Contact Lenses: The Realist Neglect of Transparency and U.S.-Russian Military Ties

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Realists are engaged in a debate among themselves over the importance of cooperative international institutions. At one extreme, John J. Mearsheimer maintains that institutions merely reflect the underlying state power balance in the international system, and therefore "have no independent effect on state behavior."[1] At the other end is Joseph M. Grieco, who claims, "Neorealism can be amended to ascribe significance to international institutions."[2] Grieco argues that weaker states can use institutions to enhance their influence in the international system by exercising institutional opportunities for "voice," or public expression of concerns and preferences.[3] Despite this range of positions, all realists

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[1] John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 7.

[2] Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 264. Also see Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, ed. David A. Baldwin (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1993): 301–338.

[3] Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, in "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," *Mershon International Studies Review* 41, suppl. 1 (May 1997): 1–32,

agree that states participate in institutions primarily as a means of preserving or enhancing their power or security.

Realists also agree that successful institutions form only rarely, regardless of how much independent effect some institutions might have, because states fear that others will take advantage of cooperative arrangements to gain power at the expense of their partners. Relative power gains are the paramount concern in state decision-making, according to realists, since power is a zero-sum asset and the gains of one state are the losses of another. Since all states need to ensure their autonomy in order to survive, prudent states doubt the intentions of current partners who may become future adversaries. Hence states must not allow others to reap cooperative benefits in the short term that might turn into long-term power advantages.[4]

Given that realists pay so much heed to states' distrust of each other and to the uncertainty of others' intentions, it is surprising that those participating in the realist debate over institutions have not recognized a key benefit that security-conscious states gain from the very existence of institutions: transparency. When institutions foster information exchange and personal interactions across states, they serve to make the long-term capabilities, intentions, and motives of other states more transparent.

Even institutions that fail in their ostensible goal of increased *substantive* state-to-state cooperation and policy coordination can serve realist leaders well if they increase transparency. Transparency, even in the absence of more substantive cooperation, decreases the uncertainty states face about possible future threats, providing all states involved with valuable intelligence about their partners. Transparency furthermore broadcasts the benign intentions of states who seek security rather than domination.[5] This helps states who only want to preserve the status quo

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argue that classical realists have always understood the value of institutions. But the major arguments that Schweller and Priess make go far beyond the limits of the current mainstream realist literature, and bring in the notion that powerful states transmit long-lasting changes in values and norms to lesser powers, changes which endure even when the systemic balance of power shifts. Schweller and Priess fail to explain why any state that is concerned about the things that realists care about most--autonomy, survival, and influence--would allow itself to be invaded by the values of another state that is attempting to wrest control away from it. The Schweller and Priess argument should in fact be welcomed as a capitulation by those cultural institutionalists who have long seen realists as their major enemies. See, for example, Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Culture and National Security* (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1996).

[4] This theme appears in the work of both Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 86, and Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation."

[5] Alongside the debate over the independent impact of institutions, realists are also debating whether states primarily seek status quo security or increased power and influence in the system. For summaries of the debate, see Michael Spirtas, "A House Divided: Tragedy and Evil in Realist Theory," *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 385–

avoid unnecessary spirals of what is known as the security dilemma[6]—the tendency states have to misinterpret others' defensive actions as offensively intended, and to react defensively in a way that is similarly misinterpreted by the other side.

Academic realists including Mearsheimer and Grieco have minimized the importance of transparency because they have associated it with the more limited claims of neoliberal institutionalism.[7] Neoliberal institutionalists such as Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin have portrayed transparency as a means for states to cement cooperative relationships, and not as an end in itself. In their model, transparency does three things: it reduces the costs involved in reaching agreements, by revealing potential options for mutual gain; it reveals how well states fulfill these agreements, thereby making monitoring easier and lowering the incentive for states to cheat; and it alleviates fears about unequal gains from these agreements, by clarifying the benefits each side receives from cooperation.[8] Each of these benefits is wedded to the substantive gains that cooperation is supposed to achieve. Neoliberals have failed to address the most fundamental benefit that transparency provides. Transparency improves long-term state intelligence about potential adversaries, regardless of the degree (or lack thereof) of substantive policy coordination that institutions create, and thereby allows states to design better strategies.[9]

423, and Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 1997.

[6] The classic description of the security dilemma and its spirals is found in Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 62–76. Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 50–90, argues that security-seeking states will engage in cooperation to broadcast their status quo orientation, and thereby prevent unnecessary military competitions.

[7] See Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 487; Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," pp. 17–19; and Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation," p. 303.

[8] Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*, p. 274; and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 45–46.

[9] One institutionalist who has gone beyond the Keohane and Martin formulation is Celeste Wallander, "Balancing Acts: Security, Institutions, and German-Russian Relations after the Cold War," unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, June 1997. Wallander makes a powerful argument that states choose to maintain security institutions that no longer reflect the international balance of power because they serve to decrease uncertainty (p. 45–46). She argues that states can use the information that institutions provide about other states "to distinguish 'lemons' from 'creampuffs,' " (p. 62) and thereby make better choices. Wallander nonetheless still focuses on how states use such information to reveal the dangers or benefits to be had from cooperation itself (pp. 63,

It is my contention that transparency *in and of itself* is a realist gain to be had from institutions, and that realist policy-makers and state leaders today recognize this gain and pursue it vigorously. In stark contrast to both Mearsheimer and Grieco, I furthermore contend that international institutions in security issue-areas should be relatively common,[10] since they are of vital importance to realists who fear the future. (I will use the definition of "institutions" provided by Mearsheimer, since he is most critical of their value and thus least likely to be too inclusive in his terminology. Institutions are "rules…negotiated by states…that prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior, and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior. [They] are typically formalized in international agreements, and are usually embodied in organizations…" [11]) The only reason that academic realists have not found successful security institutions to be prevalent is that they have defined institutional success too narrowly, focusing on the substantive policy coordination that institutionalized rules create rather than on the transparency they provide.

A good example is provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which Mearsheimer denigrates as merely "an American tool for managing power in the face of the Soviet threat" (and not worthy of consideration as an institution with independent impact, since it did not create any policy coordination beyond what U.S. dominance alone would have done).[12] NATO is seen by its own state leaders and military officers as having performed a unique and vital role in preventing conflict among former West European adversaries who feared each other immensely following World War II. The transparency mandated by NATO membership forced these states to reveal their military budgets and plans to each other regularly, and thereby prevented unwarranted perceptions of threat from arising among them.[13]

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66), and does not address the realist use of institutions to gather intelligence for more general security concerns (such as choice of military strategies or budgets).

[10] Mearsheimer argues that institutions are unlikely to form in military issue-areas, because both the fear of cheating and the "threat of 'swift, decisive defection' " are more likely; see "False Promise of International Institutions," p. 19. Grieco maintains that concerns about relative gains should be lower in economic than security affairs, making institutions more likely in the former; see "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation," p. 324.

[11] Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," pp. 8–9.

[12] Ibid., p. 14.

[13] For examples, see Joseph Kruzel (U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy until his untimely death in 1995), "Partnership for Peace and the Transformation of North Atlantic Security," in *NATO in the Post-Cold War Era: Does It Have a Future?* ed. S. Victor Papacosma and Mary Ann Heiss (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 343–344; and Col. Nelson Drew (who served on the U.S. National Security Council staff until his death in the same accident that killed Kruzel, and had earlier been both a NATO military diplomat and a professor at the U.S. National War College), "NATO, NACC, and the Partnership for Peace," in *Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia,* ed. Lena Jonson and Clive Archer (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996), p. 222.

Mearsheimer mischaracterizes NATO as purely an outward-looking alliance,[14] rather than recognizing the multiple security-enhancing roles that its institutions played.

In this article I use the example of U.S./Russian military-to-military contacts to demonstrate that realist policy-makers value transparency as an end in itself. I find a great deal of support for Grieco's argument that weak states join institutions to gain "voice." Yet Grieco and other academic realists neglect the fact that senior military officers—arguably the "real-est" of the realists[15]—believe so strongly in the importance of transparency for state security that they will expend domestic political capital in order to create international institutions that enhance it. In the sections that follow, I will first briefly describe U.S.-Russian military contact programs through the mid-1990s. I will then illustrate how officials on both sides view these programs, demonstrating both the variety of realist motives that underlie them, and the significance of transparency as one of those motives. I will next answer a hypothetical argument that a cynical realist in the Mearsheimer tradition might make—that this belief is misplaced and the benefits of transparency are illusory—by examining the effects of Soviet-German military-to-military cooperation in the 1920s, cooperation which preceded the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. I will then answer those who might claim that U.S.-Russian security institutions today are a special case brought on by rare circumstances in the international system, where both sides feel so secure that neither side has anything to lose by sharing information. Finally, I will close with suggestions drawn from these preliminary findings about how academic realists might integrate the search for transparency into their research questions.

U.S.-Russian Military-to-Military Contacts

The history of U.S.-Russian military ties has been explored elsewhere,[16] and need not be recounted here in detail. Between World War II (when the United States and the Soviet Union were military allies) and the era of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev (which laid the foundations for today's

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[14] Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply," p. 83.

[15] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and the Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 66, notes that military officers across all states tend to have conservative, realist views of the world, often exaggerating the presence of international security threats.

[16] See Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "A Quiet Success for Arms Control: Preventing Incidents at Sea," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 154–154; Kurt M. Campbell, "The Soldiers' Summit," *Foreign Policy* 75 (Summer 1989): 76–91, especially pp. 77–81; Steven E. Miller, "Russian-U.S. Security Cooperation on the High Seas," in *The Limited Partnership: Building a Russian-U.S. Security Community*, ed. James E. Goodby and Benoit Morel (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 249–271; and Michael J. McCarthy, "Comrades in Arms: Russian-American Military-to-Military Contacts Since 1992," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 9, no. 4 (Dec. 1996): 743–778, especially pp. 744–750.

military cooperation) there was only minimal cooperative contact—and frequent hostile contact—between the military organizations of these superpower adversaries. Yet even in this tense cold war atmosphere, political and military leaders in both countries recognized the importance of transparency and communication for preventing unnecessary conflict spirals. Several bilateral arrangements were established for the express purpose of encouraging direct interaction between the two militaries in response to concerns raised by the other side, such as the military liaison missions that bridged the gap of silence across the two Germanys for more than forty years.[17]

One of these military-to-military arrangements, the 1972 Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea, actually qualified as a security institution as Mearsheimer defines the term. Negotiated by the two states over a period of several years, this formal agreement set rules for the behavior of ships at sea, to avoid minor confrontations that might spark a major crisis which neither side intended. In accordance with Mearsheimer's definition, it prescribed the use of certain signals to convey information about naval exercises that might otherwise be misinterpreted or cause dangerous accidents, and proscribed various kinds of harassment of opponents' vessels that had until then been routine. It furthermore formalized the personnel channels through which communication and complaints about naval incidents took place, and led to the formation of a new joint committee and an annual oversight and review process.[18] Although the coordination this institution created was limited and its enforcement mechanisms were minimal and problematic, the communication it created was cited by senior military officers as the inspiration for the very significant military-to-military contact programs that began in the Gorbachev era.[19] Even during the cold war, security institutions were formed between current (not merely potential) adversaries for the purpose of increasing transparency and controlling the security dilemma.

The more recent and intensive post-cold war military-to-military programs between Russia and the United States cover a wide range of activities.[20] Three types of joint military-to-military effort have been especially significant, and are worth describing here: (1) the 1989 Dangerous Military Activities (DMA) Agreement, designed to prevent the

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[17] Campbell, "Soldiers' Summit," p. 79.

[18] Each of these elements is described in depth by Lynn-Jones, "Quiet Success for Arms Control," pp. 169–176.

[19] For examples, see Gen. George L. Butler, Gen. Anatolii V. Boliatko, and Scott D. Sagan, *Reducing the Risk of Dangerous Military Activities*, Report of the Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford, Cal., July 1991, passim; Campbell, "Soldiers' Summit," p. 80.

[20] Some have taken place in a multilateral context under NATO auspices, but as I will show below, the U.S.-Russian relationship has been primary here.

unintentional or miscalculated use of force in peacetime (and thus earning the sobriquet of "operational arms control"[21]); (2) regularized programs of officer conferences, unit visits and joint exercises that are designed as confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), to break down enemy images and foster trust and communication between military services in the two countries; and (3) joint peacekeeping activities, most notably Russian participation alongside U.S. forces in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia under United Nations auspices.

It was the DMA agreement, and particularly the negotiations leading up to it, that fundamentally set the stage for the institutionalization of U.S.-Russian military-to-military contacts that followed. This was the first set of negotiations in the history of U.S.-Soviet relations to be primarily headed, designed, and signed by military officers on both sides.[22] Not surprisingly, it focused on the kinds of day-to-day technical and operational problems that are best recognized and solved by those with lengthy military experience.[23] It flowed from the unprecedented one-on-one meetings that Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff William Crowe held with his Soviet counterpart, Chief of the General Staff Sergei Akhromeev, during the latter's 1988 U.S. visit.[24]

Drawing on the logic of the Incidents at Sea agreement, the DMA agreement was designed (in the words of one of its principal negotiators, then-Soviet Gen. Anatolii Boliatko) "to reduce the possibility of incidents between [our] armed forces, to facilitate rapid peaceful resolution of those incidents which result from dangerous military activities, and to assure the safety of personnel of ships, aircraft, and land-based installations."[25] To accomplish these tasks, the DMA agreement extended the kinds of proscriptions and prescriptions that were included in the Incidents at Sea agreement, for example by regulating the use of aircraft lasers when in proximity to forces of the other side, prohibiting the use of command and control jamming against the other side, and mandating the use of particular radio frequencies and other communications procedures in the event of dangerous unforeseen incidents or accidental incursion into the

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[21] William J. Perry, "Preface," in *Reducing the Risk of Dangerous Military Activities*, p. vi.
[22] Scott D. Sagan, "A New Agenda for Military-to-Military Talks and Operational Arms Control," in ibid., p. 27; and Bob Woodward and R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S.-Soviet Pact to Curb Incidents," *Washington Post*, June 7, 1989. Civilian authorities in the executive branches of both countries gave final approval of the agreement before it was signed.
[23] An example brought up by Gen. Butler was which procedures would be followed by the Soviet military if a C-141 U.S. Air Force plane carrying on-site U.S. inspectors to the USSR under Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty mandates accidentally strayed off course over a sensitive installation. See George L. Butler, "Negotiating the Dangerous Military Activities Agreement," in ibid., p. 6.
[24] Campbell, "Soldiers' Summit."
[25] Anatolii V. Boliatko, "The Negotiations on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities," in *Reducing the Risk of Dangerous Military Activities*, p. 14.

other side's national territory.[26] Most important for the military-to-military contacts that would follow, the DMA agreement created a permanent Joint Military Commission for the express purpose of having senior officers meet annually to discuss matters of concern to either country.

As in the case of other forms of U.S.-Russian military agreements, the substantive coordination and policy cooperation that this agreement has created are imperfect. Claims still occasionally arise, for example, that Russian military vessels use laser beams in close range of U.S. aircraft in violation of DMA agreement terms. But the kind of transparency that the agreement has created—in this case, transparency about the immediate intentions of the military forces of the two sides as they go about their daily tasks—has immense value in the eyes of military planners on both sides as a way of defusing potential conflict. To cite one example, in a June 1992 meeting in Moscow, senior Russian General Staff officers privately raised concerns with U.S. air force officers about U.S. violations of Cuban airspace during Haitian refugee crisis operations.[27] According to an U.S. observer, "Having this issue successfully resolved with a minimum of fanfare helped build trust and confidence between the leaders of the two forces."[28]

What perhaps illustrates best the importance that military officers have attached to the DMA program is the fact that on both sides they had to fight uphill bureaucratic battles to win the right to negotiate an agreement of military design under military leadership. On the U.S. side it is well known that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) spent a great deal of political capital to win over both civilians in the Pentagon and diplomats in the State Department to get approval for the negotiation process to go forward; some think that Crowe may have devoted so much political effort to this issue that he damaged his ability to pursue other items on the JCS agenda as a result.[29] The hostility that senior U.S. officers faced was not merely the result of typical bureaucratic in-fighting over roles and resources, but also because civilians in the administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush feared seeming too "soft" on the Russians and sending the wrong signal to a potential adversary.[30] Although on the Soviet side fewer details have been revealed, it appears that similar bureaucratic and political compunctions were raised in

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[26] See "Text of the Dangerous Military Activities Agreement," in *Reducing the Risk of Dangerous Military Activities*, pp. 19–26.
[27] McCarthy, "Comrades in Arms," p. 755.
[28] Ibid., citing an interview he had with U.S. Air Force Gen. James McCarthy who headed the U.S. delegation to the talks.
[29] Off-the-record comment made by mid-level Pentagon officials in an interview with the author, Feb. 1995.
[30] See Campbell, "Soldiers' Summit," pp. 78, 81–82, and John Isaacs, "Stopping the Nonsense," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 44, no. 8 (Oct. 1988): 4.

Moscow.[31] It would have been easier for military officers on both sides not to have concentrated so many resources and so much effort on a program that was clearly experimental, if they thought it would have only minimal value. Instead, significant individuals on both sides decided that the benefits of military-to-military institutions outweighed the risks.

The perceived success of these senior officer conferences has contributed to the second major growth area in U.S.-Russian military ties in recent years: the blossoming of official contacts between military officers and troops at all levels, including unit-to-unit visits and exercises of various kinds. While these military contacts began in the Gorbachev era on an *ad hoc* basis, they were institutionalized in 1993 by a Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation on Defense and Military Relations.[32] This Memorandum mandates a variety of periodic (usually annual) meetings between senior military officials at various ranks, which are often "used to resolve specific issues or to convey important messages between government or military leaders."[33] It also establishes a Bilateral Working Group that meets each year to prescribe a program of lower-level unit activities and exercises. It is a sign of how important these meetings are to the military organizations of both sides that even as U.S.-Russian political and diplomatic relations have fluctuated and sometimes plummeted in recent years (reflecting conflict over security issues ranging from NATO expansion to Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty amendment), the number of official U.S.-Russian military-to-military programs has steadily increased. In late 1995, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry and Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev announced that there would be around 40 military-to-military events in 1996;[34] by mid-1997, the number of similar events planned by Defense Secretary William Cohen and Defense Minister Igor Rodionov had expanded to over 100.[35] (These U.S.-Russian ties have intensified even as Russian leaders have refused for diplomatic and domestic political reasons to take advantage of similar, multilateral opportunities offered to Russia through its membership in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.[36])

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[31] Campbell, "Soldiers' Summit," p. 78.
[32] McCarthy, "Comrades in Arms," pp. 753–755.
[33] Ibid., p. 735.
[34] Charles Aldinger, "U.S. and Russia to Increase Joint Military Ties," Reuters, November 29, 1995.
[35] Linda D. Kozaryn, "U.S., Russia Expanding Military Ties," American Forces Press Service, May 20, 1997.
[36] Then-Russian Security Adviser Aleksandr Lebed said in 1996 that "so far there has been no progress in establishing joint actions envisioned in the [PfP] program;" cited in "Lebed Calls for Closer Russia-NATO Links," Reuters, Oct. 8, 1996. Similarly, Russian defense analyst Dmitrii Trenin noted that PfP was "in cold storage because of the problem of NATO expansion," in "Avoiding a New Confrontation with NATO," *NATO Review* 44, no. 3 (May 1996): 18.

Military-to-military relations appear more stable and friendly than other forms of state interaction in this case.

Unit-to-unit meetings and exercises have become so common that they now seem normal and no longer command much press attention in the United States. However, it is important to keep in mind that these programs, even more than the DMA agreement, have provoked a great deal of political controversy in the recent past, especially in Russia. Russian military leaders have had to brave a storm of protest over the conduct of joint military exercises with U.S. troops. Army maneuvers involving U.S. troops held in Totsk, Russia in 1994 (codenamed Peacekeeper-94) were delayed and almost canceled because of opposition from Russian nationalists, who feared that U.S. Green Berets and intelligence operatives would use them to obtain information for a future invasion.[37] U.S. officials noted that there was nonetheless "strong Russian Defense Ministry backing" for the exercises.[38] Col.-Gen. Eduard Vorobev, first deputy chief of Russian ground forces, complained about "the problems we had to go through to explain these exercises to the public."[39]

Similar exercises the next year in Kansas (Peacekeeper-95) again came close to being canceled, this time because of Russian government disapproval of NATO bombing raids against Bosnian Serbs in retaliation for their disruption of U.N. peacekeeping activities there.[40] Although the Kansas exercises did not face the same level of public disapproval by Americans that the Totsk exercises had by Russians, there were some political voices raised against them, including at the congressional level, as a national security risk.[41] Certainly on the Russian side, the fact that exercises have gone forward illustrates how highly military officers and senior governmental officials value them, since it would be politically easier for them to throw their lot in with the nationalists and declare such institutions unworkable in the present uncertain climate of U.S.-Russian relations.

The crowning achievement of U.S.-Russian military cooperation thus far, and the end result of earlier peacekeeping exercises, has been the shoulder-to-shoulder service of troops from the two countries in Joint

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[37] For an example, see Vadim Yegorov, "Details: Green Berets Visit Russia Incognito," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, August 31, 1994, as reported in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 46, no. 35 (Sept. 28, 1994): 26.

[38] Daniel Sneider, "Russia Links PfP with Treaty Limits," *Defense News*, May 9–15, 1994.

[39] Sebastian Smith, "Russia and U.S. Long Way from Full Blown Alliance," *Agence France Presse*, Sept. 7, 1994.

[40] "Pentagon Ponders Moscow Threat," Associated Press, Oct. 3, 1995.

[41] The U.S. congressman in whose district they took place, Republican Todd Tiahrt, complained that the maneuvers "could expose classified information," and a founder of the Kansas Citizens Militia group was reported to have said, "The Russians being a recent enemy, I am a little leery--don't bring them in too close." James Brooke, "Kansans Finding Their Russian Visitors Not So Foreign," *New York Times*, Oct. 30, 1995.

Endeavor peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. After lengthy and sometimes difficult negotiations at both the diplomatic and military levels about the level and character of Russian involvement in IFOR, Russia sent a mobile brigade drawn from its 76th and 98th airborne divisions to serve alongside a brigade of the United States 1st Armored Division, under the command of NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) U.S. Gen. George Joulwan in Bosnia in Feb. 1996. As in the case of all of the other military-to-military contacts cited here, policy coordination has not always gone smoothly, and each side has attempted to preserve as much of its autonomy and influence over the process as possible.

Initial agreement on the plan was reached only after the U.S. side agreed that Joulwan would be commanding Russian troops in his capacity as a U.S. general, and not as a NATO commander.[42] This was primarily a salve for the wounded pride of Russian nationalists, who see an important distinction between military cooperation *with* the United States (as equal great powers) and military cooperation *under* NATO. There were then a series of incidents following the signing of the agreement that proved the devil was in the details of implementation. First the Russian side sent in a hard-line officer, Gen. Nikolai Staskov, to exercise immediate command over Russian forces even though he was "outside the chain of command originally agreed to by Moscow and Washington."[43] U.S. officials were particularly unhappy about his presence because he was "privately questioning the mingling of Russian and American soldiers," and seemed to have been sent to Bosnia as a result of communist victories in the December 1995 Russian parliamentary elections. Said one U.S. officer, "All of the relationships that we'd worked so carefully to build are suddenly shaky."[44] Following this change, the bulk of the Russian troops arrived later than planned, placing heavier than expected burdens on their U.S. counterparts, and proceeded to pitch their tents in an area on Bosnian Serb territory that was outside what the United States saw as the agreed deployment area.[45] The Russian deputy commander of the joint operation, Gen. Leontii Shevtsov, acceded to a U.S. request that the Russians relocate, but some Russian observers then claimed that the relocation violated the Dayton Peace Accords. These civilian commentators argued that the accords had been signed by the Bosnian Serbs only with the understanding that friendly Russian troops would be deployed in the strategically significant Posavina Corridor, and now U.S. troops (perceived as hostile by Bosnian Serbs) were stationed there instead.[46] The

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[42] Peter Ford, "GI Ivans Gear Up to Join Joes," *Christian Science Monitor*, Jan. 8, 1996.
[43] Rick Atkinson, "Bosnia Force Testing New Russian-U.S. Ties," *Washington Post*, Jan. 18, 1996. Also see Mikhail Shevtsov, "Russian Defense Minister to Visit Russia," TASS, Feb. 7, 1996.
[44] Atkinson, ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Maria Dementeva and Mikhail Leontev, "Gen. Shevtsov's Corridor Question," *Segodnia*, March 13, 1996, as reported in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (CDPSP)

U.S. side was in turn outraged when Shevtsov, on unilateral Russian initiative, chose to hold private meetings with indicted Bosnian Serb war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, whom the IFOR troops were authorized to capture and detain on behalf of the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal.[47] More recently, the Russian side expressed anger at what it called a NATO "cowboy attack" against two Bosnian Serbs who were under sealed U.N. war crimes indictment, one of whom was captured and the other killed in confrontation with NATO troops. Western observers thought Russian umbrage arose in part because Russia was not fully briefed before the raid occurred.[48]

Once again, the substantive policy coordination resulting from U.S.-Russian military contacts has not been solid. Neither side has been willing to give up much autonomy for the sake of cooperation, and certainly the Mearsheimer school could rightly argue that ultimate outcomes here reflect the underlying power balance, since Russia has tended to give ground and the United States has tended to take the lead. Yet through all of these cases of disputed unilateral action, cooperative and interwoven military activities (such as joint patrols, joint reconnaissance, and mine clearing[49]) have continued and are generally viewed as having accomplished their mission successfully. Russia renewed its commitment to keep troops under U.S. command in Bosnia when the IFOR operation was extended into its SFOR stage in late 1996, and Shevtsov proudly wrote, "We military have set an example for our politicians by demonstrating that the question of Russian participation in a peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina jointly with the Americans…can be successfully solved."[50] Russian defense leaders have maintained this commitment even in the face of an anti-NATO nationalist upsurge at home,[51] and despite (once again) complaints from hard-liners within President Boris Yeltsin's administration that the Defense Ministry violated protocol, "bypassing the Foreign Ministry, [and]…making decisions on foreign policy questions."[52] In the meantime, NATO has established a permanent office for Russian military leaders at its

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48, no. 11 (April 10, 1996): 2. Also see Viacheslav Grunskii, NTV Balkans correspondent, "Segodnia" newscast, Moscow NTV, March 2, 1996, as reported by *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report* FBIS-SOV-96-044.

[47] Boris Vinogradov, "First Falling-Out Between Russian and NATO Peacekeepers in Bosnia," *Izvestiia*, Feb. 3, 1996, as reported in CDPSP 48, no. 5 (February 28, 1996): 25.

[48] "Russia Blasts NATO Raid in Bosnia," United Press International, July 11, 1997.

[49] Leontii P. Shevtsov, "Russian-NATO Cooperation in Bosnia: A Basis for the Future?" *NATO Review* 45, no. 2 (March 1997): 19.

[50] Ibid., p. 21.

[51] See Tyler Marshall, "More at Stake than Bosnia for NATO-Led Force," *Los Angeles Times*, Dec. 17, 1995, and Atkinson, "Bosnia Force Testing New Russian-U.S. Ties."

[52] Boris Gromov, interviewed by Yelena Kaliadina, "An Authoritative Expert's Opinion: For the Homeland, for Clinton?" *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, November 28, 1995, as reported in CDPSP 47, no. 48 (December 27, 1995): 12.

headquarters in Mons, Belgium, further institutionalizing this cooperative activity.

Realist Motives for Military Cooperation

Why do senior military officers and top civilian leaders value these military-to-military programs so highly that they expend significant domestic political capital to maintain them even when state-to-state relations are rocky? Their reasons are clearly practical, and based on traditional realist concerns. They believe that these institutions have at least three significant and positive independent effects on state and international security.

First, both sides value the military training that many of these programs provide, particularly as these activities lead to the exchange of practical knowledge and enhance the ability of troops to engage in joint-command peacekeeping operations. On the U.S. side, command and coordination practice with any new country is considered useful for a variety of future scenarios, ranging from working with new partners in an expanded NATO to the success of multinational UN peacekeeping operations. One U.S. observer even argues that the United States "seeks to develop a relationship [with the Russian military] which could be beneficial during actual joint operations against a common adversary,"[53] perhaps having in mind as a future enemy one of the world's rising powers.

On the Russian side, the most unguarded statement about the direct military training benefits of military-to-military cooperation was made by Bosnian commander Shevtsov, who said, "It is useful because we are learning a lot, we are knocking our weakened military muscle into shape."[54] In a more circumspect statement, Lt. Col. Andrei Demurenko of the Russian General Staff wrote that the exercises in Totsk had beneficial effects on the Russian military's understanding of peacekeeping operations in general, saying that "the Russians acquired useful practical experience in organizing the management/direction of joint rapid reaction forces and joint control/pass points and units."[55] The General Staff Academy (at least as of 1996) offered no courses on peacekeeping operations, and hence Russian participation in the Totsk and Kansas exercises and in the Bosnian operation itself has provided officers with an educational opportunity that the Russian state may use elsewhere.[56] Key

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[53] McCarthy, "Comrades in Arms," p. 761.
[54] Shevtsov, interviewed by Yelena Kaliadina, "General Shevtsov Gnaws on NATO's Bone," *Moscow News*, Sept. 12, 1996.
[55] Andrei Demurenko and Timothy L. Thomas, "Getting to Know You: The U.S.-Russian Totsk Peacekeeping Exercise from a Russian Lessons Learned Perspective," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 8, no. 3 (September 1995): 479–480.
[56] Lt. Col. (Ret.) Timothy L. Thomas, "Russian Lessons Learned in Bosnia," *Military Review* 76, no. 5 (September–October 1996): 39.

lessons learned have been in such areas as how to avoid unnecessary conflict and maintain neutrality while interacting with hostile civilians,[57] how to establish rules of engagement[58] and communicate across language and procedural barriers[59] in an ambiguous threat environment, and how to conduct public relations. Units participating in both the Totsk and Kansas exercises were drawn from Russia's 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade, which has primary responsibility for peacekeeping activities in the Caucasus, including the Georgian region of Abkhazia.[60] Furthermore, it is probably not accidental that Shevtsov, the man in charge of Russian troops in the Bosnian IFOR and SFOR operations, "oversaw the daily planning and execution of the military assault on Chechnya" during some of the bloodiest days of that civil war, from Dec. 1994 to Apr. 1995,[61] or that some of the units used in the Bosnia operations were drawn from the airborne regiment which attacked the Russian White House when it was held by armed opponents to President Yeltsin in Oct. 1993.[62] Although neither of these earlier actions would exactly qualify as "peacekeeping," many of the same tricky issues of military/civilian interaction and on-the-ground public relations arose in these two instances and were handled abysmally,[63] circumstances which certainly did not help (and most likely aggravated) the painful state of societal-military relations in Russia today. The Russian military may use lessons learned in military contact programs to avoid similar mistakes in the future.

More recently the Russian military command has suggested a wide range of additional practical subjects on which it wishes to learn from contact with the U.S. military. Shevtsov hopes that military reformers in Russia will take note of the U.S. style of logistics preparation, for example.

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[57] This was an important lesson both sides learned from the Kansas exercises; see Maj. Gen. Randolph W. House, Maj. Mark R. Pires, and Lt. Col. (Ret.) Lester W. Grau, "Peacekeeper 95: 27th Guards Train with 'The Big Red One,'" *Military Review* 76, no. 2 (March–April 1996): 10.

[58] Ibid., p. 7.

[59] Demurenko and Thomas, "Getting to Know You," pp. 480–482.

[60] McCarthy, "Comrades in Arms," p. 768.

[61] John C. Roper, "Gen. in Chechnya Attack in Peace Force," UPI, November 15, 1995, citing "a Pentagon official." In fact Shevtsov seems to be attuned to these issues, saying, "In wartime you may cut down fruit trees in a nearby garden or use furniture from somebody's house to make a fire to keep yourself warm. But we are not going to wage a war there! We will be there to bring peace and help people reach reconciliation! If the soldiers do something lawless, they will only set the population against themselves." See "General Leonty Shevtsov, First 'Our Man' in NATO," Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, November 14, 1995.

[62] Il'ia Bulavinov, "Talks Military Style—Trust but Check," *Kommersant Daily*, January 24, 1996, as reported in the Russian Press Digest, January 24, 1996.

[63] For an argument that Shevtsov in particular learned lessons from the Bosnian operations that would have been useful to him in Chechnya, see Thomas, "Russian Lessons Learned in Bosnia," p. 41, who cites Dmitrii Sabov and Leonid Gankin, "Our Man in NATO," *Moscow News*, April 4–10, 1991: 1.

He remarked on the resources and advance planning the United States devotes to the food, clothing, and medical needs of soldiers, and said, "Unfortunately, in this country such a plan is often considered of secondary importance…It's not a matter of pride that the Americans have two or three logistic workers for each combat soldier, and we one for three."[64] Further, retired Gen. Igor Rodionov, Russian Defense Minister at the time of his May 1997 remarks, expressed what he termed the Russian military's desire to learn from the extensive training and use of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) by the United States.[65] Russia lacks a true NCO system, and this is thought to contribute to the disciplinary problems among troops that have become so well known in recent times, including the practice of brutal hazing or *dedovshchina*.[66] During his visit to the United States, Rodionov and his U.S. counterpart Cohen signed a Joint Statement on Cooperation which calls for the United States to assist Russian military reform, including help with such issues as structuring defense budgets and force downsizing.[67] On both sides, realist goals are served by joint training and sharing of information. Realists in Russia value the increased military strength and reliability they gain. Realists in the United States hope that a happier and better-socialized Russian military will pose less of a threat to Russian stability, and in fact contribute to international security by ensuring the legitimacy and control of the state over its vast and nuclear-armed territory.

A second practical motive for institutionalized cooperation matches Grieco's predictions well. The weaker partner in the relationship perceives participation in the institution as a means for gaining "voice" or influence over policy matters that it does not control. In a striking confirmation of Grieco's argument, the slogan most associated with the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act is "To give Russia a voice, not a veto." This phraseology appears to have been borrowed from the command arrangements worked out for U.S.-Russian IFOR cooperation, where Shevtsov was said to have been given "a voice but no vote."[68]

Russian military and civilian leaders have explicitly stated that obtaining "voice," or whatever influence is available to those who choose to participate in international institutions, is in fact one of the primary

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[64] "General Leonty Shevtsov, First 'Our Man' in NATO."

[65] Kozaryn, "U.S., Russia Expanding Military Ties." Also see Atkinson, "Bosnia Force Testing New Russian-U.S. Ties," and House, Pires, and Grau, "Peacekeeper 95," p. 11, fn. 2.

[66] Off-the-record comment made by a retired Russian colonel to a U.S. audience, May 1997.

[67] "Rodionov: Moscow Interested in U.S. Experience in Reform," Radio Rossii Network, May 15, 1997, as reported in David Johnson's Russia List. I am grateful to Brian Taylor for this citation.

[68] Vladimir Nedein, "Operation 'Fig Leaf'--U.S. and Russian Presidents Used It to Gloss over Their Differences on Bosnia," *Izvestiia*, November 11, 1995, as reported in CDPSP 47, no. 45 (December 6, 1995): 23.

aims of their involvement in military-to-military programs. Perhaps the most eloquent statement of realist Russian thinking along these lines is Shevtsov's testimony before Russia's upper house of parliament concerning Russian participation in the IFOR mission. The military commander said:

In conclusion, esteemed deputies, is Russia's participation in this operation necessary for NATO? It's necessary for Russia. NATO can solve these problems without Russia…This operation is necessary not for the Defense Ministry, but for Russia as a European state…Three hundred years ago we opened up a window to Europe thinking that we have interests there…Virtually all European countries are taking part in this operation. We will refuse to take part once, we will refuse to take part twice—the third time everything will be done without the participation of Russia. By refusing to take part, we will hurt nobody but ourselves. We cannot consider ourselves to be a strong country, sit in these Russian corridors here and take no part in anything.[69]

Foreign Ministry official Nikolai Afanasievskii, speaking on behalf of President Yeltsin, seconded Shevtsov's analysis, saying, "Nonparticipation by Russia in this operation would substantially reduce our possibilities to influence not only events in the Balkans but also in Europe as a whole."[70] A variety of other senior Russian commanders and officials have said similar things. In 1994, then-Defense Minister Pavel Grachev insisted that Russia had to allow the scheduled military exercises in Totsk to go forward, because otherwise its international standing and financial well-being would be harmed.[71] The implication here is clear: Russia sees participation in these security institutions as a means for gaining access to international financial institutions and influence over their decisions about resource expenditures. In Oct. 1996, retired Gen. Aleksandr Lebed, then head of Russia's Security Council, complained about Russia's low participation level in NATO PfP activities, saying that "By refusing to take part, we are placing ourselves outside the bounds of the process…and as such we will lose the opportunity to have influence on anything."[72] This Russian goal of "voice" is recognized and supported by both the United States and NATO, who cede policy influence over some areas to Russia in return for Russian cooperation in other areas. In the case of the Bosnian peacekeeping mission, granting Russia "voice" was traded for Russian help in bringing the nationalist (and like Russians,

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[69] "Speeches in the Federation Council of the Russian Federation During the Discussion of the Question of Sending a Russian Military Contingent as Part of the Multinational Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina and of Supplying This Contingent," Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, January 5, 1996.
[70] Ibid.
[71] "Russia-U.S. Army Manoeuvres to Be Held in September," Reuters, July 28, 1994.
[72] "Lebed's Unexpected Praise for NATO Riles Duma," *Jamestown Foundation Monitor* 2, no. 189 (October 10, 1996).

Slavic Orthodox) Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table and to ultimate agreement at the Dayton Accords.[73]

A third realist motive for military-to-military institutions, and most important for my argument here, is that leaders on both sides see increased transparency as an important achievement of these programs. Many academic theorists who focus on perceptions and organizational variables have argued that transparency stops both sides from engaging in unrealistic worst-case thinking about the other, thereby allowing them to avoid unnecessary conflict.[74] Real-world military commanders and civilian national security officials share this view. U.S. leaders in particular seem to see transparency as the primary goal of military-to-military programs, viewing it as a means for preventing misunderstanding and overcoming outdated enemy images that could cause a rekindling of the Cold War.

Gen. George L. Butler, the Joint Chiefs of Staff officer responsible for negotiating the DMA Agreement, wrote that (among other things) one of the primary motives of the U.S. military in reaching the agreement was that "we really were dealing with something here that was extremely serious…deeply rooted suspicions about intentions."[75] Gen. Joulwan several years later praised the stationing of Russian officers at NATO headquarters in Mons, since they "provide the General Staff in Moscow a window of understanding about NATO and a direct channel to address military issues of mutual interest."[76] An unnamed senior defense official in the Clinton administration said, "One of the things that we're trying to do is break down the legacy of the Cold War, and to make certain that the military establishments on both sides see each other not as Cold War enemies…You want to knock down the threat perception of the other side. Increased contact and transparency is a major part of that."[77] NATO leaders share these goals. NATO Secretary General Javier Solano wrote that, "cooperation in Joint Endeavor will show Russian decision-makers and the Russian public at large that NATO is sincere in its efforts to forge a close relationship with her. We want to develop as transparent and

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[73] Philip Smucker, "NATO Backpedals on Russian Participation in Bosnia Force," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, October 20, 1995.
[74] For recent examples of this argument, see Sagan, "A New Agenda," p. 36; Miller, "Russian-U.S. Security Cooperation on the High Seas," passim; and Judyth L. Twigg, "Defense Planning: The Potential for Transparency and Cooperation," in *Limited Partnership*, p. 272.
[75] Butler, "Negotiating the Dangerous Military Activities Agreement," pp. 2-3.
[76] George A. Joulwan, "When Ivan Meets GI Joe," *Washington Post*, April 28, 1996.
[77] Unnamed senior defense official, "Background Briefing: SECDEF Trip to Russia," Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, October 15, 1996.

cooperative a relationship as possible—one in which both sides can understand and take account of the concerns of the other."[78]

As a result of the desire to eliminate threat perceptions, U.S. leaders have consciously shared previously classified information with Russia through these military-to-military institutions in order to demonstrate that U.S. intentions are only defensive. William J. Perry as Defense Secretary stressed the importance of "exchanges of defense data,"[79] reflecting his own long-standing goal of "increas[ing] greatly the level of communications between senior military officials of both countries."[80] Ashton Carter, then Clinton's assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, said after a meeting with the Russian side in 1994, "We described to them our strategic exercises in great detail and code names and everything…Our purpose there was to be as complete and revealing [as possible] as to what our plans are."[81] This was said to be part of a "diplomatic offensive aimed at persuading the Russian military that Washington still regards it as a close friend and strategic partner."[82] Fred Charles Iklé, former undersecretary of defense for policy under President Reagan, wrote in support of such initiatives that "If the two nations no longer see each other as potential enemies, the need for military secrecy could nearly vanish; and if military secrecy between them is nearly eliminated, they will have removed a key source of military tension that could cause a new enmity."[83] NATO, too, has been sharing previously classified information through the PfP program.[84]

The Russian side also places a high value on the transparency and communication that military-to-military institutions provide. Statements to this effect were particularly frequent and strong during the height of Gorbachev's cooperative international initiatives. Boliatko, the Soviet General Staff officer in charge of DMA Agreement negotiations, said that his goal was to "reduce 'the area of unpredictability in our relations,'"[85] by enhancing "communication at all levels to prevent incidents or to limit the consequences of possible incidents."[86] Akhromeev as chief of the General

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[78] Javier Solano, "NATO's Role in Bosnia: Charting a New Course for the Alliance," *NATO Review* 44, no. 2 (March 1996): 5.
[79] "Pentagon Ponders Moscow Threat," Associated Press, October 3, 1995.
[80] William J. Perry, "Preface," in *Reducing the Risk of Dangerous Military Activities*, p. v.
[81] Lee Hockstader, "U.S. Offers Russians New Joint War Games, Research," *Washington Post*, May 6, 1994.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Fred Charles Iklé, "The Case for a Russian-U.S. Security Community," in *Limited Partnership*, p. 19.
[84] Maj. Gen. George Lange, Director of the Partnership Coordination Cell, "The PCC--A New Player in the Development of Relations Between NATO and Partner Nations," *NATO Review* 43, no. 3 (May 1995): 33.
[85] Cited by Michael Dobbs, "New Pact Addresses Accidental Conflicts," *Washington Post*, June 12, 1989.
[86] Boliatko, "Negotiations on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities," pp. 10-11.

Staff wrote that he saw military-to-military contacts as a means for reassurance: "I decided to set forth the military-technical side of our doctrine and to clarify it in hopes of reducing the anxiety of the American military leaders."[87] Soviet Defense Minister Gen. Dmitrii Yazov went on to say, "Excessive secrecy and the desire to draw a curtain of secrecy where there is absolutely no need for it are remnants of the past, when the stereotypes of suspicion and hostility at times squeezed out even common sense…Mutual understanding is an absolute condition for finding constructive joint solutions to even the most acute problems and for untangling even the tightest knots."[88]

Recent Russian statements about the confidence-building value of transparency have been less common. This may be because the concept is associated too closely with the Gorbachev era, and sounds too "soft" and pro-Western at a time of high domestic nationalist sentiment. "Hard" military-to-military contact benefits of increased readiness and international voice may be easier to sell. It is also possible that with time the Russian side has come to value transparency less than the other realist goals associated with these programs, particularly in comparison with the perceived boost in international influence that they provide. Nonetheless, significant Russian military planners still value transparency as a means for building confidence and security, and (as noted above) have in any case devoted significant resources to programs which have the effect of increased transparency. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said in 1994 that joint military exercises with the United States would help "sweep away the image of the Cold War enemy."[89] The official joint U.S./Russian mission statement (developed through negotiation) for the Peacekeeper-95 exercises in Kansas cited as its first major goal "to develop a relationship based on mutual trust and better understanding of each other," and "enhance military cooperation and trust between the United States and the Russian Federation, with long-term implications for world peace and stability."[90] More recently, Shevtsov wrote that IFOR cooperation was "expanding mutual understanding and confidence…[as] a direct and natural result of our partnership in performing a common mission,"[91] and argued that Joint Endeavor had demonstrated that "Russia is not a country which should be feared."[92] The Russian officer in direct command of troops on the ground in Bosnia, Col. Aleksandr Lentsov, seconded

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[87] An interview in Izvestiia, as translated and reprinted in "Building Trust," *World Press Review* 35, no. 10 (October 1988): 46.

[88] R. Ignat'ev, interview of Yazov, "From Confrontation to Political Dialogue," *Izvestiia*, Oct. 12, 1989, as reported in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/0586/A1/1, October 13, 1989.

[89] Cited in Sneider, "Russia Links PfP with Treaty Limits."

[90] House, Pires, and Grau, "Peacekeeper 95," pp. 5, 6.

[91] Shevtsov, "Russian-NATO Military Cooperation in Bosnia," p. 21.

[92] "Russian General Backs Security Treaty with NATO," Reuter European Community Report, March 18, 1996.

Shevtsov's comments, stating that in day-to-day joint operations "there has been openness and trust, and complete mutual understanding."[93]

In both the United States and Russia today, military transparency is valued by realist leaders, and is being maintained through joint contact programs even as diplomatic relations fluctuate. Alongside other realist benefits of military-to-military cooperation, such as enhancement of military preparedness and increased international "voice," transparency contributes to the fundamental realist goal of preserving and enhancing state security. Security institutions are created, promoted, and supported because they are seen as having significant independent impact on states' ability to achieve this goal.

What perhaps demonstrates best that these institutions are undergirded by realist motives, rather than some more idealistic convergence of normative thinking, is the situation that has arisen in the military-to-military subfield sometimes referred to as "education for democracy." Following good realist logic, the United States has attempted to create what Randall L. Schweller and David Priess have called "a process of socialization in which the hegemon, by manipulating material incentives, successfully transmits its values to secondary states."[94] In particular, the United States has repeatedly invited Russian military officers to take part in educational programs designed to transmit democratic values in civil-military relations.

Joulwan proclaimed in 1995, "We will impart the ideals and values associated with military service in a democratic political system. This the true benefit of the Partnership for Peace system."[95] One example of an attempt to do exactly this was the 1993 establishment of the George C. Marshall Center in Germany under the auspices of the U.S. European Command. Military officers, civilian defense officials, and academic experts from each of the Partnership for Peace countries are invited to spend time in residence at the Center, participating in months-long programs whose purpose is "devoted to fostering the principles and processes of democratic defense in the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union."[96] Yet according to one Russian observer, as of spring 1997 "no one from the [Russian] Defense Ministry has been seen there for a long time," and Russian military personnel invited to lecture at the center consistently decline,

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[93] Cited in Ford, "GI Ivans Gear Up to Join Joes."
[94] Schweller and Priess, "Tale of Two Realisms," p. 17.
[95] George A. Joulwan, "NATO's Military Contribution to Partnership for Peace: The Progress and the Challenge," *NATO Review* 43, no. 2 (March 1995): 6.
[96] Richard Cohen, "The Marshall Center--An Experiment in East-West Cooperation," *NATO Review* 43, no. 4 (July 1995): 27.

saying that to attend would be "inexpedient."[97] This is the case even though U.S. military officers planned to begin attending classes at the Russian General Staff Academy in 1997.[98]

The reasons for this Russian wariness about participation are well known. Officers who attend such programs fear political retaliation from Russian nationalists if their participation is publicized,[99] and "there are reports that the Russian military does not look favorably on its officers which [sic] attend U.S. military schools, sending them to less-than-desirable assignments and limiting their promotion opportunities when they return."[100] It is easy to make a realist argument about why this should be the case. Russian leaders concerned about Russian autonomy and great power status have no interest in fielding a military command that has accepted U.S. values, since the United States is a potential adversary who through NATO expansion is gaining control over Russia's traditional sphere of influence. This pattern of wariness about Western values is not new in Russian military history, and in fact is far milder today than it has been in the past. A Russian military historian believes that Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin's blood purge of the High Command in the late 1930s particularly decimated the ranks of those who had had the most contact with the German military during the Weimar years,[101] and both Stalin and Tsar Nicholas I imprisoned many military officers returning from foreign wars out of fear that they had been contaminated by Western values.

Russian wariness about Western value transmission clearly indicates that the military-to-military institutions established in this case have fundamentally self-interested goals; they are not seen from the Russian perspective as having a primarily normative content, nor do they indicate Russian acceptance of U.S. normative hegemony. Although from the U.S. perspective the transmission of democratic norms might expand its own international influence, Russia is reluctant to cede any such additional influence to the United States.

In sum, each side chooses to participate in military-to-military institutions when it believes that it is gaining security benefits from them. Yet cynics might argue that these perceived security benefits are illusory. After all, the Soviet Union did engage in military-to-military cooperation with the Weimar Republic for over a decade, with both sides sharing a

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[97] Vadim Solov'ev, "Brake on Relations Between the Ministry of Defense and the Pentagon," *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie* (supplement to Nezavisimaia Gazeta), April 26-May 16, 1997, as reported in David Johnson's Russia List, May 5, 1997.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Off-the-record comments made to the author by representatives of a leading U.S. "education for democracy" institution in September 1993 and January 1997.
[100] McCarthy, "Comrades in Arms," p. 758.
[101] Maj. Gen. Aleksandr Karmanov, "Zloveshchaia ten' 'Rapallo' [The Ominous Shadow of Rapallo]," *Orientir* 1997, no. 5 (May): 55.

great deal of military information. Yet when the German leadership changed and Adolph Hitler came to power, the two were once again bitter and brutal enemies, and the security of the Soviet state evaporated. Does this not indicate that transparency and information exchange are foolish risks for states to take, and that wise leaders should avoid this kind of cooperation?

The Weimar Example

According to Kurt M. Campbell, "The Soviets have reason to be concerned about the potential military uses of information gained from interaction between rival militaries…It has long been speculated that the German Supreme Command used information gained from this long [Weimar era] association in planning Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941."[102] Certainly this would explain the reaction of Russian nationalists to the prospect of the joint military exercises held in Totsk.

Yet the Soviets also received crucially useful information from the Germans in this case, information both about practical military techniques, strategies and tactics and, perhaps more important, about German intentions. The problem that the Soviets faced at the start of World War II was not that they had given away too much information to the German side, but instead that Stalin as dictator refused to heed the information obtained through military cooperation and transparency. If he had been wiser, he could have used this information to prepare the country better for the German attack.

Secret Soviet-German military-to-military cooperation began in 1921 and endured until May 1933, shortly after Hitler became German Chancellor.[103] On the German side, the primary motive for cooperation was to avoid the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, using Soviet territory to build up both a strong army and an arsenal of heavy modern weaponry. On the Soviet side, the primary motives of this fledgling pariah state were to learn from the centuries-long development of Prussian strategic thinking and organizational experience and to take advantage of superior German knowledge of military industry and technology. Both sides also saw the alliance as a means to balance one great power (namely, each other) off against the others in Europe through diplomatic maneuvering.

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[102] Campbell, "Soldiers' Summit," p. 83.

[103] Excellent sources on this period include Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, *The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir-History of German-Soviet Relations*, 1918–1941 (N.Y.: Hafner, 1971); Edward Hallett Carr, *German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919–1939* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951); R. H. Haigh, D. S. Morris and A. R. Peters, *German-Soviet Relations in the Weimar Era: Friendship from Necessity* (Aldershot, U.K.: Gower, 1985); and Karmanov, "Zloveshchaia ten' 'Rapallo.'"

Their cooperation was multifaceted, encompassing defense industrial and other economic programs as well as exchanges between the uniformed militaries of each side. Of particular interest to the arguments here are the military education and training programs that the two states created. Three practical training schools were set up on Soviet territory, under the administration of the German Reichswehr command, for the joint instruction of German and Soviet soldiers and officers: an aviation school in Lipetsk, a tank school in Kazan, and a chemical warfare school (whose exact location and details of operation remain cloudy).[104] In addition, Soviet officers took part in exchange programs at German military academies. According to a German diplomat who had first-hand knowledge of these programs, Gustav Hilger, "General Staff officers from both countries were continually participating in maneuvers of the other's army and were exchanging military information and experience."[105] In words that resound with an eerie echo for today's military-to-military programs, Hilger wrote, "Personal relations between the two armies were excellent and rapidly developed into cordial friendship."[106]

There are many differences between that cooperation and U.S.-Russian military cooperation today. It was conducted at a solely bilateral level in secret, and leaks about the program scandalized the other European great powers—a strong contrast to the multinational and well publicized efforts of today's programs. Soviet-German military cooperation was kept secret for several years even from civilian diplomats and politicians in Germany, and was always kept compartmentalized in both countries. Military commanders then did not seek the kind of national consensus that both sides do today, with frequent testimony about the programs being given in each side's parliament. Finally, this earlier cooperation was aimed at preparing for future war, rather than for future peacekeeping operations, and it therefore involved a different set of military activities and attitudes than do today's programs. Yet military transparency and communication then served two of the same realist functions that are served by military-to-military contact today.

First, the Soviets gained an immense amount of practical military-technical information from the Germans that was used in their own military reform programs. According to one group of historians, "the experience gained by senior Red Army officers attending German military maneuvers and staff officer training courses provided the vehicle by which a complete revision of Red Army organization and strategy could

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[104] Karmanov, ibid., pp. 53–54.
[105] Hilger and Meyer, *Incompatible Allies*, p. 202. Hilger held a leadership post in the German Commission for the Repatriation of War Prisoners, the original source of the military-to-military links, and was directly involved in much of the associated diplomacy throughout the 1920s and early 1930s.
[106] Ibid., p. 199.

be undertaken."[107] A current Russian military historian writes that these exchanges "had an enormous influence on the development of principles of Soviet tactics and strategy."[108] Probably the only reason that these practical lessons were not used better by Soviet forces at the start of the German invasion was that by the end of the 1930s, 80 percent of the Soviet officer corps had been imprisoned or killed as part of Stalin's purges,[109] including most of those who had any significant contact with foreigners.

Second, cooperative programs themselves served as a bellwether of the intentions of each side. The Soviets cut off the program shortly after Hitler came to power, when Soviet visitors to Germany began to be physically harassed[110] and when Moscow authorities began to suspect that Hitler had revealed details of the military-to-military cooperation to the French ambassador in Berlin.[111] Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, a fervent supporter of these programs (whom Stalin executed in 1937 under suspicions that he was leading a military coup plot with German backing) used information he obtained through these programs to Soviet advantage, when he warned the Soviet leadership publicly about Hitler's war plans at an October 1935 German-Soviet diplomatic dinner.[112] Certainly for the German side, the fact that the Soviets ended the military-to-military program abruptly (sending a German delegation home from planned maneuvers without preamble[113]) must have signaled the seriousness with which Stalin chose to pursue his new diplomatic tack of collective security with France against Germany. While war between the Soviets and the Germans would not begin for several more years, each side knew where it stood with the other because of the information the contact program (and its termination) provided.

Thus although Stalin's dictatorial leadership style, blood purges, and personal idiosyncrasies prevented the Soviets from taking full advantage of the information they gained from military contacts with Germany (and eventually caused the disastrous "surprise" of Operation Barbarossa), the lessons the Russian side should have learned from that historical episode are exactly the opposite of those feared by Campbell. Military-to-military transparency can contribute to wise realist decision-making by revealing the strengths, techniques, and intentions of potential future adversaries. Transparency serves the goals of state intelligence, whether the intelligence leads to reassurance that prevents unnecessary spirals of the security dilemma, or instead to warnings about what lies over the horizon.

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[107] Haigh, Morris, and Peters, *German-Soviet Relations in the Weimar Era*, p. 174.
[108] Karmanov, "Zloveshchaia ten' 'Rapallo,' " p. 54.
[109] Hilger and Meyer, *Incompatible Allies*, p. 296.
[110] Ibid., p. 254
[111] Ibid., p. 257.
[112] Ibid., p. 271.
[113] Ibid., pp. 256–257.

Is the U.S.-Russian Situation Today Atypical?

One last set of hypothetical objections to my argument must be addressed: perhaps U.S.-Russian military-to-military cooperation and transparency today is possible only because both sides feel so secure that they do not mind sharing information with each other. After all, according to proponents of offense-defense theory, cooperation between potential adversaries is supposed to be much easier when defensive military technology has the advantage;[114] assured second-strike nuclear capability is thought to be the ultimate defense and guarantor of state security against attack.[115] In fact, according to Steve Weber, mutual assured destruction "denies the promise or even the possibility of relative gains,"[116] and thus should make cooperation between great nuclear powers easy.[117] Certainly, Russian military leaders accept basic second-strike logic.[118]

However, the Russian state may have reason to doubt the efficacy of its nuclear deterrent, at least more so now than in Soviet times. The general problems facing the Russian military today are well known, ranging from draft-dodging and the resultant understaffing of bases to *dedovshchina*, corruption, underfunding, and a precipitous decline in morale and discipline. Sometimes observers have claimed that the troops manning Russia's strategic nuclear forces are exempt from these problems, given that they are favored in the military budget and constitute an elite social stratum within the military. Yet Gen. Igor Sergeev, then head of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and now Defense Minister, stated in June 1997 that this exemption may not hold. He complained that SRF officers are burdened by understaffing, giving them too many hours on alert duty; that conscripts are undereducated and undertrained; that those serving in the missile garrisons and their families face impoverishment because of low and late-paid wages; and that "40 percent of the facilities being used have obsolete electrical supply,

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[114] An outstanding literature review is provided by Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," *Security Studies* 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995): 660–691.
[115] Ibid., p. 667.
[116] Steve Weber, "Realism, Détente, and Nuclear Weapons," *International Organization* 44, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 55–82.
[117] Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," p. 22, states that liberal institutionalist theory "applies only when relative-gains considerations matter little or hardly at all."
[118] For example, Gen. Igor Sergeev, formerly head of the Strategic Rocket Forces and now Defense Minister, has said that "largely thanks to [the strategic nuclear forces] as a deterrent, a world war has not broken out on the planet," and cited "mobile complexes" as the basis of a "counterstrike" because of their "immense survival capability." Valerii Borisenko, interview of Igor Sergeev, "I. Sergeev: Both the Missiles and the People Are Always in Complete Readiness," *Moskovskaia Pravda*, June 4, 1997, as reported in FBIS-SOV-97-110.

ventilation, air-conditioning, fire-extinguishing, and other systems which need replacement."[119]

Although official statements from both the Russian and U.S. sides have sought to reassure everyone that both countries believe the command and control of Russian nuclear forces to be secure and reliable, the potential vulnerability of their deterrent must prey on the minds of realist Russian leaders. Even if this deterrent remains solid now, prudent decision-makers should be admitting doubts to themselves (even if not to the public) about Russia's long-term invulnerability, especially given NATO expansion on one flank and growing Chinese military strength on the other.

This is especially the case because Russian military commanders fear the decisive lead in precision, deep-strike, high-technology weaponry that the United States demonstrated in the 1991 Desert Storm operations against Iraq.[120] For this reason, the current U.S.-Russian security climate is actually not one that can be dismissed as so structurally safe that cooperation is easy, especially for Russia. In today's situation, the United States may feel so strong and well protected that it has nothing to lose by selectively revealing some of its secrets. But prudent Russian commanders are likely to believe that exchanges of information and transparency do carry risks. As Russian IFOR deputy commander Shevtsov freely admitted in 1995, "I consider NATO as an adversary…As a General Staff officer I am duty-bound to envision all possible options as to where a threat may come from…NATO can be one of the potential sources of threat too, we cannot rule that out."[121] The fact that senior military and civilian defense officials continue to support military-to-military activities in spite of doubts about their defensive invulnerability indicates that even in a climate of uncertainty, the perceived realist benefits of these security institutions outweigh the risk.

Conclusions

Military-to-military programs are an example of a security institution that provides important benefits to realist leaders, especially in times of uncertainty. Some of these benefits, including enhanced military preparedness and international "voice," result from the substantive cooperation and policy coordination that the institution fosters, and endure only for the life of the institution. But one key benefit, transparency, has long-term beneficial effects for state security even if

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[119] Ibid.

[120] For summaries of the Russian view, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, *Desert Storm and Its Meaning: The View from Moscow*, Report R-4164-AF (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992); Mary C. Fitzgerald, *The New Revolution in Russian Military Affairs*, RU.S.I Whitehall Paper Series (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1994); and Stephen J. Blank, "Reform and Revolution in Russian Defense Economics," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 8, no. 4 (December 1995): 693.

[121] "General Leonty Shevtsov, First 'Our Man' in NATO."

substantive cooperation fails. Transparency provides states with information useful for evaluating the capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries. Since it is a benefit that is impossible to obtain without the creation of cooperative international institutions, this means that institutions have independent effects on state calculations and hence state behavior.

In fact, even from the brief analysis presented here it is clear that transparency-creating security institutions are relatively common in international relations, ranging from German-Soviet military cooperation in the 1920s to NATO information-sharing following World War II, and from the Incidents at Sea Agreement of the early 1970s to the IFOR and SFOR operations of the late 1990s. The benefits obtained from these institutions do not depend only on the substantive coordination achieved. Transparency in and of itself serves realist goals, and academic realists should not cede the concept to their liberal institutionalist colleagues.

How can realists integrate transparency into their research programs? Two questions relating to causality and contingency present themselves as good candidates for further exploration, especially since generalizations are dangerous from a single case-study. First, as was noted above, civilians on both sides in the U.S.-Russian case objected at various times to military-to-military programs that they feared gave away too much to a potential adversary. Policy debates over the security effects of military-to-military cooperation mirror academic debates, between realists who see a world beset by conflict and competitiveness over relative gains,[122] and realists who see cooperation as sometimes serving state security interests.[123] This means that a cross-national, empirical study of the long-term effects of military-to-military programs on the thinking of potential adversaries would be useful. Do these programs cause cooperation to snowball, or do they instead invite potential adversaries to take sensitive information and run?

Second, military-to-military programs obviously create immense counterintelligence headaches for the organizations engaged in them. How do concerns about protecting sensitive knowledge and the sources and means for obtaining it limit the scope of cooperation that is possible in these programs? Where do decision-makers draw the line between cooperation that enhances security and cooperation that gives away security? Is what Charles L. Glaser calls “standard” realism (the kind that

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[122] Schweller and Priess in “Tale of Two Realisms,” p. 6, argue, “The nature of international interaction is inherently conflictual.” Mearsheimer, “False Promise of International Institutions,” p. 13, states, “Cooperation takes place in a world that is competitive at its core.”

[123] Glaser, “Realists as Optimists,” p. 53, argues that “cooperative policies are an important type of self-help,” since “cooperative military policies…can convince a rational opponent to revise favorably its view of the country’s motives.” Note that Glaser is not an institutionalist (p. 52).

stresses competitiveness) more likely to dominate military concerns under some conditions, while "contingent realism"[124] (the kind that sees cooperation as enhancing security) becomes dominant at other times?

By subjecting arguments about security institutions and military cooperation among adversaries to multiple historical case studies, it may be possible to bring more unity to realist theory. Inductive analysis may reveal which underlying conditions favor which strategies—or what combination of autarky and cooperation—or ensuring state security. Integrating transparency into realist arguments may lead realists to reintegrate their own work into a common framework.

[124] Ibid., p. 52.