attaché at the New Zealand Embassy, characterized his service's culture this way in public remarks at the Surface Navy Association National Symposium on January 14, 2015.

55. The United States and the UK Commonwealth, whose declaration of principles led to the enduring and still critical "Five Eyes" intelligence sharing arrangement.

56. See the Ministry of Defence Singapore's Navy equipment information pages at http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/navy/assets/submarines.html.

57. See Ministry of Defense Singapore, "Navy: About Us," http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/navy/about_us/crest.html; Sweden's Armed Forces information pages at <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/about/our-mission-in-sweden-and-abroad/current-missions/gulf-of-aden-eunavfor/>.

58. See Ong Weichong, "Rethinking Littoral Warfare," *Canadian Naval Review*, June 3, 2010, <http://www.navalreview.ca/2010/06/rethinking-littoral-warfare-by-ong-weichong/>, which recounts the U.S. Navy's valuable training experiences with the Swedish submarine HMSwS *Gotland* during the mid-2000s.

59. Rear Admiral Charlie Williams, "U.S. Navy in Singapore: Making a Large Impact with a Small Presence," *Singapore American Newspaper* (small circulation newsletter), March 2015.

60. Agence France-Presse, "US Navy: 4 LCSs to Operate Out of Singapore by 2018," *DefenseNews*, February 18, 2015, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/navy/2015/02/18/us-navy-lcs-operate-singapore/23619799/>.

network and serve U.S. interests in improving the Navy's littoral warfare capability⁶¹ and offsetting a dearth of mine warfare and mine countermeasure investments.⁶²

SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT

Neither of these navies currently exhibits strong alignment with the principles of a more comprehensive partnership approach, but they have considerable defense relationships with the United States and France upon which to expand. If deeper maritime cooperation is to help ensure the free flow of international trade, the fact alone that Saudi and Egyptian naval forces operate astride three of the world's strategic lines of communication merits their inclusion in a tailored global network. Their increased involvement in providing a stabilizing presence would send a strong message of support for the present international order within the Middle East region. The nature of the principal challenges faced by each navy—Iran in the case of Saudi Arabia, radical Islamic blowback for the el-Sisi government in Egypt's case—means enhanced activity (even with only modestly improved capability and capacity) holds the potential to enhance deterrence.

Notwithstanding a 2014 announcement of intent by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to create a combined maritime security force,⁶³ there is scant evidence of naval cooperation in the Middle East absent U.S. Navy bilateral involvement.⁶⁴ If anything is to come of the effort between the Gulf Arab states, however, Saudi Arabia will need to press from within the GCC as a global leader in military spending.⁶⁵ There is simply no better bet for a regional check on Iranian maritime activity than the Royal Saudi Naval Force (RSNF). While holding a modest ship and rotary wing inventory—save for three French-fabricated multimission frigates—the RSNF now seems ready to move ahead with the recapitalization of its eastern fleet of small surface combatants (the so-called “Saudi Naval Expansion Program II”) that it has planned for close to a decade.⁶⁶ In two major procurement efforts thought likely to rise well over \$20 billion,⁶⁷ German diesel-electric submarines and modified American littoral combat ships may soon bring enough advanced multimission capability to make the RSNF a valuable, well-placed node in the global network. British plans to

61. See Milan Vego, “On Littoral Warfare,” *Naval War College Review* 68, no. 2 (Spring 2015): 30–68.

62. See Scott Truver, “Wanted: U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Champion,” *Naval War College Review* 68, no. 2 (Spring 2015): 116–127.

63. Habib Toumi, “GCC Proposes Joint Naval Force,” Thompson Reuters Zawya, October 16, 2014, https://www.zawya.com/story/GCC_proposes_joint_naval_force-GN_16102014_161045/.

64. Greg Gause, comments made during a CSIS roundtable on GCC and Middle East security, Washington, DC, December 12, 2015.

65. Anthony H. Cordesman, “The FY 2016 Defense Budget and US Strategy: Key Trends and Data Points” (Washington, DC: CSIS, March 6, 2015), http://csis.org/files/publication/150306_FY2016.pdf, shows that as of 2013, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ranked fourth in military expenditures globally behind the United States, China, and Russia, and ahead of France and the United Kingdom.

66. Awad Mustafa, “Military Sees Need for More Naval Muscle,” *DefenseNews*, February 21, 2015, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/show-daily/idex/2015/02/21/united-arab-emirates-navy-yemen-gcc-kuwait-saudi-adsb/23525749/>.

67. Agence France-Presse, “Report: Saudi Arabia Eyes Buying German Submarines,” *DefenseNews*, November 3, 2013, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131103/DEFREG04/311030007/Report-Saudi-Arabia-Eyes-Buying-German-Submarines>. See also Sam LaGrone, “Industry: Potential \$20 Billion U.S. Naval Sale to Saudi Arabia Picking Up Steam,” *USNI News*, February 19, 2015, <http://news.usni.org/2015/02/19/industry-potential-20-billion-u-s-naval-sale-to-saudi-arabia-picking-up-steam>.

increase forward deployed operations out of improved Bahraini facilities⁶⁸ might also help connect that node to partners other than the U.S. Navy.

The Egyptian Navy, for its part, remains the largest of any Arab state, even though it consists mostly of obsolete Soviet equipment. What the Egyptian Navy has modernized is predominantly U.S.-built, such as fast missile craft with the same surface-to-surface missile capability as U.S. large surface combatants.⁶⁹ That modernization is set to continue, even though Egypt's ability to continue deficit spending now relies on GCC nation subsidies,⁷⁰ and some of it will continue to come from U.S. industry even as relations between Egypt and the United States remain tense. The Egyptian Navy is seized with the need to counter asymmetric threats with deeper partnership and to include information sharing and affordable military sales⁷¹ as it seeks to avoid any incidents like last year's hijacking of an Egyptian naval vessel near Damietta by Islamic militants.⁷² The Egyptian Navy's effort to grow littoral undersea capability—by contracting for German diesel-electric submarines, French corvettes,⁷³ and even a French FREMM destroyer⁷⁴—would be a welcome addition to both the Mediterranean and Red Sea approaches to the Suez Canal, if it can be done squarely within the context of the global network.

Nascent Relationships with High Upside Potential

INDIA AND BRAZIL

Bringing the growing navies of these two nations firmly into the global network will not be easy, but no other partners have comparable potential to bolster a favorable international order in the mid- to long-term—and specifically check the disruptive efforts of China and Russia. After President Obama's successful meetings with Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India⁷⁵ and agreements on deeper defense ties,⁷⁶ expanded cooperation with India is likely

68. Nasser Al-Haqbani, "Enhanced British Military Presence in Region Will Benefit Gulf: British Defense Minister," *Asharq Al-Awsat*, March 4, 2015, <http://www.aawsat.net/2015/03/article55342017/enhanced-british-military-presence-in-region-will-benefit-gulf-british-defense-minister>.

69. "Egyptian Navy Fast Missile Craft, Egypt," Naval Technology Industry Projects, n.d., <http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/egyptian-navy-fast-missile-craft/>. See also Wertheim, "World Navies in Review."

70. IISS, *The Military Balance 2015*, 308.

71. Rear Admiral Mohamed Abdel-Aziz, Egyptian Navy, Naval attaché at the Egyptian Embassy, indicated as much in public remarks at the Surface Navy Association National Symposium on January 14, 2015.

72. Mostafa Hashem, "Egyptian Navy Kills Four after Boat Attack: Security Sources," Reuters, November 12, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/12/us-egypt-navy-attacks-idUSKCN01W2HU20141112>.

73. Wertheim, "World Navies in Review."

74. Pierre Tran, "French Navy Plans around Ship Sale to Egypt," *DefenseNews*, February 12, 2015, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/ships/2015/02/11/france-egypt-frigate-fremm-sale-navy-multi-mission/23232695/>.

75. See White House Office of the Press Secretary, "U.S.-India Joint Statement—'Shared Effort; Progress for All,'" January 25, 2015, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-statement-shared-effort-progress-all>; Indian Ministry of External Affairs, "US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region," January 25, 2015, <http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/24728/US-India-Joint-Strategic-Vision-for-the-Asia-Pacific-and-Indian-Ocean-Region>.

76. U.S. Department of Defense, "Hagel Praises New Defense Cooperation Agreements with India," *DoD News*, January 25, 2015, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128033>.

to be driven top down within the Department of Defense. The Navy must therefore stay postured to channel senior departmental attention toward effective maritime initiatives. Brazil, in contrast, is likely to receive comparably little senior leader attention as the Department of Defense executes QDR14 guidance. The Navy must highlight Brazil's naval aspirations as an opportunity to shape a bilateral relationship of equal long-term importance—one at some risk of counterproductive Chinese economic influence.⁷⁷

With demonstrations of China's newfound reach into the Indian Ocean⁷⁸ looming large for the Modi government, India's Navy is committing significant resources within an essentially flat defense budget to amplify its presence on the country's east coast.⁷⁹ Domestic manufacturing lines for corvettes, destroyers, and nuclear ballistic missile submarines are up and running, promising a formidable seagoing fleet by the middle of the next decade. These will soon be supplemented with French-designed diesel-electric submarines, as well as Russian-made fixed wing aircraft for India's two medium-displacement aircraft carriers.⁸⁰ Also on the aviation front, India contracted for American SH-60 helicopters and is expected to purchase Japanese seaplanes.⁸¹ Some see in these procurement patterns continuing evidence of India's traditional hedging behavior.⁸² Yet, the Modi government's new defense and security dialogue with Japan,⁸³ and its more equitable defense-industrial discourse with the United States,⁸⁴ could prove crucial in completing India's transition from Cold War nonalignment to modern-day geopolitical influence. The Indian Navy's response to U.S. calls for an expanded Malabar exercise⁸⁵ series should provide an early indication of how confident the service is becoming in its rapidly growing regional profile.

Brazil's Navy, already the largest in the Western Hemisphere after the U.S. Navy, aspires to exclusive status as a modern blue-water force with indigenous nuclear propulsion and advanced carrier-based power projection capabilities. Near-zero growth and rising

77. See Carlos Pereira and João Augusto de Castro Neves, "Brazil and China: South-South Partnership or North-South Competition?" (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Paper Series, March 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2011/4/03-brazil-china-pereira/03_brazil_china_pereira.pdf; the paper highlights the full extent of China's trade and commerce inroads into Brazil against the backdrop of the West's global financial crisis.

78. Keith Johnson, "China, Sri Lanka, and the Maritime Great Game," *Foreign Policy*, February 12, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/12/china-sri-lanka-and-the-maritime-great-game-silk-road-xi-port/>. See also David Brewster, "The Bay of Bengal: The Maritime Silk Road and China's Naval Ambitions," *Diplomat*, December 14, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-bay-of-bengal-the-maritime-silk-route-and-chinas-naval-ambitions/>.

79. IISS, *The Military Balance 2015*, 209–210, 212, 219.

80. Wertheim, "World Navies in Review."

81. *Ibid.*

82. Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi, "The American 'Pivot' and the Indian Navy: It's Hedging All the Way," *Naval War College Review* 68, no. 1 (Winter 2015), <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/ddacac3c-c6e2-4117-8e97-665d8e78d8eb/The-American--Pivot--and-the-Indian-Navy--It-s-Hed.aspx>.

83. "Japan Wants Closer Maritime Security Cooperation with India," *Zeenews*, January 17, 2015, http://zeenews.india.com/news/india/japan-wants-closer-maritime-security-cooperation-with-india_1531963.html.

84. See Richard Rossow, "A New Vision for U.S.-India Cooperation in Asia," *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Brief* (Washington, DC: AMTI/CSIS, February 4, 2015), <http://amti.csis.org/a-new-vision-for-u-s-india-cooperation-in-asia/>.

85. Rajat Pandit, "US Wants India's Help in Multilateral Naval Engagements in Asia-Pacific," *Times of India*, March 4, 2015, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/US-wants-Indias-help-in-multilateral-naval-engagements-in-Asia-Pacific/articleshow/46450471.cms>.

inflation suggest this will be a longer-term project than India's.⁸⁶ Brazil's current fleet consists of a mix of French, British, and German excess articles spanning most ship categories, including a light aircraft carrier originally in service for France. As evidenced by Brazil's reported interest in modern French carrier design,⁸⁷ as well as contracts for Scorpene diesel-electric submarines⁸⁸ and Sweden's "navalized" Gripen fixed-wing tactical aircraft,⁸⁹ new European defense industry inroads into the South American country could help bring the Brazilian Navy into the global network where American efforts cannot. That said, the U.S. Navy has consistently voiced its support for Brazilian Navy efforts to build nuclear submarine capability⁹⁰ and to participate in high-profile multilateral exercises.⁹¹ Especially in light of U.S. Southern Command's "economy of force" circumstances,⁹² U.S. Navy interactions with Brazil's deployed naval forces in places like the Eastern Mediterranean and Gulf of Guinea⁹³ can reinforce the Brazilian Navy's great promise as an expeditionary maritime force. How soon Brazil's naval capabilities can expand the breadth of their impact abroad will go a long way in determining how important the nation's contributions to strategic stability ultimately become.

86. IISS, *The Military Balance 2015*, 365.

87. "France's PA2/CVF Carrier Project: Stalled in France, Hedged on Demand from Brazil?," *Defense Industry Daily*, December 4, 2014, <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/france-steaming-ahead-on-pa2cvf-carrier-project-01621/>.

88. Wertheim, "World Navies in Review."

89. Gareth Jennings, "Brazil Signs for 36 Gripen E/F Fighters," *IHS Jane's 360*, October 26, 2014, <http://www.janes.com/article/45013/brazil-signs-for-36-gripen-e-f-fighters>.

90. U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations Public Affairs, "CNO Expands Brazil Partnership," Navy.mil, January 19, 2014, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=71552.

91. U.S. Navy Secretary of the Navy Public Affairs, "SECNAV Meets with Commander of Brazilian Navy," Navy.mil, September 16, 2014, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=83319.

92. General John F. Kelly, *2014 Posture Statement before the House Armed Services Committee*, February 26, 2014, http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/2014_SOUTHCOM_Posture_Statement_HASC_FINAL_PDF.pdf.

93. Rear Admiral Sinclair Harris, "South Is Forward," *Proceedings Magazine* 141, no. 2 (February 2015), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-02/south-forward>.

5 | Proposals to Tailor the Global Network

Having reviewed several maritime forces the U.S. Navy might prioritize for enhanced partnership, a consideration of possible activities to pursue with them is in order. Which opportunities should the U.S. Navy seek out—along the spectrum from cooperative force employment, to common procurement, combined force allocation, and co-development—in order to tailor the global network? Much as with the relationships addressed earlier, are there existing avenues to leverage in support of U.S. interests, or other prospects to explore further? Finally, are there areas of work the Navy might urge key allies and partners to engage?

Prioritize Multilateral Exercises, Selectively

The Navy's thrust toward an enhanced network is clearest on the subject of maritime exercises.¹ Yet, the revised *Cooperative Strategy*, which highlights more exercises as central to deepening partnerships, withholds comment on which types of exercises best serve that end. Today's supply-demand mismatch would caution that more exercises are not necessarily better for the U.S. Navy. Return on the time and assets invested matters more when the Navy seeks to build more interoperability and predictability in other exercise participants than previously.

In that light, **multilateral exercises** should receive priority over bilateral ones to the extent that they avoid the pitfalls of reducing exercise objectives in order to facilitate more participant navies. Large multilateral exercises such as the biennial Rim of the Pacific² or the UK's Joint Warrior³ should continue to be emphasized for the advanced, broad-spectrum group training they provide—but those high-quality opportunities are few, not to mention expensive, for whoever might attempt to recreate them elsewhere. That said,

1. CS21R directly addresses enhancing the global network of navies by building trust through deepened integration with allies and partners during training exercises and cooperative deployments.

2. MC2 John Sorensen, "RIMPAC 2014 Concludes with Enhanced Cooperation among 22 Nations," Navy.mil, August 2, 2014, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=82545.

3. See UK Ministry of Defence, Royal Navy, public information pages on the Joint Warrior multinational exercise, <http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/operations/uk-home-waters/joint-warrior>. On U.S. commitment to participation in this excellent training venue, see also LTJG Seth Clarke and MC2 Abe McNatt, "DESRON 26 Aims to Maximize Proficiency with Joint Warrior Training," Navy.mil, April 3, 2015, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=86396.

more such broad, high-quality exercises could be pursued where costs are sunk—as in NATO exercises utilizing the alliance’s command structure or a previously funded NATO force structure organization like Striking and Support Forces NATO (under the command of the U.S. Sixth Fleet commander).⁴ Additionally, full-spectrum bilateral exercises such as Keen Sword (U.S. Navy–JMSDF) should be expanded slightly where new entrants could readily be incorporated into high-quality group training without diluting the war-fighting lessons learned. The maritime portion of Foal Eagle (U.S. Navy–ROKN) has done this within the constraints of the 1953 armistice agreement.⁵ India’s Malabar exercise made this jump last year (for a second time, after previous Chinese protests prevailed upon India to keep it a bilateral U.S. Navy–IN series) by including the JMSDF.⁶

Also valuable are advanced, mission-focused multilateral exercises such as the International Mine Countermeasures Exercise (IMCMEX), where the U.S. Navy is able to test new operational concepts in a complex mine warfare scenario and build mine countermeasure and explosive ordnance disposal interoperability with a large contingent of Middle East and extra-regional navies.⁷ There are more examples of mission-focused multilateral exercises to be found on the low end of operations (e.g., the Cooperative At-Sea Readiness and Training series and Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training) but, if not in scale, in principle the type of niche war-fighting focus found in last year’s IMCMEX can be repeated at other points along the war-fighting spectrum. Where possible, advanced, mission-focused bilateral exercises ranging from anti-submarine warfare, to strike warfare, to integrated air and missile defense should be expanded to seize every opportunity for greater interoperability between capable navies. In the expeditionary realm, those partners actively building marine infantry and amphibious capabilities should be encouraged to take part in the Bold Alligator series, which while geared toward testing fully integrated amphibious operations has shown itself capable of including partners synthetically and as staff observers.⁸

Finally, those key partners capable and predictable enough to stand at the center of constellations within the network should be encouraged to host maritime security exercises. Those lower-end exercises intended to reassure less capable allies and build partner capacity remain important, but the U.S. Navy need not drive all aspects of the network’s expansion globally. As more of the Navy’s main partners step forward within venues like the EU or NATO, U.S. detachments could support and observe as a demonstration of

4. The commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe has emphasized the need for high-end training opportunities with transiting American aircraft carriers and amphibious ships, in particular. See David Larter, “NAVEUR: Ships Needed in Sixth Fleet for High-End Training,” *Navy Times*, January 13, 2015, <http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/01/13/mark-ferguson-naveur-russia-syria/21452635/>.

5. Oh Seok-min, “S. Korea, U.S. to Stage Annual Joint Military Drills.”

6. “India, Japan and US Navies Start Malabar 2014 Naval Exercise,” *Naval Technology Industry News*, July 25, 2014, <http://www.naval-technology.com/news/newsindia-japan-and-us-navies-start-malabar-2014-naval-exercise-4327256>.

7. U.S. Navy, Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, “Successful International Mine Countermeasures Exercise Concludes,” Navy.mil, November 13, 2014, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=84419.

8. U.S. Navy, Fleet Forces Command Public Affairs, data sheet on the “Bold Alligator” exercise series, <http://www.public.navy.mil/usff/ba/Pages/about.aspx>.

continued interest in reinforcing international norms. Italy's Mare Aperto exercises, which started in early March 2015, could readily expand to include other EU navies increasingly interested in maritime security patrols to check illicit human trafficking.⁹ Similarly, NATO's near-continuous maritime exercise in the Black Sea must be replicated in the future regardless of whether the U.S. Navy is leading the allied standing formation involved.¹⁰

Conduct Combined Operations with Future Stakes in Mind

Much as with exercises, the Navy's commitment to exploratory **combined operations** is steadily improving. The U.S. Fifth Fleet-led Combined Maritime Forces—constituted by three standing, task-organized multinational formations—is an established model for sustaining broad partnership around constabulary missions (30 nations are involved).¹¹ Over recent years, Australia and Japan have each embedded individual ships with U.S. Forward Deployed Naval Forces for extended periods, making them available for steady-state operations across the spectrum of the U.S. Seventh Fleet's employment. In 2014, the U.S. Navy assumed rotational command of a standing NATO maritime group that has engaged in more advanced exercises than is typical for NATO formations, including in locations meant to reassure allies concerned over heightened Russian activity in the Black Sea.¹² The revised *Cooperative Strategy* enshrines U.S. Navy participation in combined operations, and within NATO's standing naval forces in particular,¹³ which over time can be expected to improve allied readiness across a fuller spectrum of tasks and missions in European waters—ultimately a vital element of the Navy's strategic rebalance toward Asia.

Combined operations such as these improve interoperability to a degree not possible with exercises alone. These operations require a certain level of capability and transparency between partners, of course, but can yield great benefits in terms of predictability if they can be sustained and routinized. However, even the gold standard represented by the U.S. Navy–UK Royal Navy *Combined Seapower* vision, with a groundbreaking emphasis on collaborative force management, falls short of interdependent fleet scheduling and operational planning.¹⁴ A tailored global network approach should seek out the ability to craft global force management plans accounting for pledged contributions from the Royal

9. "Italy to Begin Naval Exercises off Libya," *World Bulletin*, March 1, 2015, <http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/155975/italy-to-begin-naval-exercises-off-libya>.

10. "NATO Naval Drills Start in Black Sea after One-Day Delay," *Today's Zaman*, March 10, 2015, http://www.todayszaman.com/world_nato-naval-drills-start-in-black-sea-after-one-day-delay_374819.html.

11. U.S. Navy, Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, data sheet on "Combined Maritime Forces" structure and employment, <http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/about/>.

12. "SNMG2, Turkish Navy End Black Sea Exercises," *Naval Today*, March 10, 2015, <https://navaltoday.com/2015/03/10/snmg2-turkish-navy-end-black-sea-exercises/>.

13. CS21R references NATO's standing naval forces explicitly, significantly promoting public awareness of transatlantic naval cooperation and perhaps reflecting a realization that, strategic rebalance notwithstanding, European partners will figure prominently in a tailored global network.

14. The *Combined Seapower* vision champions collaborative force and capability planning and increased personnel exchanges, yet it limits discussion of collaborative force management to reducing duplication of

Navy and other key capable partners. A principal U.S. Navy goal, in fact, should be to deepen those partnerships likely to yield the most broadly applicable combined force allocation opportunities in the near- to midterm. Any partners the Navy comes to rely upon in a planning sense must reflect the inherent operational flexibility and combat credibility of U.S. fleet units.

Test Alternative Employment Concepts

Deputy Secretary Work has spoken about the decisive role wargaming, testing, evaluation, and demonstration *with allies and partners* must play in maintaining the U.S. military's conventional deterrent effects.¹⁵ A tailored approach to deepening partnerships would see the Navy's rhetoric on the global network begin to reflect a new openness to expanding the combined exploration already taking place, albeit without much fanfare. New employment concepts between the Navy and Marine Corps have already unearthed the suitability of the Navy's new Mobile Landing Platform for some ship-to-objective applications, going so far as to inform future modifications to both those ships and alternative Marine detachments.¹⁶ In a similar vein, early last year a deployed carrier strike group practiced combined flight operations at sea with France's carrier task group for the first time ever, an evolution that involved launching, recovering, and even maintaining each other's aircraft.¹⁷ This combined exploration yielded operational results in less than a year as French fighter aircraft recently launched on combat missions from another U.S. Navy carrier in the Persian Gulf.¹⁸

The new *Cooperative Strategy* does not lay claim to previous exploratory efforts as a matter for partners. Nor does it call for their expansion as a key facet of how the Navy will help address known capability and capacity gaps or new threats to global access.¹⁹ Yet, there is vast potential to leverage combined exchanges to that end. **Alternative employment concepts** might help mitigate the persistent amphibious lift shortfall within the U.S. inventory,²⁰ for instance, by employing Marine air-ground task force elements from for-

effort in reaching out to more potential partners. Combined force allocation against common war-fighting requirements is not yet envisioned between the U.S. and British fleets.

15. Work, "The Third U.S. Offset Strategy."

16. Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General John Paxton, "U.S. Marine Corps: Forward and Ready" (remarks on naval integration during discussion at CSIS Defense Policies Studies Conference, Washington, DC, October 2, 2014), <http://csis.org/event/forward-and-ready>. See also Megan Eckstein, "Marines Considering New Platforms to Extend Africa Reach, including the Gulf of Guinea," *USNI News*, March 4, 2015, <http://news.usni.org/2015/03/04/marines-considering-new-platforms-to-extend-africa-reach-including-the-gulf-of-guinea>.

17. Hendrick Simoes, "US and French Navies Complete Combined Strike Group Operations," *Stars and Stripes*, February 2, 2015, <http://www.stripes.com/news/us-and-french-navies-complete-combined-strike-group-operations-1.265315>.

18. David Cenciotti, "French Rafale Omnirole Fighter Jet Operates from U.S. Aircraft Carrier in the Arabian Gulf," *Aviationist*, March 6, 2015, <http://theaviationist.com/2015/03/06/french-rafale-carl-vinson-gulf/>.

19. CS21R.

20. The amphibious shipping shortfall is well documented and the subject of most Marine Corps and Navy congressional hearings on future force structure. Dr. Maren Leed of CSIS captured the shortfall succinctly at the outset of the 2014 study, *Amphibious Shipping Shortfalls: Risks and Opportunities to Bridge the Gap* (Washington, DC: CSIS, September 2014), http://csis.org/files/publication/140902_Leed_AmphibiousShipping_WEB.pdf.

eign ships, or crewing foreign ships with U.S. sailors in order to build expeditionary operational competencies in those partner navies only now introducing amphibious lift. As mentioned earlier with regard to operational demand for U.S. naval forces outstripping the size of the fleet, there are similar shortfalls to be found in maritime patrol aircraft, littoral-capable ships like small surface combatants or patrol craft, naval airborne reconnaissance, and mine countermeasures within the U.S. inventory today—each of which might be addressed with combined employment experiments, extended “cross-decking” of expert advisers, or collaborative development of new concepts of operation.

Alternative employment concepts are most compelling where they might permit partners to draw on one another’s core competencies in order to improve upon existing tactics. They can empower the most capable allies and potentially illuminate new doctrinal approaches to contend with shifting advantages in war fighting at sea. This area, in the end, may prove richest for the kind of give-and-take dynamics the United States needs in its international cooperation. It is not difficult to imagine combined exploration of the Navy’s new “distributed lethality” and “hunter-killer group”²¹ concepts, for example, achieving the same kind of offensive anti-surface warfare gains that increased U.S. exposure to AIP diesel submarine operations over the last decade did for modern coordinated anti-submarine warfare. Of course, the U.S. Navy will need to strike a balance between exploratory projects that address the highest priority U.S. war-fighting gaps and active support for partner-driven projects. Professional maritime forums such as the International Seapower Symposium, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium should play a role in shaping the global network’s alternative concept agenda, but experimentation on the kinds of complex operations most relevant to assuring access may require smaller group approaches for now. It may be adequate, therefore, at this early stage in the global network’s development, for the latest U.S. Naval War College Global Series game on “cross-domain operations” to involve foreign partners only from the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Japan, even as it highlighted the importance of wider “multilateral information sharing related to cyber plans, capabilities, and effects with allies and partners prior to conflict.”²²

Promote Organizational Construct Convergence

The U.S. Navy’s longest experience with **organizational convergence** has been in the NATO context, where U.S. contributions to standing naval formations and staff headquarters have been consistent, if not nearly a priority as compared to war-fighting requirements in other theaters. Lately, however, the Navy’s leadership in establishing (and providing capability for) the emerging allied mission area of ballistic missile defense in Europe has it postured to demand more effort from partners to construct novel organizational

21. Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden, Rear Admiral Peter Gumataotao, and Rear Admiral Peter Fanta, “Distributed Lethality,” *Proceedings Magazine* 141, no. 1 (January 2015), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-01/distributed-lethality>.

22. Don Marrin and Walter Berbrick, *U.S. Naval War College Global 2014 Game Report* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, February 2015), <https://www.usnwc.edu/global14>.

approaches—both in NATO and well beyond.²³ There is a foundation in this field to build on, and it shows that convergence need not follow a massive, prolonged political-military effort such as that which bequeathed the transatlantic alliance to the present generation. Even if that were repeatable, the gains to be had are questionable when the U.S. interest is in a more flexible, networked approach to partnership.

To the extent that voluntary organizational convergence at some point becomes more binding than the other proposals already mentioned, it may be scoped tightly at first between partners seeking to pool resources for operational or acquisition purposes. If the effort is able to demonstrate its merits—in the form of operational cost savings, investment cost avoidance, or enhanced capability—other partners may subsequently join. A good example of this is the Danish-German Ark Project, which began in 2003 as a public-private commercial recapitalization effort to provide commercial and military sealift for both nations, and over the course of 12 years has transported military equipment for 9 other European states and also taken on liaisons from 25 nations at its Movement Coordination Centre Europe.²⁴ The International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office (ISMERLO) is another prime example. Created in 2004 as a voluntary, low-overhead NATO force structure entity comprising experts from the U.S. Navy’s submarine community as well as Norwegian and Spanish counterparts, the organization has become a clearinghouse of best practices in submarine rescue mobilization for the scores of navies currently operating submarines.²⁵

Organizational construct convergence is more common around issue areas or skill sets on the lower end of the war-fighting spectrum, however. The approach has long been recognized as a way of building foundational maritime domain awareness and law enforcement presence as a combined endeavor from the outset, where the nations involved would not otherwise have been able to address their national requirements in those areas. The Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) forum built around common counterpiracy interests in the western Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea is one such instance, as are most of the maritime “centers of excellence” being developed between NATO area nations.²⁶ In tailoring a global network of navies to its ends, however, the U.S. Navy should look to emphasize convergence toward higher-end war-fighting functions. There may still be niche requirements (as in the submarine rescue activity above), but they must be related to assured access and power projection if they are to contribute to credible deterrence.

23. Rear Admiral Roy Kitchener, chief of staff for allied striking and support forces NATO, states that U.S. ballistic missile defense experts will staff the C2 nodes for this capability within NATO—this manpower requirement on top of U.S. multimission destroyers and the new Aegis Ashore site in Romania, which together will constitute the entirety of NATO’s initial ballistic missile defense capability. RDML Kitchener, “COS: SFN Taking the Lead for NATO Maritime BMD,” *Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO Spring 2015 Newsletter* (small circulation newsletter), March 2015.

24. Government of Denmark, Defence Command Denmark, Naval Staff, Ark Project information pages, <http://forsvaret.dk/MST/eng/International/ARK/Pages/default.aspx>.

25. Mark Piggott, “ISMERLO Put into Action for Submarine Rescue Exercise,” Navy.mil, June 15, 2005, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=18783.

26. Brian Wilson, “Five Maritime Security Developments That Will Resonate for a Generation,” *Harvard Law School National Security Journal*, March 11, 2015, <http://harvardnsj.org/2015/03/five-maritime-security-developments-that-will-resonate-for-a-generation/>.

European organizational convergence in the field of ballistic missile defense, for example, shows great potential to offset ballooning U.S. requirements²⁷ in that emerging warfare area. The Maritime Theatre Missile Defence Forum (MTMD) began in 1999 as a trilateral effort between the Netherlands, Germany, and the United States to develop a broader interoperable sea-based missile defense architecture,²⁸ and has since grown to a nine-nation community of practice including Australia, Canada, France, Italy, and Spain.²⁹ By now, these nations have explored together the myriad technical issues associated with ballistic missile defense architectures—from sensors to datalinks to procedures.³⁰ As a result, several of the navies involved are well positioned to influence NATO approaches to regional and global missile defense demands, and potentially to modify existing ship combat systems for greater missile defense contributions to a global network. At-sea demonstrations in the coming years could raise the profile of this initiative both in Europe and beyond.

Seek Cooperative Acquisition, Embrace the Global Defense Market

From excess defense article transfers to foreign military sales and procurement, acquisition efforts often capture the imagination when considering pathways to deeper partnerships. They remain integral to spreading commonality (and therefore interoperability) into partner inventories, but they only tell part of the contemporary security cooperation story. As addressed earlier, the reality of an increasingly globalized defense industry requires that the pursuit of affordability in procurement will involve a different mix of domestic procurement, foreign purchases, and **cooperative acquisition**. While always a tender issue domestically for those nations involved in *foreign procurement* or *combined programs*, a trend toward global supply chains and hybrid programs has characterized the defense industry since the 1980s.³¹ Indeed, there is a considerable track record of *both* activities when it comes to how modern naval forces have been able to afford increasingly costly systems.

The complexities of government-to-government interaction on cooperative acquisition efforts themselves often militate against expanding these kinds of initiatives—either in participation or diversification. While the U.S.-Japan codevelopment arrangement for the SM-3 Block IIA missile interceptor is widely regarded as a model program, the many

27. Megan Eckstein and Sam LaGrone, “Stackley: Fleet Needs More BMD Ships to Meet Demand,” *USNI News*, March 4, 2015, <http://news.usni.org/2015/03/04/stackley-fleet-needs-more-bmd-ships-to-meet-demand>.

28. IABG, “Ottobrunn Maritime! Multinational Forum Hosted by IABG,” March 26, 2013, <http://www.iabg.de/en/news-events/details/news/ottobrunn-ma/>.

29. Scott, “UK Extends Sampson Radar Experimental BMD Research.”

30. Giji Gya, ed., *NATO Missile Defence: Political and Budgetary Implications* (Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, March 2013), <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/NATO-Missile-Defence-Political-and-Budgetary-Implications>.

31. Pierre Chao, “Federated Defense and the Defense Industrial Base” (comments made at Global Security Forum 2014, CSIS, Washington, DC, November 12, 2014), <http://csis.org/event/global-security-forum-2014-defense-industrial-base-and-federated-defense>.

travails of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program (with an eight-nation production consortium)³² provide a cautionary tale. Yet, there are several examples where the benefits of cooperative acquisition have been borne out, either in making low-rate production of advanced capabilities affordable, or making high-rate production a driver of commonality. The French and Spanish consortium behind the popular Scorpene diesel-electric submarine, and the common anti-air warfare suite developed between Germany and the Netherlands for their respective frigate classes, are two European examples of how low-rate production became affordable for the nations involved as a result of the combined effort. The aforementioned Sea Sparrow consortium and the Multifunction Information Distribution System program (which underpins Link-16 tactical data link use between allies) are two examples within NATO where the pervasive distribution of a capability greatly enhanced interoperability. The U.S. Navy should champion small group coordination when introducing new capabilities into partner navy inventories or upgrading existing systems. It should take note of whether cooperative acquisition efforts might help immature capability areas like unmanned systems (aerial and undersea) develop more efficiently or spread through the network more quickly, and then participate in them.

A corresponding expansion of foreign sales and purchases will be no less important to a more relevant global network as it reflects the same drive toward commonality, just at a different stage in a program's maturity. In this regard, possible U.S. P-8I maritime patrol aircraft sales to Australia and India³³ are of much greater interest for deeper partnership than excess material transfers of older equipment to other Asian states. The Navy should seek similar export opportunities for partner navies with ageing maritime patrol capability, and in areas such as munitions, where partners have the ability to incorporate breakthrough upgrades to U.S. systems currently in their inventories (i.e., SM-6 sales to those already fielding Standard Missile family munitions).³⁴ There is also a role for foreign purchases to play in closing identified U.S. war-fighting gaps, it seems, if development done elsewhere would meet Navy requirements more rapidly than an internal U.S. design effort. The Navy acknowledges that affordability must be considered on a par with other key performance parameters in programming,³⁵ and also that foreign munitions such as Norway's Naval Strike Missile might meet the fleet's near-term need for longer-range anti-ship weaponry.³⁶ If affordability improves with foreign sourcing, the Navy should actively seek partner contributions in near-term improvements over legacy systems, and also in support of "all domain access" advancements going forward—perhaps beginning with assured

32. *DefenseNews* provides a helpful overview of the complex arrangements associated with this massive multinational procurement program. See "The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter," *DefenseNews*, <http://archive.defensenews.com/section/SPECIAL08/F-35-Joint-Strike-Fighter>.

33. Brendan McGarry, "Boeing Pushes P-8 Poseidon Sales Abroad," *Military.com*, July 17, 2014, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/07/17/boeing-pushes-p8-poseidon-sales-abroad.html>.

34. Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden, commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces, has said publicly that Japan, South Korea, and Australia (all with Standard Missile–operating navies) might benefit from more offensive anti-surface warfare capability. See Andrea Shalal, "U.S. Navy Surface Chief Calls for More Offensive Weapons on Ships," *Reuters*, January 14, 2015, <http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/01/13/navy-ships-idINL1N0US1VT20150113>.

35. Stackley, "Atlantic Council Defense-Industrial Policy Address."

36. U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Forces Public Affairs, "USS *Coronado* Performs Live-Fire Test of Norwegian Strike Missile," *Navy.mil*, September 23, 2014, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=83491.

command and control and battlespace awareness.³⁷ This would be in keeping with concept development on Joint Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (heretofore termed “Air-Sea Battle”), which continues to surface the finding that credible, networked partner capacity will be needed if joint forces are to preserve their prerogatives to global access.³⁸

Distribute Open Core Standards for the Long Term

A step beyond cooperative acquisition—one that might mitigate some of the cost and complexity associated with collaborative programs in the long term—would be the **distribution of open core standards** in defining future requirements. Open core standards across platform variants can bring all the supply and training efficiencies of commonality to bear by instituting early competitive contracting to build “technology demonstrators,” whose results would refine common requirements definition and then be re-competed to address more specific service needs. The Department of Defense is currently approaching the “future of vertical lift” this way, by directing a methodical development of joint common architecture standards for all the services’ future rotary wing inventories before attempting to define the baseline and variant requirements for each service.³⁹

The Navy is participating in this effort and should consider other opportunities to expand commonality with key partner navies on fundamental requirements for aviation and shipbuilding going forward. Much the same way that baseline procedures for safe operations at sea are captured in allied publications, core standards within a tailored global network can reduce total operating costs for large segments of partner navies and affordably bake in some of the performance parameters the Navy might like to see resident in their inventories. Along a continuum between common fuels and networked communications, there is ample room to both give and take engineering lessons learned so that substitutability within the global network might, over time, become a functional reality.

Foster Cooperative Technical Exploration

Finally, there are clear long-term benefits to deepening **cooperative technical exploration** between key partners. “Mutual technology investment” has been a cornerstone of the

37. CS21R defines five elements of “all domain access.” The other three are cyber, electromagnetic maneuver warfare, and integrated fires—three areas of deep exploration within the Department of the Navy and the U.S. government, where they will probably stay for now rather than becoming an area of international naval cooperation.

38. Terry S. Morris, et al., “Securing Operational Access: Evolving the Air-Sea Battle Concept,” *National Interest*, February 11, 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/securing-operational-access-evolving-the-air-sea-battle-12219?page=3>.

39. Two CSIS discussions with the engineering community currently working on this issue revealed the great potential associated with this fundamentally different approach to design and production contracting. See “Future Vertical Lift: The Next Generation of Rotorcraft,” CSIS, Washington, DC, June 4, 2014, <http://csis.org/event/future-vertical-lift-next-generation-rotorcraft>, and “Common Architectures for Future Rotorcraft,” CSIS, Washington, DC, November 18, 2014, <http://csis.org/event/common-architectures-future-rotorcraft>.

model U.S. Navy–UK Royal Navy combined approach to strategic deterrence, a commitment expressed not only in the joint design of a common missile compartment for the Navy’s Ohio Replacement submarines and the Royal Navy’s Trafalgar-class submarines⁴⁰ but also in the Royal Navy’s collaborative approach to maintaining its submarine launched missile inventory over the next several decades.⁴¹ But that model needs to be expanded beyond the nuclear realm and outside the “special relationship” to yield asymmetric gains similar to what is expected out of U.S.-Japan ballistic missile interceptor development, and eventually out of the UK-France Lancaster House agreements on deep defense industrial cooperation.⁴² As the Navy works toward possibly game-changing advancements on the alternative energy and directed energy fronts,⁴³ then, it should make maintaining the qualitative edge in friendly naval capability development a priority. Less revolutionary but no less important to building the hardware of the future global network will be cooperative exploration of modularity in platform design.⁴⁴ If future fleets are to be affordable, they must infuse flexibility into capital-intensive, long-lived platforms to better account for relentless technological change in a maturing information age.

There is some potential for deeper partnerships to diminish major U.S. capacity drivers if the global network ever manages to change the balance of competition at sea, or the cost of competing itself. Without presuming the eventual outcomes of any particular cooperative technical efforts, it follows that combined technical exploration holds the greatest prospect of building substitutable key partner capability—in either general purpose or niche forces—to the point where it might affect U.S. force planning. Combined with open investigation of proposals in the categories above (especially novel operating concepts and organizational convergence), “born-combined” capabilities might afford the U.S. Navy the flexibility it seeks to balance imperatives for steady-state presence and war-fighting credibility. Notionally, what might make deeper partnerships a matter of strategic importance is the eventual possibility of key partner contributions permitting the United States to moderate its presence near recognized operating hubs, to periodically shift those hubs, or to divest nontraditional missions such as land-based theater missile defense.

40. Department of the Navy and Navy Command Headquarters, *Combined Seapower*, 7.

41. See Lockheed Martin, “Trident II D5 Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM),” <http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/trident-ii-d5-fleet-ballistic-missile--fbm-.html>.

42. Government of the United Kingdom, Prime Minister’s Office, “UK-France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation,” November 2, 2010, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-france-summit-2010-declaration-on-defence-and-security-co-operation>.

43. See Office of Naval Research (ONR), *Naval S&T Strategy: Innovations for the Future Force* (Arlington, VA: ONR, 2015), 16, 38–39, http://www.onr.navy.mil/About-ONR/~/_media/Files/About-ONR/2015-Naval-Strategy-final-web.ashx.

44. Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden highlights modularity alongside integrated power and directed energy as three keys to the future U.S. surface fleet. See Editor, “In Pursuit of the Navy’s Next Surface Combatant,” *USNI News*, January 14, 2014, <http://news.usni.org/2014/01/14/pursuit-u-s-navys-next-surface-combatant>.

6 | Priorities for the Global Network: Partners in a Minimum Deterrent Force

Taking the aforementioned prospects and proposals into consideration, how should the U.S. Navy prioritize its security cooperation efforts? The CSIS Federated Defense Project series proposes a framework to prioritize initiatives by their geostrategic importance, affordability, and “executability”;¹ these qualitative standards could serve as a good rule of thumb for the Navy in unearthing opportunities as part of (or distinct from) a top-down Department of Defense review. The interactions suggested by the prospects and proposals above would meet those standards if (1) they animate collective action at sea around shared interests, (2) they can improve upon the costs of unilateral U.S. Navy approaches, and (3) they advance core U.S. security interests in maintaining access from the sea.

By all appearances, the United States is no longer willing to pay the costs of a unilateral approach to global security. The Department of Defense’s modest goal of achieving higher capability at marginally reduced capacity within the Future Years Defense Plan² looks out of reach given the lack of congressional consensus on budget relief. Chairman Dempsey has argued that, without a repeal of Budget Control Act spending caps, the U.S. armed forces are already “at the point where our national aspirations are at genuine risk of exceeding our resources.”³ Secretary of Defense Ash Carter stated that the expected return to sequestration-level funding would disproportionately affect operations, maintenance, and modernization in the short term, and over the long term would make the military prepared to do “significantly less than what we have traditionally expected, and required of it.”⁴

1. These metrics are introduced in the first regional study of the CSIS Federated Defense Project. See Michael J. Green, Kathleen H. Hicks, and Zack Cooper, *Federated Defense in Asia* (Washington, DC: CSIS, December 2014), http://csis.org/files/publication/141120_Green_FederatedDefenseAsia_Web.pdf.

2. Work and Winnefeld, in a pre-PB16 conference call, February 2, 2015, articulated the Department of Defense’s readiness goals in this manner. For the Navy’s articulation of the goal, see Megan Eckstein, “CNO Greenert: Navy Could Fix Readiness Shortfall by 2020 if Sequestration Is Avoided,” *USNI News*, March 10, 2015, <http://news.usni.org/2015/03/10/cno-greenert-navy-could-fix-readiness-shortfall-by-2020-if-sequestration-is-avoided>.

3. Jim Garamone, “Reforms Just as Important as Budget Increase, Dempsey Says,” *DoD News*, March 4, 2015, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128295>.

4. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, “Submitted Statement—Senate Armed Services Committee (Budget Request),” March 3, 2015, <http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1915>.

Even if the Department of Defense gets funding relief—either in year-on-year supplemental awards or in amendment of the Budget Control Act to exclude discretionary spending on defense—the Navy must soon come to terms with its capacity shortage and shape the long-awaited global force management review now under way with the Department of Defense.

Given the circumstances, the Navy must be prepared to articulate both its base rationale for deeper partnerships and its priorities in seeking them out. If the fiscal pressures weighing on the U.S. government mean more of our power must be exercised in the diplomatic and informational arenas,⁵ the Navy must change how it seeks to preserve the nation’s asymmetric advantage in power projection. Insofar as states remain committed to the current international order that has benefited them, they should assert their collective authority to uphold it through cooperative defense of common values. *A tailored global network approach, with targeted investment in key allied and partner maritime relationships, could pursue qualitative superiority capable of deterring the most destabilizing threats to the international system.* The alignment of foreign political will behind burden sharing at sea cannot be assumed, but it can be nurtured over time and the potential for divergence minimized by the careful selection of military partners and naval activities. Common maritime capability investments can be pursued where interests are truly mutual and their potential applications broad, with the express understanding that the process of partnership-driven investing itself might improve the affordability and suitability of American naval forces—finally striking an appropriate balance between joint interdependence and international cooperation.

If, as some fear, the revised *Cooperative Strategy* will “mute its advocacy of reaching out to foreign navies”⁶ with its focus on war fighting, the Navy must change its public messaging about how and why we intend to rely on allies and partners to help defend the present international order. The driver should not be peacetime presence alone, even though that is the shortfall most immediately stressing the U.S. fleet. It must also include, as an equal driver, our ability to exercise sea power in the precision-missile age, where international arms sales from Russia and others increase the likelihood we will encounter anti-access/area-denial beyond solely the most stressing Indo-Asia-Pacific cases. The “multilateralism”⁷ advocated in the Navy’s global network concept, and endorsed in the revised *Cooperative Strategy*, still requires a hard core to shore up breaches in the interna-

5. Dempsey, “The Bend of Power.”

6. James Holmes, “How to Rule the High Seas and Contain an Asian Country That Will Remain Nameless,” *Foreign Policy*, January 21, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/21/navy-china-marines-strategy/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2AEditors%20Picks&utm_campaign=2014_EditorsPicksRS1%2F21RS.

7. The phrase is Francis Fukuyama’s, but a 2009 *Washington Quarterly* article by Thomas Wright (then at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, now at Brookings) correctly amplified the concept to argue that U.S. foreign policy tends to assume the United States must—and can—drive multilateral approaches and, in many cases, inappropriately prioritizes broad participation. The author points out that “bilateral or small group cooperation by the very important states may be a necessary prerequisite for broader cooperation” on complex issues. See Thomas Wright, “Toward Effective Multilateralism,” *Washington Quarterly* 32, no. 3 (July 2009): 164, <http://csis.org/files/publication/twq09julywright.pdf>.

tional order presently being exploited by revisionist powers. As Secretary Carter said at his first appearance with his British counterpart, “We need as many kindred countries in the world as we can who are capable of wielding their own influence independently of us.”⁸ Operational access and war-fighting capability will determine the credibility of what presence we and our partners are able to achieve and are increasingly relevant aspects of a more effective global network.

A more comprehensive approach to deepening partnerships would do well to recognize, as former deputy secretary of defense John Hamre observed, that sustaining the historical U.S. commitment to lead abroad will prove crucial to upholding a credible deterrent.⁹ It must also acknowledge that effective deterrence, as former principal deputy under secretary of defense Kathleen Hicks points out, requires disciplined communication of a widely held commitment to long-standing norms of behavior where they are now threatened, as in the maritime domain.¹⁰ Consistent communication is so important with regard to enhanced maritime cooperation because the aspects of sea power that make it “benign” (and therefore politically palatable to more nations) also tend to make it inaudible until “one side’s maritime weakness is sufficient to convince the other that sea control is open to contestation.”¹¹ Only a global network of navies characterized by *partnered presence that deters*—presence capable of spreading shared values, reinforcing norms where they are under threat, and affecting the risk-reward calculus of potential adversaries—can best serve U.S. interests.

8. Department of Defense Joint Press Conference by U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and UK Secretary of State for Defence Michael Fallon, Pentagon Press Briefing Room, Washington, DC, March 11, 2015, <http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5600>.

9. See John J. Hamre, “Introduction: Is America in Retreat?,” in *Global Flashpoints 2015: Crisis and Opportunity*, ed. Craig Cohen and Josiane Gabel (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2015), vii–xi, http://csis.org/files/publication/150220_Cohen_GlobalFlashpoints_Web.pdf.

10. See Kathleen Hicks, “The Case for Deterrence,” in *Global Flashpoints 2015*, ed. Cohen and Gabel, 2–5.

11. David Blagden, “Sea Power Is Benign Power: The International Case for a Maritime Posture,” *RUSI Journal* 159, no. 3 (June/July 2014): 54–61.

7 | Conclusion

No sooner had Admiral Mullen coined the term “one thousand-ship navy” than analysts began to dredge up (and deride) Sir Julian Corbett’s notion of a “fleet in being”¹ where there was once ample U.S. military might. This sparked a series of dire warnings about the U.S. Navy’s decline that continue to this day.² Many critiques point to the Royal Navy’s post–World War II retreat from global power as a cautionary tale, and invariably prescribe increased funding for the U.S. Navy—not a terribly worthwhile indulgence for uniformed Navy leadership coming to terms with the dismal trajectories of dwindling U.S. defense spending and rising procurement costs.³ The comparison is nevertheless useful in illuminating a unique challenge and opportunity the Navy faces as it executes higher strategic guidance to innovate by deepening maritime partnerships.

Unlike postwar Britain, the United States has no rising power behind which to align, no power that would counsel a different (perhaps more difficult) course than the Royal Navy took in cultivating ties with the U.S. Navy. Nor does the United States hold the type of colonial ambitions that preoccupied postwar Britain’s geostrategic concerns from VE Day to the Suez Crisis. This fact frees the United States considerably to accentuate what is distinct about the American geopolitical case. A path uniquely available to the United States is quite clearly to demonstrate its commitment to (1) remain on the global stage at sea as the underwriter of global stability, and (2) break a dynamic rooted in old international political approaches by highlighting that we aim to uphold a generally favorable system of rules, reached by consensus, rather than counterbalance any particular adversary for narrow gains. The 2007 *Cooperative Strategy* started to articulate this American vision for its Navy. Follow-through on this year’s revised *Cooperative Strategy* must set the Navy firmly on a course to bolster that vision with cooperative deeds at sea. The times demand those deeds be less about expanding the network globally and more about deepening the network where it might deter attempts by revisionist powers to upend the international order.

When considered alongside the economic gains and broadening geopolitical interests of rising and as-yet nonaligned powers, the relative improvements of other large regional

1. Robert D. Kaplan, “America’s Elegant Decline,” *Atlantic*, November 1, 2007, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/11/america-s-elegant-decline/306344/2/>.

2. Robert C. O’Brien, “The Navy’s Hidden Crisis: It’s Too Small, and Getting Smaller,” *Politico*, February 5, 2015, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/navy-hidden-crisis-114943.html#.VPvEPfnF9Gg>.

3. Anthony Capaccio, “Cost for U.S. Weapons Programs Increased by \$27 Billion Last Year,” *BloombergBusiness*, March 4, 2015, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-04/cost-for-47-u-s-weapons-increased-by-27-billion-gao-finds>.

navies growing in stature could also present a challenge to U.S. influence if left uninformed by U.S. Navy outreach. A global international system, for example, defined increasingly by Brazil in the West, India in the East, and less by the U.S. Navy and its long-standing allies globally, holds diminished prospects for the United States in the long term. Rather than a singular focus on engaging the People's Liberation Army (Navy), then, perhaps the greatest project ahead for the U.S. Navy is to bring its Brazilian and Indian counterparts to the fore responsibly, and fully invested in the values of a global network of navies.

Today's global network has many virtues, surely, but not enough to advance U.S. interests. There is a mismatch between U.S. Navy rhetoric on the value of partnerships (which is positive and improving, but still inefficiently directed), and the Navy's plans to develop those partnerships to greater effect (which are promising in too few cases). By building on the most worthwhile activities already under way, and by pursuing a declaratory policy on a more comprehensive approach to deepening cooperation, the Navy can fashion a network capable of upholding a conventional deterrent that becomes more strained with each month the U.S. Navy labors under budget uncertainty—without being able to seize any initiative or provide friends and allies clarity on how it intends to manage risk.

This paper has sought to articulate opportunities where the U.S. Navy might posture itself to shape the global commons with allies and partners, surge with the most proficient to check new threats, and, in the process, tailor the global network for real burden sharing at sea. By doing so, the Navy would plot a course for the joint force in controlling (while defense modernization efforts proceed) the U.S. military's exposure to the risks associated with instability in places of prime strategic interest. Targeted messaging on international cooperation, backed by aggressive, shared plans and combined with the immutable character of our forward presence in the coming years, would speak volumes to capable allies and partner navies who continue to look for direction. Such an approach, as the CSIS Federated Defense Project makes clear, must not entail the elimination of redundancy to the point of excessive interdependence.⁴ It should, however, recognize that there are enough day-to-day global operational requirements to go around and as-yet unaddressed challenges to American war-fighting advantages the Navy must always seek to preserve.

4. CSIS, *Federated Defense Project: Concept Overview*, December 16, 2013, 2, http://csis.org/files/publication/131216_FederatedProject_Concept_Overview.pdf.

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